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Relations all terminate in

but for the most part eafy enough to know the fimple Ideas that make up any Relation I think on, or have a Name for: v. g. Comparing two Men, in reference to one common Parent, it is very eafy to frame the Ideas of Brothers, without having yet the perfect Idea of a Man. For fignificant relative Words, as well as others, ftanding only for Ideas; and those being all either fimple, or made up of fingle ones, it fuffices for the knowing the precife Idea the relative Term ftands for, to have a clear Conception of that which is the Foundation of the Relation; which may be done without having a perfect and clear Idea of the thing it is attributed to. Thus having the Notion, that one laid the Egg out of which the other was hatch'd, I have a clear Idea of the Relation of Dam and Chick, between the two Caffiowaries in St. James's Park; tho' perhaps I have but a very obfcure and imperfe&t Idea of thofe Birds themfelves.

§. 9. Thirdly, Tho' there be a great number of Confiderations, wherein things may be compar'd one with another, and fo a multitude of Relations; yet they Simple Ideas. all terminate in, and are concern'd about those fimple Ideas, either of Senfation or Reflection: which I think to be the whole Materials of all our Knowledg. To clear this, I shall fhew it in the most confiderable Relations that we have any Notion of, and in fome that seem to be the moft remote from Senfe or Reflection; which yet will appear to have their Ideas from thence, and leave it past doubt, that the Notions we have of them are but certain fimple Ideas, and fo originally deriv'd from Senfe or Reflection.

Terms lead

S. 10. Fourthly, That Relation being the confidering of one thing with another, ing the Mind which is extrinfecal to it, it is evident, that all Words that neceffarily lead the beyond the Mind to any other Ideas than are fuppos'd really to exift in that thing, to which Subject denominated, are the Word is apply'd, are relative Words: v. g. A Man Black, Merry, Thoughtful, Thirsty, Angry, Extended; these, and the like, are all abfolute, because they neither fignify nor intimate any thing, but what does or is fuppos'd really to exift in the Man thus denominated: But Father, Brother, King, Husband, Blacker, Merrier, &c. are Words which, together with the thing they denominate, imply alfo fomething else separate and exteriour to the Exiftence of that thing.



§. 11. Having laid down thefe Premifes concerning Relation in general, I fhall now proceed to fhew, in fome Inftances, how all the Ideas we have of Relation are made up, as the others are, only of fimple Ideas; and that they all, how refin'd or remote from Senfe foever they feem, terminate at laft in fimple Ideas. I fhall begin with the moft comprehenfive Relation, wherein all things that do or can exift, are concern'd; and that is, the Relation of Caufe and Effect. The Idea whereof, how deriv'd from the two Fountains of all our Knowledg, Senfation and Reflection, I fhall in the next place confider.

Whence their §. 1.

Ideas got.



Of Cause and Effect, and other Relations.

N the notice that our Senfes take of the constant Viciffitude of things, we cannot but obferve, that feveral particular, both Qualities and Subftances, begin to exift; and that they receive this their Exiftence from the due Application and Operation of fome other Being. From this Obfervation, we get our Ideas of Caufe and Effect. That which produces any fimple or complex Idea, we denote by the general name Caufe; and that which is produc'd, Effect. Thus finding that in that Substance which we call Wax, Fluidity, which is a fimple Idea that was not in it before, is conftantly produc'd by the Application of a certain Degree of Heat; we call the fimple Idea of Heat, in relation to Fluidity in Wax, the Caufe of it, and Fluidity the Effect. So also finding that the Substance Wood, which is a certain Collection of fimple Ideas fo call'd, by the Application of Fire is turn'd into another Subftance call'd Ashes; i, e. another complex Idea, confifting of a Collection of fimple Ideas, quite different from that complex Idea which we call Wood; we confider Fire, in relation to Afbes, as Caufe, and the Ashes as Effect. So that whatever is confider'd by us to conduce or operate to the producing any particular fimple Idea, or Collection


of fimple Ideas, whether Subftance or Mode, which did not before exist, hath thereby in our Minds the Relation of a Cause, and fo is denominated by us.

§. 2. Having thus, from what our Senfes are able to discover in the Ope- Creation, Gerations of Bodies on one another, got the Notion of Caufe and Effect, viz. neration, maThat a Caufe is that which makes any other thing, either fimple Idea, Subftance king Alteraor Mode begin to be; and an Effect is that, which had its beginning from some other thing: The Mind finds no great Difficulty to distinguish the feveral Originals of things into two forts.

First, When the thing is wholly made new, fo that no part thereof did ever exift before; as when a new Particle of Matter doth begin to exist, in rerum natura, which had before no Being, and this we call Creation.

Secondly, When a thing is made up of Particles, which did all of them before exift, but that every thing fo conftituted of pre-exifting Particles, which, confider'd all together, make up fuch a Collection of fimple Ideas, had not any Existence before, as this Man, this Egg, Rofe or Cherry, &c. And this, when refer'd to a Substance, produc'd in the ordinary Courfe of Nature by an internal Principle, but fet on work by, and receiv'd from fome external Agent or Caufe, and working by infenfible ways, which we perceive not, we call Generation: When the Caufe is extrinfecal, and the Effect produc'd by a fenfible Separation, or Juxta-Pofition of difcernible Parts, we call it Making; and fuch are all artificial things. When any fimple Idea is produc'd, which was not in that Subject before, we call it Alteration. Thus a Man is generated, a Picture made, and either of them alter'd, when any new fenfible Quality or fimple Idea is produc'd in either of them, which was not there before; and the things thus made to exift, which were not there before, are Effects; and those things, which operated to the Existence, Caufes. In which, and all other Cafes, we may obferve, that the Notion of Caufe and Effect, has its Rife from Ideas, receiv'd by Senfation or Reflection; and that this Relation, how comprehenfive foever, terminates at laft in them. For to have the Idea of Cause and Effect, it fuffices to confider any fimple Idea, or Subftance, as beginning to exift by the Operation of some other, without knowing the manner of that Operation.


4. 3. Time and Place are alfo the Foundations of very large Relations, and all Relations of finite Beings at least are concern'd in them. But having already fhewn, in a- Time nother place, how we get these Ideas, it may fuffice here to intimate, that most of the Denominations of things, receiv'd from time, are only Relations. Thus when any one fays, that Queen Elizabeth liv'd fixty nine, and reign'd forty five Years, these words import only the Relation of that Duration to fome other, and means no more than this, 'That the Duration of her Existence was equal to fixty nine, and the Duration of her Government to forty five annual Revolutions of the Sun; and fo are all words anfwering How long. Again, William the Conquerer invaded England about the year 1070. which means this; That taking the Duration from our Saviour's Time till now, for one entire great Length of Time, it fhews at what Distance this Invafion was from the two Extremes: And fo do all words of Time, anfwering to the Question When, which fhew only the Distance of any Point of Time, from the Period of a longer Duration from which we measure, and to which we thereby confider it as related.

§. 4. There are yet, befides thofe, other words of Time, that ordinarily are thought to ftand for pofitive Ideas, which yet will, when confider'd,be found to be relative, such as are Young, Old, &c. which include and intimate the Relation any thing has to a certain Length of Duration, whereof we have the Idea in our Minds. Thus having fettled in our Thoughts the Idea of the ordinary Duration of a Man to be feventy Years, when we fay a Man is Young, we mean that his Age is yet but a small part of that which usually Men attain to: And when we denominate him Old, we mean that his Duration is run out almoft to the end of that which Men do not ufually exceed. And fo 'tis but comparing the particular Age, or Duration of this or that Man, to the Idea of that Duration which we have in our Minds, as ordinarily belonging to that fort of Animals: which is plain, in the Application of these Names to other things; for a Man is called young at twenty Years, and very young at feven Years old: But yet a Horse we call old at twenty, and a Dog at feven Years; because in



each of thefe, we compare their Age to different Ideas of Duration, which are fettled in our Minds, as belonging to thefe feveral forts of Animals, in the ordinary Course of Nature. But the Sun and Stars, tho' they have out-lafted feveral Generations of Men, we call not old, because we do not know what period GOD hath fet to that fort of Beings. This Term belonging properly to those things which we can obferve, in the ordinary Courfe of things, by a natural Decay, to come to an end in a certain period of Time; and fo have in our Minds, as it were, a Standard to which we can compare the feveral Parts of their Duration; and by the relation they bear thereunto, call them young or old: which we cannot therefore do to a Ruby or a Diamond, things whole ufual Periods we know not.

Relations of §. 5. The Relation alfo that things have to one another in their Places and Place and Ex-Diftances, is very obvious to obferve; as Above, Below, a Mile distant from tenfion. Charing Crofs, in England, and in London. But as in Duration, fo in Extenfion and Bulk, there are fome Ideas that are relative, which we fignify by Names that are thought pofitive; as Great and Little are truly Relations. For here allo having, by Obfervation, fettled in our Minds the Ideas of the Bignefs of feveral Species of things, from thofe we have been moft accuftom'd to, we make them as it were the Standards whereby to denominate the Bulk of others. Thus we call a great Apple, fuch a one as is bigger than the ordinary fort of those we have been used to; and a little Horfe, fuch a one as comes not up to the fize of that Idea which we have in our Minds to belong ordinarily to Horses: And that will be a great Horse to a Welshman, which is but a little one to a Fleming; they two having, from the different Breed of their Countries, taken feveral fiz'd Ideas to which they compare, and in relation to which they denominate their Great and their Little.



§. 6. So likewife Weak and Strong are but relative Denominations of Power, Terms often compar'd to fome Ideas we have, at that time, of greater or lefs Power. Thus Stand for Re- when we say a Weak Man, we mean one that has not fo much Strength or Power to move, as ufually Men have, or usually those of his fize have; which is a comparing his Strength to the Idea we have of the ufual Strength of Men, or Men of fuch a fize. The like, when we fay the Creatures are all weak things; Weak, there, is but a relative Term, fignifying the Difproportion there is in the Power of GOD and the Creatures. And fo abundance of Words, in ordinary Speech, ftand only for Relations (and perhaps the greatest part) which at first fight feem to have no fuch Signification: v. g. The Ship has neceffary Stores. Neceffary and Stores are both relative Words; one having a Relation to the accomplishing the Voyage intended, and the other to future Ufe. All which Relations, how they are confin'd to and terminate in Ideas deriv'd from Sensation ori Reflection, is too obvious to need any Explication.

Bity confifts.

§. 1.

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Of Identity and Diversity.

NOTHER occafion the Mind often takes of comparing, is the very Being of Things, when confidering any thing as exifting at any determin'd Time and Place, we compare it with it felf exifting at another time, and thereon form the Ideas of Identity and Diverfity. When we fee any thing to be in any place in any Inftant of Time, we are fure (be it what it will) that it is that very thing, and not another, which at that fame time exifts in another place, how like and undiftinguifhible foever it may be in all other refpe&s: And in this confifts Identity, when the Ideas it is attributed to vary not at all from what they were that moment wherein we confider their former Existence, and to which we compare the present. For we never finding, nor conceiving it poffible, that two things of the fame kind fhould exift in the fame place at the fame time, we rightly conclude, that whatever exifts any where at any time, excludes all of the fame kind, and is there it felf alone. When therefore we demand, whether any thing be the fame or no; it refers always to fomething


that exifted fuch a time in fuch a place, which 'twas certain at that inftant was the fame with it felf, and no other. From whence it follows, that one thing cannot have two Beginnings of Existence, nor two things one Beginning; it being impoffible for two things of the fame kind to be or exift in the fame inftant, in the very fame place, or one and the fame thing in different places. That therefore that had one Beginning, is the fame thing; and that which had a different Beginning in time and place from that, is not the fame, but diverfe. That which has made the difficulty about this Relation, has been the little Care and Attention used in having precife Notions of the things to which it is attributed.

§. 2. We have the Ideas but of three forts of Subftances; 1 God. 2. Fi- Identity of nite Intelligences. 3. Bodies. First, GOD is without Beginning, eternal, un- Substances. alterable, and every where; and therefore concerning his Identity, there can be no doubt. Secondly, Finite Spirits having had each its determinate time and place of beginning to exift, the Relation to that time and place will always determine to each of them its Identity, as long as it exifts. Thirdly, The fame will hold of every Particle of Matter, to which no Addition or Subtraction of Matter being made, it is the fame. For tho' thefe three forts of Subftances, as we term them, do not exclude one another out of the fame place; yet we cannot conceive but that they muft neceffarily each of them exclude any of the fame kind out of the same place: or elfe the Notions and Names of Identity and Diversity would be in vain, and there could be no fuch diftinction of Substances, or any thing else one from another. For example: Could two Bodies be in the fame place at the fame time, then those two Parcels of Matter must be one and the fame, take them great or little; nay, all Bodies must be one and the fame. For by the fame realon that two Particles of Matter may be in one place, all Identity of Bodies may be in one place: which, when it can be fuppos'd, takes away the Modes. Diftinction of Identity and Diverfity of one and more, and renders it ridiculous. But it being a Contradiction, that two or more fhould be one, Identity and Diversity are Relations and Ways of comparing well founded, and of ufe to the Understanding. All other things being but Modes or Relations ultimately terminated in Subftances, the Identity and Diverity of each particular Exiftence of them too will be by the fame way determin'd only as to things whole Existence is in Succeffion; fuch as are the Actions of finite Beings, v.g. Motion and Thought, both which confift in a continu'd Train of Succeffion, concerning their Diversity, there can be no queftion: Because each perifhing the moment it begins, they cannot exist in different times, or in different places, as permanent Beings can at different times exift in diftant places; and therefore no Motion or Thought, confider'd as at different times, can be the fame, each part thereof having a different Beginning of Existence.


.3. From what has been faid, 'tis eafy to discover what is fo much enquir'd Principium after, the Principium Individuationis; and that, 'tis plain, is Existence it felf, Individuatio which determines a Being of any fort to a particular time and place incommunicable to two Beings of the fame kind. This, tho' it feems easier to conceive in fimple Subftances or Modes, yet when reflected on, is not more difficult in compounded ones, if care be taken to what it is apply'd: v. g. Let us fuppofe an Atom, i. e. a continu'd Body under one immutable Superficies, exifting in a determin'd time and place; 'tis evident that, confider'd in any inftant of its Existence, it is in that inftant the fame with it felf. For being at that inftant what it is, and nothing elfe, it is the fame, and fo muft continue as long as its Existence is continu'd; for fo long it will be the fame, and no other. In like manner, if two or more Atoms be join'd together into the fame Mafs, every one of those Atoms will be the fame, by the foregoing Rule: And whilst they exift united together, the Mafs, confifting of the fame Atoms, must be the fame Mais, or the fame Body, let the Parts be ever fo differently jumbled. But if one of thefe Atoms be taken away, or one new one added, it is no longer the fame Mafs, or the fame Body. In the State of living Creatures, their Identity depends not on a Mafs of the fame Particles, but on fomething elle. For in them the Variation of great Parcels of Matter alters not the Identity: An Oak growing from a Plant to a great Tree, and then lop'd, is fill the fame Oak; and a Colt grown up to a Horse, fometimes fat, fometimes lean, is all the while


the fame Horse: tho', in both these cafes, there may be a manifeft Change of the Parts; fo that truly they are not either of them the fame Maffes of Matter, tho' they be truly one of them the fame Oak, and the other the fame Horfe. The reafon whereof is, that in thefe two Cafes of a Mafs of Matter, and a living Body, Identity is not apply'd to the fame thing.

Identity of §. 4. We must therefore confider wherein an Oak differs from a Mass of Vegetables. Matter, and that feems to me to be in this; that the one is only the Cohesion of Particles of Matter any how united, the other fuch a difpofition of them as conftitutes the Parts of an Oak; and fuch an Organization of those Parts as is fit to receive and diftribute Nourishment, fo as to continue and frame the Wood, Bark, and Leaves, &c. of an Oak, in which confifts the vegetable Life. That being then one Plant which has fuch an Organization of Parts in one coherent Body partaking of one common Life, it continues to be the fame Plant as long as it partakes of the fame Life, tho' that Life be communicated to new Particles of Matter vitally united to the living Plant, in a like continu'd Organization conformable to that fort of Plants. For this Organization being at any one Inftant in any one Collection of Matter, is in that particular Concrete diftinguish'd from all other, and is that individual Life, which exifting constantly from that moment both forwards and backwards, in the fame Continuity of infenfibly fucceeding Parts united to the living Body of the Plant, it has that Identity which makes the fame Plant, and all the Parts of it Parts of the fame Plant, during all the time that they exift united in that continu'd Organization, which is fit to convey that common Life to all the Parts fo united.

Identity of

Identity of


Identity fuited to the Idea.

§. 5. The cafe is not fo much different in Brutes, but that any one may hence fee what makes an Animal, and continues it the fame. Something we have like this in Machines, and may ferve to illuftrate it. For example, what is a Watch 'Tis plain 'tis nothing but a fit Organization, or Construction of Parts, to a certain End, which when a fufficient Force is added to it, it is capable to attain. If we would fuppofe this Machine one continu'd Body, all whofe organiz'd Parts were repair'd, increas'd or diminish'd by a conftant Addition or Separation of infenfible Parts, with one common Life, we fhould have fomething very much like the Body of an Animal; with this Difference, That in an Animal the Fitness of the Organization, and the Motion wherein Life confifts, begin together, the Motion coming from within; but in Machines, the Force coming fenfibly from without, is often away when the Organ is in order, and well fitted to receive it.

§. 6. This alfo fhews wherein the Identity of the fame Man confists, viz. in nothing but a Participation of the fame continu'd Life, by conftantly fleeting Particles of Matter, in Succeffion vitally united to the fame organiz'd Body. He that shall place the Identity of Man in any thing elfe, but like that of other Animals in one fitly organiz'd Body, taken in any one Inftant, and from thence continu'd under one Organization of Life in feveral fucceffively fleeting Particles of Matter united to it, will find it hard to make an Embryo, one of Years, mad and fober, the fame Man, by any Suppofition, that will not make it poffible for Seth, Ifmael, Socrates, Pilate, St. Auftin, and Cafar Borgia, to be the fame Man. For if the Identity of Soul alone makes the fame Man, and there be nothing in the Nature of Matter, why the fame individual Spirit may not be united to different Bodies, it will be poffible that thofe Men living in diftant Ages, and of different Tempers, may have been the fame Man: which way of speaking muft be, from a very ftrange ufe of the word Man, apply'd to an Idea, out of which Body and Shape is excluded. And that way of speaking would agree yet worse with the Notions of thofe Philofophers who allow of Tranfmigration, and are of opinion that the Souls of Men may, for their Mifcarriages, be detruded into the Bodies of Beafts, as fit Habitations, with Organs suited to the Satisfaction of their brutal Inclinations. But yet, I think, no body, could he be fure that the Soul of Heliogabalus were in one of his Hogs, would yet fay, that Hog were a Man or Heliogabalus.

§. 7. 'Tis not therefore Unity of Subftance, that comprehends all forts of Identity, or will determine it in every cafe: But to conceive and judg of it a-right, we must confider what Idea the word it is apply'd-to, ftands for; it being one thing to be the fame Subftance, another the fame Man, and a third


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