Voluntary oppos'd to Inv luntary, not to Neceffary.

Liberty what.

Neceflity what

Liberty be

lengs not to the Will.

preferring; but to the Perfon having the Power of doing, or forbearing to do, according as the Mind fhall chufe or direct. Our Idea of Liberty reaches as far as that Power, and no farther. For wherever Reftraint comes to check that Power, or Compulfion takes away that Indifferency of Ability on either fide to act, or to forbear acting; there Liberty, and our Notion of it, prefently ceafes.

. 11. We have Inftances enough, and often more than enough in our own Bodies. A Man's Heart beats, and the Blood circulates, which 'tis not in his power by any Thought or Volition to ftop; and therefore in refpect of these Motions, where Reft depends not on his Choice, nor would follow the Determination of his Mind, if it fhould prefer it, he is not a free Agent. Convulfive Motions agitate his Legs, fo that, tho' he wills it ever fo much, he cannot by any Power of his Mind flop their Motion, (as in that odd Difcafe call'd Chorea Sancti Viti) but he is perpetually dancing: He is not at liberty in this A&ion, but under as much neceffity of moving, as a Stone that falls, or a Tennis-ball ftruck with a Racket. On the other fide, a Palfy or the Stocks hinder his Legs from obeying the Determination of his Mind, if it would thereby transfer his Body to another place. In all thefe there is want of Freedom; tho' the fitting ftill even of a Paralytick, whilft he prefers it to a Removal, is truly voluntary. Voluntary then is not oppos'd to Necessary, but to Involuntary. For a Man may prefer what he can do, to what he cannot do; the State he is in, to its Ablence or Charge, tho' N. ceffity has made it in it fe funalterable.

§. 12. As it is in the Motions of the Body, fo it is in the Thoughts of our Minds: where any one is fuch, that we have power to take it up, or lay it by, according to the Preference of the Mind, there we are at liberty. A waking Man being under the neceffity of having fome Ideas conftantly in his Mind, is not at liberty to think, or not to think; no more than he is at liberty, whether his Body fhall touch any other or no: But whether he will remove his Contemplation from one Idea to another, is many times in his Choice; and then he is in respect of his Ideas as much at liberty, as he is in refpect of Bodies he refts on: he can at pleasure remové himself from one to another. But yet fome Ideas to the Mind, like fome Motions to the Body, are fuch as in certain Circumstances it cannot avoid, nor obtain their abfence by the utmoft Effort it can use. A Man on the Rack is not at liberty to lay by the Idea of Pain, and divert himself with other Contemplations: And fometimes a boifterous Paffion hurries our Thoughts as a Hurricane does our Bodies, without leaving us the L.berty of thinking on other things, which we would rather chufe. But as foon as the Mind regains the Power to ftop or continue, begin or forbear, any of these Motions of the Body without, or Thoughts within, according as it thinks fit to prefer either to the other, we then confider the Man as a free Agent again.

§. 13. Wherever Thought is wholly wanting, or the Power to act or for bear according to the Direction of Thought, there Neceffity takes place. This in an Agent capable of Volition, when the Beginning or Continuation of any Action is contrary to that Preference of his Mind, is call'd Compulfion; when the hindering or stopping any Action is contrary to his Volition, it is call'd Reftraint. Agents that have no Thought, no Volition at all, are in every thing neceffary Agents.

9.-14. If this be fo (as I imagine it is) I leave it to be confider'd, whether it may not help to put an end to that long-agitated, and I think unreafonable, becaufe unintelligible Question, viz. Whether Man's Will be free, or no? For if I mistake not, it follows from what I have faid, that the Question it self is altogether improper; and it is as infignificant to ask, whether Man's Will be free, as to ask whether his Sleep be fwift, or his Vertue fquare; Liberty being as little applicable to the Will, as Swittnefs of Motion is to Sleep, or Squareness to Vertue. Every one would laugh at the Abfurdity of fuch a Question as either of thefe, because it is obvious, that the Modifications of Motion belong not to Sleep, nor the Difference of Figure to Vertue: And when any one well con fiders it, I think he will as plainly perceive, that Liberty, which is but a Power, belongs only to Agents, and cannot be an Attribute or Modification of the Will, which is alfo but a Power.

§. 15.

. 15. Such is the difficulty of explaining and giving clear Notions of inter- Volition. nal Actions by Sounds, that I muft here warn my Reader that Ordering, Directing, Chufing, Preferring, &c. which I have made ufe of will not diftin&tly enough expreis Volition, unless he will reflect on what he himself does when he wills. For example, Preferring, which feems perhaps best to exprefs the A&t of Volition, does it not precifely. For tho' a Man would prefer flying to walking, yet who can say he ever wills it? Volition, 'tis plain, is an Act of the Mind knowingly exerting that Dominion it takes it felf to have over any part of a Man, by employing it in, or with-holding it from any particular Action. And what is the Will, but the Faculty to do this? And is that Faculty any thing more in effect than a Power, the Power of the Mind to determine its Thought, to the producing, continuing, or ftopping any Action, as far as it depends on us? For can it be deny'd, that whatever Agent has a Power to think on its own Actions, and to prefer their doing or omiffion either to other, has that Faculty call'd Will? Will then is nothing but fuch a Power. Liberty, on the other fide, is the Power a Man has to do or forbear doing any particular Action, according as its doing or forbearance has the actual preference in the Mind; which is the fame thing as to fay, according as he himself wills it.

§. 16. "Tis plain then, that the Will is nothing but one Power or Ability, Powers belong and freedom another Power or Ability: fo that to ask, whether the Will has to Agents. Freedom, is to ask whether one Power has another Power, one Ability another Ability; a Question at first fight too grofly abfurd to make a dispute, or need an anfwer. For who is it that fees not that Powers belong only to Agents, and are Attributes only of Subftances, and not of Powers themfelves? So that this Way of putting the Queftion, viz. Whether the Will be free? is in effect to ask, Whether the Will be a Substance, an Agent? or at least to suppose it, fince Freedom can properly be attributed to nothing elfe. If Freedom can with any Propriety of Speech be apply'd to Power, it may be attributed to the Power that is in a Man to produce, or forbear producing Motion in parts of his Body, by Choice or Preference; which is that which denominates him free, and is Freedom it felf. But if any one should ask, whether Freedom were free, he would be fufpected not to understand well what he faid; and he would be thought to deferve Midas's Ears, who knowing that rich was a Denomination from the Poffeffion of Riches, fhould demand whether Riches themselves were rich.

§. 17. However the name Faculty, which Men have given to this Power call'd the Will, and whereby they have been led into a way of talking of the Will as acting, may, by an Appropriation that difguifes its true Senfe, ferve a little to palliate the Abfurdity; yet the Will in truth fignifies nothing but a Power, or Ability, to prefer or chufe: And when the Will, under the name of a Faculty, is confider'd as it is, barely as an Ability to do fomething, the Abfurdity in saying it is free, or not free, will eafily difcover it felf. For if it be reasonable to fuppofe and talk of Faculties, as diftinct Beings that can act, (as we do, when we fay the Will orders, and the Will is free) 'tis fit that we fhould make a speaking Faculty, and a walking Faculty, and a dancing Faculty, by which those Actions are produc'd, which are but feveral Modes of Motion; as well as we make the Will and Understanding to be Faculties, by which the A&ions of Chufing and Perceiving are produc'd, which are but feveral Modes of Thinking: And we may as properly fav, that 'tis the finging Faculty fings, and the dancing Faculty dances; as that the Will chufes, or that the Underflanding conceives; or, as is usual, that the Will directs the Understanding, or the Understanding obeys, or obeys not the Will It being altogether as proper and intelligible to fay, that the Power of Speaking directs the Power of Singing, or the Power of Singing obeys or difobeys the Power of Speaking.

18. This way of talking, nevertheless, has prevail'd, and, as I guess, produced great Confufion. For thefe being all different Powers in the Mind, or in the Man, to do feveral Actions, he exerts them as he thinks fit: but the Power to do one Action, is not operated on by the Power of doing another Action. For the Pover of Thinking operates not on the Power of Chufing, nor the Power of Chufing on the Power of Thinking; no more than the Power of Dancing operates on the Power of Singing, or the Power of Singing on the Power of Dancing; as any one, who reflects on it, will eafily perceive: And

yer

Liberty be

the Will.

yet this is it which we fay, when we thus fpeak, That the Will operates on the Understanding, or the Understanding on the Will.

. 19. I grant, that this or that actual Thought may be the Occafion of Volition, or exercifing the Power a Man has to chufe; or the actual Choice of the Mind, the Caufe of actual thinking on this or that thing: as the actual finging of fuch a Tune, may be the Occafion of dancing fuch a Dance, and the actual dancing of fuch a Dance the occafion of finging fuch a Tune. But in all these it is not one Power that operates on another: But it is the Mind that operates, and exerts thefe Powers; it is the Man that does the Action, it is the Agent that has Power, or is able to do. For Powers are Relations, not Agents: And that which has the Power, or not the Power to operate, is that alone which is or is not free, and not the Power it felf. For Freedom, or not Freedom, can belong to nothing, but what has or has not a Power to a&.

9. 20. The attributing to Faculties that which belong'd not to them, has longs not to given occafion to this way of talking: But the introducing into Difcourfes concerning the Mind, with the name of Faculties, a Notion of their operating, has, I fuppofe, as little advanc'd our Knowledg in that part of our felves, as the great ufe and mention of the like Invention of Faculties, in the Operations of the Body, has help'd us in the Knowledg of Phyfick. Not that I deny there are Faculties, both in the Body and Mind: They both of them have their Powers of Operating, elfe neither the one nor the other could operate. For nothing can operate, that is not able to operate; and that is not able to operate, that has no Power to operate. Nor do I deny, that thofe Words, and the like, are to have their place in the common Ute of Languages, that have made them current. It looks like too much Affectation wholly to lay them by And Philosophy it felf, tho' it likes not a gaudy Drefs, yet when it appears in publick, muft have fo much Complacency, as to be clothed in the ordinary Fashion and Language of the Country, fo far as it can confift with Truth and Prefpicuity. But the fault has been, that Faculties have been spoken of and reprefented as fo many diftinct Agents. For it being ask'd, what it was that digefted the Meat in our Stomachs? It was a ready and very fatisfa&tory Anfwer, to fay, that it was the digeftive Faculty. What was it that made any thing come out of the Body? the expulfive Faculty. What moved? the motive Faculty. And fo in the Mind, the intellectual Faculty, or the Understanding, understood; and the elective Faculty, or the Will, willed or commanded. Which is in fhort to fay, That the Ability to digeft, digefted; and the Ability to move, moved; and the Ability to understand, understood. For Faculty, Ability, and Power, I think, are but diffe rent names of the fame things: which ways of fpeaking, when put into more intelligible words, will I think amount to thus much; that Digeftion is perform'd by fomething that is able to digeft, Motion by fomething able to move, and Understanding by fomething able to understand. And in truth it would be very strange if it fhould be otherwife; as ftrange as it would be, for a Man to be free without being able to be free.

But to the A

. 21. To return then to the Enquiry about Liberty, I think the Question is gent or Man not proper, whether the Will be free, but whether a Man be free. Thus, I think, 1. That fo far as any one can, by the Direction or Choice of his Mind, preferring the Existence of any Action to the Non-existence of that Action, and vice verfa make it to exift or not exift; fo far he is free. For if I can, by a Thought directing the Motion of my Finger, make it move when it was at reft, or vice verfa; 'tis evident, that in refpe&t of that I am free: and if I can, by a like Thought of my Mind, preterring one to the other, produce either Words or Silence, I am at liberty to fpeak, or hold my peace; and as far as this Power reaches, of acting, or not acting, by the Determination of his own Thought preferring either, So far is a Man free. For how can we think any one freer, than to have the pow er to do what he will? And fo far as any one can, by preferring any Action to its not being, or Reft to any A&tion, produce that Action or Reft, fo tar can he do what he will For fuch a preferring of Action to its abfence, is the willing of it; and we can scarce tell how to imagine any Being freer, than to be able to do what he wills. So that in refpect of Actions within the reach of fuch, a Power in him, a Man feems as free, as 'tis poffible for Freedom to make him.

§. 22.

. 22. But the inquifitive Mind of Man, willing to fhift off from himself, as In respect of far as he can, all Thoughts of Guilt, tho' it be by putting himself into a worfe willing, a ftate than that of fatal Neceffity, is not content with this: Freedom, unless Man is not free. it reaches farther than this, will not ferve the turn: And it paffes for a good Plea, that a Man is not free at all, if he be not as free to will, as he is to act what he wills. Concerning a Man's Liberty, there yet therefore is rais'd this farther Queftion, Whether a Man be free to will? which I think is what is meant, when it is difputed whether the Will be free. And as to that I imagine,

§. 23. 2. That Willing, or Volition, being an Action, and Freedom confifting in a Power of acting or not acting, a Man in respect of willing, or the Act of Volition, "when any Action in his power is once propos'd to his Thoughts, as presently to be done, cannot be free. The reafon whereof is very manifeft: For it being unavoidable that the A&tion depending on his Will fhould exift, or not exift; and its Existence, or not Exiftence, following perfectly the Determination and Preference of his Will, he cannot avoid willing the Existence, or not Existence of that Action; it is abfolutely neceffary that he will the one, or the other, i. e. prefer the one to the other: fince one of them muft neceflarily follow; and that which does follow, follows by the Choice and Determination of his Mind, that is, by his willing it: for if he did not will it, it would not be. So that in refpect of the Act of Willing, a Man in fuch a cafe is not free: Liberty consisting in a Power to act, or not to act; which, in regard of Volition, a Man, upon fuch a propofal, has not. For it is unavoidably neceffary to prefer the doing or forbearance of an Action in a Man's power, which is once fo propos'd to his Thoughts; a Man muft neceffarily will the one or the other of them, upon which Preference or Volition, the Action or its Forbearance certainly follows, and is truly voluntary. But the Act of Volition, or preferring one of the two, being that which he cannot avoid, a Man in refpect of that Act of Willing, is under a neceffity, and fo cannot be free; unlefs Neceffity and Freedom can confift together, and a Man can be free and bound at once.

§. 24. This then is evident, That in all Propofals of prefent Action, a Man is not at liberty to will or not to will, because he cannot forbear willing: Liberty confifting in a Power to act or to forbear acting, and in that only. For a Man that fits ftill, is faid yet to be at liberty, because he can walk if he wills it, But if a Man fitting ftill has not a Power to remove himself, he is not at liberty; fo likewise a Man falling down a Precipice, tho' in motion, is not at liberty, because he cannot stop that motion if he would. This being fo, 'tis plain that a Man that is walking, to whom it is propos'd to give off walking, is not at liberty whether he will determine himself to walk, or give off walking, or no: He muft neceffarily prefer one, or t'other of them, walking or not walking; and fo it is in regard of all other Actions in our power fo propos'd, which are the far greater number. For confidering the vast number of voluntary Actions that fucceed one another every moment that we are awake in the courfe of our Lives, there are but few of them that are thought on or propos'd to the Will, till the time they are to be done : And in all fuch Actions, as I have fhewn, the Mind in refpect of willing has not a power to act, or not to act, wherein confifts Liberty. The Mind in that cafe has not a power to forbear willing; it cannot avoid fome Determination concerning them, let the Confideration be as fhort, the Thought as quick as it will, it either leaves the Man in the ftate he was before thinking, or changes it; continues the Action, or puts an end to it. Whereby it is manifeft, that it orders and directs one, in preference to or with neglect of the other, and thereby either the continuation or change becomes unavoidably voluntary.

without it.

§. 25. Since then it is plain, that in moft cafes a Man is not at liberty, whe- The Will dether he will or no; the next thing demanded, is, Whether a Man be at liberty termin'd by to will which of the two he pleases, Motion or Reft? This Queftion carries the Ab- Jomething furdity of it fo manifeftly in it felf, that one might thereby fufficiently be convinc'd that Liberty concerns not the Will. For to ask, whether a Man be at liberty to will either Motion or Reft, Speaking or Silence, which he pleases; is to ask, whether a Man can will what he wills, or be pleas'd with what he is pleas'd with. A Question which, I think, needs no Answer; and they who can make

a

a Question of it, muft fuppofe one Will to determine the Acts of another, and another to determine that; and fo on in infinitum.

. 26. To avoid thefe and the like Abfurdities, nothing can be of greater ufe, than to establish in our Minds determin'd Ideas of the things under confideration. If the Ideas of Liberty and Volition were well fix'd in our Understandings, and carry'd along with us in our Minds, as they ought, thro' all the Queftions that are rais'd about them; I fuppofe a great part of the Difficulties that perplex Mens Thoughts, and entangle their Understandings, would be much eafier refolv'd; and we fhould perceive where the confus'd Signification of Terms, or where the nature of the thing caus'd the Obfcurity.

Freedom. §. 27. First then, it is carefully to be remember'd, That Freedom confits in the Dependence of the Existence, or not Existence of any Action, upon our Volition of it; and not in the Dependence of any Action, or its contrary, on our preference. A Man standing on a Cliff, is at liberty to leap twenty Yards downwards into the Sea, not because he has a power to do the contrary Action, which is to leap twenty Yards upwards, for that he cannot do: but he is therefore free, because he has a power to leap or not to leap. But if a greater Force than his either holds him faft, or tumbles him down, he is no longer free in that cafe : because the doing or forbearance of that particular Action, is no longer in his Power. He that is a close Prisoner in a Room twenty foot fquare, being at the North-fide of his Chamber, is at liberty to walk twenty foot Southward, because he can walk or not walk it; but is not, at the fame time, at liberty to do the contrary, and to walk twenty foot Northward.

In this then confifts Freedom, viz. in our being able to act or not to act, according as we fhall chufe or will.

Volitionwhat. §. 28. Secondly, We must remember, that Volition or Willing, is an Act of the Mind directing its Thought to the Production of any Action, and thereby exerting its Power to produce it. To avoid multiplying of words, I would crave leave here, under the word Action, to comprehend the forbearance too of any Action propos'd; fitting ftill, or holding one's peace, when walking or Speaking are propos'd, tho' mere Forbearances, requiring as much the Determination of the Will, and being often as weighty in their Confequences as the contrary Actions, may, on that confideration, well enough pafs for Actions too: But this I fay, that I may not be mistaken, if for brevity fake I speak thus.

What deter

§. 29. Thirdly, The Will being nothing but a Power in the Mind to direct minestheWill, the operative Faculties of a Man to Motion or Reft, as far as they depend on fuch Direction: To the Queftion, What is it determines the Will? the true and proper Answer is, The Mind. For that which determines the general Power of directing to this or that particular Direction, is nothing but the Agent it felf exercising the Power it has that particular way. If this Answer fatisfies not, 'tis plain the meaning of the Queftion, What determines the Will? is this, what moves the Mind, in every particular Inftance to determine its general Power of directing to this or that particular Motion or Reft? And to this I answer, The Motive for continuing in the fame State or Action, is only the prefent Satisfaction in it; the Motive to change, is always fome Uneafiness : nothing fetting us upon the change of State, or upon any new Action, but some Uneafinefs. This is the great Motive that works on the Mind to put it upon Action, which for fhortnefs fake we will call determining of the Will; which I fhall more at large explain.

Will and De

fire must not be confounded.

. 30. But in the way to it, it will be neceffary to premife, that tho' I have above endeavour'd to express the Act of Volition by Chufing, Preferring, and the like terms, that fignity Defire as well as Volition, for want of other words to mark that Act of the Mind, whofe proper Name is Willing or Volition; yet it being a very fimple Act, whofoever defires to understand what it is, will better find it by reflecting on his own Mind, and obferving what it does when it wills, than by any variety of articulate Sounds whatfoever. This Caution of being careful not to be misled by Expreffions that do not enough keep up the difference between the Will and several Acts of the Mind that are quite diftinct from it, I think the more neceffary; because I find the Will often confounded with feveral of the Affections, efpecially Defire, and one put for the other; and that by Men who would not willingly be thought not to have had very diftinct

Notions