the human intellect, considered in contrast with the subordinate ministry of the senses, as to rival in its effect the sublime impressions of poetical description. "The mind "perceives, by occasion of outward objects, as much more than is represented to it by sense, as a learned man does in the best written book, than an illiterate "person or brute. To the eyes of both the same cha"racters will appear; but the learned man, in those characters, will see heaven, earth, sun, and stars; read profound theorems of philosophy or geometry; learn a great deal of new knowledge from them, and admire "the wisdom of the composer; while to the other nothing appears but black strokes drawn on white paper."* In the works of Leibnitz various passages occur, extremely similar in their spirit to those which have just been quoted. One of these I select, in preference to the rest, because it shows how early and how clearly he perceived that very vulnerable point of Locke's philosophy, against which the foregoing reasonings have been directed.

"In Locke's Essay, there are some particulars not un"successfully expounded; but, on the whole, he has wan"dered widely from his object; nor has he formed a just "notion of the nature of truth and of the human mind."He seems, too, not to have been sufficiently aware, that "the ideas of existence, of personal identity, of truth, be"sides many others, may be said (in one sense) to be "innate in the mind; inasmuch as they are necessarily "unfolded by the exercise of its faculties. In other words, "when we affirm that there is nothing in the intellect which

*Treatise of Immutable Morality, B. iv. c. ii.

"was not previously in the senses, we must be always un"derstood to except the intellectual powers themselves, "and the simple ideas which are necessarily implied in "our intellectual operations."*

In quoting these strictures upon Locke, I would not be understood to approve of the use which Leibnitz has here made of the word innate; as I think it is liable, in some degree, to the same objections which apply to the innate ideas of Des Cartes.

In both authors, this form of expression seems to imply, not only that ideas have an existence distinct from the faculty of thinking, but that some ideas, at least, form part of the original furniture of the mind; presenting to it treasures of knowledge, which it has only to examine by abstracted meditation, in order to arrive at the most sublime truths. The same remark may be extended to certain doctrines, which Mr. Harris has connected with a passage already quoted from his Hermes; and also to the speculations of Dr. Price concerning the origin of our ideas, in his Review of the Principal Questions and Difficulties in Morals. Of the limited functions of sense, these two very candid and profound inquirers were fully aware; but, like the other writers, they have blended, with their

*As, in the above paragraph, I have departed a little from Leibnitz's language, in order to render his meaning somewhat more obvious to my readers, I think it proper to subjoin the words of the original.

"In Lockio sunt quædam particularia non male exposita, sed in "summâ longe aberravit a janua, nec naturam mentis veritatisque in"tellexit. Idem non satis animadvertit ideas entis, substantiæ, unius ❝et ejusdem, veri, boni, aliasque multas menti nostræ ideo innatas "esse, quia ipsa innata est sibi, et in se ipsâ hæc omnia deprehendit. "Nempe, nihil est in intellectu, quod non fuerit in sensu, nisi ipse "intellectus."-Tom. V. p. 355. (Edit. Dutens.)

statement of this important fact, hypothetical expressions and notions, calculated to impose on an unreflecting reader, by a specious explanation of a mystery, placed beyond the reach of the human faculties.* The supposition in which all these different philosophers seem to have agreed, of the existence of latent ideas in the mind, previous to the exercise of the senses, (a supposition bordering nearly on the old Platonic scheme of the soul's reminiscence) cannot be guarded against with too great caution; but, as to the arguments in the Essay of Human Understanding, which have exposed the phrase innate ideas to the ridicule of Locke's followers, I must own, that they have very little weight with me, when I recollect that Locke himself, no less than Des Cartes, gave his express sanction to the Ideal Theory. If that theory be rejected, and the word idea be understood as exactly synonymous with thought or notion, the phrase innate ideas becomes much less exceptionable; implying nothing more (though perhaps not in the plainest language) than the following propositions, which I have already endeavoured to prove: "That there are many of our most familiar notions (alto"gether unsusceptible of analysis) which relate to things "bearing no resemblance either to any of the sensible qualities of matter, or to any mental operation which is "the direct object of consciousness; which notions, there

What I mean, in this instance, by a mixture of fact and of hypothesis, will be still more clearly illustrated by two quotations from Mr. Harris's notes; which have the merit of stating fairly and explicitly the theories of their respective authors, without any attempt to keep their absurdity out of view (according to the practice of their modern disciples) by a form of words, in which they are only obscurely hinted to the fancy. For these quotations, see Note (C).

"fore, (although the senses may furnish the first occa"sions on which they occur to the understanding) can "neither be referred to sensation nor to reflection, as their "fountains or sources, in the acceptation in which these "words are employed by Locke."*

The period at which these thoughts first arise in the mind is a matter of little consequence, provided it can be shown to be a law of our constitution that they do arise, whenever the proper occasions are presented. The same thing may be said with respect to what Locke calls innate practical principles; and also with respect to what other writers have called innate affections of human nature. The existence of both of these some have affirmed, and others denied, without any suspicion that the controversy between them turned on little more than the meaning of a word.

* D'Alembert's opinion on this question, although not uniformly maintained through all his philosophical speculations, appears to have coincided nearly with mine, when he wrote the following sen

tence.

"Les idées innées sont une chimere que l'experience reprouve; ❝ mais la manière dont nous acquérons des sensations et des idées "refléchies, quoique prouvées par la même experience, n'est pas "moins incomprehensible."—Elem. de Phil. article Metaphysique.)

From various other passages of D'Alembert's writings, it might be easily shown, that by the manner of acquiring sensations, he here means, the manner in which we acquire our knowledge of the primary qualities of matter; and that the incomprehensibility he alludes to, refers to the difficulty of conceiving how sensations, which are the proper subjects of consciousness, should suggest the knowledge of external things, to which they bear no resemblance.

CHAPTER FOURTH.

THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED.*

MR. LOCKE'S quibbles, founded on the word innate, were early remarked by Lord Shaftesbury. "Innate "is a word he poorly plays upon; the right word, though "less used, is connatural. For what has birth, or progress "of the fœtus out of the womb, to do in this case? The

If any of my readers should think, that, in this section, I make too wide, and too abrupt a transition from the question concerning the origin of our knowledge, to that which relates to the moral constitution of human nature, I must beg leave to remind them that, in doing so, I am only following Mr. Locke's arrangement in his elaborate argument against innate ideas. The indefinite use which he there makes of the word idea, is the chief source of the confusion which runs through that discussion. It is justly observed by Mr. Hume, that "he employs it in a very loose sense, as standing for "any of our perceptions, our sensations and passions, as well as "thoughts."—"Now, in this sense" (continues Mr. Hume) “ I ❝should desire to know what can be meant by asserting, that self"love, or resentment of injuries, or the passion of love between the "sexes, is not innate?" The following passage which forms a part of the same note, bears a close resemblance in its spirit to that quoted in the text from Lord Shaftesbury.

"It must be confessed, that the terms employed by those who "denied innate ideas, were not chosen with such caution, nor so ex"actly defined, as to prevent all mistakes about their doctrine. For "what is meant by innate? If innate be equivalent to natural, then "all the perceptions and ideas of the mind must be allowed to be innate ❝or natural, in whatever sense we take the latter word, whether in " opposition to uncommon, artificial, or miraculous. If by innate be " meant contemporary to our birth, the dispute seems to be frivo"lous; nor is it worth while to inquire at what time thinking begins, "whether before or after our birth."-Hume's Essays, Vel. Ik (Note A).