CHAPTER VII.-Continuation of the subject.-Objec- tions to a theory of Beauty proposed by Father Buffier CHAPTER I.-Of Sublimity, in the literal sense of the CHAPTER II-Generalizations of the word Sublimity, in consequence of the influence of religious associa- CHAPTER III.-Generalizations of Sublimity in conse- quence of associations resulting from the phenomena of gravitation, and from the other physical arrange- ments with which our senses are conversant, CHAPTER IV-Confirmation of the foregoing theory from the natural signs of Sublime emotion.-Reciprocal influence of these signs on the associations which sug- CHAPTER I.-General observations on our acquired powers of judgment.-Application of these to the sub- CHAPTER II.-Gradual progress by which Taste is CHAPTER III.-Different Modifications of Taste.- Distinction between Taste and the natural sensibility to CHAPTER IV.-Continuation of the subject.-Specific pleasure connected with the exercise of Taste.-Fas- tidiousness of Taste.-Miscellaneous remarks on this ESSAY FOURTH.-On the culture of certain intellectual 475 CHAPTER I.-Dependence of Taste on a relish for the pleasures of imagination.-Remarks on the prevailing idea, that these are to be enjoyed in perfection, in youth CHAPTER II.-Continuation of the subject.-Reply to an objection founded on the supposed vigour of imagi- PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION. CHAPTER FIRST. THE chief aim of the following dissertation is, to correct some prevailing mistakes with respect to the Philosophy of the Human Mind. In the introduction to a former Work, I have enlarged, at considerable length, upon the same subject; but various publications which have since appeared, incline me to think, that, in resuming it here, I undertake a task not altogether superfluous. Of the remarks which I am now to state, a few have a particular reference to the contents of this volume. Others are intended to clear the way for a different series of discussions, which I hope to be able, at some future period, to present to the public. I. In the course of those speculations on the Mind, to which I have already referred, and with which, I trust, that my present readers are not altogether unacquainted, I have repeatedly had occasion to observe, that " as our "notions both of matter and of mind are merely relative; "as we know the one only by such sensible qualities as "extension, figure, and solidity, and the other by such "operations as sensation, thought, and volition; we are certainly entitled to say, that matter and mind, consi. "dered as Objects of Human Study, are essentially differ A "ent; the science of the former resting ultimately on phenomena exhibited to our senses, that of the latter "on phenomena of which we are conscious. Instead, "therefore, of objecting to the scheme of materialism, "that its conclusions are false, it would be more accurate "to say, that its aim is unphilosophical. It proceeds on "a misapprehension of the extent and the limits of genu"ine science; the difficulty, which it professes to remove, "being manifestly placed beyond the reach of our facul"ties. Surely, when we attempt to explain the nature of "that principle, which feels, and thinks, and wills, by saying, that it is a material substance, or that it is the "result of material organization, we impose on ourselves by words; forgetting that matter, as well as mind, is "known to us by its qualities alone, and that we are equally ignorant of the essence of either." In the farther prosecution of the same argument, I have attempted to show, that the legitimate province of this department of philosophy extends no farther than to conclusions resting on the solid basis of observation and experiment; and I have, accordingly, in my own inquiries, aimed at nothing more, than to ascertain, in the first place, the Laws of our Constitution, as far as they can be discovered by attention to the subjects of our consciousness; and afterwards to apply these laws as principles for the synthetical explanation of the more complicated phenomena of the understanding. It is on this plan I have treated of the association of ideas, of memory, of imagination, and of various other intellectual powers; imitating, as far as I was able, in my reasonings, the example of those who are allowed to have cultivated the study of Natural Philosophy with the greatest success. The Physiological Theories which profess to explain how our different mental operations are produced by means of vibrations, and other changes in the state of the sensorium, if they are not altogether hypothetical and visionary, cannot be considered, even by their warmest advocates, as resting on the same evidence with those conclusions which are open to the examination of all men capable of exercising the power of Reflection; and, therefore, scientific distinctness requires, that these two different classes of propositions should not be confounded together under one common name. For my own part, I have no scruple to say, that I consider the physiological problem in question, as one of those which are likely to remain for ever among the arcana of nature; nor am I afraid of being contradicted by any competent and candid judge, how sanguine soever may be his hopes concerning the progress of future discovery, when I assert, that it has hitherto eluded completely all the efforts which have been made towards its solution. As to the metaphysical romances above alluded to, they appear to me, after all the support and illustration which they have received from the ingenuity of Hartley, of Priestley, and of Darwin, to be equally unscientific in the design, and uninteresting in the execution; destitute, at once, of the sober charms of Truth, and of those imposing attractions, which Fancy, when united to Taste, can lend to Fiction. In consequence of the unbounded praise which I have heard bestowed upon them, I have repeatedly begun the study of them anew, suspecting that I might be under the influence of some latent and undue prejudice against this new mode of philosophizing, so much in vogue at present in England; but notwithstanding the strong predilection which I have always felt for such pursuits, my |