The Argu

ftanding and affenting firmly to fuch Propofitions. And thus all Mathematical Demonstrations, as well as first Principles, must be receiv'd as native Impreffions on the Mind; which I fear they will fcarce allow them to be, who find it harder to demonftrate a Propofition, than aflent to it when demonstrated. And few Mathematicians will be forward to believe, that all the Diagrams they have drawn, were but Copies of those Innate Characters which Nature had ingraven upon their Minds.

§. 23. There is, I fear, this farther weakness in the foregoing Argument, which ment of Af would perfuade us, that therefore thofe Maxims are to be thought Innate, which fenting on firft Men admit at firft hearing, because they affent to Propofitions which they are bea ing, is upon a falfe not taught, nor do receive from the force of any Argument or Demonftration, fuppofition of but a bare Explication or Understanding of the Terms. Under which there no precedent feems to me to lie this fallacy, That Men are fuppofed not to be taught, nor teaching. to learn any thing de novo; when in truth they are taught, and do learn fomething they were ignorant of before. For firft it is evident, they have learned the Terms and their Signification; neither of which was born with them. But this is not all the acquir'd Knowledg in the Cafe: The Ideas themselves, about which the Propofition is, are not born with them, no more than their Names, but got afterwards. So that in all Propofitions that are aflented to, at first hearing; the Terms of the Propofition, their ftanding for fuch Ideas, and the Ideas themselves that they ftand for, being neither of them Innate; I would fain know what there is remaining in fuch Propofitions that is Innate. For I would gladly have any one name that Propofition, whofe Terms or Ideas were either of them Innate. We by degrees get Ideas and Names, and learn their appropriated Connexion one with another; and then to Propofitions made in fuch Terms, whofe Signification we have learnt, and wherein the Agreement or Difagreement we can perceive in our Ideas, when put together, is exprefs'd, we at first hearing affent: tho' to other Propofitions in themselves as certain and evident, but which are concerning Ideas, not fo foon or fo eafily got, we are at the fame time no way capable of affenting. For tho' a Child quickly affents to this Propofition, That an Apple is not Fire, when by familiar Acquaintance, he has got the Ideas of thofe two different things diftin&tly imprinted on his Mind, and has learnt that the Names Apple and Fire ftand for them; yet it will be fome Years after, perhaps, before the fame Child will affent to this Propofition, That it is impoffible for the fame thing to be, and not to be. Because that tho', perhaps, the Words are as easy to be learnt; yet the Signification of them being more large, comprehenfive, and abftract, than of the Names annex'd to thofe fenfible Things the Child hath to do with; it is longer before he learns their precife meaning, and it requires more time plainly to form in his Mind thofe general Ideas they ftand for. Till that be done, you will in vain endeavour to make any Child afsent to a Propofition made up of fuch general Terms; but as foon as ever he has got those Ideas, and learn'd their Names, he forwardly closes with the one as well as the other of the foremention'd Propofitions: and with both for the fame Reason, (viz.) because he finds the Ideas he has in his Mind to agree or disagree, according as the Words ftanding for them, are affirm'd, or denied one of another in the Propofition. But if Propofitions be brought to him in Words, which ftand for Ideas he has not yet in his Mind; to fuch Propofitions, however evidently true or falfe in themselves, he affords neither affent nor diffent, but is ignorant. For Words being but empty Sounds any farther than they are figns of our Ideas, we cannot but affent to them, as they correfpond to thofe Ideas we have, but no farther than that. But the fhewing by what fteps and ways Knowledg comes into our Minds, and the grounds of feveral degrees of Affent, being the bufinefs of the following Difcourfe, it may fuffice to have only touched on it here, as one Reason, that made me doubt of those Innate Principles. §. 24. To conclude this Argument of Univerfal Confent, I agree with these because not us Defenders of Innate Principles, that if they are Innate, they muft needs have niversally af fented to. univerfal Affent. For that a Truth fhould be Innate and yet not affented to, is to me as unintelligible as for a Man to know a Truth, and be ignorant of it at the fame time. But then by these Mens own Confeffion, they cannot be Innate; fince they are not affented to by those who understand not the Terms, nor by a great part of those who do understand them, but have yet never heard, nor

ما

Not Innate,

thought

thought of thofe Propofitions; which, I think, is at least one half of Mankind. But were the number far lefs, it would be enough to destroy univerfal Affent, and thereby fhew these Propofitions not to be Innate, if Children alone were ignorant of them.

§. 25. But that I may not be accused, to argue from the Thoughts of Infants, Thefe Max which are unknown to us, and to conclude, from what paffes in their Under-ims not the fstandings, before they exprefs it; I fay next, that thefe two general Propofi- first known. tions are not the Truths that firft poffefs the Minds of Children, nor are antecedent to all acquired and adventitious Notions; which if they were Innate, they muft needs be. Whether we can determine it or no, it matters not, there is cer tainly a time when Children begin to think; and their Words and Actions do ailure us that they do fo. When therefore they are capable of Thought, of Knowledg, of Affent, can it rationally be fuppos'd, they can be ignorant of thofe Notions that Nature has imprinted, were there any fuch? Can it be imagin'd, with any appearance of Reason, that they perceive the Impreffions from things without; and be at the fame time ignorant of those Characters which Nature it felf has taken care to ftamp within? Can they receive and aflent to adventitious Notion, and be ignorant of thofe which are fuppos'd woven into the very Principles of their Being, and imprinted there in indelible Characters, to be the Foundation and Guide of all their acquir'd Knowledg, and future Reasonings? This would be to make Nature take pains to no purpose, or at least to write very ill; fince its Characters could not be read by thofe Eyes which faw other things very well; and thofe are very ill fuppofed the cleareft parts of Truth and the Foundations of all our Knowledg, which are not first known, and without which the undoubted Knowledg of feveral other Things may be had. The Child certainly knows that the Nurfe that feeds it, is neither the Cat it plays with, nor the Blackmoor it is afraid of; that the Wormfeed or Mustard it refufes, is not the Apple or Sugar it cries for; this it is certainly and undoubtedly affur'd of: But will any one fay, it is by virtue of this Principle, that it is impoffible for the fame thing to be, and not to be, that it fo firmly affents to thefe, and other parts of its Knowledg? Or that the Child has any Notion or Apprehenfion of that Propofition at an Age, wherein yet 'tis plain, it knows a great many other Truths? He that will fay, Children join th thefe general abftract Speculations with their Sucking-Bottles and their Rattles, may, perhaps with juftice, be thought to have more Paffion and Zeal for his Opinion, but lefs Sincerity and Truth than one of that Age.

. 26. Tho' therefore there be feveral general Propofitions, that meet with And so not in conftant and ready Affent, as foon as propos'd to Men grown up, who have at- nate. tained the use of more general and abstract Ideas, and Names standing for them; yet they not being to be found in thofe of tender Years, who nevertheless know other things, they cannot pretend to univerfal Affent of intelligent Perfons, and fo by no means can be fuppos'd Innate; it being impoffible that any Truth which is Innate (if there were any fuch) fhould be unknown, at least to any one who knows any thing elfe. Since, if they are Innate Truths, they must be Innate Thoughts; there being nothing a Truth in the Mind that it has never thought on. Whereby it is evident, if there be any Innate Truths, they must neceffarily be the fift of any thought on, the first that appear there.

§. 27. That the general Maxims we are difcourfing of are not known to Chil- Not Innate, because they dren, Idiots, and a great part of Mankind, we have already fufficiently proved; whereby it is evident they have not an univerfal Affent, nor are general Imprel where what is appear leaft, fions. But there is this farther Argument in it against their being Innate; that Innate Jhews thefe Characters, if they were native and original Impreffions, fhould appear fairest it felf clear and cleareft in thofe Perfons in whom, yet we find no foot-iteps of them: And eft. 'tis, in my Opinion, a ftrong Prefumption that they are not Innate, fince they are least known to those, in whom, if they were Innate, they must needs exert themselves with moft Force and Vigour. For Children, Idiots, Savages, and illiterate People, being of all others the leaft corrupted by Cuttom or borrow'd Opinions; Learning and Education having not caft their native Thoughts into new Moulds, nor by fuper-inducing foreign and studied Doctrines, confounded those fair Characters Nature had written there: one might reafonably imagine, that in their Minds thele Innate Notions fhould lie open fairly to every one's Vol. I:

C 1

view,

No moral

Principles fo

view, as 'tis certain the Thoughts of Children do. It might very well be expected, that thefe Principles fhould be perfectly known to Naturals; which being ftamp'd immediately on the Soul (as thefe Men fuppofe) can have no dependence on the Conftitutions, or Organs of the Body, the only confefs'd difference between them and others. One would think, according to these Mens Principles, That all these native Beams of Light (were there any fuch) should in those who have no Reserves, no Arts of Concealment, fhine out in their full luftre, and ́leave us in no more doubt of their being there, than we are of their love of Fleafure, and abhorrence of Pain. But alas! amongst Children, Idiots, Savages, and the grofly literate, what general Maxims are to be found? What univerfal Principles of Knowledg? Their Notions are few and narrow, borrow'd only from thofe Objects they have had moft to do with, and which have made upon their Senfes the frequenteft and strongeft Impreffions. A Child knows his Nurfe and his Cradle, and by degrees the Play-things of a little more advanc'd Age: And a young Savage has, perhaps, his Head fill'd with Love and Hunting, according to the fafhion of his Tribe. But he that from a Child untaught, or a wild Inhabitant of the Woods, will expect thefe abftra&t Maxims and reputed Principles of Sciences; will, I fear, find himfelf mistaken. Such kind of general Propofitions are feldom mention'd in the Huts of Indians, much lefs are they to be found in the Thoughts of Children, or any Impreffions of them on the Minds of Naturals. They are the Language and Bufiness of the Schools and Academies of learned Nations, accuftom'd to that fort of Converfation or Learning, where Difputes are frequent: these Maxims being fuited to artificial Argumentation, and useful for Conviction; but not much conducing to the discovery of Truth, or advancement of Knowledg. But of their small ufe for the improvement of Knowledg, I shall have occasion to speak more at large, l. 4. c. 7.

J. 28. I know not how abfurd this may seem to the Masters of Demonftra tion: And probably, it will hardly down with any body at first hearing. I muft therefore beg a little truce with Prejudice, and the forbearance of Cenfure, till I have been heard out in the Sequel of this Difcourfe, being very willing to fubmit to better Judgments. And fince I impartially fearch after Truth, I fall not be forry to be convinc'd that I have been too fond of my own Notions: which I confefs we are all apt to be, when Application and Study have warm'd our Heads with them.

Upon the whole matter, I cannot fee any ground, to think these two famed fpeculative Maxims Innate, fince they are not univerfally affented to; and the Affent they fo generally find, is no other than what feveral Propofitions, not allow'd to be Innate, equally partake in with them: And fince the Affent that is given them is produc'd another way, and comes not from natural Infcription, as I doubt not but to make appear in the following Difcourfe. And if these first Principles of Knowledg and Science are found not to be Innate, no other Speculative Maxims can I fuppose) with better Right pretend to be so.

9.1. IF

CHA P. III.

No Innate Practical Principles:

F thofe fpeculative Maxims, whereof we difcours'd in the foregoing Chapter, have not an actual univerfal Affent from all Mankind, as we clear and fo there prov'd, it is much more vifible concerning Practical Principles, that they generally receiv'd, as the come hort of an univerfal Reception: And I think it will be hard to inftance any fore-menti- one moral Rule, which can pretend to fo general and ready an Affent, as, What on'd fpecula is, is; or to be fo manifeft a Truth as this, That it is impoffible for the fame thing to be, and not to be. Whereby it is evident, that they are farther remov'd from a title to be Innate: and the doubt of their being native Impreffions on the Mind, is ftronger against these moral Principles than the other. Not that it brings their truth at all in queftion. They are equally true, tho' not equally evident. Thofe fpeculative Maxims carry their own Evidence with them: But

tive Maxims.

moral

moral Principles require Reafoning and Difcourfe, and fome Exercife of the Mind, to discover the Certainty of their Truth. They lie not open as natural Characters ingraven on the Mind; which, if any fuch were, they must needs be vifible by themfelves, and by their own light be certain and known to every body. But this is no derogation to their Truth and Certainty, no more than it is to the Truth or Certainty of the three Angles of a Triangle being equal to two right ones; because it is not fo evident, as, The Whole is bigger than a Part; nor fo apt to be affented to at first hearing. It may fuffice, that these moral Rules are capable of Demonftration: And therefore it is our own fault, if we come not to a certain knowledg of them. But the Ignorance wherein many Men are of them, and the Slowness of Affent wherewith others receive them, are manifeft proofs, that they are not Innate, and fuch as offer themfelves to their view without fearching.

§. 2. Whether there be any fuch moral Principles, wherein all Men do agree, Faith and JuI appeal to any who have been but moderately converfant in the Hiftory of fice not own'd Mankind, and look'd abroad beyond the Smoak of their own Chimneys. as Principles by all Men Where is that practical Truth, that is univerfally receiv'd without doubt or queftion, as it must be if Innate? Justice, and keeping of Contracts, is that which moft Men Jeem to agree in. This is a Principle, which is thought to extend it felf to the Dens of Thieves, and the Confederacies of the greatest Villains; and they who have gone fartheft towards the putting off of Humanity it self, keep Faith and Rules of Juftice one with another. I grant that Out-laws themselves do this one amongst another; but 'tis without receiving these as the Innate Laws of Nature. They practise them as Rules of Convenience within their own Communities: But it is impoffible to conceive, that he embraces Juftice as a practical Principle, who acts fairly with his Fellow-Highway-men, and at the fame time plunders or kills the next honeft Man he meets with. Juftice and Truth are the common Ties of Society; and therefore, even Outlaws, and Robbers, who break with all the World befides, muft keep Faith and Rules of Equity amongst themselves, or elfe they cannot hold together. But will any one fay, That thofe that live by Fraud and Rapine, have Innate Principles of Truth and Juftice, which they allow and affent to?

them in their

§. 3. Perhaps it will be urg'd, That the tacit Affent of their Minds agrees to Object. Tho what their Practice contradicts. I answer, First, I have always thought the Men deny Actions of Men the beft Interpreters of their thoughts. But fince it is certain, Practice, yet that moft Mens Practice, and fome Mens open Profeffions, have either queftion'd they admit or deny'd these Principles, it is impoffible to eftablifh an Univerfal Confent them in their (tho' we fhould look for it only amongst grown Men) without which, it is im- Thoughts, anpoffible to conclude them Innate. Secondly, 'Tis very ftrange and unreasonable,wer'd. to fuppofe Innate Practical Principles, that terminate only in Contemplation. Practical Principles deriv'd from Nature, are there for Operation, and must produce Conformity of Action, not. barely fpeculative Affent to their Truth; or elfe they are in vain diftinguifh'd from fpeculative Maxims. Nature, I confefs, has put into Man a Defire of Happiness, and an Averfion to Mifery: Thefe indeed are Innate Practical Principles, which (as Practical Principles ought) do continue conftantly to operate and influence all our Actions, without ceafing. These may be obferv'd in all Perfons and all Ages, fteddy and univerfal; but thefe are Inclinations of the Appetite to good, not Impreffions of Truth on the Understanding. I deny not, that there are natural Tendencies imprinted on the Minds of Men; and that, from the very firft inftances of Senfe and Perception, there are fome things that are grateful, and others unwelcome to them; fome things that they incline to, and others that they fly: But this makes nothing for Innate Characters on the Mind, which are to be the Principles of Knowledg, regulating our Practice. Such natural Impreffions on the Underftanding, are fo far from being confirm'd hereby, that this is an argument against them; fince if there were certain Characters imprinted by Nature on the Understanding, as the Principles of Knowledg, we could not but perceive them conftantly operate in us, and influence our Knowledg, as we do those others on the Will and Appetite; which never ceafe to be the constant Springs and Motives of all our Actions, to which we perpetually feel them ftrongly impelling us.

ergo not Innate.

Moral Rules S. 4. Another Reason that makes me doubt of any Innate Practical Principles, need a Proof, is, That I think there cannot any one moral Rule be propos'd, whereof a Man may not justly demand a Reafon: Which would be perfectly ridiculous and abfurd, if they were Innate, or fo much as felf-evident; which every Innate Principle muft needs be, and not need any Proof to ascertain its Truth, nor want any Reafon to gain it Approbation. He would be thought void of common Senfe, who ask'd on the one fide, or on the other fide went to give a Reafon, Why it is impoffible for the fame thing to be, and not to be. It carries its own Light and Evidence with it, and needs no other proof: He that underftands the Terms, affents to it for its own fake, or elfe nothing will ever be able to prevail with him to do it. But fhould that most unfhaken Rule of Morality, and Foundation of all focial Virtue, That one should do as he would be done unto, be propos'd to one who never heard before, but yet is of capacity to understand its meaning; might he not without any abfurdity ask a reason why? And were not he that propos'd it, bound to make out the Truth and Reafonableness of it to him? Which plainly fhews it not to be Innate: for if it were, it could neither want nor receive any proof; but muft needs (at least, as foon as heard and understood) be receiv'd and affented to, as an unquestionable Truth, which a Man can by no means doubt of. So that the Truth of all these moral Rules plainly depends upon fome other antecedent to them, and from which they must be deduc'd; which could not be, if either they were Innate, or fo much as felf-evident.

Inftance in 5. That Men fhould keep their Compacts, is certainly a great and undekeeping Com- niable Rule in Morality: But yet, if a Chriftian, who has the view of Happipats. nefs and Mifery in another Life, be ask'd why a Man must keep his Word, he will give this as a Reafon; Because God, who has the power of eternal Life and Death, requires it of us. But if an Hobbit be ask'd why, he will anfwer, Becaufe the Publick requires it, and the Leviathan will punifh you, if you do not. And if one of the old Heathen Philofophers had been ask'd, he would have anfwer'd; Because it was difhoneft, below the Dignity of a Man, and oppofite to Vertue, the highef Perfection of human Nature; to do otherwife.

Vertue gene §. 6. Hence naturally flows the great variety of Opinions concerning moral rally approv'd, Rules which are to be found amongst Men, according to the different forts of not because Happiness they have a profpect of, or propofe to themselves: Which could not Innate, but because profibe, if practical Principles were Innate, and imprinted in our Minds immediately table. by the hand of God. I grant the Existence of God is fo many ways manifeft, and the Obedience we owe him fo congruous to the Light of Reason, that a great part of Mankind give teftimony to the Law of Nature: But yet I think it must be allow'd, That feveral moral Rules may receive from Mankind a very general Approbation, without either knowing or admitting the true ground of Morality; which can only be the Will and Law of a God, who fees Men in the dark, has in his hand Rewards and Punishments, and power enough to call to account the proudest Offender. For God having, by an infeparable Connexion, join'd Vertue and Publick Happiness together, and made the practice thereof neceffary to the preservation of Society, and visibly beneficial to all with whom the Vertuous Man has to do; it is no wonder, that every one fhould not only allow, but recommend and magnify thofe Rules to others, from whofe obfervance of them he is fure to reap advantage to himself. He may, out of intereft, as well as conviction, cry up that for facred; which if once trampled on and profan'd, he himself cannot be fafe nor fecure. This, tho' it takes nothing from the moral and eternal Obligation which thefe Rules evidently have, yet it fhews that the outward acknowledgment Men pay to them in their words, proves not that they are Innate Principles; nay, it proves not fo much, as that Men affent to them inwardly in their own Minds, as the inviolable Rules of their own Practice: fince we find that Self-Intereft and the Conveniences of this Life make many Men own an outward Profeffion and Approbation of them, whofe Actions fufficiently prove, that they very little confider the Law-giver that preferib'd thefe Rules, nor the Hell he has ordain'd for the Punishment of thofe that tranfgrefs them.

§. 7. For if we will not in civility allow too much Sincerity to the Profeffions of most Men, but think their Actions to be the Interpreters of their Thoughts,

we