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I formerly had concerning that, which gives the laft determination to the will in all voluntary actions. This I cannot forbear to acknowledge to the world. with as much freedom and readinefs, as I at first publifhed what then feemed to me to be right; thinking myself more concerned to quit and renounce any opinion of my own, than oppofe that of another, when truth appears against it. For it is truth alone I feck, and that will always be welcome to me, when or from whence foever it comes.

But what forwardness foever I have to refign any opinion I have, or to recede from any thing I have writ, upon the first evidence of any errour in it; yet this I muft own, that I have not had the good luck to receive any light from thofe exceptions I have met with in print against any part of my book; nor have, from any thing that has been urged against it, found reason to alter my fenfe, in any of the points have been queftioned. Whether the fubject I have in hand requires often more thought and attention than curfory readers, at leaft fuch as are prepoffeffed, are willing to allow : or, whether any obfcurity in my expreffions cafts a cloud over it, and thefe notions are made difficult to others apprehenfions in my way of treating them: fo it is, that my meaning, I find, is often miftaken, and I have not the good luck to be every where rightly understood. There are fo many inftances of this, that I think it justice to my reader and myfelf, to conclude, that either my book is plainly enough written to be rightly understood by thofe who perufe it with that attention and indifferency, which every one, who will give himself the pains to read, ought to employ in reading; or elfe, that I have writ mine fo obfcurely, that it is in vain to go about to mend it. Which ever of these be the truth, it is myself only am affected thereby, and therefore I fhall be far from troubling my reader with what I think might be faid, in anfwer to thofe feveral objections I have met with, to paffages here and there of my book: fince I perfuade myfelf, that he who thinks them of moment enough to be concerned whether they are true or falfe, will be able to


fee, that what is faid, is either not well founded, or elfe not contrary to my doctrine, when I and my opposer come both to be well understood.

If any, careful that none of their good thoughts fhould be loft, have published their cenfures of my Effay, with this honour done to it, that they will not fuffer it to be an Effay; I leave it to the public to value the obligation they have to their critical pens, and fhall not wafte my reader's time in fo idle or ill-natured an employment of mine, as to leffen the fatisfaction any one has in himself, or gives to others, in fo hafty a confutation of what I have written.

The bookfellers preparing for the fourth edition of my Effay, gave me notice of it, that I might, if I had leifure, make any additions or alterations I fhould think fit. Whereupon I thought it convenient to advertise the reader, that befides feveral corrections I had made here and there, there was one alteration which it was neceffary to mention, because it ran through the whole book, and is of confequence to be rightly understood. What I thereupon faid was this:

Clear and diftinct ideas are terms, which, though familiar and frequent in men's mouths, I have reason to think every one, who ufes, does not perfectly underftand. And poffibly it is but here and there one, who gives himself the trouble to confider them fo far as to know what he himself or others precisely mean by them I have therefore in moft places chofe to put determinate or determined, instead of clear and distinct, as more likely to direct men's thoughts to my meaning in this matter. By thofe denominations, I mean fome object in the mind, and confequently determined, i. e. fuch as it is there feen and perceived to be. This, I think, may fitly be called a determinate or determined idea, when fuch as it is at any time objectively in the mind, and fo determined there, it is annexed, and with out variation determined to a name or articulate found, which is to be fteadily the fign of that very fame object of the mind, or determinate idea.

To explain this a little more particularly. By de terminate, when applied to a fimple idea, I mean that

fimple appearance which the mind has in its view, or perceives in itself, when that idea is faid to be in it: by determinate, when applied to a complex idea, I mean fuch an one as confifts of a determinate number of certain fimple or lefs complex ideas, joined in fuch a proportion and fituation, as the mind has before its view, and fees in itself, when that idea is present in it, or fhould be present in it, when a man gives a name to it: I fay fhould be; because it is not every one, not perhaps any one, who is fo careful of his language, as to ufe no word, till he views in his mind the precife determined idea, which he refolves to make it the fign of. The want of this is the cause of no fmall obfcurity and confufion in men's thoughts and difcourfes.

I know there are not words enough in any language, to answer all the variety of ideas that enter into men's difcourfes and reasonings. But this hinders not, but that when any one ufes any term, he may have in his mind a determined idea, which he makes it the fign of, and to which he should keep it fteadily annexed, during that present discourse. Where he does not, or cannot do this, he in vain pretends to clear or distinct ideas it is plain his are not fo; and therefore there can be expected nothing but obfcurity and confufion, where fuch terms'are made ufe of, which have not fuch a precife determination.

Upon this ground I have thought determined ideas a way of speaking lefs liable to miftakes, than clear and diftinct and where men have got fuch determined ideas of all that they reafon, inquire, or argue about, they will find a great part of their doubts and difputes at an end. The greatest part of the questions and controverfies that perplex mankind, depending on the doubtful and uncertain use of words, or (which is the fame) indetermined ideas, which they are made to ftand for; I have made choice of thefe terms to fignify, 1. Some immediate object of the mind, which it perceives and has before it, diftinct from the found it ufes as a fign of it. 2. That this idea, thus determined, i. e. which the mind has in itself, and knows, and fees there,


be determined without any change to that name, and that name determined to that precife idea. If men had fuch determined ideas in their inquiries and difcourfes, they would both difcern how far their own inquiries and difcourfes went, and avoid the greateft part of the difputes and wranglings they have with others.

Befides this, the bookfeller will think it neceffary I fhould advertise the reader, that there is an addition of two chapters wholly new; the one of the affociation of ideas, the other of enthufiafm. Thefe, with fome other larger additions never before printed, he has engaged to print by themselves after the fame manner, and for the fame purpose, as was done when this effay had the fecond impreffion.

In the fixth edition, there is very little added or altered; the greatest part of what is new, is contained in the 21ft chapter of the fecond book, which any one, if he thinks it worth while, may, with a very little labour, transcribe into the margin of the former edition.

Voi. I..



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5. Not on the mind natu
rally imprinted, because
not known to children,
idiots, &c.

6, 7. That men know them

when they come to the use

of reason, answered.

8. If reafon difcovered them,

that would not prove them


9-11. It is false, that reafon dif-

covers them.

12. The coming to the use

of reason, not the time

we come to know these


13. By this, they are not distin-

guished from other know-

able truths.

14. If coming to the use of
reafon were the time of
their discovery, it would
not prove them innate.
15, 16. The fteps by which the
mind attains feveral truths.
17. Affenting as foon as pro-
pofed and understood,
proves them not innate.
18. If fuch an affent be a

mark of innate, then that
one and two are equal
to three; that sweetness

is not bitterness; and a

thousand the like, must be


19. Such less general propofi-

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