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an Intellectual experience; and in proportion as it is wanting in these, and shows itself in pleasure or pain, it is of the nature of Feeling. The very same state of mind may have both an intellectual side and an emotional side; indeed, this is a usual occurrence. And, like many things that are radically contrasted, as day and night, these two distinct facts of our nature pass into one another by a gradual transition, so that an absolute line of separation is not always possible; a circumstance that does not invalidate the genuineness of their mutual contrast.

The exercise of Thought is greatly mixed up with Volition also, but there is rarely any difficulty in distinguishing the two functions. Indeed, it is hardly possible for us to exist in one exclusive state. Still, in our explanations of things, we often require to separate in statement what is not separated in fact.

4. If we advert to the various classifications of the mental phenomena that have hitherto passed current, we shall find that the three attributes above specified have been more or less distinctly recognized.

In the old division of mind into Understanding and Will, the element of Feeling would appear to be left out entirely. We shall find in fact, however, that the feelings are implied in, or placed under, both heads. The same remark applies to Reid's classification, also twofold and substantially identical with the foregoing, namely, into Intellectual Powers and Active Powers. The submerged department of Feeling will be found partly mixed up with the Intellectual Powers, wherein are included the Senses and the Emotions of Taste, and partly treated of among the Active Powers, which comprise the exposition of the benevolent and the malevolent Affections.

Dr. Thomas Brown, displeased with the mode of applying the term Active' in the above division, went into the other extreme, and brought forward a classification where Feeling seems entirely to overlie the region of Volition. He divides mental states into External affections and Internal affections. By external affections he means the feelings we have by the Senses, in other words, Sensation. The internal affections he

identical

CLASSIFICATIONS OF MIND.

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subdivides into Intellectual states of mind and Emotions. His division therefore is tantamount to Sensation, Emotion, and Intellect. All the phenomena commonly recognized as of an active or volitional character, he classes as a part of Emotion.

Sir William Hamilton, in remarking on the arrangement followed in the writings of Dugald Stewart, states his own view as follows:-'If we take the Mental to the exclusion of Material phenomena, that is, the phenomena manifested. through the medium of Self-consciousness or Reflection, they naturally divide themselves into three categories or primary genera; the phenomena of Knowledge or Cognition,-the phenomena of Feeling or of Pleasure and Pain,-and the phenomena of Conation or of Will and Desire.* Intelligence, Feeling, and Will, are thus distinctively set forth.

I may farther notice the mode of laying out the subject that has occurred to an able physiologist. I quote a passage intended as introductory to the Anatomy of the Nervous System.

'Of the functions performed through the agency of the nervous system, some are entirely corporeal, whilst others involve phenomena of a mental or psychical nature. In the latter and higher class of such functions are first to be reckoned those purely intellectual operations, carried on through the instrumentality of the brain, which do not immediately arise from an external stimulus, and do not manifest themselves in outward acts. To the same class also belong sensation and volition. In the exercise of sensation, the mind becomes conscious, through the medium of the brain, of impressions conducted or propagated to that organ along the nerves from distant parts; and in voluntary motion, a stimulus to action arises in the brain, and is carried outwards by the nerves from the central organ to the voluntary muscles. Lastly, emotion, which gives rise to gestures and movements, varying with the different mental affections which they express, is an involuntary state of the mind, connected with some part of the brain, and influencing the muscles through the medium of the nerves.'+

Editor.

Collected Works of Dugald Stewart, Vol. II.: Advertisement by the

+ Dr. Sharpey, in QUAIN's Anatomy, 6th edition, p. clxviii.

In this passage a quadruple partition is indicated,-Sensation, Intellect, Emotion, and Volition. Sensation is raised to the rank of a primary division. Except, however, as regards one important point to be afterwards adverted to, there is nothing in Sensation that does not come either under Feeling, as above defined, or under Intellect.

5. In the plan of the present volume, Part first, entitled 'Movement, Sense, and Instinct,' will include the discussion of both Feeling and Volition in their lower forms, that is, apart from Intellect, or so as to involve Intellect in the least possible degree; the Sensations of the different Senses will form a leading portion of the contents. This division will comprise all that is primitive or instinctive in the susceptibilities and impulses of the mental organization. The second Part will aim at a full exposition of the Intellectual properties.

Thus, while Feeling, Volition, and Intellect are regarded as the ultimate properties and the fundamental classification of mind, it is not proposed that the exposition should proceed strictly in the order thus stated.

Although Feeling and Volition, in their elementary aspect, can be explained before entering on the consideration of the Intellect, while one large important department of Feeling, namely, Sensation, is always considered as introductory to the Intellectual powers, yet the full exposition of the Emotions and the Active impulses of our nature properly comes last in the systematic arrangement of the mind.

6. It is requisite at the outset to give some intimation of a great mental law involved in the fundamental property of Discrimination above noticed, namely, the law of RELATIVITY. By this is meant that, as change of impression is an indispensable condition of our being conscious, or of being mentally alive either to feeling or to thought, every mental experience is necessarily twofold. We can neither feel nor know heat, except in the transition from cold. In every feeling there are two contrasting states; in every act of knowing, two things are known together.

LAW OF RELATIVITY.

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With reference to many of our feelings, mankind have always to some extent recognized the working of this principle. It is seen that the first shock of the transition from one state to another-from sickness to health, poverty to abundance, ignorance to knowledge—is the most intense, and that as the memory of the previous condition fades away, so does the liveliness of the emotion caused by the change. Leisure, retirement, rest, are enjoyed only by contrast to previous toils. The incessant demands for novelty and change, for constant advances in wealth, in knowledge, in the arrangements of society, farther show the principle of Relativity as applied to pleasure.

Language contains many names avowedly relative, as parent, child; ruler, subject; up, down; north, south; light, dark; virtue, vice. It is obvious that either name in those couples implies the other; there can be no ruler without a subject. But, in reality, the principle of Relativity applies to everything that we are capable of knowing. Whatever we can conceive implies some other thing or things also conceivable, the contrast, co-relative, or negative of that. Red means the exclusion of all the other colours. If we had never been affected by any colour except red, colour would never have been recognized by us. When we speak of a fixed star, we mean to exclude certain other things-the sun, planets, comets, &c. When we make an affirmation, the stars shine. by their own light,' we also by implication make a denial, 'the stars do not borrow their light.'

The applications of this principle are numerous and important. It bears directly on the arts of human happiness; it is essentially involved in Fine Art; it must be attended to in the communication of knowledge; in Metaphysics it conflicts with the doctrine of the Absolute. (For farther remarks on the Definition and Divisions of Mind, see APPENDIX A.)

1. A

CHAPTER II.

THE NERVOUS SYSTEM.

LTHOUGH Subject and Object (Mind and Matter) are

the most diametrically opposite facts of our experience, yet there is a concomitance or connexion between mind and a material organism. This position is best supported by the subsequent details. (See also APPENDIX B.)

The parts of the human frame that chiefly concern the student of mental science are the Nerves and Nerve Centres (principally collected in the Brain), the Organs of Sense, and the Muscular System. The organs of sense and of movement will be described afterwards; a brief description of the Nerves and Nerve Centres will occupy this preliminary chapter, in which we shall confine ourselves as far as possible to the facts bearing directly or indirectly upon Mind.

2. 'That the Brain is the principal organ of Mind is proved by such observations as the following:

(1.) From the local feelings that we experience during mental excitement. In most cases of bodily irritation, we can assign the place or seat of the disturbance. We localize indigestion in the stomach, irritation of the lungs in the chest, toothache in the gums or jaws; and when the mental workings give rise to pain, we point to the head. In ordinary circumstances we have no local consciousness of mental action, but in a time of great mental agitation, or after any unusual exertion of thought, the aching or oppression in the head tells where the seat of action is, precisely as aching limbs prove what muscles have been exercised during a long day's march. The observation can occasionally be carried much farther; for it is found that a series of intense mental emotions, or an excessive strain on the powers of thinking, will end in a diseased alteration of the substance of the brain.

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