the fame Perfon, if Perfon, Man, and Substance are three Names ftanding for three different Ideas; for fuch as is the Idea belonging to that Name, fuch must be the Identity: which, if it had been a little more carefully attended to, would poffibly have prevented a great deal of that Confufion, which often occurs about this matter, with no fmall feeming Difficulties, especially concerning Perfonal Identity, which therefore we fhall in the next place a little

confider.

§. 8. An Animal is a living organiz'd Body; and confequently the fame A- Same Man. nimal, as we have obferv'd, is the fame continu'd Life communicated to different Particles of Matter, as they happen fucceffively to be united to that organiz'd living Body. And whatever is talk'd of other Definitions, ingenuous Obfervation puts it paft doubt, that the Idea in our Minds, of which the Sound Man in our Mouths is the Sign, is nothing elle but of an Animal of such a certain Form: fince I think I may be confident, that whoever fhould fee a Creature of his own Shape and Make, tho' it had no more Reafon all its Life than a Cat or a Parrot, would call him ftill a Man; or whoever fhould hear a Cat or a Parrot difcourfe, reafon and philosophize, would call or think it nothing but a Cat or a Parrot; and fay, the one was a dull irrational Man, and the other a very intelligent rational Parrot. A Relation we have in an Author of great Note, is fufficient to countenance the Suppofition of a rational Parrot. His Words * are:

62

"I had a mind to know from Prince Maurice's own Mouth the Account of

* Memoirs of what pass'd in Christendom

*Whence come ye? It an

a common, but much credited Story, that I had heard fo often from many from 1672 to "others, of an old Parrot he had in Brafil during his Government there, that 1679 P.332. fpoke, and ask'd, and answer'd common Questions like a reasonable Creature: "fo that thofe of his Train there generally concluded it to be Witchery or "Poffeffion; and one of his Chaplains, who liv'd long afterwards in Holland, "would never from that time endure a Parrot, but faid, they all had a Devil " in them. I had heard many Particulars of this Story, and affever'd by People hard to be difcredited, which made me ask Prince Maurice what there was of it. He faid, with his ufual Plainnefs and Drynefs in Talk, there was fomething true, but a great deal falfe of what had been reported. I de"fir'd to know of him what there was of the firft? He told me short and coldly, that he had heard of fuch an old Parrot when he came to Brafil; and "tho' he believ'd nothing of it, and 'twas a good way off, yet he had fo much "Curiofity as to fend for it: that 'twas a very great and a very old one, and " when it came firft into the Room where the Prince was, with a great many "Dutch-men about him, it faid prefently, What a Company of white Men are here? "They ask'd it what he thought that Man was, pointing at the Prince? It wered, From "anfwer'd, Some General or other; when they brought it close to him, he ask'd Marinnan. it, * D'ou venes vous? It anfwer'd, De Marinnan. The Prince A qui eftes The Prince, "vous? The Parrot, A un Portugais. Prince, Que fais tula? Parrot, le garde To whom do "les poulles. The Prince laugh'd, and faid, Vous gardes le poulles? The Parrot The Parrot, you belong? anfwer'd, Ouy, moy & je fcay bien faire; and made the Chuck four or five To a Portu"times that People ufe to make to Chickens when they call them. I fet down gueze. the Words of this worthy Dialogue in French, juft as Prince Maurice faid Prince, What "them to me. I ask'd him in what Language the Parrot fpoke, and he faid, Parrot, I look "in Brafilian; I ask'd whether he understood Brafilian, he faid, no, but he had after the Chic"taken care to have two Interpreters by him, the one a Dutch-man that spoke kens. The Bafilian, and the other a Brafilian that spoke Dutch; that he ask'd them fe- Prince parately and privately, and both of them agreed in telling him juft the fame laugh'd, and faid, Tou look "thing that the Parrot faid. I could not but tell this odd Story, because it is after the Chic"fo much out of the way, and from the first Hand, and what may pafs for a kens? ThePar"good one; for I dare fay this Prince at leaft believ'd himself in all he told rot aufwer'd, me, having ever pafs'd for a very honeft and pious Man: I leave it to Na- Tes 1, and I "turalifts to reafon, and to other Men to believe as they please upon it; how-nough how to ever, it is not perhaps amifs to relieve or enliven a bufy Scene fometimes with do it. "fuch Digreffions, whether to the purpose or no."

do there?

you

know well e

I had taken care that the Reader fhould have the Story at large in the Au- Same Man. thor's own words, because he seems to me not to have thought it incredible; for it cannot be imagin'd that fo able a Man as he, who had Sufficiency enough

Vol. I.

U

to

Perfonal Identity.

to warrant all the Teftimonies he gives of himself, fhould take fo much pairs, in a place where it had nothing to do, to pin fo clofe not only on a Man whom he mentions as his Friend, but on a Prince in whom he acknowledges very great Honesty and Piety, a Story which if he himself thought incredible, he could not but also think ridiculous. The Prince, 'tis plain, who vouches this Story, and our Author, who relates it from him, both of them call this Talker a Parrot; and I ask any one elfe, who thinks fuch a Story fit to be told, whether if this Parrot, and all of its kind, had always talk'd, as we have a Prince's Word for it, as this one did, whether, I fay, they would not have pafs'd for a Race of rational Animals: but yet whether for all that they would have been allow'd to be Men, and not Parrots ? For I prefume 'tis not the Idea of a thinking or rational Being alone that makes the Idea of a Man in moft Peoples Senfe, but of a Body, fo and fo fhap'd, join'd to it; and if that be the Idea of a Man, the fame fucceffive Body not fhifted all at once, muft, as well as the fame immaterial Spirit, go to the making of the fame Man.

. 9. This being premis'd to find wherein perfonal Identity confifts, we must confider what Perfon ftands for; which, I think, is a thinking intelligent Being, that has Reason and Refle&ion, and can confider it felf as it felf, the fame thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only by that Consciousness which is infeparable from thinking, and as it feems to me eflential to it it being impoffible for any one to perceive without perceiving that he does perceive. When we fee, hear, fmell, tafte, feel, meditate, or will any thing, we know that we do fo. Thus it is always as to our prefent Senfations. and Perceptions: And by this every one is to himself that which he calls Self; it not being confider'd in this cafe, whether the fame Self be continu'd in the fame or divers Subftances. For fince Confcioufnefs always accompanies thinking, and 'tis that that makes every one to be what he calls Self, and thereby diftinguifhes himself from all other thinking things; in this alone confifts per-. fonal Identity, i. e. the Sameness of a rational Being And as far as this Confcioufnefs can be extended backwards to any paft Action or Thought, fo far. reaches the Identity of that Perfon; it is the fame Self now it was then; and 'tis by the fame Self with this prefent one that now reflects on it, that that Action was done.

Confciousness . 10. But it is farther enquir'd, whether it be the fame Identical Substance? makes perfe- This few would think they had reafon to doubt of, if thefe Perceptions, with nal Identity. their Confcioufnefs, always remain'd prefent in the Mind, whereby the fame thinking thing would be always confciously prefent, and, as would be thought, evidently the fame to it felf. But that which feems to make the Difficulty is this, that this Confcioufnefs being interrupted always by Forgetfulness, there being no moment of our Lives wherein we have the whole Tram of all our paft Actions before our Eyes in one view, but even the beft Memories lofing the Sight of one part whilft they are viewing another; and we fometimes, and that the greatest part of our Lives, not reflecting on our paft Selves, being intent on our present Thoughts, and in found Sleep, having no Thoughts at all, or at least none with that Confcioufnels which remarks our waking Thoughts: I fay, in all thefe cafes, our Consciousness being interrupted, and we losing the Sight of our paft Selves, Doubts are rais'd whether we are the fame thinking thing, i. e. the fame Subftance or no. Which, however reasonable or unreafonable, concerns no perfonal Identity at all: The Queftion being, what makes the fame Perfon, and not whether it be the fame Identical Subftance, which always thinks in the fame Perfon; which in this cafe matters not at all: Different Subftances, by the fame Consciousness, (where they do partake in it) being united into one Perfon, as well as different Bodies by the fame Life are united into one Animal, whofe Identity is preferv'd, in that Change of Subftances, by the Unity of one continu'd Life. For it being the fame Confciousness that makes a Man be himself to himself, perfonal Identity depends on that only, whether it be annex'd only to one individual Subftance, or can be continu'd in a Succeffion of feveral Subftances. For as far as any intelligent Being can repeat the Idea of any paft Action with the fame Confcioufnefs it had of it at firft, and with the fame Confcioufnefs it has of any prefent Action; fo far it is the fame perfonal Self. For it is by the Confcioufnefs it has of its present Thoughts

Thoughts and A&ions, that it is Self to it Self now, and fo will be the fame Self, as far as the fame Confcioufnefs can extend to Actions paft or to come; and would be by Distance of Time, or Change of Subftance, no more two Perfons, than a Man be two Men by wearing other Cloches to day than he did yesterday, with a long or fhort Sleep between: The fame Consciousness uniting thofe diftant Actions into the fame Perfon, whatever Substances contributed to their Production.

Subftances

§. 11. That this is fo, we have fome kind of Evidence in our very Bodies, all Perfonal Iwhofe Particles, whilft vitally united to this fame thinking confcious Self, fo dentity in Change of that we feel when they are touch'd, and are affected by, and confcious of Good or Harm that happens to them, are a part of our Selves; i. e. of our thinking confcious Self. Thus the Limbs of his Body is to every one a part of himself: he sympathizes and is concern'd for them. Cut off an Hand, and thereby feparate it from that Consciousness we had of its Heat, Cold, and other Affections, and it is then no longer a part of that which is himself, any more than the remoteft part of Matter. Thus we fee the Subftance, whereof perfonal Self confifted at one time, may be vary'd at another, without the Change of perfonal Identity; there being no question about the fame Perfon, tho' the Limbs, which but now were a part of it, be cut off.

S. 12. But the question is, whether if the fame Subftance which thinks be chang'd, it can be the fame Perfon; or remaining the fame, it can be different Perfons.

And to this I answer, first, This can be no Question at all to those who place Whether in Thought in a purely material animal Conftitution, void of an immaterial Sub- the Change of thinking Subftance. For whether their Suppofition be true or no, 'tis plain they conceive conceive ftances. perfonal Identity preferv'd in fomething elfe than Identity of Subftance; as animal Identity is preferv'd in Identity of Life, and not of Subftance. And therefore those who place Thinking in an immaterial Subftance only, before they can come to deal with thefe Men, muft fhew why perfonal Identity cannot be preferv'd in the Change of immaterial Subftances or Variety of particular immaterial Substances, as well as animal Identity is preferv'd in the Change of material Substances, or Variety of particular Bodies: unless they will fay, 'tis one immaterial Spirit that makes the fame Life in Brutes, as it is one immaterial Spirit that makes the fame Perfon in Men; which the Cartefians at least will not admit, for fear of making Brutes thinking things too.

§. 13. But next, as to the firft part of the Queftion, Whether if the fame thinking Substance (fuppofing immaterial Subftances only to think) be chang'd, it can be the fame Perfon? I anfwer, That cannot be refolv'd, but by thofe who know what kind of Subftances they are that do think, and whether the Consciousness of paft Actions can be transfer'd from one thinking Subftance to another. I grant, were the fame Confcioufnels the fame individual Action, it could not but it being but a present Representation of a past Action, why it may not be poffible, that that may be reprefented to the Mind to have been, which really never was, will remain to be fhewn. And therefore how far the Conscioufnels of past Actions is annex'd to any individual Agent, fo that another cannot poffibly have it, will be hard for us to determine, till we know what kind of Action it is that cannot be done without a reflex A&t of Perception accompanying it, and how perform'd by thinking Substances, who cannot think without being confcious of it. But that which we call the fame Conciousness, not being the fame individual A&t, why one intellectual Subftance may not have reprefented to it, as done by it felf, what it never did, and was perhaps done by fome other Agent; why, I fay, fuch a Reprefentation may not poffibly be without Reality of Matter of Fact, as well as feveral Reprefentations in Dreams are, which yet whilft dreaming we take for true, will be difficult to conclude from the nature of things. And that it never is fo, will by us, till we have clearer Views of the nature of thinking Substances, be beft refolv'd into the Goodness of God, who, as far as the Happiness or Mifery of any of his fenfible Creatures is concern'd in it, will not by a fatal Error of theirs transfer from one to another that Consciousness which draws Reward or, Punishment with it. How far this may be an Argument against those who would place Thinking in a Syftem of fleeting animal Spirits, I leave to be confider'd. But Vol. I. U 2

yet

yet to return to the Queftion before us, it must be allow'd, That if the fame Confcioufnefs (which, as has been fhewn, is quite a different thing from the fame numerical Figure or Motion in Body) can be transfer'd from one thinking Subftance to another, it will be poffible that two thinking Subftances may make but one Perfon. For the fame Consciousness being preferv'd, whether in the fame or different Subftances, the perfonal Identity is preferv'd.

. 14. As the fecond part of the Question, Whether the fame immaterial Subftance remaining, there may be two diftin& Perfons? which Question feems to me to be built on this, Whether the fame immaterial Being, being confcious of the Actions of its paft Duration, may be wholly ftrip'd of ail the Confcioufnefs of its past Exiftence, and lofe it beyond the Power of ever retrieving again; and fo as it were beginning a new Account from a new Period, have a Consciousness that cannot reach beyond this new State. All thofe who hold Pre-existence are evidently of this mind, fince they allow the Soul to have no remaining Consciousness of what it did in that pre-exiftent State, either wholly separate from Body, or informing any other Body; and if they fhould not, 'tis plain, Experience would be against them. So that perfonal Identity reaching no farther than Confciousness reaches, a pre-exiftent Spirit not having continu'd fo many Ages in a State of Silence, muft needs make different Perfons. Suppose a Chriftian Platonist or Pythagorean fhould, upon God's having ended all his Works of Creation the feventh Day, think his Soul hath exifted ever fince; and should imagine it has revolv'd in feveral human Bodies, as I once met with one, who was perfwaded his had been the Soul of Socrates: (how reasonably I will not difpute; this I know, that in the Poft he fill'd, which was no inconfiderable one, he pass'd for a very rational Man, and the Prefs has fhewn that he wanted not Parts or Learning) would any one fay, that he being not conscious of any of Socrates's Actions or Thoughts, could be the fame Perfon with Socrates? Let any one reflect upon himself, and conclude that he has in himself an immaterial Spirit, which is that which thinks in him, and in the constant Change of his Body keeps him the fame; and is that which he calls himself: Let him alfo fuppofe it to be the fame Soul that was in Neftor or Therfites, at the Siege of Troy (for Souls being, as far as we know any thing of them in their nature, indifferent to any Parcel of Matter, the Suppofition has no apparent Abfurdity in it) which it may have been, as well as it is now, the Soul of any other Man : But he now having no Confcioufnefs of any of the A&ions either of Neftor or Therfites, does or can he conceive himfelf the fame Perfon with either of them? Can he be concern'd in either of their A&tions? attribute them to himself, or think them his own more than the Actions of any other Man that ever exifted? So that this Confciousness not reaching to any of the Actions of either of thofe Men, he is no more one Self with either of them, than if the Soul or immaterial Spirit that now informs him, had been created, and began to exift, when it began to inform his prefent Body; tho' it were ever fo true, that the fame Spirit that inform'd Neftor's or Ther fites's Body, were numerically the fame that now informs his. For this would no more make him the fame Perfon with Neftor, than if fome of the Particles of Matter that were once a part of Neftor, were now a part of this Man; the fame immaterial Substance, without the fame Consciousness, no more making the fame Perfon by being united to any Body, than the fame Particle of Matter, without Conscioufnefs united to any Body, makes the fame Perfon. But let him once find himself conscious of any of the Actions of Neftor, he then finds himself the fame Perfon with Neftor.

S. 15. And thus we may be able, without any difficulty, to conceive the fame Perfon at the Resurrection, tho' in a Body not exactly in Make or Parts the fame which he had here, the fame Concioufnefs going along with the Soul that inhabits it. But yet the Soul alone, in the Change of Bodies, would scarce to any one, but to him that makes the Soul the Man, be enough to make the fame Man. For fhould the Soul of a Prince, carrying with it the Confcioufnefs of the Prince's paft Life, enter and inform the Body of a Cobler, as foon as deferted by his own Soul, every one fees he would be the fame Person with the Prince, accountable only for the Prince's Actions: But who would fay it was the fame Man? The Body too goes to the making the Man, and would, I guess, to every body determine the Man in this cafe; wherein the Soul, with all its Princely

Thoughts

Thoughts about it, would not make another Man: but he would be the fame Cobler to every one befides himself. I know that in the ordinary way of (peaking, the fame Perfon, and the fame Man, ftand for one and the fame thing. And indeed every one will always have a liberty to fpeak as he pleases, and to apply what articulate Sounds to what Ideas he thinks fit, and change them as often as he pleases. But yet when we will enquire what makes the fame Spirit, Man, or Perfon, we muft fix the Ideas of Spirit, Man, or Perfon in our Minds; and having refolv'd with our felves what we mean by them, it will not be hard to determine in either of them, or the like, when it is the same, and when not.

16. But tho' the fame immaterial Subftance or Soul does not alone, where- Consciousness ever it be, and in whatsoever State, make the fame Man; yet 'tis plain Con- makes the fcioufnefs, as far as ever it can be extended, fhould it be to Ages paft, unites fame Perfen. Existences and A&tions, very remote in time, into the fame Perfon, as well as it does the Exiftences and Actions of the immediately preceding Moment: So that whatever has the Conscioufnels of prefent and paft Actions, is the fame Perfon to whom they both belong. Had I the fame Conscioufnefs that I faw the Ark and Noah's Flood, as that I faw an overflowing of the Thames laft Winter, or as that I write now; I could no more doubt that I who write this now, that faw the Thames overflow'd laft Winter, and that view'd the Flood at the general Deluge, was the fame Self, place that Self in what Subftance you please, than that I who write this am the fame my felf now whilft I write (whether I confift of all the fame Subftance, material or immaterial, or no) that I was yesterday. For as to this point of being the fame Self, it matters not whether this prefent Self be made up of the fame or other Substances; I being as much concern'd, and as juftly accountable for any A&tion was done a thousand Years fince, appropriated to me now by this Self-consciousness, as I am for what I did the laft Moment.

9. 17. Self is that confcious thinking thing (whatever Subftance made up of, self depends whether spiritual or material, fimple or compounded, it matters not) which is on Confcicusfenfible, or confcious of Pleasure and Pain, capable of Happiness or Mifery, and ness. fo is concern'd for it felf, as far as that Consciousness extends. Thus every one finds, that whilst comprehended under that Conscioufnefs, the little Finger is as much a part of it self, as what is most fo. Upon Separation of this little Finger, fhould this Confciousness go along with the little Finger, and leave the reft of the Body, 'tis evident the little Finger would be the Perfon, the fame Perfon; and Self then would have nothing to do with the reft of the Body. As in this cafe it is the Confciousness that goes along with the Substance, when one part is feparate from another, which makes the fame Perfon, and conftitutes this infeparable Self; fo it is in reference to Subftance remote in time. That with which the Confcionfuefs of this prefent thinking thing can join it felf, makes the fame Perfon, and is one Self with it, and with nothing elfe; and fo attributes to it felf, and owns all the A&tions of that thing as its own, as far as that Consciousnels reaches, and no farther as every one who reflects, will perceive.

. 18. In this perfonal Identity, is founded all the Right and Juftice of Re- object of Reward and Punishment; Happiness and Mifery being that for which every one ward and Pu is concern'd for himself, not mattering what becomes of any Subftance, not nifhment. join'd to, or affected with that Consciousness. For as it is evident in the Inftance I gave but now, if the Confcioufnefs went along with the little Finger when it was cut off, that would be the fame Self which was concern'd for the whole Body yefterday, as making a part of it felf, whofe Actions then it cannot but admit as its own now. Tho' if the fame Body should still live, and immediately, from the Separation of the little Finger, have its own peculiar Confcioufnefs, whereof the little Finger knew nothing; it would not at all be concern'd for it, as a part of it felf, or could own any of its Actions, or have any of them imputed to him.

§. 19. This may fhew us wherein perfonal Identity confifts, not in the Identity of Subftance, but, as I have faid, in the Identity of Consciousness; wherein, if Socrates and the prefent Mayor of Queenborough agree, they are the fame Perfon: If the fame Socrates waking and fleeping do not partake of the fame Consciousnefs, Socrates waking and fleeping is not the fame Perfon. And to punish Socra

tes