in point of promptitude and address, which some of these unphilosophical artists display, in circumstances where the most profound mechanician would be totally at a loss how to avail himself of his knowledge! The philosopher himself, the first time he is at sea, cannot cease to wonder, when he observes the theorems hitherto associated in his mind with mathematical diagrams, exemplified by every ship-boy on board; nor need he be ashamed to acknow. ledge his own incompetency to apply these theorems to their practical use, while he attempts to handle the ropes, or to steer the vessel. Still less, however, would he have reason, on this account, to conclude, that, in studying the composition and resolution of forces, he had made an acquisition of no intrinsic value.

The proper inference to be drawn from these and similar considerations, is so admirably expressed in the following passage, that I shall transcribe it without any comment. It is quoted from an obscure author by Sir Joshua Reynolds, and placed by him in the front of his academical discourses, as an apology for his own disquisitions concerning some of the principles of painting. "Omnia fere quæ præceptis continentur ab ingeniosis "hominibus fiunt; sed casu quodam magis quam scientia. "Ideoque doctrina et animadversio adhibenda est, ut ea

quæ interdum sine ratione nobis occurrunt, semper in "nostrâ potestate sint; et quoties res postulaverit, a nobis ex præparato adhibeantur."

It is hardly necessary for me to remark how applicable this observation is to those very doctrines of the science of Mind which have given rise to this discussion. They who consider how much of the business of education resolves into a skilful management of attention and

of association, will not be disposed to deny, that something might still be done, by awakening the vigilance of parents and preceptors to these important principles of our frame to render this task more systematical in its aim, and less doubtful in its success. Have no conclusions with respect to them been yet ascertained, of which a better practical use might be made to develope, or to increase the mental energies of man; to promote his moral improvement; and to shed on his understanding that pure and and steady light, without which reason itself can do but little, either to exalt his views, or to secure his happiness? Even the very curious facts here appealed to, with respect to the education of the war-horse and of the elephant, only afford additional proofs of the universality of the proposition, "that knowledge is power." They demonstrate, that the empire of man over the brute force of the lower animals is proportioned, not to his physical strength, but to the knowledge he possesses of their respective constitutions. They form indeed a most beautiful and instructive comment on Bacon's maxim, that "nature is to be subdued only by obeying her laws;" and might almost be quoted as apologues for the moral lesson they may convey to the guardians of youth, and to the rulers of nations.

It must indeed be granted, that, in the best works which have yet appeared on the science of mind, the mere refutation of scholastic errors occupies a large and melancholy space. Accordingly, it has been mentioned, with an air of triumph, as a fact which, since the time of Reid," seems now to be admitted with regard to perception, and some of the other primary functions of "mind; that philosophy can be of no use to us, and that

"the profoundest reasonings lead us back to the creed, "and to the ignorance of the vulgar." The reflection is undoubtedly just, if by philosophy be here meant the theory of perception, which prevailed universally before the time of Reid. But I must be allowed to refuse my assent to the statement, if it is to be understood as calling in question the utility of that philosophy by which this theory was exploded, after having reigned in the schools for more than two thousand years, and bewildered, not more than a century ago, the speculations of Locke, of Clarke, and of Newton. In order to prepare the way for the mechanical inquiries of the moderns, it was necessary to begin with exposing the futility of the scholastic explanations of phenomena, by occult qualities, and Nature's horror of a void. After the darkness in which every theory relating to the study of mind has been so long involved, by means of hypotheses consecrated by time, and interwoven with the inmost texture of language, some preliminary labour, in like manner, may be expected to be necessarily employed in clearing away the metaphysical rubbish of the ancients, and of the middle ages; and it is a circumstance highly honourable to the sagacity and zeal, both of Locke and of Reid, that they have devoted to this ungrateful, but indispensable task, so large a portion of their writings. What the latter of these philosophers has said concerning the doctrine of his illustrious predecessor on the subject of definitions, may be applied to various other parts of the Essay on Human Understanding, as well as to many discussions which occur in his own publications; that "it is valuable, not so much because it enlarges our knowledge, as because it makes us sensi"ble of our ignorance; and shews that a great part of

"what speculative men have admired as profound philosophy, is only a darkening of knowledge by words with"out understanding."

Nor must it be forgotten, that it is on this very hypothesis concerning perception, which has been successfully exploded by Reid, that the scepticism of Hume, concerning the existence both of matter and of mind, rests fundamentally. Has this scepticism had no effect in unsettling the opinions of mankind? or granting (as I believe will not be disputed) that the effect has been great and extensive, shall we deny the practical utility of disentangling human reason from such a labyrinth?

After all, it is not on this or similar articles of the science of Mind, that I myself am inclined to lay any great stress in this part of my argument. The points to which I wish chiefly to draw my readers' attention, are the intimate connection between this science and the general conduct of the understanding; and its obvious tendency, by facilitating the analysis of whatever casual combinations the fancy may have formed, to dissolve the charm of those associations, against which the most conclusive arguments spend their force in vain.

I have always been convinced, that it was a fundamental error of Aristotle (in which he has been followed by almost every logical writer since his time) to confine his views entirely to reasoning or the discursive faculty, instead of aiming at the improvement of our nature in all its various parts.-Granting, however, for a moment, that this very limited idea of the object of their study was to be adopted, a more comprehensive survey of our faculties and powers was necessary than they appear to have suspected; for it is in corners of our frame which seem, on a su

perficial view, to have the least connection with our speculative opinions, that the sources of our most dangerous errors will be found to lurk. It is sufficient for me to mention here, the Association of Ideas; Imagination; Imitation; the use of Language as the great Instrument of Thought; and the Artificial Habits of Judging, imposed by the principles and manners in which we have been educated.

If this remark be well founded, it obviously follows, that, in order to prepare the way for a just and comprehensive system of Logic, a previous survey of our nature, considered as one great whole, is indispensably requisite. To establish this fundamental principle, and to exemplify it in some of its practical applications, was one of the main objects I had in view, when I first entered upon my inquiries into the Human Mind; and I am not without hopes, that if my original design shall ever be completed, the imperfect sketch I have presumed to attempt, will be regarded by competent judges, as no inconsiderable step towards the accomplishment of this great undertaking by some abler hand.

If my health and leisure allow me to put in writing some speculations which have long been familiar to my own thoughts, I shall endeavour to place the defects of our common logical systems in a still stronger light, by considering them in their application to the fundamental doctrines of Ethics; and more particularly, by examining how far, in researches of this sort, our moral feelings or emotions are entitled to consideration; checking, on the one hand, our speculative reasonings, when they lead to conclusions at which our nature revolts; and, on the other, sanctioning those decisions of the understanding,