Fifthly, whereas it might have been more flourish and ostentation of reading to have vouched the authorities, and sometimes to have enforced or noted upon them; yet I have abstained from that also. And the reason is, because I judged it a matter undue and preposterous to prove rules and maxims; wherein I had the example of Mr. Littleton and Mr. Fitzherbert, whose writings are the institutions of the laws of England: whereof the one forbeareth to vouch any authority altogether; the other never reciteth a book, but when he thinketh the case so weak of credit in itself as it needeth a surety. And these two I did far more esteem than Mr. Perkins or Mr. Standford, that have done the contrary. Well will it appear to those that are learned in the laws, that many of the cases are judged cases, either within the books or of fresh report, and most of them fortified by judged cases and similitude of reason; though, in some few cases, I did intend expressly to weigh down the authorities by evidence of reason, and therein rather to correct the law, than either to soothe a received error, or by unprofitable subtlety, which corrupteth the sense of the law, to reconcile contrarieties. For these reasons I resolved not to derogate from the authority of the rules by vouching of the authority of the cases, though in mine own copy I had them quoted: for although the meanness of mine own person may now at first extenuate the authority of this collection, and that every man is adventurous to control; yet, surely, according to Gamaliel's reason, if it be of weight, time will settle and authorise it; if it be light and weak, time will reprove it. So that, to conclude, you have here a work without any glory of affected novelty, or of method, or of language, or of quotations and authorities, dedicated only to use, and submitted only to the censure of the learned, and chiefly of time. Lastly, there is one point above all the rest I account the most material for making these rules indeed profitable and instructing; which is, that they be not set down alone, like short dark oracles, which every man will be content still to allow to be true, but in the meantime they give little light or direction; but I have attended them, (a matter not practised, no not in the civil law to any purpose, and for want whereof, indeed, the rules are but as proverbs, and many times plain fallacies,) with a clear and perspicuous exposition; breaking them into cases, and opening their sense and use and limiting them with distinctions; and sometimes showing the reasons above whereupon they depend, and the affinity they have with other rules. And though I have thus, with as good discretion and foresight as I could, ordered this work, and, as I might say, without all colours or shows, husbanded it best to profit; yet, nevertheless, not wholly trusting to mine own judgment; having collected three hundred of them, I thought good, before I brought them all into form, to publish some few ;1 that by the taste of other men's opinions in this first, I might receive either approbation in mine own course, or better advice for the altering of the other1 which remain. For it is great reason that that which is intended to the profit of others should be guided by the conceits of others. 1 The Camb. MS. has "to publish the first," and afterwards "for the altering of the other two." REGULE. 1. In jure non remota causa, sed proxima spectatur. 2. Non potest adduci exceptio ejusdem rei, cujus petitur disso lutio. 3. Verba fortius accipiuntur contra proferentem. 4. Quod sub certa forma concessum vel reservatum est, non trahitur ad valorem vel compensationem. 5. Necessitas inducit privilegium quoad jura privata. 6. Corporalis injuria non recipit æstimationem de futuro. 7. Excusat aut extenuat delictum in capitalibus, quod non operatur idem in civilibus. 8. Estimatio præteriti delicti ex post facto nunquam crescit. 9. Quod remedio destituitur ipsa re valet, si culpa absit. 10. Verba generalia restringuntur ad habilitatem rei vel personæ. 11. Jura sanguinis nullo jure civili dirimi possunt. 12. Receditur a placitis juris potius quam injuriæ et delicta maneant impunita. 13. Non accipi debent verba in demonstrationem falsam, quæ competunt in limitationem veram. 14. Licet dispositio de interesse futuro sit inutilis, tamen potest fieri declaratio præcedens quæ sortiatur effectum interveniente novo actu. 15. In criminalibus sufficit generalis malitia intentionis cum facto paris gradus. 16. Mandata licita recipiunt strictam interpretationem, sed illicita latam et extensam. 17. De fide et officio judicis non recipitur quæstio, sed de scientia, sive error sit juris sive facti. 18. Persona conjuncta æquiparatur interesse proprio. 19. Non impedit clausula derogatoria quominus ab eadem potestate res dissolvantur a quibus 1 constituuntur. 20. Actus inceptus cujus perfectio pendet ex voluntate partium revocari potest; si autem pendet ex voluntate tertiæ personæ, vel ex contingenti, revocari non potest. 21. Clausula vel dispositio inutilis per præsumptionem remotam vel causam ex post facto non fulcitur. 22. Non videtur consensum retinuisse, si quis ex præscripto minantis aliquid immutavit. 23. Licita bene miscentur, formula nisi juris obstet. 24. Præsentia corporis tollit errorem nominis, et veritas nominis tollit errorem demonstrationis. 25. Ambiguitas verborum latens verificatione suppletur; nam quod ex facto oritur ambiguum verificatione facti tollitur. 1 So, I believe, in all the MSS. and editions, and therefore the slip is probably of Bacon's pen. See p 301. 01.1.9. |