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their directions been guided by a prayer-book.

Speaking of the administration of the Lord's supper, Justin says: "Bread, and wine, and water are brought; and the president offers up prayers and thanksgivings according to his ability, öơn dúvaμis avto, and the people respond, Amen." The expression here is quite inconsistent with the use of a form.

Tertullian says, "We Christians pray, with eyes uplifted, with hands outspread, with head uncovered, and without a monitor, because from the heart." Is this the manner of one reading prayers from a book?

There is an allusion in the foregoing passage to the common attitude of prayer in the primitive church. It was "with eyes uplifted, and with hands outspread." The ancient coins that were struck in honor of Constantine represent him as praying in this manner. He appears, "with hands extended, and with eyes upturned, as if looking towards heavAnother common attitude was that of kneeling, with the eyes closed; as Origen expresses it, "closing the eyes of the senses, but erecting those of the mind." It is

en."

obvious that both these attitudes are inconsistent with the use of written forms.

Liturgies had their origin in an ignorant and degenerate age. The most ancient of which we have any knowledge, date back to the fifth century, or possibly to the latter part of the fourth. The clergy, at this period, were notoriously ignorant and corrupt, unable to guide suitably the devotions of the people; and to assist them in their incompetence, liturgies were provided for their use. As a learned German writer expresses it

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"When, in process of time, the distinguished fathers of the church had passed away, and others, of an inferior standing, arose in their place, with less learning and talents for public speaking,—as barbarism and ignorance continued to overspread the Roman empire, and after the

secret mysteries of Christianity were done away, or, at least, had assumed another form of manifestation,-then, the clergy, not being competent themselves to conduct the exercises of religious worship to the edification of the people, saw the necessity of providing themselves with written formulas for their assistance.

For this purpose, men were readily found to indite and transcribe them. In this manner arose its formula

ries, which are known under the name of liturgies and missals, and which afterwards, in order to give greater authority to them, were ascribed to distinguished men, and even to the apostles themselves, p. 351.

as their authors.'

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The foregoing remarks relate to liturgies in general. The history of the present English liturgy may be given in a single sentence. It is an expurgated translation of the Romish. The chief points of differ ence between the Romish and English liturgies are thus briefly stated by Hallam:

"1. The liturgy was translated into the vernacular language of the people. Formerly, it had been in an unknown tongue.

2. Its acts of idolatrous worship to saints and images were expunged. "3. Auricular confession was done away; or rather it was left to every man's discretion, and went into neglect. tion, or the change, at the moment of

"4. The doctrine of transubstantia

consecration, of the substances of bread and wine into those of Christ's body and blood,' was discarded.

"5. The celibacy of the clergy was done away.

"With these modifications the religion of Rome became that of the church of England. And to this day, her ritual, crudely formed in the infancy of Protestantism, which Milton denominates an extract of the mass translated,' continues with little variation to be the liturgy of and America." pp. 359, 360. the whole Episcopal church in England

It would be interesting to follow Mr. Coleman through his very able and instructive chapters on the psal. mody and homilies of the primitive church; but so much time has been given to the previous portions of the book, that we must refer these to the consideration of the reader. Indeed, we would refer the entire work to him. The notice we have taken of

it was not intended to supersede, but rather invite and promote, the study of the work itself.

In but a single point, so far as we have observed, do we feel inclined to call in question the soundness of our author's positions. He states more than once-as the Germans do generally-that in the age of the Apostles, there was no distinction be tween clergy and laity. "All Christians accounted themselves priests of God, and between the church and its spiritual leaders, very little distinction was known." p. 257.

If this only means that the terms clergy and laity, clerici et laici, were not then in use, we shall not dispute it. Nor is the question, in this view, of any great importance. But if Mr. Coleman means to say that there was not, in the age of the Apostles, what was afterwards called a clergy, and what is so called now among ourselves, viz pastors, teachers, elders, bishops, in distinction from the other brethren, and to whom belonged appropriately the performance of ministerial acts; the position is contradicted, not only by the New Testament, and the writings of the early Fathers, but by a considerable part of his own volume. We have no account of the appointment of elders in the church at Jerusalem, but we know that there were elders there at a very early period. (Acts xi, 30.) There were elders at Ephesus and Antioch, and bishops at Philippi. Paul and Barnabas "ordained elders in every church" which they established among the Gentiles. Titus also was left in Crete, that he "might ordain elders in every city." Among these elders or bishops, there would be a diversity of gifts, some being specially qualified for teaching or preaching, and others for administering the government of the church. But it is evident we think, from what is incidentally said of them, from the qualifications required of them, and from the instructions given to VOL. IV.

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them, that they were the constituted preachers of the Gospel. They must be "6 'apt to teach." They

must "feed the church of God, which he had purchased with his own blood." They must "hold fast the faithful word, as they had been taught, that they might be able, by sound doctrine, both to exhort and convince the gainsayers.' It was the elders who "labored in word and doctrine;" and it was for this reason especially that the churches were required to make provision for their support, 1 Tim. v, 18.

Without doubt, the deacons and private Christians of that age were expected to do what they could, by conversation and exhortation, to diffuse the blessings of the Gospel. Thus Stephen was employed, when he encountered the hostility of the Jewish rulers, and was put to death. And thus privately Christians are sometimes employed, in our own age; and should be much more frequently than they are. But we find no evidence from Scripture, that any deacon, or private Christian, in the apostolic age, performed what would now be called ministerial acts. Philip, to be sure, baptized at Samaria and elsewhere; but Philip was an evangelist only a few years after this, and he may have been created one, before he left Jerusalem. Some one of those who went with Peter from Joppa to Cesarea seems to have administered baptism to Cornelius and his family; but the probability is, that these brethren, one or more of them, were elders or evangelists.

The earliest of the Fathers who describes, at length, the public worship of the Christians, was Justin Martyr, in the first half of the second century, less than fifty years after the death of the apostle John. And he expressly ascribes the preaching, and the administering of the sacraments to the presiding presbyter. When the Scriptures have been read, he says, "the president,

in an address, makes an application, and enforces an imitation of the excellent things" contained in the lesson for the day. "Then we all stand up together, and offer up our prayers. After prayer, bread and wine are brought, and the president, in like manner, offers prayers and thanksgivings, according to his ability, and the people respond, saying, Amen."

This statement, we are aware, is contradicted by the Pseudo Ambrose, in his commentary on Eph. iv, 11. But this commentary could not have been written before the latter part of the fourth century; and as the author of it is unknown, his testimony is not entitled to much credit, contradicted, as it is, by that of Justin and the Apostles.

This is not the place to pursue the inquiry here entered upon; and yet we can not but think it one of very considerable importance. No one supposes that every thing pertaining to church order and government is definitively settled for us in the New Testament, so that no allowance is to be made for circumstances, and no room left for the exercise of judgment. And yet, the Scriptures do furnish us with some general outlines of ecclesiastical polity, from which, so far as they are clear and plain, we are not at liberty to depart. It is this which gives so much interest and importance to our inquiries respecting the church organization of the Apostles. We look into these things, not as mere matters of antiquarian curiosity, but that we may be instructed and directed. We inquire, that we may learn, from the teaching and example of the inspired Apostles, what God has ordained. Now, if the Apostles made no distinction between ministers and people, but all Christians were priests of God alike, and the distinction referred to, like other corruptions, grew up in an age subsequent to the Apostles; then why should it be continued? If the distinction be

tween minister and people is a mere human device, like the sign of the cross in baptism; then why should it not be abandoned, and all Christians now-according to the plan of some-be regarded as alike religious teachers and ministers ?*

We propound these questions for the consideration of our author, and of others who adopt the same sentiment. Our own opinion is, that they have been led astray on this point by their German guides, and have taken a position alike inconsistent with their own principles, and with the teachings of the Gospel.

We have before said that, with the single exception here referred to, we regard the volume before us with high satisfaction. It is an able, learned, and conclusive vindication. of a free and popular system of church government, in opposition to all prelatical and hierarchical claims; and that, too, on the ground of apos tolical and primitive usage.

The value of the work is consid. erably enhanced, by the Introduction from the pen of Dr. Neander. It is interesting to find this veteran Professor-in the opinion of some, the Coryphæus of ecclesiastical history-coinciding so generally, if not entirely, with the conclusions of the American divine.

We can not take our leave of the volume before us, without again bespeaking for it a general and an earnest persual. It is one of the few books-among the many now issuing from the American press-which must not be laid upon the shelf. It is worthy to be read and studied; nor can it be studied by a serious and candid mind without much profit.

*The officers of a church are so far

distinguished from the people, that they have official rank and authority. The evangelists have no such distinction; yet they are entitled to respect and affection for their works' sake. Neither class of ministers is separated from the common brotherhood by a peculiar sacred character, either ens absolutum or ens relatum.-ED.

MASSACHUSETTS AND SOUTH CAROLINA.

In a former article we proved, or claimed to have proved, as conclusively as if the words of the Constitution were express to that effect, that under the second Section of Article fourth, the citizens of each state have the right of free ingress into every other. We exposed the fallacies and absurdities involved in the proposition that a state may nevertheless in the exercise of her police power exclude from her territories persons, whether citizens or not, whose presence she considers dangerous to her peace; and, commenting upon the allegation that examples of the actual exercise of such a power are furnished in the quarantine laws and in certain provisions of the poor laws, we showed in respect to the former that they are not at all in conflict with the Constitution, that they are in their nature and operation essentially different from a law of exclusion, and furnish therefore no analogy in support of such a law. And we had prepared an argument leading to a similar conclusion with respect to the poor laws. At this point however, we were obliged to suspend, somewhat abruptly, our remarks, expecting to resume them in the January number. But we are anxious to close a discussion already extended far beyond our original design, and as its continuity has been broken by so long an interruption, we have thought it best to leave untouched the argument to which we have referred, and condensing as much as possible what we had intended to say further upon the law of the case, to pass on to topics of a different nature, connected with the inquiry we have proposed. We have taken this course with less reluctance, because the allegation respecting the pauper laws, if we concede all it claims, has but a remote and indirect bearing upon our main position. A mere analogy can not overthrow a positive demonstration; and that can

hardly be called a constitutional argument which justifies one infraction of the Constitution by pointing out another which has been committed with impunity. There is another point, however, which we are unwilling to leave altogether unnoticed, on which we subjoin a few remarks.

We have alluded to a case decided in the Supreme Court of the United States which has been supposed to favor those doctrines with respect to the police power on which reliance is placed in justifying the laws of South Carolina. The Court in that case,* speaking of the distribution of powers between the State and General Governments, took occasion to assert in strong language the complete authority of the States over all subjects within the range of mere municipal legislation or internal police; and insisted that the power of legislation on these subjects had not been transferred to Congress nor shared with it. But they expressly admitted that though the power of legislating was not given up, yet the states were subject to restraints in the manner of exercising it; as they could not but admit, unless they intended to assert that the states were competent to make any law whatsoever which should cern the welfare of the state or any individual within it, and whose operation should be within the limits of the state, and upon the persons or things within its jurisdiction:" for such are police laws according to the definition of the court. The point decided was simply this, that the law whose validity was in question was not a law assuming to regulate commerce; if it had been it would have been void, whether in conflict with any existing law of Congress or not, for the reason that the power to legislate on that subject is exclusively in Congress;

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con,

"City of New York vs. Milne-11 Pe ters, 139.

but being a mere regulation of internal police and not of commerce, it was within the power of the state and not void unless made so by actual conflict with the Constitution, or a constitutional law of Congress. The whole case has been shockingly perverted, though it must be conceded that a single sentence in the decision, taken alone, is open to a misconstruction which might make it assert an unlimited police power in the States.

We shall consider it therefore established that South Carolina has no right to exclude from her territories any class of the citizens of Massachusetts or of any other state, and that her law so far as it attempts such exclusion is unconstitutional and void, and no law. Its violation, consequently, is no crime, and that part of it which inflicts punishment for that violation is in like manner against the constitutional guaranty of privileges, and void; void alike whether the punishment be mild or cruel, whether inflicted summarily and without any of the forms of law, or as the sentence of a court after a fair trial and conviction.

In resting our argument, as we have, solely upon the fact that the law in question is a law of exclusion, we have but accepted the issue proposed by South Carolina herself, and insisted on by those who have made themselves most conspicuous in her defense. Her law is entitled, 'An Act to prevent free persons of color from entering the state.' The capital provision in it is the prohibition of such entrance. The imprisonment, stripes and slavery of which it authorizes the infliction are made consequent, as we have seen, in express terms, upon entrance into the state contrary to the act. The resolutions of her legislature, we have also seen, assert expressly as the basis of her action, the power to exclude from the state any persons, whether citizens or not, whose presence may be dangerous to her peace. Judge Berrien and Mr. Walker in the United States Senate maintained the

same doctrine; as also does Mr.
Rhett of the House in his attempted
vindication of South Carolina. And
this we shall find, notwithstanding the
hue and cry about the omnipotence
of the police power, is the ultimate
For it
and sole ground of defense.
is seen, it is too obvious not to be
seen, that neither the police power
nor any other power, except that of
the despot, even in a state entirely in-
dependent, is competent to imprison,
scourge and enslave free citizens, so
long as they obey the laws and com-
Strike out of the
mit no offense.
law in question the prohibition of en-
trance, and let it simply enact that
every free negro within the state, not
being a native of it, shall be forth-
with seized and consigned to prison,
and kept there till he will consent to
be banished from the state, and,
without the forms of accusation or
trial, in certain contingencies over
which he may have no control, shall
be sold as a slave for life, and not
even Governor Hammond would
think of justifying it. Such acts, it
is felt, by whatever name called, for
whatsoever purpose committed, whe-
ther of state necessity, convenience
or amusement, whether dictated by
fear, by hatred, or by caprice, are
nothing else than tyranny, palpable,
unmitigated and odious. The only
ground which can be taken is that
which is taken; that a state has the
right to exclude, and therefore to use
any means which it may deem pro-
per to enforce the exclusion; has the
power to make entrance into the
state an offense, and consequently to
prevent or punish at its discretion the
commission of the offense.* In fall-
ing back therefore upon this position,
we regard South Carolina as dis-
tinctly abandoning all other grounds
of defense; abandoning especially
the doctrine, if it ever was maintain-
ed, that she can justify, as a mere

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police regulation for the govern

*This subsidiary proposition, we may remark, has under the Constitution important limitations; but we are obliged to let that pass.

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