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perience of others, as distinguished from their outward circumstances and manifestations.

3. The subjective tendency is also necessary to the delicate sense of right and wrong. Ethical self-examination, to be thorough, must be conscious, having regard to the feelings, motives, or intentions of the actor. It may not, however, be

essential to rectitude in all degrees, but only to the highest degrees. The Stoical morality, as seen in Marcus Aurelius, was intensely subjective; so also is the highest morality of the modern world.

The best practical mode of seizing the ideal balance of the objective and subjective regards, is, in the manner of Aristotle, to study the extremes.

The objective regards have these signal advantages. They are favourable to activity; they promote health; they subdue both a considerable amount of pain, and also morbid broodings and discontents. They alternate the outbursts of pleasure with large periods of satisfied indifference; thereby enhancing enjoyments when they come. The delineation of Plot-Interest is the illustration of these advantages.

The disadvantages of too great Objectivity are expressed by the negation of what has been said in favour of the subjective regards.

The disadvantages of excessive Subjectivity are also implicated in the above remarks. Explicitly, they may be described as an inactive, unhealthy, morbid preying upon self; an aggravation of painful states generally; an extreme occupation of mind with organic feelings, called hypochondria; a tendency to push ethical self-examination to the point where it brings misery rather than a stimulus to duty; a mysticizing disposition to convert subjective abstractions, as soul, will, conscience, into independent existences; an extreme idealism, with a distaste for the practical world as it is; a susceptibility to opposition and to reproach; a revulsion against the coarse, indiscriminate energy of the objective man.

The ancient world, compared with the modern, was objective. Homer, as a poet, was in the objective extreme; Wordsworth is near the other extreme. Shakespeare has strong subjective leanings; but, in him, there is a good mixture of both.

The excess of subjectivity is seen in the religious mystics.

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An admirable example is introduced by Goethe, into Wilhelm Meister,' under the title Confessions of a Fair Saint.'

Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments' is a continuous subjective exposition; his language and illustration preponderate towards subjectivity.

4. The study of the mind, as a science, must contain an element of introspection. There is difference of opinion as to what ratio this should bear to the objective study of the physical concomitants of the mind. Some psychologists define the science of mind, as the science of the facts of Consciousness, meaning Self-consciousness or subjectivity; as, for example, Hamilton and Cousin. Auguste Comte, in his 'Cours de Philosophie Positive,' rejected self-consciousness as a source of mental knowledge, and proposed an exclusive reference to the material adjuncts, as exhibited in the Physiology of the brain. The only tenable position is the combination of both.

H.-The Abstractions-Number, Time, and Space.

In the great controversy as to whether our entire knowledge is derived from experience, or whether part of it is derived from an intuitive source, the supporters of the last-named view have given various enumerations of the elements declared to be intuitive or innate. Those elements are stated either in the shape of Notions, as Time, Space, Cause, or in the shape of Frinciples,as the axioms of Mathematics, and the law of Causation. point of fact, however, the same intuition is stated sometimes as a notion, and sometimes as a principle. Thus the intuition of space is considered identical with the intuition of the geometrical axioms. The notion 'cause,' and the law of cause and effect, must be treated as the same thing in a different form of speech.

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For example, Mr. Mansel's enumeration of innate elements (exclusive of the moral sentiment) would probably be exhausted by the notions-Time, Space, Cause, Substance, together with the principles of Identity, Contradiction, and Excluded Middle (called the Laws of thought). Each of the notions could at will be expressed in the form of principles. It is sometimes said, that the axioms of Geometry flow out of, or are derived from, the notion of Space; but, more correctly, the notion and the axioms are to be held as the same intuition in an altered dress.

Number. Of all the attributes of things knowable to us, the most comprehensive and widely-spread is Quantity. We cannot be conscious at all without the consciousness of more or less-of degree, or quantity. Our very first acts of discrimination and of identification have reference to the degree of our feelings; of two differing sensations of light, one is felt as more intense than the other; of two muscular energies, we recognize the difference of amount. It is the same with pleasures and pains, and with feelings of every description. The property called degree is inseparable alike from object states and from subject states. We even discriminate different modes of degree; we distinguish the fact of continuance from the fact of intensity, and estimate the degree of each by comparison with its own kind; one day is longer than another; one flame is brighter than another.

Our estimate of degree is more or less delicate according to the quality of the sense concerned. In the higher senses-sight and hearing, our discrimination is at the maximum as in the interesting case of visible, or retinal, magnitude.

Quantity, or degree, is familiarly divided into two kindscontinuous and discrete.

Continuous or unbroken quantity is the more typical form. Its best example is the Duration of a continuous impression-the continuance of a muscular exertion, a sound, a pleasure. It farther applies to Extension, whose primary measure is the continuance or duration of movement. It does not apply to intensive quantity, or the comparison between a stronger and a weaker impression, as the loudness of a sound, or the brilliancy of a light.

Discrete quantity is the same as number. It supposes our impressions to be interrupted, or changed; and takes advantage of the effect of sudden change in making us acutely conscious, or mentally wakeful. In the case of breaks, or interruptions, we note the frequency of the transitions; we mark the difference between a transition made once, and a series of those transitionstwo, three, four, and so on. This is Number. It is in various ways a remarkable experience. In the first place, it is given by every sensibility that we possess. By Aristotle, it was accounted one of the common perceivables, or the notions attained through all our senses alike; which is true, but not the whole truth. We have it by every one of our emotions; we distinguish a day when

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we had one surprise, one fright, one fit of anger, or one burst of tender feeling, from a day when we had two or three such experiences. We have it from the flow of our ideas, which are interrupted or discrete effects.

In the second place, Number is our best and most accurate means of estimating quantity. The most delicate of our sensibilities- visible magnitude, may be to some degree inaccurate; two persons may differ as to whether two rods exactly coincide in length; but nobody was ever mistaken in the difference between one and two. Hence the highest art of measuring both continuous quantity, and intensive quantity, consists in resolving each into discrete quantity; the beats of a clock are a surer measure of time than the place of the hands between the dial figures.

Probably no one now contends that Number is an intuition, or a form of thought,' provided by nature beforehand. It is a fact inseparable from the nature of our feelings; if these are intermitted and resumed, they are, by that very circumstance, numbered; and if our consciousness is interrupted by beats, or transitions, it is a consciousness of number.

Time. This is one of the intuitive forms' of the à priori school. The Experience-psychology treats it as an abstraction from particulars. In our feeling of the continuous, whether in movement, in sensation, in emotion, or in intellectual strain, we have a consciousness of degree, and that consciousness is the fact called Time, or Duration. Time in the abstract, is the generalization of all these modes of the continuous, and apart from these, or prior to these, it does not exist. We cannot be conscious of two movements being differently prolonged,-as, for example, lifting (at the same pace) a weight one foot and lifting it two feet-without having a particular experience of duration; we could not be deprived of that cognition, without being deprived of our discriminative muscular sensibility. If this be so, a form of thought pre-existing in the mind, corresponding to Time, is a superfluity; it could add nothing to our particular experiences of duration; and our generalizing faculty can obtain out of these whatever is meant by Time in general, or in the abstract.

Space. The origin of our notion of the Extended, the characteristic property of the object world, has been traced in its successive stages, under the heads of Muscular Feeling (p. 95), Touch (p. 181), Sight (p. 234), External Perception (p. 371). It

will, of course, be inferred that I do not regard it as an intuition of the mind, a form of thought, or an element transcending our actual experience. By such steps as I have endeavoured to describe, we derive our notions of extended things,—of extension in the concrete. And from this we can obtain an abstract notion of the extended, in the same manner as we gain any other abstract notion, as colour, heat, or justice.

The Kantian doctrine, which regards Space and Time as forms of thought, and not products of our experience, has been examined and, as I think, decisively refuted by various writers, among whom I may name Mr. Spencer (Psychology, pp. 52, 244, 309) and Mr. Bailey (Letters on the Mind). I do not here propose to argue the point. My plan has been to exhibit what seems to me the genesis of the notions; and if that is satisfactory to the reader, an à priori origin is disproved by being superseded. The objections urged by Locke against innate notions generally have never, to my mind, been repelled; and they have been reinforced since his time. It may be granted, however, that Locke did not succeed in explaining how we come by such notions as Space, Substance, and Power. The five senses, as commonly understood, are inadequate to the purpose. I am satisfied, however, that when the muscular feelings are fully taken into the account, the difficulty exists no longer. The à priori notion of space has a shadowy and evanescent character in the hands of Sir W. Hamilton, who concedes an empirical knowledge of extension, as an element of existence.' He proposes to give the name extension to our empirical knowledge of space, and to reserve the name of space for space considered as a form, or fundamental law of thought.' I confess myself altogether unable to follow him in constituting a difference between (empty) extension and space.

I.-Classification of the Intellectual Powers.

The Intellectual powers were classified by Reid as follows:External Senses; Memory; Conception, or Simple Apprehension; Abstraction, under which he discussed the questions of Nominalism, Realism, &c.; Judgment, or the theory of Common Sense as a basis of truth, the distinction between Necessity and Contingent Truth, &c.; Reasoning, which contains under it Demonstration.

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