An afterthought. by outside world. tains brief references to his mechanical metaphysics and psychology, but is a most practical and well-organized discussion of the educational process. Herbart's Psychology.-Herbart's metaphysical psychology seems to have been an after-thought developed to afford a basis for the method of pedagogical procedure that he had worked out of his tutorial experience and his acquaintance with the Pestalozzian practice. But some explanation of this elaborate psychology may serve to make clearer his educational principles. For the most Mind built up part he holds that the mind is built up by the outside world, and he is generally supposed to have left no place for instincts or innate characteristics and tendencies. With him the simplest elements of consciousness are 'ideas,' which are atoms of mind stuff thrown off from the soul in endeavoring to maintain itself against external stimuli. Once produced by this contact of the soul with its environment, the ideas become existences with their own dynamic force, and constantly strive to preserve themselves. They struggle to attain as nearly as possible to the summit of consciousness, and each idea tends to draw into consciousness or heighten those allied to it, and to depress or force out those which are unlike. Each new idea or group of ideas is heightened, modified, or rejected, according to its degree of harmony or conflict with the previously existing ideas. In other words, all new ideas are interpreted through those already in consciousness. In accordance with this principle, which Herbart called 'apperception,' the teacher can secure interest and the attention of the pupil to any new idea or set of ideas and have him retain it, only through making use of his previous body of related knowledge. Genesis and combination of ideas. 'Apperception.' character as Hence the educational problem becomes how to present new material in such a way that it can be 'apperceived' or incorporated with the old, and the mind of the pupil is largely in the hands of the teacher, since he can make or modify his 'apperception masses,' or systems of ideas. The Aim, Content, and Method of Education.-Accordingly, Herbart holds that the purpose of education should be to establish moral and religious character. He Attainment of believes that this final aim can be attained through aim. instruction, and that, to determine how this shall furnish a 'moral revelation of the world,' a careful study must be made of each pupil's thought masses, temperament, and mental capacity. There is not much likelihood of the pupil's receiving ideas of virtue that will develop into glowing ideals of conduct when his studies do not appeal to his thought systems and are consequently regarded with indifference and aversion. They must coalesce with the ideas he already has, and thus touch his life. But Herbart does not limit 'interest' to a temporary stimulus for the performance of certain school tasks; he advocates the building up by education of certain broad interests that may become permanent Many-sided sources of appeal in life. Instruction must be so selected and arranged as not only to relate itself to the previous experience of the pupil, but as also to reveal and establish all the relations of life and conduct in their fullness. interest.' In analyzing this 'many-sided interest,' Herbart holds that ideas and interests spring from two main sources,'experience,' which furnishes us with a knowledge of nature, and 'social intercourse,' from which come the sentiments toward our fellowmen. Interests may, there- 'Knowledge' fore, be classed as belonging to (1) 'knowledge' or to tion' interests. and 'participa (2) 'participation.' These two sets of interests, in turn, Herbart divides into three groups each. He classed the 'knowledge' interests as (a) ‘empirical,' appealing directly to the senses; (b) 'speculative,' seeking to perceive the relations of cause and effect; and (c) 'æsthetic,' resting upon the enjoyment of contemplation. The 'participation' interests are divided into (a) '‘sympathetic,' dealing with relations to other individuals; (b) 'social,' including the community as a whole; and (c) 'religious,' treating one's relations to the Divine. Instruction must, therefore, develop all these interests, and, to correspond with the two main groups, Herbart and 'scientific' divides all studies into two branches,—the (1) ‘historical,' 'Historical' subjects. 'Correlation' and 'concentration.' including history, literature, and languages; and the (2) 'scientific,' embracing mathematics, as well as the natural sciences. Although recognizing the value of both groups, Herbart especially stressed the 'historical,' on the ground that history and literature are of greater importance as the sources of moral ideas and sentiments. But, while all the subjects, 'historical' and 'scientific,' are needed for a 'many-sided interest,' and the various studies have for convenience been separated and classified by themselves, Herbart holds that they must be so arranged in the curriculum as to become unified and an organic whole, if the unity of the pupil's consciousness is to be maintained. This position forecasts the emphasis upon 'correlation,' or the unification of studies, so common among his followers. The principle was further developed by later Herbartians under the name of 'concentration,' or the unifying of all subjects around one or two common central studies, such as literature or history. But the selection and articulation of the subject matter in such a way as to arouse many-sidedness and harmony is not more than hinted at by Herbart himself. He specifically holds, however, that the Odyssey should be the first work read, since this represents the interests and activities of the race while in its youth, and would appeal to the individual during the same stage. He would follow this with other Greek classics in the order of the growing complexity of racial interests depicted in them. This tentative endeavor of Herbart, in the selection of material for the course of study, to parallel the development of the individual with that of the race, was continued and enlarged by his disciples. It became especially definite and fixed in the 'culture epochs' 'Culture theory formulated by Ziller and others. epochs.' Herbart's But to secure this broad range of material and to unify and systematize it, Herbart realized that it was necessary to formulate a definite method of instructing the child. This plan of instruction he wished to conform to the development and working of the human mind, and on the basis of what he conceived this activity to be, he mapped out a method with four logical steps: (1) 'clearness,' the presentation of facts or elements to be learned; (2) 'association,' the uniting of these with related facts Four steps in previously acquired; (3) 'system,' the coherent and method of in logical arrangement of what has been associated; and (4) 'method,' the practical application of the system by the pupil to new data. The formulation of this method was made only in principle by Herbart, but it has since been largely modified and developed by his followers. It was soon felt that, on the principle of 'apperception,' the pupil must first be made conscious of the existing stock of ideas so far as they are similar struction. 'Five formal steps.' to the material to be presented, and that this can be accomplished by a review of preceding lessons or by an outline of what is to be undertaken, or by both procedures. Hence Herbart's noted disciple, Ziller, divided the step of 'clearness' into 'preparation' and 'presentation,' and the more recent Herbartian, Rein, added 'aim' as a substep to 'preparation.' The names of the other three processes have been changed for the sake of greater lucidity and significance by still later Herbartians, and the 'five formal steps of instruction' are now given as (1) 'preparation' (2) 'presentation,' (3) 'comparison and abstraction,' (4) 'generalization,' and (5) ‘application.' The Value and Influence of Herbart's Principles.On all sides, then, as compared with Pestalozzi, Herbart was most logical and comprehensive. Where Pestalozzi obtained his methods solely from a sympathetic insight into the child mind, Herbart sought to found his also upon scientific principles. The former was primarily a philanthropist and reformer; the latter, a psychologist and educationalist. Pestalozzi succeeded in arousing Europe to the need of universal education and of vitaliztion' through ing the prevailing formalism in the schools, but he was Clarified vague principle an ingenious psychology, unable with his vague and unsystematic utterances to give guidance and efficiency to the reform forces he had initiated. While he felt the need of beginning with sense perception for the sake of clear ideas, he had neither the time nor the training to construct a psychology beyond the traditional one of the times, nor to analyze the way in which the material gained by observation is assimilated. Herbart, on the other hand, did create a system of psychology that, while fanciful and mechanical, worked well as a basis for educational theory and prac |