Nor is this view of the subject altogether a novelty in the history of science; any farther, than as it aims at a simple and literal statement of the fact, without prejudg. ing any of the other questions, either physical or metaphysical, which may arise out of it. The same doctrine is obviously involved in the physical theory of Boscovich, as well as in some of the metaphysical reveries of Malebranche and of Leibnitz. The last of these writers has, indeed, expressed it very clearly and concisely' in one of his letters, where he observes to his correspondent: "Les "choses materielles en elles-même ne sont que des phe"nomenes bien réglés."* The creed, said to be so prevalent among the Hindoos, with respect to the nature of matter, would seem to be grafted on a conception nearly similar. If we may rely on the account given of it by Sir William Jones, it has not the most distant affinity, in its origin or tendency, to the system of idealism as it is now commonly understood in this part of the world; the for mer taking its rise from a high theological speculation; the latter being deduced as a sceptical consequence from a particular hypothesis concerning the origin of our knowledge, inculcated by the schoolmen, and adopted by Locke and his followers. "The difficulties" (Sir William tells us, with great clearness and precision) "attending the

* The same mode of speaking has been adopted by some more modern authors; among others, by the late very ingenious and learned Mr. Robison, in his Elements of Mechanical Philosophy, "To us,” (he observes) “matter is a mere phenomenon." (§ 118.) Leibnitz was, I think, the first person by whom it was introduced; but in the writings of Mr. Robison, wherever it occurs, it may be safely interpreted as referring to the physical theory of Boscovich, to which he had a strong and avowed leaning; although he was not blind to the various difficulties connected with it.

vulgar notion of material substances, induced many of "the wisest among the ancients, and some of the most enlightened among the moderns, as well as the Hindoo "philosophers, to believe that the whole creation was "rather an energy than a work, by which the infinite mind, "who is present at all times, and in all places, exhibits to "his creatures a set of perceptions like a wonderful pic"ture, or piece of music, always varied, yet always uni"form."*

In another passage, the same author observes, that "the "Vedantis, unable to form a distinct idea of brute matter independent of mind, or to conceive that the work of supreme goodness was left a moment to itself, imagine "that the Deity is ever present to his work, and constantly supports a series of perceptions, which in one sense "they call illusory, though they cannot but admit the re"ality of all created forms, as far as the happiness of "creatures can be affected by them."†

"The word MAYA," (we are afterwards informed) "or "delusion has a subtle and recondite sense in the Vedanta "philosophy, where it signifies the system of perceptions, "whether of secondary, or of primary qualities, which the "Deity was believed, by Epicharmus, Plato, and many "truly pious men, to raise, by his omnipresent spirit, "in the minds of his creatures; but which had not, in "their opinion, any existence independent of mind."‡

* Introduction to a translation of some Hindoo verses. † Dissertation on the Gods of Greece, Italy, and India.

Ibid. The last clause of this sentence is somewhat ambiguous; as it is not quite manifest, whether the author meant an existence independent of the supreme mind, or of the minds of created percipient beings. Neither the one opinion nor the other appears to me

R

The essential difference between these doctrines, and those which Hume has shown to be necessarily involved in the common account of the origin of our knowledge, must appear obvious to all who have any acquaintance with his writings. The Hindoo system represents the material universe, as, at all times, in a state of immediate dependence on the divine energy;-coinciding, in this respect, with the opinions of those pious men in our own quarter of the globe, who have supposed its continued existence to be the effect of a creative act renewed every moment; but admitting, in the most explicit terms, the regularity of the laws according to which its phenomena are exhibited to our senses, and the reality of these phenomena as permanent objects of science. The scepticism of Hume, on the contrary, proceeds entirely on a scholastic hypothesis concerning perception, which, when followed out to its logical consequences, leaves no evidence for the existence, either of the divine mind, or of any other; nor, indeed, for that of any thing whatever, but of our own impressions and ideas.

The fault of the Hindoo philosophy, as well as of the systems of Leibnitz and of Malebranche, is, that it pronounces dogmatically on a mystery placed beyond the reach of our faculties; professing to describe the mode in which the intellectual and material worlds are connected together, and to solve the inexplicable problem (as Bacon has justly called it) with respect to the opus quod operatur Deus a principio usque ad finem. In the present state of our knowledge, it is equally absurd to reason for it or

to be reconcileable with the doctrines, either of Epicharmus or of Plato. (Vide Bruckeri Hi st. de Ideis, p. 9. Augustæ Vindelicorum, 1723.)

against it; but thus much must be allowed in its favour, that while, in its moral tendency, it is diametrically opposite to that of the theory with which it has sometimes been classed, it explicitly recognizes the consistency and certainty of those principles of belief on which mankind proceed in the ordinary business of life, as well as in all their physical inquiries concerning the order of nature.

The statement, on the other hand, given by Turgot, possesses this advantage peculiar to itself, that it describes the simple fact with scientific precision; involving no metaphysical theory whatever, any more than Newton's statement of the law of gravitation. In both cases, premises are furnished for a most important conclusion in natural theology; but that conclusion is as foreign to our researches concerning the physical laws of our perceptions, as it would have been to Newton's purpose, to have blended it with the physical and mathematical inquiries which are contained in his Principia.

Nor let any one imagine that this statement has the slightest tendency to detract from the reality of external objects. It rests our evidence for this reality, on the very same footing with what we possess for the regularity and permanence of those physical laws which furnish the most interesting, as well as most stable objects of human knowledge; and, even when combined with the theological hypothesis of the Hindoos, only varies our ordinary mode of conception, by keeping constantly in view the perpetual dependence of the universe, in its matter as well as in its form, on the hand of the Creator.

I must again repeat, with respect to this statement of Turgot, that it differs from that of Reid, merely in resolving our belief of the permanent and independent existence

of matter into another law of our nature still more general; and of this law it is worthy of observation, that its authority has not only been repeatedly recognized by Reid, but that he has laid much more stress on its importance than any preceding writer. According to the statements of both, this belief is assumed as an ultimate fact in the constitution of the mind; and the trifling difference in their language concerning it, (considering that neither could have borrowed the slightest hint from the other) adds no inconsiderable weight to their joint conclusions.

To this natural belief, common to all mankind (a belief which evidently is altogether independent of any exercise of our reasoning powers), Reid, as well as some other Scottish philosophers, have applied the epithet instinctive; not with the view of conveying any new theory concern. ing its origin, but merely to exclude the unsatisfactory theories of their predecessors. For this supposed innovation in language, they have been severely censured and ridiculed by a late celebrated Polemic; but the strictures which, in this instance, he has bestowed on them, will be found to apply to them, in common with the most correct reasoners in every part of modern Europe. Of this I have already produced one instance, in a quotation from the works of a very learned and profound Italian;* and another authority to the same purpose is furnished by D'Alembert, a writer scrupulously cautious in his selection of words. The following passage agrees so exactly with Reid's philosophy, in point of doctrine as well as of phraseology, that the coincidence can be accounted for only by the anxious fidelity with which both authors have, on this occasion, exemplified the precepts of the inductive logic

* See p. 115 of this volume.