CHAPTER SIXTH. OF THE APPLICATION OF THE THEORY OF ASSOCIATION TO BEAUTY. FARTHER GENERALIZATIONS OF THIS WORD, IN CONSEQUENCE OF THE INFLUENCE OF THE ASSOCIATING PRINCIPLE. IN the foregoing remarks on Beauty, although I have occasionally alluded to the Association of Ideas, I have avoided all discussion with respect to the extent of its in. fluence. It is necessary for me, however, now to consider, at some length, the effects of a principle which, in the opinion of many philosophers, furnishes a complete explanation of all the phenomena which have been under our consideration; and which must be acknowledged, even by those who do not go so far, to be deeply concerned in the production of most of them. I had occasion to observe, in a former publication, that the theory which resolves the whole effect of beautiful objects into Association, must necessarily involve that species of paralogism, to which logicians give the name of reasoning in a circle. It is the province of association to impart to one thing the agreeable or the disagreeable effect of another; but association can never account for the origin of a class of pleasures different in kind from all the others we know. If there was nothing originally and intrinsically pleasing or beautiful, the associating principle would have no materials on which it could operate. Among the writers who have attempted to illustrate the great influence of Association on our judgments concerning the Beautiful, I do not know of any who seem to have been completely aware of the force of this objection but Mr. Alison; and accordingly the fundamental idea which runs through his book, and which, in my opinion, is equally refined and just, is entirely his own. He does not deny, that, independently of custom and habit, there are numberless sources of enjoyment in the human frame, arising from its adaptation to the various objects around it. He only asserts, that a large proportion of the qualities which produce these pleasures, although they cannot be called Beautiful, while they affect the bodily organs immediately, may yet enter largely, by means of the Association of Ideas, into the beauty of the visible creation. Thus, the qualities which excite the agreeable sensations exclusively appropriated to the nostrils, cannot be said to be beautiful, without departing altogether from the common use of language; but who will deny, that the pleasing effect produced by the form and colour of a rose, even when viewed at a distance, is heightened by the sweet fragrance which we know that it possesses? The effect of the appearance here presented to the eye, and that of the associated pleasure, are so intimately and so necessarily blended together in the mind of every individual, that it is impossible for any person to say, how much of the complicated delight is to be ascribed to each of the two ingredients; and therefore, the pleasing conception which is linked with the appearance of the object, no less than the appearance itself, may be justly regarded as a constituent of its Beauty: it is unquestionably the union of both which has secured to the Rose her indisputed title, as Queen of Flowers. The principle of Association is not, in this instance, employed to account for the pleasing ef fect which the smell of the rose produces on its appropriate sense; but to explain in what manner the recollection of this agreeable sensation may enter, as an element, into the composition of an order of pleasures distinguished by a different name, and classed with the pleasures of a different organ. In so far, therefore, as the sensations of smellting minister to the Beauty of nature, it may, with great correctness, be said, that they do so only through the medium of that principle, which combines the conception of them in the mind of the spectator with the perception of the colours and the forms exhibited to his eye. What has now been remarked with respect to smell, is applicable to every other pleasing impression or emotion which Association can attach to a visible object. In consequence of the close relation which subsists between the senses of seeing and of touch, it applies with peculiar force to those things about which the latter sense is likely to be employed; and hence, in many instances, the influence (formerly explained) of ideas connected with the perceptions of the hand, in modifying the judgments concerning Beauty, which the eye pronounces.* It is, however, chiefly by intellectual and moral associa "Chaque sens, par un heureux concours, "Prête aux sens alliés un mutuel secours; "Le frais gazon des eaux m'embellit leur murmure, "Et d'un ambre flatteur la pêche parfumée, "Parait plus savoureuse à la bouche embaumée; tions, that our notions of Beauty are influenced. How powerful the charm is which may be thus communicated to things of little intrinsic interest, may be judged of from "the fond partiality with which we continue, through the whole of life, to contrast the banks and streams of our infancy and youth, with "other banks and other streams.”* In this manner, by means of association, any one pleasing circumstance or occurrence in nature, how remote soever in itself from the idea of the Beautiful, may be yet so com bined in our imagination with the Beautiful properly so called, that no philosophical analysis can separate them in their effect. On such occasions, the task of the philosopher is limited to the gratification of a speculative curiosity in collecting new illustrations of his theories; or (where he experiences the inconveniences of his own early prepossessions) to a more judicious regulation of the habits of others, whose associations are yet to be formed. But on this view of the subject, although I consider it as by far the most curious and important of any, I do not mean to enlarge. The strong and happy lights which have been thrown upon it by Mr. Alison, render any farther illustration of it superfluous; and leave me nothing to add, in this part of my argument, but a few slight hints, tending to connect some of his conclusions with that "Voyez l'amour heureux par un double larcin! * Shenstone. Ode to Memory. peculiar idea of Beauty which I have been attempting to develope. It is scarcely necessary for me to observe, that, in those instances where Association operates in heightening the pleasures we receive from sight, the pleasing emotion continues still to appear, to our consciousness, simple and uncompounded. How little soever the qualities that are visible may in themselves contribute to the joint result, it is these qualities which solely, or at least chiefly, occupy our attention. The object seems really invested with the charms which we ourselves have lent to it; and so completely are these charms united, in our apprehensions, with those attached to the organic impression, that we never think of referring them to different causes; but conceive that the Beauty of the object increases in proportion to the rapture with which we gaze on it. Hence the surprise and disappointment we are apt to feel, when we strive in vain, by an exhibition of the supposed cause of our delight, to impart to a stranger an enthusiasm similar to our own: And hence, upon all questions in which the affections are concerned, a diversity in the tastes and predilections of individuals, which is not to be reconciled by any general principles drawn from the philosophy of the human mind. Nor is there any thing in this process different from what the analogy of our other perceptions would lead us to expect. If the constant coexistence of two such heterogeneous qualities as colour and extension in the objects of sight, renders them completely inseparable in our thoughts, why should we wonder, that the intellectual and more fugitive elements of Beauty, should be insensibly |