Pleasure and pain, whether of mind or body, signify, whatever delights or molests us.-The mind can choose among its ideas which it will think on; and has a perception of delight joined to several thoughts and sensations. Pain is in many cases annexed to the very ideas which delight us; as in the different degrees of heat. Existence and Unity are suggested to us by every object without and every idea within. The idea of Power is got by observing that we can move our own bodies at pleasure,-and that natural bodies are constantly producing effects in one another.

Succession is another idea which, though suggested by the senses, is more constantly offered by the train of ideas passing through our minds without inintermission.

CHAP. VIII.

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING SIMPLE

IDEAS.

POSITIVE Ideas sometimes arise from privative causes: that is the causes which produce them are barely privations in those subjects from which we

derive those Ideas. Were I enquiring into the natural causes of perception, I should offer this as a reason why a privative cause may produce a positive Idea:-that, All sensation being produced in us only by different degrees and modes of motion in our animal spirits, variously agitated by external objects, the abatement of any former motion must as necesR sarily produce a new Idea, as the variation or increase of it. Does not the shadow of a man, which consists of the absence of light, cause as clear an idea in the mind as a man himself? Indeed, we have negative names which stand for the absence of positive ideas; as, insipid, silence, ‘annihilation, denoting the absence of the positive Ideas, taste, sound, being. But it will be hard to determine whether we have really any positive ideas from privative causes, till it be determined, whether rest be any more a privation than motion. We must no more suppose our Ideas to be exact images of the qualities of bodies, than the names we give our deas to be exact images of them. The power in ny body to produce an Idea, I call a quality in that body. Thus a snow ball producing the ideas of white, cold, round, its powers to produce those Ideas I call qualities. I sometimes put the Ideas for the qualities themselves.

Primary qualities are such as are utterly inseparable from body in whatsoever state it be: viz. soli

dity, extension, figure, motion or rest, and number. Secondary qualities are nothing in the objects themselves, but powers to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities, (that is, by the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of their insensible parts) as, colours, sounds, tastes, &c. A third sort might be added, which are allowed to be barely powers, though they are as much real qualities in the subject as those which I call, for distinction, Secondary Qualities for the power of fire to produce a new colour or consistency in wax by its primary qualities is as much a quality in fire, as the power it has to produce in me a new idea of warmth or burning, which I felt not before by the same primary qualities, viz. the bulk, texture, and motion of its insensible parts. The primary and secondary qualities of bodies produce ideas in us by impulse: for if external objects be not united to our minds, some motion must be continued, by our nerves or some parts of our bodies, to the brains or seat of sensation, and by the operation of insensible particles on the senses produce Ideas. It is not more impossible to conceive that the ideas of a blue colour and a sweet smell in a violet should be annexed to certain motions of insensible particles of matter, (with which they have no similitude,) than that the idea of pain should be annexed to the motion of a piece of steel dividing our flesh, (with which that idea has no resemblance.)

The Ideas of primary qualities of bodies are resemblances of them; and their patterns really exist in the bodies themselves: Ideas of secondary qualities are not resemblances of them; and nothing like our Ideas exists in the bodies themselves. The particular bulk, number, figure, and motion of the parts of fire, or snow, are really in them whether perceived or not; but light, heat, whiteness, and coldness, are not really in them, but depend on our sensations. The same water may produce the Idea of cold by one hand, and of heat by the other, which were impossible if those ideas were in the water: we may conceive this if we imagine the warmth in our hands to be a certain sort and degree of motion in the minute particles of our nerves, or animal spirits; but figure never produces the idea of square by one hand, and of round by the other.

1! 1st. The bulk, figure, number, situation, and motion or rest of the solid parts of bodies, I call real, original, or primary qualities.

2d. The powers in bodies to produce immediately in us the ideas of several colours, sounds, smells, tastes, and feelings, by reason of their primary qualities, I call secondary, imputed, or sensible qualities; and to distinguish them from the third sort, * secondary qualities immediately perceivable.

3d. The powers in bodies, by their primary qualities, to operate on other bodies so as to change their

D

primary qualities, and make them produce ideas in us different from what they did before, I call, secondary qualities mediately perceivable.

Ideas of the third sort are not resemblances: for we plainly discover that the quality produced has commonly no resemblance with any thing in the thing producing it; thus we never believe the change of colour produced in a fair face by the sun to be the perception or resemblance of any thing in the sun:or, our senses being able to discover the likeness or unlikeness of sensible qualities in two different external objects, we never fancy any sensible quality produced in a subject to be a quality communicated, but only an effect of bare power, unless we find such a sensensible quality in the subject producing it. But our senses not discovering any unlikeness between our Ideas, and the qualities of objects producing them, we are apt to imagine that our ideas are resemblances of something in the objects, and not the effects of certain powers in their primary qualities.

CHAP. IX.

OF PERCEPTION.

PERCEPTION is the first faculty of the mind exercised about our Ideas; it is the first and simplest idea we have from reflection;-and is by some called