duce; and which, in my opinion, will sufficiently shew through what channel the French philosophers have, in general, acquired their information, with respect to Locke's doctrine concerning the origin of our ideas.*

"When Aristotle" (says Helvetius)" affirmed, nihil est “in intellectu quod non fuit prius in sensu, he certainly did "not attach to this maxim the same meaning with Locke. "In the Greek philosopher, it was nothing more than the

*In justice to some individuals, I must observe here, that the vagueness of Condillac's language, in this instance, has been remarked by several of his own countrymen. "Trompé par la nou❝veauté d'une expression qui paroit avoir pour lui un charme secret, "renfermant toutes les opérations de l'esprit sous le titre commun "de sensation transformée, Condillac croit avoir rendre aux faits "une simplicité qu'il n'a placée que dans les termes." In a note on this passage, the same author adds, "Cette observation a été faite "par M. Prevost, dans les notes de son mémoire sur les signes; par "M. Maine-Biran, dans son Traité de l'Habitude, &c. Cet abus des "termes est si sensible, qu'on s'étonne de l'avoir vu rénouvelé de"puis, par des écrivains très-éclairés." De Gerando Histoire Comparée, &c. Tome I. pp. 345. 346.

The work of M. Maine-Biran here referred to, is entitled, "Influ"ence de l'Habitude sur la faculté de penser. Ouvrage qui a rem"porté le prix sur cette question proposée par la classe des sciences "morales et politiques de l'Institut National: Determiner quelle est "l'influence de l'habitude sur la faculté de penser; ou, en d'autres "termes, faire voir l'effet que produit sur chacune de nos facultés "intellectuelles, la fréquente répétition des mêmes operations."

Although I differ from this author in many of his views, I acknowledge, with pleasure, the instruction I have received from his ingenious Essay. For his criticism on Condillac's Theory of Transformed Sensations, see pp. 51 and 52 of the Traité de l'Habitude.

To prevent any ambiguities that may be occasioned by the general title of French Philosophers, it is necessary for me to mention, that I use it in its most restricted sense; without comprehending under it the writers on the Human Mind, who have issued from the school of Geneva, or who have belonged to other parts of Europe, where the French language is commonly employed by men of learning, in their publications.

'glimpse of a future discovery, the honour of which be"longs to the Englishman alone."*

What was the interpretation annexed by Helvetius himself to Locke's doctrine on this point, appears clearly from the corollary which he deduced from it, and which he has employed so many pages in illustrating; " that every thing "in man resolves ultimately into sensation or the operation of feeling." This, therefore, is the whole amount of the discovery which Helvetius considered as the exclusive glory of Locke.

"It is to Aristotle we owe" (says Condorcet)" that important truth, the first step in the science of mind, that

our ideas, even such as are most abstract, most strictly 'intellectual, (so to speak) have their origin in our sen"sations. But this truth he did not attempt to support "by any demonstration. It was rather the intuitive per'ception of a man of genius, than the result of a series

*"Lorsqu' Aristote a dit, nihil est in intellectu, &c. il n'attachoit "certainement pas à cette axiome les même idées que M. Locke. "Cette idée n'etoit tout au plus, dans le philosophe Grec, que l'ap"percevance d'une découverte à faire, et dont l'honneur appartient "en entier au philosophe Anglois." (De l'Esprit, disc. iv.)

It is observed by Dr. Gillies, in his very valuable Analysis of Aristotle's Works, that "he nowhere finds, in that author, the words “universally ascribed to him, nihil est in intellectu," &c. He quotes, at the same time, from Aristotle, the following maxim, which seems to convey the same meaning, almost as explicitly as it is possible to do, in a different language: εν τοις είδεσι τοις αισθητοις τα νοητα εστι. (Gillies's Arist. 2d edition, Vol. I. p. 47.) I must remark here, that the clause, which I have distinguished by italics, in the above quotation from Dr. Gillies, is somewhat too unqualified, at least when applied to the writers of this country. Mr. Harris (whose Hermes happens now to be lying before me) mentions explicitly the phrase in question, as a noted school axiom. (Harris's Works, Vol. I. p. 419.) Nor do I at present recollect any one author of reputation who has considered it in a different light.

"of observations accurately analysed, and systematically combined, in order to derive from them some general "conclusion. Accordingly, this germ, cast in an ungrate "ful soil, produced no fruit, till after a period of more "than twenty centuries.*

"At length, Locke made himself master of the proper "clue. He shewed, that a precise and accurate analysis "of ideas, resolving them into other ideas, earlier in their 'origin, and more simple in their composition, was the 'only means to avoid being lost in a chaos of notions, incomplete, incoherent, and indeterminate; destitute of "order, because suggested by accident; and admitted among the materials of our knowledge without due

"examination.

"He proved by this analysis, that the whole circle of "our ideas results merely from the operation of our in"tellect upon the sensations we have received; or more "accurately speaking, that all our ideas are compounded of sensations, offering themselves simultaneously to the memory, and after such a manner, that the attention is "fixed, and the perception limited to a particular collec“tion, or portion of the sensations combined."†

The language, in this extract, is so extremely vague and loose, that I should have been puzzled in my conjectures about its exact import, had it not been for one clause, in which the author states, with an affectation of more than common accuracy, as the general result of Locke's discussions, this short and simple proposition,

* Outlines of Historic. View, &c. Eng. Trans. pp. 107, 108. ↑ Ibid. pp. 240, and 241.-Not having the original in my posses sion, I have transcribed the above passage very nearly from the English Translation, published at London in 1795.

that all our ideas are compounded of sensations. The clause immediately preceding these words, and of which they are introduced as an explanation, or rather as an amendment, certainly seems, at first sight, to have been intended to convey a meaning very different from this, and a meaning not liable, in my opinion, to the same weighty objections. But, neither the one interpretation nor the other, can possibly be reconciled with Locke's doctrine, as elucidated by himself in the particular arguments to which he applies it, in various parts of his Essay.

I shall only add to these passages a short quotation from Diderot, who has taken more pains than most French writers, to explain, in a manner perfectly distinct and unequivocal, his own real opinion with respect to the origin and the extent of human knowledge.

"Every idea must necessarily, when brought to its state "of ultimate decomposition, resolve itself into a sensible "representation, or picture; and, since every thing in our "understanding has been introduced there by the chan"nel of sensation, whatever proceeds out of the under"standing, is either chimerical, or must be able, in return"ing by the same road, to re-attach itself to its sensible "archetype. Hence an important rule in philosophy; That

every expression which cannot find an external and a "sensible object to which it can thus establish its affinity, "is destitute of signification."*

*Toute idée doit se résoudre en dernière décomposition en une representation sensible, et puisque tout ce qui est dans notre entendement est venu par la voie de notre sensation, tout ce qui sort de notre enten dement est chimerique, ou doit, en retournant par le même chemin, trouver, hors de nous, un objèt sensible pour s'y rattacher. De là une grande règle en philosophie, c'est que toute expression

!

When we compare this conclusion of Diderot's with the innate ideas of Des Cartes, the transition from one extreme to the other seems wonderful indeed. And yet I am inclined to ascribe to the lateness of the period when Locke's philosophy became prevalent in France, the extravagance of the length to which his doctrines have since been pushed by some French writers. The implicit faith which was so long attached by their immediate predeces sors to the Cartesian system, naturally prepared the way for the sudden and blind admission of a contrary error: so just is the remark of a candid and judicious inquirer, that "the first step from a complete ignorance of a phi“losophical principle, is a disposition to carry its gene"ralization beyond all reasonable bounds."*

qui ne trouve pas hors de nous un objet sensible auquel elle puisse se rattacher, est vuide de sens. (Oeuvres de Diderot, Tom. VI.) In this philosophical rule, Diderot goes much farther than Mr. Hume, in consequence of the different interpretation which he has given to Locke's principle. In other respects, the passage now quoted bears, in its spirit, a striking resemblance to the reference which Hume has made, in the following argument, to his own account of the origin of our ideas, as furnishing an incontrovertible canon of sound logic, for distinguishing the legitimate objects of human knowledge, from the illusions of fancy and of prejudice. "One event fol"lows another; but we never can observe any tie between them. "They seem conjoined, but never connected. And, as we can have "no idea of any thing which never appeared to our outward sense, "or inward sentiment, the necessary conclusion seems to be, that we have no idea of connexion, or power, at all; and that these "words are absolutely without any meaning, when employed either "in philosophical reasonings or common life."-(Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion, Part ii.)

* Rien n'est plus voisin de l'ignorance d'un principe, que son excessive generalisation.-(De Gerando, Introduct. p. xx.)

To this maxim I would beg leave to subjoin another, that "no ❝ step is more natural or common, then to pass all at once from an "implicit faith in a philosophical dogma, to an unqualified rejection