far, I have already endeavoured to show; the resistance opposed to our compressing force, manifestly implying the existence of something external, and altogether independent of our perceptions:-but still there is a wide dif ference between the notion of independent existence, and that ascribed to extension or space, which, as Dr. Reid observes, carries along with it an irresistible conviction, that its existence is eternal and necessary; equally incapable of being created or annihilated. The same remark may be applied to the system of Dr. Hutton, who plainly considered extension and hardness as qualities of the same order; and who, in consequence of this, has been led to blend (without any advantage whatever to the main object of his work) the metaphysics of Berkeley with the physics of Boscovich, so as to cast an additional obscurity over the systems of both. It is this circumstance that will be found, on examination, to be the principal stumbling-block in the Berkeleian theory, and which distinguishes it from that of the Hindoos, and from all others commonly classed along with it by metaphysicians; that it involves the annihilation of space as an external existence; thereby unhinging completely the natural conceptions of the mind with respect to a truth, about which, of all within the reach of our faculties, we seem to be the most completely ascertained; and which, accordingly, was selected by Newton and Clarke, as the groundwork of their argument for the necessary existence of God.*

*This species of sophistry, founded on an indistinctness of classi fication, occurs frequently in Berkeley's writings. It is thus that, by confounding primary and secondary qualities under one common name, he attempts to extend to both, the conclusions of Des Cartes and Locke with respect to the latter. "To what purpose is it" (he

I am always unwilling to attempt innovations in language; but I flatter myself it will not be considered as a rash or superfluous one, after the remarks now made, if I distinguish extension and figure by the title of the mathematical affections of matter;* restricting the phrase primary qualities to hardness and softness, roughness and smoothness, and other properties of the same description. The line which I would draw between primary and secondary qualities is this; that the former necessarily involve the notion of extension, and consequently of externality or outness; whereas the latter are only conceived as the unknown causes of known sensations; and, when first ap

asks) "to dilate on that which may be demonstrated with the utmost " evidence in a line or two, to any one that is capable of the least re"flection? It is but looking into your own thoughts, and so trying "whether you can conceive it possible for a sound, or figure, or "motion, or colour, to exist without the mind, or unperceived. This "easy trial may make you see, that what you contend for is a down" right contradiction. Insomuch, that I am content to put the whole "on this issue; if you can but conceive it possible for one extended “moveable substance, or, in general, for any one idea, or any thing “like an idea, to exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving it, I shall "readily give up the cause." (Principles of Human Knowledge, section xxii.)

The confusion of thought which runs through the foregoing pa'ssage was early remarked by Baxter, in his Inquiry into the nature of the Human Soul. In the first sentence, he observes, that " 'figure "and motion are nicely shuffled in with colour and sound, though "they are qualities of a different kind;" and, in the last, that "ex"tended moveable substance is supposed to be a species of idea;”. "in which case" (he adds) "Dr. Berkeley is very safe in his argu"ment." (Vol. II. p. 276. 3d edit.)

* This phrase I borrow from some of the elementary treatises of natural philosophy.

†The word outness, which has been of late revived by some of Kant's admirers in this country, was long ago used by Berkeley in his Principles of Human Knowledge, (sect xliii.); and, at a still earlier period of his life, in his Essay towards a new theory of Vision,

prehended by the mind, do not imply the existence of any thing locally distinct from the subjects of its own consciousness. But these topics I must content myself with merely hinting at, on the present occasion.*

If these observations be well-founded, they establish three very important facts in the history of the human mind. 1. That the notion of the mathematical affections of matter presupposes the exercise of our external senses; inasmuch as it is suggested to us by the same sensations which convey to us the knowledge of its primary qualities. 2. That this notion involves an irresistible conviction, on our part, not only of the external existence of its objects, but of their necessary and eternal existence; whereas, in the case of the primary qualities of matter, our perceptions are only accompanied with a belief, that these qualities exist externally, and independently of our existence as perci pient beings; the supposition of their annihilation by the power of the Creator, implying no absurdity whatsoever. 3. That our conviction of the necessary existence of extension, or space, is neither the result of reasoning nor of experience, but is inseparable from the very conception of it; and must therefore be considered as an ultimate and essential law of human thought.

The very same conclusion, it is manifest, applies to the notion of time; a notion which, like that of space, presup

(sect. xlvi.) I mention this, as I have more than once heard the term spoken of as a fortunate innovation.

*For Locke's distinction between primary and secondary quali ties, see his Essay, Book ii. chap. iii. § 9. Of its logical accuracy some judgment may be formed from its influence in leading so very acute an inquirer to class number in the same list with solidity and extension. The reader will find some additional illustrations on the subject of secondary qualities in note (K).

poses the exercise of our external senses; but which, when it is once acquired, presents irresistibly its object to our thoughts as an existence equally independent of the human mind, and of the material universe. Both these existences, too, swell in the human understanding to infinity; the one to immensity, the other to eternity; nor is it possible for imagination itself to conceive a limit to either. How are these facts to be reconciled with that philosophy which teaches, that all our knowledge is derived from experience?

The foregoing reasonings have led us, by a very short, and, I hope, satisfactory process, to the general conclusion which forms the fundamental principle of the Kantian system; a system plainly suggested to the author, by the impossibility he found of tracing any resemblance between extension and the sensations of which we are conscious. "The notion (or intuition) of space" (he tells us)

as well as that of time, is not empirical; that is, it has "not its origin in experience. On the contrary, both "these notions are supposed, or implied, as conditions in "all our empirical perceptions; inasmuch as we cannot "perceive nor conceive an external object, without re"presenting it to our thoughts as in space; nor can we "conceive any thing, either without us or within us, without representing it to ourselves, as in time. Space "and time, therefore, are called, by Kant, the two forms of our sensibility. The first is the general form of our external senses: the second, the general form of all our senses, external and internal.

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"These notions of space and of time, however, although they exist in us a priori, are not" (according to Kant)" innate ideas. If they are anterior to the per

"ceptions of our senses, it is only in the order of reason, " and not in the order of time. They have indeed their origin in ourselves; but they present themselves to the "understanding only in consequence of occasions furnish"ed by our sensations; or (in Kant's language) by our "sensible modifications. Separated from these modifica

tions, they could not exist; and, without them, they "would have remained for ever latent and sterile."*

* De Gerando. Hist. des Systemes, Tom. II. p. 208, 209. It is proper for me to observe here, that, for the little I know of Kant's philosophy, I am chiefly indebted to his critics and commentators; more particularly, to M. De Gerando, who is allowed, even by Kant's countrymen, to have given a faithful exposition of his doctrines; and to the author of a book published at Copenhagen, in 1796, entitled, Philosophia Criticæ Secundum Kantium Expositio Systematica. Some very valuable strictures on the general spirit of his system may be collected from the appendix subjoined by Mr. Prevost to his French translation of Mr. Smith's posthumous Essays; from different pas sages of the Essais Philosophiques of the same author; and from the first article in the second number of the Edinburgh Review.

As to Kant's own works, I must fairly acknowledge, that, although I have frequently attempted to read them in the Latin edition printed at Leipsic, I have always been forced to abandon the undertaking in despair; partly from the scholastic barbarism of the style, and partly from my utter inability to unriddle the author's meaning. Wherever I have happened to obtain a momentary glimpse of light, I have derived it, not from Kant himself, but from my previous acquaintance with those opinions of Leibnitz, Berkeley, Hume, Reid, and others, which he has endeavoured to appropriate to himself under the deep disguise of his new phraseology. No writer certainly ever exemplifed more systematically, or more successfully, the precept which Quinctilian (upon the authority of Livy) ascribes to an ancient rhetorician; and which, if the object of the teacher was merely to instruct his pupils how to command the admiration of the multitude, must be allowed to reflect no small honour on his knowledge of human nature. "Neque id novum vitium est, cum jam apud Titum Livium "inveniam fuisse præceptorem aliquem, qui discipulos obscurare "quæ dicerent, juberent, Græco verbo utens exótico. Unde illa sci"licet egregia laudatio: Tanto melior, ne ego quidem intellexi.” (Quinct. Instit.)

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