It is scarcely necessary for me to remark, that it is not by reasoning à priori, that we can hope to make any progress in ascertaining and separating the respective effects of the various ingredients which may be thus blended in the composition of Beauty. In analysing these, we must proceed on the same general principles by which we are guided in investigating the physical and chemical properties of material substances; that is, we must have recourse to a series of observations and experiments on beautiful objects of various kinds; attending diligently to the agreeable or the disagreeable effects we experience, in the case of these diversified combinations. The conclusions we thus form, may, it is obvious, enable us afterwards to recompound the same elements, according to our own fancy, so as to diversify or to increase the pleasure produced; while they furnish an agreeable exercise to the intellectual Akenside has remarked this disposition of the mind, to identify the sources of the secondary or accessory pleasures it enjoys, with those perceptions of seeing and hearing which form the physical basis (if I may use the expression) of our idea of the Beautiful. The examples he has selected are equally familiar and striking: "So, while we taste the fragrance of the rose, "Gush thro' the trickling herbage, to the thirst Another illustration of the same thing may be collected from the wonderful effect on the estimate we form of the beauty of a particular landscape, by the agreeable or disagreeable temperature of the atmosphere at the moment we see it. How very different seems the aspect of the same scene, according as the wind happens to blow from the East, or from the West! powers, in tracing the beauties, both of nature and of art, to their general laws. In all these experiments and observations, it is worth while to add, the result is judged of by attending to our own feelings; as, in our researches concerning heat, we appeal to the thermometer. By habits of this kind, therefore, it is reasonable to expect that we may acquire a power of remarking those slighter impressions, whether pleasant or painful, which are overlooked by ordinary observers; in the same manner as the touch of a blind man appears to improve, in consequence of the peculiar attention which he is led to bestow on the perceptions of the hand. Our sensibility to beauty does not, in this way, become really more exquisite and delightful than before; but, by attracting our notice in a greater degree, it is rendered a nicer and more delicate instrument for assisting the judgment in its estimate of facts. Nor is it only in analysing the pleasing ingredients which enter into the composition of beautiful objects, that observations and experiments are necessary to those who wish to study the principles of Beauty, with a view to their practical applications. Whether their aim may be to produce new combinations of their own, or to pronounce on the merits and defects of those executed by others, it is of essential importance, that they should be able to separate what is pleasing from what obstructs the agreeable effect. Independently of experience, however, the most exquisite sensibility, seconded by the most acute intellect, cannot lead to a single conclusion concerning the particular circumstances from which the pleasure or uneasiness arises. In proportion, indeed, to the degree of the observer's sensibility, he will be delighted with the former and offended with the latter; but till he is able to draw the line distinctly between them, his sensibility will afford no lights of which he can avail himself in future, either as an artist or as a judge. It is in this distinguishing or discriminating perception, that the power denoted by the word Taste seems to me chiefly to consist. The fact is perfectly analogous in that bodily sense from which this mental power derives its name. A dealer in wines is able, in any of the common articles of his trade, to detect, the least ingredient which does not properly enter into the composition; and, in pronouncing it to be good or bad, can fix at once on the specific qualities which please or offend. It is not on the sensibility of his organ that this power depends. Some degree of sensibility is undoubtedly necessary to enable him to receive any sensation at all; but the degree of his distinguishing power is by no means proportioned to the degree of his sensibility. At the same time, it is manifestly this distinguishing power alone, which renders his judgment in wine of any use to himself in his purchases, or of any value to those whose gratification is the object of his art. Mr. Hume, in his Essay on the Standard of Taste, has approached nearly to this view of the subject, in the application which he makes to it, of a story in Don Quixote: And, although I can by no means assent to the general train of reasoning which that essay contains, I cannot help availing myself of the support, which, on this fundamental point, my conclusions may receive from their coincidence with those of so profound a writer; as well as of the very happy illustration which he has employed in its statement. "It is with good reason," says Sancho to the squire with the great nose, "that I pretend to have a judgment "in wine. This is a quality hereditary in our family. "Two of my kinsmen were called to give their opinion "of a hogshead which was supposed to be excellent, "being old and of a good vintage. One of them tastes it; "considers it; and after mature reflection pronounces the "wine to be good, were it not for a small taste of leather "which he perceived in it. The other, after using the same precautions, gives also his verdict in favour of the "wine; but with the reserve of a taste of iron, which he "could easily distinguish. You cannot imagine how they "were both ridiculed for their judgment. But who laugh"ed in the end? On emptying the hogshead, there was "found at the bottom an old key, with a leathern thong "tied to it." Another circumstance, remarkably characteristical of intellectual Taste, is the instantaneousness with which its decisions appear, in most instances, to be formed. In this respect, likewise, it resembles the external sense after which it is named; and indeed the analogy between the two powers is, in various points, so complete, as sufficiently to account for an application of the same expressions to both; and even to justify those writers who have attempted to illustrate the theory of the former, by an examination of the more obvious and familiar perceptions of the latter. It is somewhat curious, that Voltaire should have been so strongly impressed with this analogy, as to conclude, that it must have presented itself universally to the human understanding, in all ages of the world. "The feel ing" (he observes) "by which we distinguish beauties "and defects in the arts, is prompt in its discernment, "and anticipates reflection, like the sensations of the tongue and palate. Both kinds of Taste, too, enjoy, with "a voluptuous satisfaction, what is good; and reject what "is bad, with an emotion of disgust. Accordingly," (he adds) "this metaphorical application of the word taste, "is common to all known languages."* It is scarcely necessary for me to remark, that the metaphor here mentioned by Voltaire, is entirely of modern origin. Petronius, indeed, as Dr. Beattie has observed, seems to have employed sapor in this figurative sense; but the use he has made of that word is so peculiar to himself, that it has been urged as a presumption in favour of the opinion of those critics who think, that the book which passes under his name is, at least in part, the composition of a later period.† Although, however, in the ancient languages, the word Taste was certainly not employed in that metaphorical acceptation which has now become so familiar to the ear, it is evident that the analogy which has led to the metaphor did not entirely escape the ancient critics. Quinctilian, in particular, speaking of this very power, observes, "That it is not to be communicated by instruction any "more than the senses of taste or of smell;" and with respect to some of its objects, he tells us, that "they are * Encyclop. art. Goût. †The passage in question is this: "Sermonem habes non publici "saporis,”—i. e. (commentante et interprete Gesnero) non placentem vulgo, sed sapientibus. Ad sensum communem, et intelligentiam refertur. Non magis arte traditur quam gustus aut odor. 1 |