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tes waking for what fleeping Socrates thought, and waking Socrates was never confcious of, would be no more of Right, than to punifh one Twin for what his Brother-Twin did, whereof he knew nothing, because their Outsides were fo like, that they could not be diftinguifh'd; for fuch Twins have been seen.

Difference between Identity of Man and Perfon.

§. 20. But yet poffibly it will still be obje&ed, Suppose I wholly loose the Memory of fome parts of my Life, beyond a poffibility of retrieving them, fo that perhaps I fhall never be conscious of them again; yet am I not the fame Perfon that did thofe Actions, had thofe Thoughts that I was once confcious of, tho' I have now forgot them? To which I answer, That we must here take notice what the Word I is apply'd to; which, in this cafe, is the Man only. And the fame Man being prefum'd to be the fame Perfon, I is cafily here fuppos'd to stand alfo for the fame Perfon. But if it be poffible for the same Man to have diftin&t incommunicable Confcioufnefs at different times, it is paft doubt the fame Man would at different times make different Perfons; which, we fee, is the Sense of Mankind in the folemneft Declaration of their Opinions, human Laws not punishing the Mad Man for the Sober Man's A&tions, nor the Sober Man for what the Mad Man did, thereby making them two Perfons: which is fomewhat explain'd by our way of fpeaking in English, when we fay fuch an one is not himself, or is befides himself; in which Phrafes it is infinuated, as if those who now, or at least firft ufed them, thought that Self was chang'd, the felf-fame Perfon was no longer in that Man.

§. 21. But yet 'tis hard to conceive that Socrates, the fame individual Man, fhould be two Perfons. To help us a little in this, we muft confider what is meant by Socrates, or the fame individual Man.

Firft, It must be either the fame individual, immaterial, thinking Substance; in fhort, the fame numerical Soul, and nothing else.

Secondly, Or the fame Animal, without any regard to an immaterial Soul.
Thirdly, Or the fame immaterial Spirit united to the fame Animal.

Now take which of thefe Suppofitions you please, it is impoffible to make perfonal Identity to confift in any thing but Consciousness, or reach any farther than that does.

For by the first of them, it must be allow'd poffible, that a Man born of different Women, and in diftant Times, may be the fame Man. A way of speaking, which whoever admits, must allow it poffible for the fame Man to be two diftin& Perfons, as any two that have liv'd in different Ages, without the knowledg of one another's Thoughts.

By the fecond and third, Socrates in this Life, and after it, cannot be the same Man any way, but by the fame Consciousness; and so making human Identity to confift in the fame thing wherein we place perfonal Identity, there will be no difficulty to allow the fame Man to be the fame Perfon. But then they who place human Identity in Confcioufnefs only, and not in fomething else, must confider how they will make the Infant Socrates the fame Man with Socrates after the Refurrection. But whatsoever to fome Men makes a Man, and confequently the fame individual Man, wherein perhaps few are agreed, perfonal Identity can by us be placed in nothing but Confcioufnels (which is that alone which makes what we call Self) without involving us in great Abfurdities.

§. 22. But is not a Man drunk and fober the fame Perfon, why elfe is he punifh'd for the Fa&t he commits when drunk, tho' he be never afterwards conscious of it? Juft as much the fame Perfon, as a Man that walks, and does other things in his Sleep, is the fame Perfon, and is anfwerable for any mischief he fhall do in it. Human Laws punish both, with a Justice suitable to their way of Knowledg; because in these cases, they cannot diftinguifh certainly what is real, what counterfeit and fo the Ignorance in Drunkennefs or Sleep, is not admitted as a Plea. For tho' Punishment be annex'd to Perfonality, and Perfonality to Consciousness, and the Drunkard perhaps be not confcious of what he did; yet human Judicatures juftly punish him, because the Fact is prov'd against him, but want of Conscioufnefs cannot be prov'd for him. But in the great Day, wherein the Secrets of all Hearts fhall be laid open, it may be reasonable to think, no one fhall be made to anfwer for what he knows nothing of; but fhall receive his Doom, his Confcience accufing or excufing him.

§. 23.

L

. 23. Nothing but Confcioufnefs can unite remote Exiftences into the fame Consciousness, Perfon, the Identity of Subftance will not do it. For whatever Subftance there alone makes Self. is, however fram'd, without Confcioufnefs there is no Perfon: And a Carcafe may be a Perfon, as well as any sort of Substance be fo without Consciousness.. Could we fuppofe two diftinct incommunicable Confcioufneffes acting the fame Body, the one conftantly by Day, the other by Night; and, on the other fide, the fame Conscioufnefs a&ting by Intervals two diftin&t Bodies: I ask in the first cafe, Whether the Day and the Night-man would not be two as diftin& Perfons, as Socrates and Plate? And whether, in the fecond cafe, there would not be one Perlon in two diftinct Bodies, as much as one Man is the fame in two diftin& Clothings? Nor is it at all material to say, that this fame, and this diftinct Confciousness, in the Cafes abovemention'd, is owing to the fame and diftinct immaterial Subftances, bringing it with them to thofe Bodies; which, whether true or no, alters not the Cafe: fince 'tis evident the perfonal Identity would equally be determin'd by the Confcioufnefs, whether that Consciousness were annex'd to fome individual immaterial Subftance or no. For granting, that the thinking Subftance in Man muft be neceffarily fuppos'd immaterial, 'tis evident that immaterial thinking thing may fometimes part with its paft Consciousness, and be reftor'd to it again, as appears in the Forgetfulness Men often have of their paft Actions; and the Mind many times recovers the Memory of a past Consciousness, which it had loft for twenty Years together. Make the Intervals of Memory and Forgetfulness to take their turns regularly by Day and Night, and you have two Perfons with the fame immaterial Spirit, as much as in the former Inftance two Perfons with the fame Body. So that Self is not determin'd by Identity or Diversity of Subftance, which it cannot be fure of, but only by Identity of Consciousness.

§. 24. Indeed it may conceive the Subftance, whereof it is now made up, to have exifted formerly, united in the fame confcious Being: but Consciousness remov'd, that Subftance is no more it felf, or makes no more a part of it, than any other Subftance; as is evident in the Inftance we have already given of a Limb cut off, of whofe Heat, or Cold, or other Affections, having no longer any Consciousness, it is no more of a Man's felf, than any other Matter of the Univerfe. In like manner it will be in reference to any immaterial Subftance, which is void of that Confcioufnefs, whereby I am my self to my felf: If there be any part of its Exiftence, which I cannot upon Recollection join with that prefent Conscioufnefs whereby I am now my felf, it is in that part of its Exiftence no more my felf, than any other immaterial Being. For whatsoever any Substance has thought or done, which I cannot recollect, and by my Consciousnefs make my own Thought and Action, it will no more belong to me, whether a Part of me thought or did it, than if it had been thought or done by any other immaterial Being any where exifting.

§. 25. I agree, the more probable Opinion is, That this Confciousness is annex'd to, and the Affection of one individual immaterial Subftance.

And

But let Men, according to their diverfe Hypothefes, refolve of that as they pleafe. This every intelligent Being, fenfible of Happiness or Misery, muft grant, that there is fomething that is himself that he is concern'd for, and would have happy; that this Self has exifted in a continu'd Duration more than one Inftant, and therefore 'tis poffible may exift, as it has done, Months and Years to come, without any certain Bounds to be fet to its Duration; and may be the fame Self, by the fame Confcioufhefs continu'd on for the future. thus, by this Confcioufnefs, he finds himself to be the fame Self which did fuch or fuch an Action fome Years fince, by which he comes to be happy or miserable now. In all which account of Self, the fame numerical Subftance is not confider'd as making the fame Self; but the fame continu'd Conicioufnefs, in which feveral Subftances may have been united, and again feparated from it, which, whilst they continu'd in a vital Union with that, wherein this Conscioufnefs then refided, made a part of that fame Self. Thus any part of our Bodies vitally united to that which is confcious in us, makes a part of our Selves: But upon Separation from the vital Union, by which that Consciousness is communicated, that which a moment fince was part of our Selves, is no more fo, than a part of another Man's Self is a part of me; and 'tis not impoffible, but

in

in a little time may become a real Part of another Perfon. And fo we have the fame numerical Substance become a Part of two different Perfons; and the fame Perfon preferv'd under the Change of various Subftances. Could we fuppose any Spirit wholly ftrip'd of all its Memory or Consciousness of past Actions, as we find our Minds always are of a great part of ours, and sometimes of them all; the Union or Separation of such a spiritual Substance would make no variation of perfonal Identity, any more than that of any Particle of Matter does. Any Subftance vitally united to the prefent thinking Being, is a part of that very fame Self which now is: Any thing united to it by a Consciousness of former Actions, makes also a part of the fame Self, which is the fame both then and now.

Perfon, a Fo §. 26. Perfon, as I take it, is the Name for this Self. Wherever a Man finds renick Term. what he calls Himself, there I think another may fay is the fame Perfon. It is a forenfick Term appropriating Actions and their Merit; and fo belongs only to intelligent Agents capable of a Law, and Happiness and Mifery. This Perfonality extends it felf beyond prefent Exiftence to what is paft, only by Conscioufnels, whereby it becomes concern'd and accountable, owns and imputes to it felf paft Actions, juft upon the fame ground, and for the fame reafon that it does the prefent. All which is founded in a Concern for Happiness, the unavoidable Concomitant of Confcioufnefs; that which is conscious of Pleasure and Pain, defiring that that Self that is confcious fhould be happy. And therefore whatever paft Actions it cannot reconcile or appropriate to that prefent Self by Consciousness, it can be no more concern'd in, than if they had never been done: And to receive Pleasure or Pain, i. e. Reward or Punishment, on the account of any such Action, is all one as to be made happy or miferable in its first Being, without any Demerit at all. For fuppofing a Man punish'd now for what he had done in another Life, whereof he could be made to have no Consciousness at all, what difference is there between that Punishment, and being created miferable? And therefore conformable to this the Apostle tells us, that at the Great Day, when every one fhall receive according to his Doings, the Secrets of all Hearts fhall be laid open. The Sentence fhall be juftify'd by the Consciousness all Perfons fhall have, that they themselves, in what Bodies foever they appear, or what Subftances foever that Consciousness adheres to, are the fame that committed thofe A&tions, and deferve that Punishment for them.

Names.

§. 27. I am apt enough to think I have, in treating of this Subject, made ome Suppofitions that will look ftrange to fome Readers, and poffibly they are o in themselves. But yet, I think, they are fuch as are pardonable in this Ignorance we are in of the Nature of that thinking thing that is in us, and which we look on as our Selves. Did we know what it was, or how it was ty'd to a certain Syftem of fleeting animal Spirits; or whether it could or could not perform its Operations of Thinking and Memory out of a Body organiz'd as ours is; and whether it has pleas'd God, that no one fuch Spirit shall ever be united to any but one fuch Body, upon the right Conftitution of whofe Organs its Memory should depend; we might fee the Abfurdity of fome of thofe Suppofitions I have made. But taking, as we ordinarily now do, (in the dark concerning these Matters) the Soul of a Man, for an immaterial Subftance, independent from Matter, and indifferent alike to it all, there can from the Nature of things be no Abfurdity at all to fuppofe, that the fame Soul may, at different times, be united to different Bodies, and with them make up, for that time, one Man: As well as we fuppofe a Part of a Sheep's Body yesterday should be a Part of a Man's Body to morrow, and in that Union make up a vital Part of Melibæus himself, as well as it did of his Ram.

The Difficulty §. 28. To conclude, whatevet Substance begins to exist, it must, during its fromill ufe of Existence, neceffarily be the fame: Whatever Compofitions of Subftances begin to exift during the Union of thofe Subftances, the Concrete must be the fame : Whatsoever Mode begins to exift, during its Existence, it is the fame: And fo if the Compofition be of diftin&t Subftances and different Modes, the fame Rule holds. Whereby it will appear, that the Difficulty or Obfcurity that has been about this Matter, rather rifes from the Names ill us'd, than from any Obfcurity on things themselves. For whatever makes the specifick Idea to which the Name is apply'd, if that Idea be fteddily kept to, the Diftinction of any thing

into the fame, and divers will eafily be conceiv'd, and there can arife no Doubt about it.

§. 29. For fuppofing a rational Spirit be the Idea of a Man, 'tis eafy to know Continu'd Exwhat is the fame Man, viz. the fame Spirit, whether feparate or in a Body, fence makes will be the fame Man. Suppofing a rational Spirit vitally united to a Body of Identity. a certain Conformation of Parts to make a Man, whilft that rational Spirit, with that vital Conformation of Parts, tho' continu'd in a fleeting fucceffive Body, remains, it will be the fame Man. But if to any one the Idea of a Man be but the vital Union of Parts in a certan Shape; as long as that vital Union and Shape remains, in a Concrete no otherwise the fame, but by a continu'd Succeffion of fleeting Particles, it will be the fame Man. For whatever be the Compofition, whereof the complex Idea is made, whether Existence makes it one particular thing under any Denomination, the fame Existence continu'd, preferves it the fame Individual under the fame Denomination.

CHA P. XXVIII.

Of other Relations.

6.1. BESIDES the before-mention'd Occafions of Time, Place, and Cau- Proportionalá fality of comparing, or referring things one to another, there are,

as I have faid, infinite others, fome whereof I fhall mention.

First, The first I fhall name is fome one fimple Idea; which being capable of Parts or Degrees, affords an occafion of comparing the Subjects wherein it is to one another, in refpect of that fimple Idea, v. g. Whiter, Sweeter, Bigger, Equal, More, &c. Thefe Relations depending on the Equality and Excess of the fame fimple Idea, in feveral Subjects, may be call'd, if one will, Proportional; and that thefe are only converfant about thofe fimple Ideas receiv'd from Senfation or Reflection, is fo evident, that nothing need be faid to evince it.

§. 2. Secondly, Another occafion of comparing things together, or confider-Naturali ing one thing, fo as to include in that Confideration fome other thing, is the Circumftances of their Origin or Beginning; which being not afterwards to be alter'd, make the Relations depending thereon as lafting as the Subjects to which they belong; v. g. Father and Son, Brothers, Coufin-Germans, &c. which have their Relations by one Community of Blood, wherein they partake in several Degrees; Country-men, i. e. thofe who were born in the fame Country, or Tract of Ground; and thefe I call natural Relations: wherein we may obferve, that Mankind have fitted their Notions and Words to the ufe of common Life, and not to the Truth and Extent of things. For 'tis certain, that in reality the Relation is the fame betwixt the Begetter and the Begotten, in the feveral Races of other Animals as well as Men: But yet 'tis feldom faid, This Bull is the Grandfather of fuch a Calf; or that two Pigeons are Coufin-Germans. It is very convenient, that by diftinct Names thefe Relations should be obferv'd, and mark'd out in Mankind; there being occafion, both in Laws, and other Communications one with another, to mention and take notice of Men under thefe Relations: from whence alfo arife the Obligations of feveral Duties amongst Men. Whereas in Brutes, Men having very little or no cause to mind thefe Relations, they have not thought fit to give them diftinct and peculiar Names. This, by the way, may give us fome Light into the different State and Growth of Languages; which being fuited only to the Convenience of Communication, are proportion'd to the Notions Men have, and the Commerce of Thoughts familiar amongst them; and not to the Reality or Extent of things, nor to the various Refpects might be found among them, nor the different abstract Confiderations might be fram'd about them. Where they had no Philofophical Notions, there they had no Terms to exprefs them: And 'tis no wonder Men fhould have fram'd no Names for thofe things they found no occafion to difcourfe of. From whence it is eafy to imagine, why, as in fome Countries, they may not have fo much as the Name for a Horfe; and in others, where they are more careful of the Pedigrees of their Horfes than of their own,

Vol. I.

X

Inflituted.

Moral.

Moral Good and Evil.

Moral Rules.

Laws.

own, that there they may have not only Names for particular Horses, but also of their feveral Relations of Kindred one to another.

§. 3. Thirdly, Sometimes the Foundation of confidering things, with reference to one another, is fome Act whereby any one comes by a moral Right, Power, or Obligation to do fomething. Thus a General is one that hath Power to command an Army; and an Army under a General is a Collection of arm'd Men oblig❜d to obey one Man. A Citizen, or a Burgher, is one who has a Right to certain Privileges in this or that Place. All this fort depending upon Mens Wills, or Agreement in Society, I call inftituted, or voluntary; and may be diftinguish'd from the natural, in that they are moft, if not all of them, fome way or other alterable, and feparable from the Perfons to whom they have fometimes belong'd, tho' neither of the Subftances, fo related, be destroy'd. Now, tho' these are all reciprocal, as well as the reft, and contain in them a Reference of two things one to another; yet, because one of the two things often wants a relative Name, importing that Reference, Men usually take no notice of it, and the Relation is commonly over-look'd: v. g. a Patron and Client are easily allow'd to be Relations, but a Conftable or Dictator are not fo readily, at first hearing, confider'd as fuch; because there is no peculiar Name for those who are under the Command of a Dictator, or Conftable, expreffing a Relation to either of them; tho' it be certain, that either of them hath a certain Power over fome others; and fo is fo far related to them, as well as a Patron is to his Client, or General to his Army.

§. 4. Fourthly, There is another fort of Relation which is the Conformity, or Difagreement, Mens voluntary Actions have to a Rule to which they are refer'd, and by which they are judg'd of; which, I think, may be call'd Moral Relation, as being that which denominates our moral Actions, and deferves well to be examin'd, there being no Part of Knowledge wherein we should be more careful to get determin'd Ideas, and avoid, as much as may be, Obfcurity and Confufion. Human Actions, when with their various Ends, Objects, Manners, and Circumstances, they are fram'd into diftinct complex Ideas, are, as has been fhewn, so many mix'd Modes, a great Part whereof have Names annex'd to them. Thus, fuppofing Gratitude to be a Readiness to acknowledge and return Kindness receiv'd, Polygamy to be the having more Wives than one at once; when we frame thefe Notions thus in our Minds, we have there fo many determin'd Ideas of mix'd Modes. But this is not all that concerns our Actions; it is not enough to have determin'd Ideas of them, and to know what Names belong to fuch and fuch Combinations of Ideas. We have a farther and greater Concernment, and that is, to know whether fuch Actions fo made up are morally good or bad.

§. 5. Good and Evil, as hath been fhewn, B. II. Ch. 20. §. 2. and Ch. 21. S. 42. are nothing but Pleasure or Pain, or that which occafions, or procures Pleasure or Pain to us. Moral Good and Evil then is only the Conformity or Difagreement of our voluntary Actions to fome Law, whereby Good or Evil is drawn on us by the Will and Power of the Law-Maker; which Good and Evil, Pleasure or Pain, attending our Obfervance, or Breach of the Law, by the Decree of the Law-maker, is that we call Reward and Punishment.

§. 6. Of thefe Moral Rules, or Laws, to which Men generally refer, and by which they judge of the Rectitude or Pravity of their Actions, there feem to me to be three forts, with their three different Enforcements, or Rewards and Punifhments. For fince it would be utterly in vain to fuppofe a Rule fet to the free Actions of Man, without annexing to it fome Enforcement of Good and Evil to determine his Will, we muft, where-ever we fuppofe a Law, fuppofe alfo fome Reward or Punishment annex'd to that Law. It would be in vain for one intelligent Being to fet a Rule to the Actions of another, if he had it not in his Power to reward the Compliance with, and punish Deviation from his Rule, by fome Good and Evil, that is not the natural Product and Confequence of the Action it felf. For that being a natural Convenience, or Inconvenience, would operate of it felf without a Law. This, if I mistake not, is the true Nature of all Law, properly fo call'd.

§. 7. The Laws that Men generally refer their Actions to, to judge of their Rectitude, or Obliquity, feem to me to be these three. 1. The Divine Law.

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