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CONDITION SPECIAL TO SIMILARITY IN DIVERSITY. 471

Besides the general power of Similarity, all the special or local conditions of revival under Feebleness apply to revival under diversity—(1) acuteness of sense, (2) previous familiarity, (3) acquired delicacy or habits of attention; and to these a fourth has now to be added. In the case of a present object bringing up a past, both resembling it, and also differing from it, there is obviously a struggle or contest of attracting similarities. In the example now givenlanguage-a certain passage before the mind may bring up, from the past, another passage resembling in expression, but differing in sense; or a passage resembling in sense, but differing in expression: this shows that both peculiarities have a power of attraction, each for its own kind, although one prevails, and is thereupon called the stronger attraction. ABC is liable to bring up ADE, the likeness being struck on A; or BFG, on the likeness of B; or CHI, on the likeness of C. The attraction of B for some combination where it enters, and of C for a combination where it enters, have to be overcome by A, in order to secure the recovery of ADE. Now, the less active B and C are, the more easily will A predominate and effect the recall; that is, if all the local conditions above specified are of a low order as respects B and C, while the same conditions are well developed in A, the chances in favour of A are proportionally great. Hence, the additional circumstance applicable to Similarity in Diversity is (4) a low susceptibility, or comparative insensibility, to the points of difference. A speech will recall by preference other speeches resembling in diction, if the individual is more highly susceptible to language, than to meaning or subject

matter.

15. To pass to the Sensations. In Organic Life, there are many cases of a sensation repeated with new admixtures, serving to disguise its character, and to prevent its recalling the former instances of the same impressions. It often happens that the same organic state is produced by very different causes. A shock of grief, a glut of pleasure, a fit of overworking, an accidental loss of two or three nights'

rest, may all end in the very same kind of headache, stupor, or feeling of discomfort; but the great difference in the antecedents may prevent our identifying the occasions. The derangement caused by grief is more likely to recall a previous occasion of a similar grief, than to suggest a time of overdone enjoyment; the sameness in organic state is, in the case of such a parallel, nullified by the repulsion of opposites in the accompanying circumstances; a state of grief does not permit a time of pleasure to be recalled and dwelt upon; the loss of a parent at home is not compatible with the remembrance of a long night of gaiety abroad. Hence we do not identify the supposed state of organic depression with all the previous recurrences of the same state; unless, indeed, a scientific education has made us aware of the sameness of the physical effects resulting from the most dissimilar causes.

16. Under Taste, we have examples of a like nature. A taste may be so disguised by mixture as to be undiscernible; the presence of the other ingredients operating to resist the reviving power of the one that we desire to identify. In a solution of Epsom salts, we should not be able to discern a small quantity of sugar; the saline bitter of the salts overpowering the sugary taste. Again, when malt liquor becomes sour, we are unable to discriminate any longer the alcoholic taste; the acid taste overcomes every other sensation. If, in such a case, the alcohol is still discernible by any one person, when others fail to perceive it, we should say that such an one's memory had been specially impressed by alcohol.

17. Hitherto I have spoken of sensations identified through actual sameness, the identification being impeded only by others mixed up with them. A case of greater complicacy and more importance is furnished by the existence of sensations really different, but having something in common that cannot be seized by itself. Take as an instance the tastes of the various wines; these are all different, and if similarity only in absolute sameness, port would remind us only of laret of claret, madeira of madeira, and so on. But we

TASTES IDENTIFIED-CLASSIFICATION.

473 find that there is so much of a common influence in all wines, that any of them can remind us of a great many others; we, at the same time, noting points of difference, when they are thus brought into comparison. It is this common influence, with its suggesting power, that has led mankind to constitute what is termed a class, or a genus, 'wine,' comprehending many widely-scattered individuals. The identification of likeness in the midst of unlikeness, in other words, of a common property, is the essence of this classifying operation. A class is distinct from a catalogue by virtue of a common resemblance, in the midst of diversity. Again, the class, wines,' identified through their common organic sensation and taste, is merged in a larger class when spirituous liquors come to be known. There is felt to be an identity between the principal effect of these liquors on the system, and the effect of the various members of the vinous group. The class is now extended; yet, because of there being some features common to wines that do not attach to spirits, the wines are still retained in a group apart, subordinate to the larger group, or as a species coming under the other as a genus. The addition of malt liquors to the comparison extends the identity still farther, and enlarges the class of substances that suggest one another through the common quality of causing intoxication. These malt liquors being themselves identical in more points than those common to them with wines and distilled spirits, they also make a small species by themselves, contained in the comprehensive genus of intoxicating drinks.

It was not discovered at first that this influence, common to so many substances derived from such various natural sources (the grape, the sugar-cane, barley, oats, rice, &c.), was owing to one sole ingredient occurring under various combinations. The identification had proceeded solely on their common influence on the human system, and not from a knowledge of the common element, alcohol. Had the grouping proceeded on this perception, the case would have been exactly like those above described, where

a taste or smell is identified in its mixtures with other tastes or smells. But the substances were classed together, without men knowing whether it was that many different liquors had the same action on the human body, or that there was one substance pervading many compounds, to which the influence was solely owing. It was a generalization of a common internal feeling or attribute, not of a common external object.

Another example akin to the foregoing is furnished by the Pungent Odours. The influence of the various kinds of snuff upon the nose is so well marked, that we readily identify it notwithstanding differences of aroma or flavour. Upon this similarity, we group all the different varieties together, and make a class of bodies, any one of which may be used for any other when the common effect of pungency is desired. The kinds of snuff would doubtless also be identified on the ground of their common origin, the tobacco plant, like wines by the grape. But looking at the subjective sensation of the snuffs, we find that this assimilates itself to a like sensation produced from other bodies; thus, the odour of smelling salts may by similarity recall the odour of snuffs, and the two different substances will hence be brought together in the mind. If we have at any time acquired the impression of hartshorn, this impression also might be recalled in virtue of its resemblance to these others; we should then have three distinct experiences summoned up from different times and circumstances of our past history, these experiences presenting three different substances lying quite remote from one another in nature, but now brought together under the view of the mind, through exerting on it a common influence. If our acquaintance with pungent odours had been still greater, others would be recalled to join the group already formed, and we should have amassed, from far or near, a multitude of recollections strung upon one common thread of resemblance, and these recollections would thenceforth be held together as a group in the mind, forming what we term a class, a genus, or a generalization of agreeing objects.

In this instance, there is no external element common

TOUCHES IDENTIFIED.

475

to all the bodies producing the pungent effect; the classification is based purely on the common sensation of smell. The smelling salts and hartshorn are identical, inasmuch as both yield ammonia; but the effluvium of snuff is not ammonia, although found to bear a resemblance to it in chemical constitution.

These various identifications put to the test the force of similarity in different individuals. While seized by some minds, they are wholly missed by others; and the reason for their being missed usually resolves itself into deficiency in one or more of the five conditions already recounted-natural delicacy of the sense itself, previous familiarity, acquired delicacy, low susceptibility to the points of difference, and general power of Similarity. Moreover, there may never have been any motive or desire to strike out identities in the department.

18. The illustration of Similarity in Touch might be very copious.

The intellectual sensations of Touch comprise the feelings of Temperature, of Plurality of points, and of Muscularity in conjunction with touch proper. Everything handled for the purpose of discerning its tactile properties affects all these sensibilities; and there may be the greatest variety in their conjunctions, and a corresponding scope for detecting likeness coupled with unlikeness. We identify the soft, warm contact of wool; the cold, hard smoothness of polished stone; the roughness of a file-in the midst of diversity of shape, size, and weight. We identify degrees of weight without much difficulty, unless distracted by some very acute accompanying sensibility, as cold or heat. We recognize tactile shape in variety of surface, material, weight, and size. Our discrimination of distinct properties becomes knowledge only when supplemented by our sense of agreement; a present high temperature is distinguished from a recent lower, and identified with previous experiences of the same intense degree; by which means our notion of that quality is complete. We are thus in possession of classes of things based

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