2. The Civil Law. 3. The Law of Opinion or Reputation, if I may fo call it. By the Relation they bear to the firft of thefe, Men judge whether their Actions are Sins or Duties; by the Second, whether they be Criminal or Innocent; and by the third, whether they be Vertues or Vices.

§. 8. First, The Divine Law, whereby I mean that Law which God has fet Divine Law, to the Actions of Men, whether promulgated to them by the Light of Nature the Measure of or the Voice of Revelation. That God has given a Rule whereby Men fhould Sin and Duty. govern themfelves, I think there is no body fo brutifh as to deny. He has a Right to do it, we are his Creatures: He has Goodnefs and Wisdom to direct our Actions to that which is best; and he has power to enforce it by Rewards and Punishments, of infinite Weight and Duration, in another Life; for no body can take us out of his hands. This is the only true Touchstone of moral Rectitude, and by comparing them to this Law it is, that Men judge of the most confiderable moral Good or Evil of their Actions: that is, whether as Duties or Sins they are like to procure them Happiness or Mifery from the hands of the ALMIGHTY.

Crimes and Innocence.

§. 9. Secondly, The Civil Law, the Rule fet by the Commonwealth to the Civil Law, the Actions of thofe who belong to it, is another Rule to which Men refer their Measure of Actions, to judge whether they be criminal or no. This Law no body overlocks; the Rewards and Punishments that enforce it being ready at hand, and fuitable to the Power that makes it which is the Force of the Commonwealth, engag'd to protect the Lives, Liberties, and Poffeffions of thofe who live according to its Laws, and has power to take away Life, Liberty, or Goods from him who disobeys: which is the Punishment of Offences committed against this Law.

§. 10. Thirdly, The Law of Opinion or Reputation. Vertue and Vice are Names Philofophical pretended and fuppos'd every where to ftand for Actions in their own nature Law, the Mearight and wrong; and as far as they really are fo apply'd, they fo far are co-fure of Vertue incident with the Divine Law above-mention'd. But yet whatever is pretended, and Vice. this is visible, that these Names Vertue and Vice, in the particular Instance of their Application, thro' the feveral Nations and Societies of Men in the World, are conftantly attributed only to fuch Actions, as in each Country and Society are in Reputation or Difcredit. Nor is it to be thought strange, that Men every where fhould give the name of Vertue to thofe Actions, which amongst them are judg'd praife-worthy; and call that Vice, which they account blameable: fince otherwife they would condemn themfelves, if they should think any thing right, to which they allow'd Commendation; any thing wrong, which they let pafs without Blame. Thus the Measure of what is every where call'd and efteem'd Vertue and Vice is this Approbation or Diflike, Praife or Blame, which by a fecret and tacit Confent establishes it felf in the feveral Societies, Tribes, and. Clubs of Men in the World; whereby feveral Actions come to find Credit or Difgrace amongst them, according to the Judgment, Maxims, or Fashions of that place. For tho' Men uniting into politick Societies have refign'd up to the Publick the difpofing of all their Force, fo that they cannot employ it against any Fellow-Citizens any farther than the Law of the Country directs; yet they retain ftill the Power of thinking well or ill, approving or difapproving of the Actions of those whom they live amongft, and converfe with: And by this Approbation and Dislike, they establish amongst themselves what they will call Vertue and Vice.

§. II. That this is the common Measure of Vertue and Vice will appear to any one who confiders, that tho' that paffes for Vice in one Country, which is counted a Vertue, or at least not Vice in another, yet every where Vertue and Praife, Vice and Blame go together. Vertue is every where that which is thought praife-worthy; and nothing elfe but that which has the allowance of publick Efteem, is call'd Vertue *. Vertue and Praise are fo united, that they are call'd

often

* Our Author, in his Preface to the fourth Edition, taking notice bow apt Men have been to mistake bim, added what here follows. Of this the Ingenious Author of the Difcourfe concerning the Nature of Man, has given me a late Inftance, to mention no other. For the Civility of his Expreffions, and the Candor that belongs to his Order, forbid me to think, that he would have clofed his Vol. I. X 2 Preface

often by the fame name. Sunt fua pramia Laudi, fays Virgil; and fo Cicero, Nihil habet natura praftantius, quam Honeftatem, quam Laudem, quam Dignitatem, quam Decus; which, he tells you, are all names for the fame thing, Tufc. I. 2. This is the Language of the Heathen Philofophers, who well understood wherein their Notions of Vertue and Vice confifted. And tho' perhaps by the different Temper, Education, Fashion, Maxims, or Intereft of different forts of Men, it fell out that what was thought Praife-worthy in one place, efcap'd not Cenfure in another; and fo in different Societies, Vertues and Vices were chang'd: yet, as to the main, they for the most part kept the fame every where. For fince nothing can be more natural, than to encourage with Efteem and Reputation that wherein every one finds his advantage, and to blame and difcountenance the contrary; 'tis no wonder that Efteem and Difcredit, Vertue and Vice, fhould in a great meafure every where correfpond with the unchangeable Rule of Right or Wrong, which the Law of God hath eftablish'd: there being nothing that fo directly and vifibly fecures and advances the general Good of Mankinnd in this World, as Obedience to the Laws he has fet them; and nothing that breeds fuch Mischiefs and Confufion, as the Neglect of them. And therefore Men, without renouncing all Senfe and Reafon, and their own Interest, which they are fo conftantly true to, could not generally mistake in placing their Commendation and Blame on that fide that really deferv'd it not. Nay, even thofe Men whofe Practice was otherwife, fail'd not to give their Approbation right; few being deprav'd to that degree, as not to condemn, at leaft in others the Fault they themselves were guilty of: whereby, even in the Corruption of Manners, the true Boundaries of the Law of Nature, which ought to be the Rule of Vertue and Vice, were pretty well preferv'd. So that even the Exhortations of infpir'd Teachers have not fear'd to appeal to common Repute: What foever is lovely, whatsoever is of good report, if there be any Vertue, if there be any Praife, &c. Phil. 4. 8.

§. 12.

Preface with an Infinuation, as if in what I had faid, Book 2. Chap. 28. concerning the third Rule which Men refer their Actions to, I went about to make Vertue Vice, and Vice Vertue, unless he had miftaken my Meaning, which he could not have done, if he had but given himfelf the trouble to confider what the Argument was I was then upon, and what was the chief Defign of that Chapter, plainly enough fet down in the fourth Section, and thofe following. For I was there not laying down moral Rules, but thewing the Original and Nature of moral Ideas, and enumerating the Rules Men make ufe of in moral Relations, whether thofe Rules were true or falfe: And purfuant thereunto, I tell what has every where that Denomination, which in the Language of that place anfwers to Vertue and Vice in ours, which Alters not the Nature of things, tho' Men do generally judge of, and denominate their Actions according to the Efteem and Fathion of the Place, or Sect they are of.

If he had been at the pains to reflect on what I had faid, B. 1. c. 13. §. 18. and in this prefent Chapter, §. 13, 14, 15, and 20. he would have known what I think of the eternal and unalterable Nature of Right and Wrong, and what I call Vertue and Vice: And if he had obferv'd, that in the place he quotes, I only report, as Matter of Fact, what others call Vertue and Vice, he would not have found it liable to any great Exception. For, I think, I am not much out in faying, that one of the Rules made ufe of in the World for a ground or meafure of a moral Relation, is that Efteem and Reputation which feveral forts of Actions find variously in the feveral Societies of Men, according to which they are there call'd Vertue or Vices: Aud whatever Authority the learned Mr. Lowde places in his Old English Dictionary, I dare fay it no where tells him (if I thould appeal to it) that the fame Action is not in Credit, call'd and counted a Vertue in one place, which being in Difrepute, paffes for and under the name of Vice in another. The taking notice that Men befow the Names of Vertue and Vice according to this Rule of Reputation, is all I have done, or can be laid to my charge to have done, towards the making Vice Vertue, and Vertue Vice. But the good Man does well, and as becomes his Calling, to be watchful in fuch Points, and to take the alarm, even at Expreflious, which ftanding alone by themselves might found ill, and be fufpected.

'Tis to this Zeal, allowable in his Function, that I forgive his citing, as he does, these words of mine, in §. 11. of this Chapter: The Exhortations of infpir'd Teachers have not fear'd to appeal to common Repute; Whatfoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are good report, if there be any Vertue, if there be any Praife, &c. Phil. 4. 8. without taking notice of thofe immediately preceding, which introduce them, run thus: Whereby in the Corruption of Manners, the true Boundaries of the Law of Nature, which ought to be the Rule of Vertue and Vice, were pretty well preferv'd; fo that even the Exbortations of infpir'd Teachers, &c. By which words, and the rest of that Section, it is plain that I brought that Pallage of St. Paul, not to prove that the general Measure of what Men call Vertue and Vice, throughout the World, was the Reputation and Fashion of

cach

mendation and

§. 12. If any one shall imagine that I have forgot my own Notion of a Law, Its Inforcewhen I make the Law, whereby Men judge of Vertue and Vice, to be nothing elfe ments, Combut the Confent of private Men, who have not Authority enough to make a Difcredit. Law; efpecially wanting that, which is fo neceffary and effential to a Law, a Power to enforce it: I think I may fay, that he who imagines Commendation and Difgrace not to be ftrong Motives on Men, to accommodate themselves to the Opinions and Rules of thofe with whom they converfe, feems little skill'd in the Nature or Hiftory of Mankind: the greatest part whereof he fhall find to govern themselves chiefly, if not folely, by this Law of Fashion; and fo they do that which keeps them in Reputation with their Company, little regard the Laws of God, or the Magiftrate. The Penalties that attend the Breach of God's Laws, fome, nay, perhaps moft Men feldom feriously reflect on; and amongst thofe that do, many whilft they break the Law, entertain thoughts of future Reconciliation, and making their peace for fuch Breaches. And as to the Punishments due from the Laws of the Commonwealth, they frequently flatter themfelves with the hopes of Impunity. But no Man escapes the Punishment of their Cenfure and Diflike, who offends against the Fashion and Opinion of the Company he keeps, and would recommend himself to. Nor is there one of ten thoufand, who is ftiff and infenfible enough to bear up under the conftant Diflike and Condemnation of his own Club. He must be of a ftrange and unusual Conftitution, who can content himself to live in conftant Difgrace and Difrepute with his own particular Society. Solitude many Men have fought, and been reconcil'd to: but no body, that has the leaft Thought or Senfe of a Man about him, can live in Society under the conftant Diflike and ill Opinion of his Familiars, and thofe he converfes with. This is a Burden too heavy for human Sufferance: And he must be made up of irreconcilable Contradictions who can take pleasure in Company, and yet be infenfible of Contempt and Difgrace from his Companions.

each particular Society within it felf; but to fhew, that tho' it were fo, yet, for reafons I there give, Men, in that way of denominating their Actions, did not for the most part much vary from the Law of Nature; which is that standing and unalterable Rule, by which they ought to judge of the moral Rectitude and Pravity of their Actions, and accordingly denomi nate them Vertues or Vices. Had Mr. Lowde confider'd this, he would have found it little to his purpofe, to have quoted that Passage in a fenfe I used it not; and would, I imagine, have fpar'd the Explication he fubjoins to it, as not very neceffary. But I hope this fecond Edition will give him Satisfaction in the point, and that this matter is now fo exprefs'd, as to thew him there was no caufe of Scruple.

Tho' I am forc'd to differ from him in thofe Apprehenfions he has exprefs'd in the latter end of his Preface, concerning what I had faid about Vertue and Vice; yet we are better agreed than he thinks, in what he fays in his third Chapter, p. 78. concerning natural Infcription and innate Notions. I thall not deny him the Privilege he claims, p. 52. to state the Question as he pleafes, especially when he ftates it fo, as to leave nothing in it contrary to what I have faid: For, according to him, innate Notion being conditionl things, depending upon the Concurrence of feveral other Circumftances, in order to the Soul's exerting them; all that he fays for innate, imprinted, imprefs'd Notions (for of innate Ideas he fays nothing at all) amounts at laft only to this: That there are certain Propofitions, which tho' the Soul from the beginning, or when a Man is born, does not know, yet by Assistance from the outward Senfes, and the Help of fome previous Cultivation, it may afterwards come certainly to know the truth of; which is no more than what I have affirm'd in my first Book. For I fuppofe, by the Soul's exerting them, he means its beginning to know them, or elfe the Soul's exerting of Notions will be to me a very unintelligible Expreffion, and I think at beft is a very unfit one in this Cafe, it misleading Mens Thoughts by an Infinuation, as if thefe Notions were in the Mind before the Soul exerts them, i. e. before they are known: whereas truly before they are known, there is nothing of them in the Mind, but a Capacity to know them, when the Concurrence of thofe Circuftances, which this ingenious Author thinks neceffary in order to the Soul's exerting them, brings them into our Knowledge. P. 52. I find him exprefs it thus; These natural Notions are not fo imprinted upon the Soul, as they naturally and neceffarily exert themselves (even in Children and Ideots) without any Affi ftance from the outward Senfes, or without the Help of fome previous Cultivation. Here he fays they exert themselves, as p. 78. that the Soul exerts them. When he has explain'd to himself or others what he means by the Soul's exerting innate Notions, or their exerting themselves, and what that previous Cultivation and Circumstances, in order to their being exerted, are, he will, I fuppofe, find there is fo little of Controverfy between him and me in the Point, bating that he calls that exerting of Notions, which I in a more vulgar Stile call knowing, that I have reafon to think he brought in my Name upon this occafion only out of the pleasure he has to fpeak civilly of me, which I must gratefully acknowledge he has done every where he mentions me, not without conferring on me, as fome others have done, a Tile I have no right to.

§. 13.

These three

Actions to thefe Rules.

§. 13. These three then, First, The Law of God; Secondly, The Law of poLaws the litick Societies; Thirdly, The Law of Fashion, or private Cenfure, are those Rules of Moral to which Men variously compare their Actions: And 'tis by their Conformity to Good and Evil one of thefe Laws that they take their Measures, when they would judge of their moral Rectitude, and denominate their Actions good or bad. Morality is the S. 14. Whether the Rule, to which, as to a Touchstone, we bring our voRelation of luntary Actions, to examine them by, and try their Goodnefs, and accordingly to name them; which is, as it were, the Mark of the Value we fet upon them: whether, I fay, we take that Rule from the Fashion of the Country, or the Will of a Law-maker, the Mind is easily able to obferve the Relation any Action hath to it, and to judge whether the Action agrees or difagrees with the Rule; and fo hath a Notion of Moral Goodness or Evil, which is either Conformity or not Conformity of any Action to that Rule: and therefore is often call'd moral Rectitude. This Rule being nothing but a Collection of feveral fimple Ideas, the Conformity thereto is but fo ordering the Action, that the fimple Ideas belonging to it may correfpond to thofe which the Law requires. And thus we fee how moral Beings and Notions are founded on, and terminated in thefe fimple Ideas we have receiv'd from Senfation or Reflection. For example, let us confider the complex Idea we fignify by the word Murder; and when we have taken it afunder, and examin'd all the Particulars, we fhall find them to amount to a Collection of fimple Ideas deriv'd from Reflection or Senfation, viz. First, From Reflection on the Operations of our Minds, we have the Ideas of Willing, Confidering, Purposing before-hand, Malice, or wifhing Ill to another; and alfo of Life, or Preception, and Self-motion. Secondly, From Senfation we have the Collection of thofe fimple fenfible Ideas which are to be found in a Man, and of fome Action, whereby we put an end to Perception and Motion in the Man; all which fimple Ideas are comprehended in the word Murder. This Collection of fimple Ideas being found by me to agree or difagree with the Efteem of the Country I have been bred in, and to be held by moft Men there worthy Praife or Blame, I call the Action vertuous or vicious: If I have the Will of a fupreme invifible Law-maker for my Rule; then, as I fuppos'd the Action commanded or forbbiden by God, I call it Good or Evil, Sin or Duty: And if I compare it to the Civil Law, the Rule made by the Legislative Power of the Country, I call it Lawful or Unlawful, a Crime or no Crime. So that whencefoever we take the Rule of moral Actions, or by what Standard foever we frame in our Minds the Ideas of Vertues or Vices, they confift only and are made up of Collections of fimple Ideas, which we originally receiv'd from Senfe or Reflection, and their Rectitude or Obliquity confifts in the Agreement or Difagreement with thofe Patterns prefcrib'd by fome Law.

§. 15. To conceive rightly of Moral Actions, we mult take notice of them under this twofold Confideration. First, As they are in themselves each made up of fuch a Collection of fimple Ideas. Thus Drunkenness, or Lying, fignify fuch or fuch a Collection of fimple Ideas, which I call mix'd Modes: And in this fenfe they are as much pofitive abfolute Ideas, as the drinking of a Horse, or fpeaking of a Parrot. Secondly, Our Actions are confider'd as good, bad, or indifferent; and in this refpect they are relative, it being their Conformity to, or Difagreement with fome Rule that makes them to be regular or irregular, good or bad: And fo, as far as they are compar'd with a Rule, and thereupon denominated, they come under Relation. Thus the challenging and fighting with a Man, as it is a certain pofitive Mode, or particular fort of Action, by particular Ideas, diftinguifh'd from all others, is call'd Dueling: Which, when confider'd, in relation to the Law of God, will deferve the name Sin, to the Law of Fashion, in fome Countries, Valour and Vertue; and to the municipal Law of fome Governments, a capital Crime. In this cafe, when the pofitive Mode has one Name, and another Name as it ftands in relation to the Law, the Dif tinction may as easily be obferv'd, as it is in Substances, where one Name, v. g. Man, is us'd to fignify the thing; another, v. g. Father to fignify the Re

lation.

The Denomina§. 16. But because very frequently the pofitive Idea of the Action, and its tions of Adi. ons often misMoral Relation, are comprehended together under one Name, and the fame Word made ufe of to exprefs both the Mode or Action, and its moral Rectitude

Lead us.

tude or Obliquity; therefore the Relation it felf is lefs taken notice of, and there is often no Diftinction made between the pofitive Idea of the Action, and the Reference it has to a Rule. By which Confufion of these two diftin& Confiderations under one Term, thofe who yield too easily to the Impreffions of Sounds, and are forward to take Names for Things, are often mifled in their Judgment of A&tions. Thus the taking from another what is his, without his Knowledge or Allowance, is properly call'd Stealing; but that Name being commonly understood to fignify alfo the moral Pravity of the Action, and to denote its Contrariety to the Law, Men are apt to condemn whatever they hear call'd Stealing, as an ill Action, difagreeing with the Rule of Right. And yet the private taking away his Sword from a Madman, to prevent his doing Mischief, tho it be properly denominated Stealing, as the name of fuch a mix'd Mode; yet when compar'd to the Law of God, and confider'd in its Relation to that Supreme Rule, it is no Sin or Tranfgreffion, tho' the name Stealing ordinarily carries fuch an Intimation with it.

§. 17. And thus much for the Relation of human Actions to a Law, which Relations intherefore I call moral Relations.

"

1

'Twould make a Volume to go over all forts of Relations; 'tis not therefore to be expected, that I fhould here mention them all. It fuffices to our present purpose, to fhew by thefe, what the Ideas are we have of this comprehenfive Confideration, call'd Relation: Which is fo various, and the Occafions of it fo many (as many as there can be of comparing things one to another) that it is not very eafy to reduce it to Rules, or under juft Heads. Those I have mention'd, I think, are fome of the moft confiderable, and fuch as may ferve to let us fee from whence we get our Ideas of Relations, and wherein they are founded. But before I quit this Argument, from what has been faid, give me leave to obferve;

numerable.

§. 18. First, That it is evident, that all Relation terminates in, and is ulti-All Relations mately founded on thofe fimple Ideas we have got from Senfation or Reflection: So terminate in that all that we have in our Thoughts our felves (if we think of any thing, or fimple Ideas. have any meaning) or would fignify to others, when we ufe Words standing for Relations, is nothing but fome fimple Ideas, or Collection of fimple Ideas, compar'd one with another. This is fo manifeft in that fort call'd Proportional, that nothing can be more: For when a Man fays, Honey is fweeter than Wax, it is plain that his Thoughts in this Relation terminate in this fimple Idea, Sweetness, which is equally true of all the reft; tho' where they are compounded or decompounded, the fimple Ideas they are made up of, are, perhaps, feldom taken notice of. V. g. when the Word Father is mention'd; Firft, There is meant that particular Species, or collective Idea, fignified by the word Man. Secondly, Thofe fenfible fimple Ideas, fignified by the word Generation: And, Thirdly, The Effects of it, and all the fimple Ideas fignify'd by the word Child. So the word Friend being taken for a Man, who loves, and is ready to do good to another, has all these following Ideas to the making of it up: Firft, All the fimple Ideas, comprehended in the word Man, or intelligent Being. Secondly, The Idea of Love. Thirdly, The Idea of Readiness or Difpofition. Fourthly, The Idea of Action, which is any kind of Thought or Motion. Fifthly, The Idea of Good, which fignifies any thing that may advance his Happiness, and terminates at laft, if examin'd, in particular fimple Ideas; of which the word Good in general fignifies any one, but if remov'd from all fimple Ideas quite, it fignifies nothing at all. And thus alfo all moral words terminate at laft, tho perhaps more remotely, in a Collection of fimple Ideas: The immediate fignification of relative Words, being very often other fuppos'd known Relations; which, if trac'd one to another, ftill end in fimple Ideas.

§. 19. Secondly, That in Relations, we have for the most part, if not always, We have ordias clear a Notion of the Relation, as we have of thefe fimple Ideas wherein it is narily as clear founded. Agreement or Difagreement, whereon Relation depends, being things Notion of the (or clearer) whereof we have commonly as clear Ideas, as of any other whatsoever; it be-Relation, as of ing but the diftinguishing fimple Ideas, or their Degrees one from another, its Foundation. without which we could have no diftinct Knowledge at all. For if I have a clear Idea of Sweetness, Light or Extenfion, I have too, of equal, or more or lefs of each of thefe: If I know what it is for one Man to be born of a Woman, viz. Sempronia, I know what it is for another Man to be born of the fame

Woman