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Power of beginning or ftopping feveral Thoughts or Motions. We have alfo the Ideas of feveral Qualities inherent in Bodies, and have the clear diftin& Ideas of them which Qualities are but the various Modifications of the Extenfion of cohering folid Parts, and their Motion. We have likewile the Ideas of the feveral Modes of Thinking, viz. Believing, Doubting, Intending, Fearing, Hoping; all which are but the feveral Modes of Thinking. We have alfo the Ideas of willing, and moving the Body confequent to it, and with the Body it felf too; for, as has been fhewn, Spirit is capable of Motion.

§. 31. Laftly, If this Notion of immaterial Spirit may have perhaps fome The Notion of Difficulties in it, not easy to be explain'd, we have therefore no more reason to Spirit involves deny or doubt the Exiftence of fuch Spirits, than we have to deny or doubt no more Difficulty in it the Exiftence of Body; because the Notion of Body is cumber'd with fome than that of Difficulties very hard, and perhaps impoffible to be explain'd or understood by Body. us. For I would fain have inftanc'd any thing in our Notion of Spirit more perplex'd, or nearer a Contradiction, than the very Notion of Body includes in it; the Divifibility in infinitum of any finite Extenfion, involving us, whether we grant or deny it, in Confequences impoffible to be explicated or made in our Apprehenfions confiftent; Confequences that carry greater Difficulty, and more apparent Abfurdity, than any thing can follow from the Notion of an immaterial knowing Substance.

6. 32. Which we are not at all to wonder at, fince we, having but fome few We know nofuperficial Ideas of things, difcover'd to us only by the Senfes from without, thing beyond our fimple or by the Mind, reflecting on what it experiments in it felf within, have no Ideas. knowledg beyond that, much less of the internal Conftitution, and true Nature of things, being deftitute of Faculties to attain it. And therefore experimenting and difcovering in our felves Knowledg, and the Power of voluntary Motion, as certainly as we experiment, or discover in things without us, the Cohesion and Separation of folid Parts, which is the Extenfion and Motion of Bodies; we have as much reafon to be fatisfy'd with our Notion of immaterial Spirit, as with our Notion of Body, and the Existence of the one as well as the other. For it being no more a Contradiction that Thinking hould exift, feparate and independent from Solidity, than it is a Contradiction that Solidity fhould exift, feparate and independent from Thinking, they being both but fimple Ideas, independent one from another; and having as clear and diftin&t Ideas in us of Thinking, as of Solidity, I know not why we may not as well allow a thinking thing without Solidity, i. e. immaterial, to exift, as a folid thing without Thinking, i. e. Matter, to exift; efpecially fince it is not harder to conceive how Thinking fhould exift without Matter, than how Matter fhould think. For whenfoever we would proceed beyond thefe fimple Ideas we have from Senfation and Reflection, and dive farther into the Nature of things, we fall prefently into Darkness and Obfcurity, Perplexednefs and Difficulties; and can difcover nothing farther but our own Blindnefs and Ignorance. But which-ever of thefe complex Ideas be cleareft, that of Body, or immaterial Spirit, this is evident, that the fimple Ideas that make them up, are no other than what we have receiv'd from Senfation or Reflection; and fo is it of all our other Ideas of Subftances, even of God himself.

. 33. For if we examine the Idea we have of the incomprehenfible fupreme Idea of God. Being, we fhall find, that we come by it the fame way; and that the complex Ideas we have both of God and feparate Spirits, are made up of the fimple Ideas we receive from Reflection; v. g. having from what we experiment in our felves, the Ideas of Exiftence and Duration; of Knowledg and Powers, of Pleasure got and Happiness; and of feveral other Qualities and Powers, which it is better to have than to be without: when we would frame an Idea the most suitable we can to the fupreme Being, we enlarge every one of these with our Idea of Infinity; and fo putting them together, make our complex Idea of God. For that the Mind has fuch a Power of enlarging fome of its Ideas, receiv'd from Senfation and Reflection, has been already hewn.

S. 34. If I find that I know fome few things, and fome of them, or all, perhaps imperfectly, I can frame an Idea of knowing twice as many; which I can double again, as often as I can add to Number; and thus enlarge my Idea of Knowledg, by extending its Comprehension to all things exifting, or poffible.


Idea of God.

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The fame alfo I can do of knowing them more perfectly; i. e. all their Qualities, Powers, Causes, Confequences, and Relations, &c. till all be perfectly known that is in them, or can any way relate to them; and thus frame the Idea of infinite or boundless Knowledg. The fame may alfo be done of Power, till we come to that we call infinite; and alfo of the Duration of Existence, without Beginning or End; and fo frame the Idea of an eternal Being. The Degrees or Extent wherein we afcribe Existence, Power, Wildom, and all other Perfection (which we can have any Ideas of) to that Sovereign Being which we call God, being all boundless and infinite, we frame the beft Idea of him, our Minds are capable of: All which is done, I say, by enlarging thofe fimple Ideas we have taken from the Operations of our own Minds, by Reflection; or by our Senfes, from exteriour things, to that Valtnefs to which Infinity can extend them.

§. 35. For it is Infinity, which join'd to our Ideas of Exiftence, Power, Knowledg, &c. makes that complex Idea, whereby we reprefent to our felves, the best we can, the fupreme Being. For tho' in his own Effence (which certainly we do not know, not knowing the real Effence of a Pebble, or a Fly, or of our own felves) God be fimple and uncompounded; yet, I think, I may fay we have no other Idea of him, but a complex one of Exittence, Knowledg, Power, Happiness, &c. infinite and eternal: which are all diftin&t Ideas, and fome of them being relative, are again compounded of others; all which being, as has been fhewn, originally got from Senfation and Reflection, go to make up the Idea or Notion we have of God.

No Ideas in . 36. This farther is to be observ'd, that there is no Idea we attribute to our complex God, bating Infinity, which is not alfo a part of our complex Idea of other one of Spirits, Spirits. Because, being capable of no other fimple Ideas, belonging to any but thofe got thing but Body, but those which by Reflection we receive from the Operation from Senfati on or Reflectis of our own Minds, we can attribute to Spirits no other but what we receive from thence: And all the difference we can put between them in our Contemplation of Spirits, is only in the feveral Extents and Degrees of their Knowledg, Power, Duration, Happiness, &c. For that in our Ideas, as well of Spirits, as of other things, we are reftrain'd to those we receive from Senfation and Reflection, is evident from hence; That in our Ideas of Spirits, how much foever advanc'd in Perfection beyond thofe of Bodies, even to that of Infinite, we cannot yet have any Idea of the manner wherein they difcover their Thoughts one to another: tho' we must neceffarily conclude, that feparate Spirits, which are Beings that have perfecterKnowledg and greater Happiness than we, muft needs have alfo a perfecter way of communicating their Thoughts than we have, who are fain to make use of corporeal Signs and particular Sounds; which are therefore of moft general use, as being the beft and quickest we are capable of. But of immediate Communication, having no experiment in our felves, and confequently no Notion of it at all, we have no Idea how Spirits, which use not Words, can with Quickness, or much lefs, how Spirits, that have no Bodies, can be Masters of their own Thoughts, and communicate or conceal them at pleasure, tho' we cannot but neceffarily fuppofe they have fuch a Power.

Recapitula fion.

. 37. And thus we have feen, what kind of Ideas we have of Subftances of all kinds, wherein they confift, and how we come by them. From whence, I think, it is very evident,

First, That all our Ideas of the several forts of Substances, are nothing but Collections of fimple Ideas, with a Suppofition of fomething to which they belong, and in which they fubfift; tho' of this fuppos'd Something, we have no clear diftin&t Idea at all.

Secondly, That all the fimple Ideas, that thus united in one common Subftratum, make up our complex Ideas of feveral forts of the Subftances, are no other but fuch as we have receiv'd from Senfation or Reflection. So that even in those which we think we are moft intimately acquainted with, and that come nearest the Comprehenfion of our mcft enlarg'd Conceptions, we cannot go beyond those fimple Ideas. And even in those which feem moft remote from all we have to do with, and do infinitely furpass any thing we can perceive in our felves by Reflection, or difcover by Senfation in other things, we can attain to nothing but thofe fimple Ideas, which we originally receiv'd from Senfation or Reflection; as

is evident in the complex Ideas we have of Ange's, and particularly of God himself.

Thirdly, That most of the fimple Ideas, that make up our complex Ideas of Subftances, when truly confider'd, are only Powers, however we are apt to take them for pofitive Qualities; v. g. the greatest part of the Ideas that make our complex Idea of Gold, are Yellownefs, great Weight, Ductility, Fufibility, and Solubility in Aq. Regia, &c. all united together in an unknown Subftratum: all which Ideas are nothing elfe but fo many Relations to other Substances, and are not really in the Gold, confider'd barely in it felf, tho' they depend on thofe real and primary Qualities of its internal Conftitution, whereby it has a Fitness differently to operate, and be operated-on by feveral other Subftances.




Of Collective Ideas of Substances.

ESIDES thefe complex Ideas of feveral fingle Subftances, as of Man, One Idea. Horfe, Gold, Violet, Apple, &c. the Mind hath alfo complex collective Ideas of Subftances; which I fo call, becaufe fuch Ideas are made up of many particular Subftances confider'd together, as united into one Idea, and which fo join'd are look'd on as one: v. g. the Idea of fuch a Collection of Men as make an Army, tho' confifting of a great number of diftinct Subftances, is as much one Idea, as the Idea of a Man: And the great collective Idea of all Bodies whatsoever, fignify'd by the name World, is as much one Idea, as the Idea of any the leaft Particle of Matter in it; it fufficing to the Unity of any Idea, that it be confider'd as one Representation or Picture, tho' made up of ever fo 'many Particulars.


§. 2. These collective Ideas of Subftances, the Mind makes by its Power of Made by the Compofition, and uniting feverally, either fimple or complex Ideas into one, as Pewer of comit does by the fame Faculty make the complex Ideas of particular Subftances, pofing in the confifting of an Aggregate of divers fimple Ideas united in one Substance: And as the Mind, by putting together the repeated Ideas of Unity, makes the collective Mode, or complex Idea of any Number, as a Score, or a Grofs, &c. fo by putting together feveral particular Subftances, it makes collective Ideas of Subftances, as a Troop, an Army, a Swarm, a City, a Fleet; each of which every one finds, that he represents to his own Mind by one Idea, in one View; and fo under that Notion confiders those several things as perfectly one, as one Ship, or one Atom. Nor is it harder to conceive, how an Army of ten thousand Men hould make one Idea, than how a Man fhould make one Idea; it being as easy to the Mind to unite into one the Idea of a great number of Men, and confider it as one, as it is to unite into one particular, all the diftin&t Ideas that make-up the Compofition of a Man, and confider them all together as one.

lective Ideas.

§. 3. Amongst fuch kind of collective Ideas, are to be counted moft part of All artificial artificial things, at leaft fuch of them as are made-up of diftin& Subftances: things are col And, in truth, if we confider all these collective Ideas aright; as Army, Conftellation, Universe, as they are united into fo many fingle Ideas, they are but the artificial Draughts of the Mind; bringing things very remote, and independent on one another, into one View, the better to contemplate and difcourfe of them, united into one Conception, and fignify'd by one Name. For there are no things fo remote, nor fo contrary, which the Mind cannot, by this Art of Compofition, bring into one Idea; as is vifible in that fignify'd by the Name Universe.

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Relation what §.




Of Relation.

ESIDES the Ideas, whether fimple or complex, that the Mind has of things, as they are in themselves, there are others it gets from their Comparison one with another. The Understanding, in the Confideration of any thing, is not confin'd to that precife Obje&: It can carry any Idea as it were beyond it felf, or at least look beyond it, to fee how it ftands in conformity to any other. When the Mind fo confiders one thing, that it does as it were, bring it to, and fet it by another, and carry its View from one to t'other: This is, as the words import, Relation and Refpect; and the Denominations given to positive things, intimating that Refpect, and ferving as Marks to lead the Thoughts beyond the Subject it felf denominated to fomething diftin&t from it, are what we call Relatives; and the things fo brought together, Related. Thus, when the Mind confiders Caius as fuch a pofitive Being, it takes nothing into that Idea, but what really exists in Caius; v. g. when I confider him as a Man, I have nothing in my Mind but the complex Idea of the Species, Man. So likewife, when I fay Caius is a white Man, I have nothing but the bare Confideration of Man, who hath that white Colour. But when I give Caius the name Husband, I intimate fome other Perfon; and when I give him the name Whiter, I intimate fome other thing: in both cafes my Thought is led to fomething beyond Caius, and there are two things brought into confideration. And fince any Idea, whether fimple or complex, may be the occafion why the Mind thus brings two things together, and as it were takes a view of them at once, tho' ftill confider'd as diftinct; therefore any of our Ideas may be the Foundation of Relation. As in the above-mention'd Inftance, the Contract and Ceremony of Marriage with Sempronia, is the Occafion of the Denomination or Relation of Husband; and the Colour White, the occafion why he is faid whiter than Free-ftone.



. 2. Thefe, and the like Relations, exprefs'd by relative Terms that have others without corre- answering them, with a reciprocal Intimation, as Father and Son, Bigger and Less, lative Terms, Caufe and Effect, are very obvious to every one, and every body at firft fight not easily perceiv'd. perceives the Relation. For Father and Son, Husband and Wife, and fuch other correlative Terms, feem fo nearly to belong one to another, and thro' Custom do fo readily chime and anfwer one another in Peoples Memories, that upon the naming of either of them, the Thoughts are prefently carry'd beyond the thing fo nam'd; and no body overlooks or doubts of a Relation, where it is fo plainly intimated. But where Languages have fail'd to give correlative Names, there the Relation is not always fo eafily taken notice of Concubine is, no doubt, a relative Name, as well as Wife: But in Languages where this, and the like words, have not a correlative Term, there People are not fo apt to take them to be fo, as wanting that evident Mark of Relation which is between Correlatives, which feem to explain one another, and not to be able to exist, but together. Hence it is, that many of thofe Names which, duly confider'd, do include evident Relations, have been call'd external Denominations. But all Names, that are more than empty Sounds, muft fignify fome Idea, which is either in the thing to which the Name is apply'd; and then it is pofitive, and is look'd on as united to, and exifting in the thing to which the Denomination is given: or elfe it arifes from the Refpe&t the Mind finds in it to fomething distinct from it, with which it confiders it; and then it includes a Relation.

Terms contain

Some feem- . 3. Another fort of relative Terms there is, which are not look'd-on to be ingly abfolute either relative, or fo much as external Denominations; which yet, under the form and appearance of fignifying fomething abfolute in the Subject, do conceal a tacit, tho' lefs obfervable Relation. Such are the feemingly pofitive Terms of Old, Great, Imperfect, &c. whereof I fhall have occafion to fpeak more at large in the following Chapters.

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139 §. 4. This farther may be obferv'd, That the Ideas of Relation may be the Relation dif fame in Men, who have far different Ideas of the things that are related, or ferent from that are thus compar'd; v. g. those who have far different Ideas of a Man, may lated. the things reyet agree in the Notion of a Father: which is a Notion fuperinduc'd to the Subftance, or Man, and refers only to an Act of that thing call'd Man, whereby he contributed to the Generation of one of his own kind, let Man be what it will.

Change in the


. 5. The Nature therefore of Relation confifts in the referring or comparing Change of Retwo things one to another; from which Comparifon, one or both comes to be lation may be denominated. And if either of thofe things be remov'd or ceafe to be, the Re- without any lation ceases, and the Denomination confequent to it, tho' the other receive in it self no Alteration at all: v. g. Caius, whom I confider to day as a Father, ceases to be so to morrow, only by the Death of his Son, without any Alteration made in himself. Nay, barely by the Mind's changing the Obje&t to which it compares any thing, the fame thing is capable of having contrary Denominations at the fame time: v. g. Caius, compar'd to feveral Perfons, may truly be said to be older and younger, ftronger and weaker, &c.

9. 6. Whatfoever doth or can exift, or be confider'd as one thing, is pofi- Relation only tive: And fo not only fimple Ideas and Subftances, but Modes alfo are politive betwixt two Beings; tho' the Parts of which they confift, are very often relative one to things. another; but the whole together confider'd as one thing, and producing in us the complex Idea of one thing; which Idea is in our Minds, as one Picture, tho' an Aggregate of divers Parts, and under one Name, it is a pofitive or abfolute Thing, or Idea. Thus a Triangle, tho' the Parts thereof compar'd one to another be relative, yet the Idea of the whole is a pofitive abfolute Idea. The fame may be faid of a Family, a Tune, &c. for there can be no Relation, but betwixt two things confider'd as two things. There muft always be in Relation two Ideas, or Things, either in themselves really feparate, or confider'd as distinct, and then a ground or occafion for their Comparifon.

§. 7. Concerning Relation in general, these things may be confider'd: First, That there is no one Thing, whether fimple Idea, Substance, Mode, or Relation, or Name of either of them, which is not capable of almost an infinite num ber of Confiderations, in reference to other things; and therefore this makes no Imall part of Mens Thoughts and Words: v. g. one fingle Man may at once be concern'd in, and fuftain all these following Relations, and many more, viz. Father, Brother, Son, Grand-father, Grand-fon, Father-in-Law, Son-in-Law, Husband, Friend, Enemy, Subject, General, Judg, Patron, Client, Profeffor, European, Englishman, Iflander, Servant, Mafter, Poffeffor, Captain, Superiour, Inferiour, Bigger, Lefs, Older, Younger, Contemporary, Like, Unlike, &c. to an almoft infinite Number: he being capable of as many Relations, as there can be Occafions of comparing him to other things, in any manner of Agreement, Disagreement, or Refpect whatfoever. For, as I faid, Relation is a way of comparing or confidering two things together, and giving one, or both of them fome Appellation from that Comparison; and fometimes giving even the Relation it felf a Name.

All things ca pable of Re


§. 8. Secondly, This farther may be confider'd concerning Relation, That tho' The Ideas of it be not contain'd in the real Exiftence of things, but fomething extraneous Relations clearer often and fuper-induc'd; yet the Ideas which relative Words ftand for, are often than of the clearer and more diftin&t, than of those Substances to which they do belong. Subjects reThe Notion we have of a Father, or Brother, is a great deal clearer and more lated. distinct, than that we have of a Man; or, if you will, Paternity is a thing whereof 'tis easier to have a clear Idea, than of Humanity: And I can much easier conceive what a Friend is, than what GOD. Because the Knowledg of one Action, or one fimple Idea, is oftentimes fufficient to give me the Notion of a Relation: but to the knowing of any fubftantial Being, an accurate Collection of fundry Ideas is neceffary. A Man, if he compares two things together, can hardly be fuppos'd not to know what it is, wherein he compares them: fo that when he compares any things together, he cannot but have a very clear Idea of that Relation. The Ideas then of Relations are capable at least of being more perfect and distinct in our Minds, than thofe of Subftances. Because it is commonly hard to know all the fimple Ideas which are really in any Subftance, Vol. I. T 2


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