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that is to be found in their Archetypes. Because those Qualities, and Powers of Subftances, whereof we make their complex Ideas, are fo many and various, that no Man's complex Idea contains them all. That our abftra&t Ideas of Subftances do not contain in them all the fimple Ideas that are united in the things themselves, is evident, in that Men do rarely put into their complex Idea of any Subftance, all the fimple Ideas they do know to exift in it. Because endeavouring to make the Signification of their fpecifick Names as clear, and as little cumbersom as they can, they make their fpecifick Ideas of the forts of Subftances, for the moft part, of a few of thofe fimple Ideas which are to be found in them: But these having no original Precedency, or Right to be put in, and make the fpecifick Idea more than others that are left out, 'tis plain that both these ways our Ideas of Subftances are deficient and inadequate. The fimple Ideas, whereof we make our complex ones of Subftances, are all of them (bating only the Figure and Bulk of fome forts) Powers, which being Relations to other Subftances, we can never be fure that we know all the Powers that are in any one Body, till we have try'd what Changes it is fitted to give to, or receive from other Subftances, in their feveral ways of Application: Which being impoffible to be try'd upon any one Body, much lefs upon all, it is impoffible we fhould have adequate Ideas of any Subftance, made up of a Collection of all its Properties.

§. 9. Whofoever firft lit on a parcel of that fort of Subftance we denote by the word Gold, could not rationally take the Bulk and Figure he obferv'd in that Lump, to depend on its real Effence or internal Conftitution. Therefore thofe never went into his Idea of that Species of Body; but its peculiar Colour, perhaps, and Weight, were the first he abstracted from it, to make the complex Idea of that Species. Which both are but Powers; the one to affect our Eyes after fuch a manner, and to produce in us that Idea we call Yellow; and the other to force upwards any other Body of equal Bulk, they being put into a pair of equal Scales, one against another. Another perhaps added to thefe the Ideas of Fufibility and Fixednefs, two other paffive Powers, in relation to the Operation of Fire upon it; another, its Ductility and Solubility in Aq. Regia, two other Powers relating to the Operation of other Bodies, in changing its outward Figure or Separation of it into infenfible Parts. Thefe, or part of thefe, put together, ufually make the complex Idea in Mens Minds, of that sort of Body we call Gold.

. But no one, who hath confider'd the Properties of Bodies in general, or this fort in particular, can doubt that this call'd Gold has infinite other Properties, not contain'd in that complex Idea. Some who have examin'd this Species more accurately, could, I believe, enumerate ten times as many Properties in Gold, all of them as infeparable from its internal Conftitution, as its Colour or Weight: And, 'tis probable, if any one knew all the Properties that are by divers Men known of this Metal, there would an hundred times as many Ideas go to the complex Idea of Gold, as any one Man yet has in his; and yet perhaps that not be the thousandth part of what is to be difcover'd in it. The Changes which that one Body is apt to receive, and make in other Bodies, upon a due Application, exceeding far not only what we know, but what we are apt to imagine. Which will not appear fo much a Paradox to any one, who will but confider how far Men are yet from knowing all the Properties of that one, no very compound Figure, a Triangle; tho' it be no fmall number that are already by Mathematicians difcover'd of it.

Ideas of Sub- S. 11. So that all our complex Ideas of Subftances are imperfect and inadequate. ftances, as Col- Which would be fo alfo in Mathematical Figures, if we were to have our lections of their Quali- Complex Ideas of them, only by collecting their Properties in reference to other ties, are all Figures. How uncertain and imperfect would our ideas be of an Ellipfis, if we inadequate. had no other Idea of it, but fome few of its Properties? Whereas having in our plain Idea the whole Effence of that Figure, we from thence difcover those Properties, and demonftratively fee how they flow, and are infeparable from it. §. 12. Thus the Mind has three forts of abftract Ideas or nominal Eilences: Firft, Simple Ideas, which are luα, or Copies; but yet certainly adequate, Becaufe being intended to exprefs nothing but the Power in things to produce in the Mind fuch a Senfation, that Senfation, when it is produc'd, cannot but be

Simple Ideas ἔκλυπα, απλ adequate.

be the Effect of that Power. So the Paper I write on, having the Power, in the Light (I fpeak according to the common Motion of Light) to produce in me the Senfation which I call White, it cannot but be the Effect of fuch a Power, in fomething without the Mind; fince the Mind has not the Power to produce any fuch Idea in it felf, and being meant for nothing elfe but the Effect of fuch a Power, that fimple Idea is real and adequate the Senfation of White, in my mind, being the Effect of that Power; which is in the Paper to produce it, is perfectly adequate to that Power; or elie, that Power would produce a different Idea.

tances are ἔκλυπα, lux, inadequate.

1. 13. Secondly, The complex Ideas of Subftances are Ectypes, Copies too; but Ideas of Subnot perfect ones, not adequate which is very evident to the Mind, in that it plainly perceives that whatever Collection of fimple Ideas it makes of any Subftance that exifts, it cannot be fure that it exactly anfwers all that are in that Substance: fince not having try'd all the Operations, of all other Subftances upon it, and found all the Alterations it would receive from, or caufe in other Subitances, it cannot have an exact adequate Collection of all its active and passive Capacities; and fo not have an adequate complex Idea of the Powers of any Subftance exifting, and its Relations, which is that fort of complex Idea of Substances we have. And after all, if we could have, and actually had, in our complex Idea, an exa& Collection of all the fecondary Qualities or Powers of any Subftance, we should not yet thereby have an Idea of the Effence of that thing. For fince the Powers or Qualities that ate obfervable by us, are not the real Effence of that Subftance, but depend on it, and flow from it, any Collection whatfoever of thefe Qualities, cannot be the real Effence of that thing. Whereby it is plain, that our Ideas of Subftances are not adequate; are not what the Mind intends them to be. Befides, a Man has no Idea of Subftance in general, nor knows what Subftance is in it felf.

S. 14. Thirdly, Complex Ideas of Modes and Relations, are Originals, and Arche- Ideas of types; are not Copies, nor made after the Pattern of any real Exiftence, to Modes and Relations, are which the Mind intends them to be conformable, and exactly to anfwer. These Archetypes, being fuch Collections of fimple Ideas, that the Mind it felf puts together, and and cannot fuch Collections, that each of them contains in it precifely all that the Mind but be adeintends it fhould, they are Archetypes and Effences of Modes that may exist ; quate. and fo are defign'd only for, and belong only to fuch Modes, as when they do exift, have an exact Conformity with thofe complex Ideas. The Ideas therefore of Modes and Relations cannot but be adequate.



Of True and False Ideas.'

§. 1. HO Truth and Falfhood belong, in Propriety of Speech, only to Propofitions; yet Ideas are oftentimes term'd true or false (as what Words are there, that are not used with great Latitude, and with fome Deviation from their ftrict and proper Significations?) Tho', I think, that when Ideas themselves are term'd true or falfe, there is ftill fome fecret or tacit Propofition, which is the Foundation of that Denomination as we fhall fee, if we examine the particular Occafions wherein they come to be call'd true or falfe. In all which, we fhall find fome kind of Affirmation or Negation, which is the reason of that Denomination. For our Ideas being nothing but bare Appearances or Perceptions in our Minds, cannot properly and fimply in themfelves be faid to be true or falfe, no more than a fingle Name of any thing can be faid to be true or false.

§. 2. Indeed both Ideas and Words may be faid to be true in a metaphyfical fenfe of the word Truth, as all other things, that any way exift, are faid to be true; i. e. really to be fuch as they exist. Tho' in things call'd true, even in that fenfe, there is perhaps a fecret Reference to our Ideas, look'd upon as the Standards of that Truth, which amounts to a mental Propofition, tho' it be ufually not taken notice of:

Vol. I.

Z 2

§. 3.

Truth and Falfhood properly belong to Propofitions.


Truth contains a tacit Propofition.

No Idea,as an §. 3. But 'tis not in that metaphyfical Senfe of Truth which we enquire here, Appearance in when we examine whether our ideas are capable of being true or false; but in the Mind,true or falfe. the more ordinary Acceptation of those words: And foI fay, that the Ideas in our Minds being only fo many Perception, or Appearances there, none of them are falfe; the Idea of a Centaur having no more Falfhood in it, when it appears in our Minds, than the name Centaur has Falfhood in it, when it is pronounc'd by our Mouths or written on Paper. For Truth or Falfhood lying always in fome Affirmation, or Negation, mental or verbal, our Ideas are not capable, any of them, of being falfe, till the Mind paffes fome Judgment on them; that is, affirms or denies fomething of them.

Ideas refer'd to any thing, may be true or falje.

Other Mens

§. 4. Whenever the Mind refers any of its Ideas to any thing extraneous to them, they are then capable to be call'd true or falfe. Because the Mind in such a Reference makes a tacit Suppolition of their Conformity to that thing: which Suppofition, as it happens to be true or falfe, fo the Ideas themselves come to be denominated. The moft ufual Cafes wherein this happens, are these following:

§. 5. First, When the Mind supposes any Idea it has, conformable to that in Ideas, real other Mens Minds, call'd by the fame common Name; v. g. when the Mind inExiftence,and Suppos'd real intends or judges its Ideas of Juftice, Temperance, Religion, to be the lame with Effences, are what other Mcn give thofe Names to.

what Men u

Sually refer their ideas to.

The Cause of fub Referen


Caufe of fuch

Secondly, When the Mind fuppofes any Idea it has in it felf, to be conformable to fome real Existence. Thus the two Ideas, of a Man and a Centaur, fuppos'd to be the Ideas of real Subftances, are the one true, and the other falfe; the one having a Conformity to what has really exifted, the other not.

Thirdly, When the Mind refers any of its Ideas to that real Conftitution and Effence of any thing, whereon all its properties depend and thus the greatest part, if not all our Ideas of Substances, are falfe.

§. 6. Thefe Suppofitions the Mind is very apt tacitly to make concerning its own Ideas. But yet, if we will examine it, we fhall find it is chiefly, if not only, concerning its abftract complex Ideas. For the natural Tendency of the Mind being towards Knowledg; and finding that, if it should proceed by and dwell upon only particular things, its Progrefs would be very flow, and its Work endless: Therefore to fhorten its way to Knowledg, and make each Perception more comprehenfive; the first thing it does, as the Foundation of the cafier enlarging its Knowledg, either by Contemplation of the things themselves that it would know, or Conference with others about them, is to bind them into Bundles, and rank them fo into Sorts, that what Knowledg it gets of any of them, it may thereby with Affurance extend to all of that fort; and so advance by larger Steps in that, which is its great bufinefs, Knowledg. This, as I have elsewhere fhew'd, is the reafon why we colle&t things under comprehenfive Ideas, with Names annex'd to them, into Genera and Species, i. e. into Kinds and Sorts.

§. 7. If therefore we will warily attend to the Motions of the Mind, and obferve what Course it ufually takes in its way to Knowledg; we fhall, I think, find that the Mind having got any Idea, which it thinks may have use of, either in Contemplation or Difcourfe. the first thing it does, is to abftra&t it, and then get a name to it; and fo lay it up in its Store-houfe, the Memory, as containing the Effence of a fort of things, of which that Name is always to be the Mark. Hence it is, that we may often observe, that when any one fees a new thing of a kind that he knows not, he prefently asks what it is, meaning by that Enquiry nothing but the Name, As if the Name carry'd with it the Knowledg of the Species, or the Effence of it: whereof it is indeed used as the Mark, and is generally fuppos'd annex'd to it.

§. 8. But this abftract Idea being fomething in the Mind between the Thing References. that exifts, and the Name that is given to it; it is in our Ideas, that both the Rightness of our Knowledg, and the Propriety or Intelligibleness of our Speaking, confifts. And hence it is, that Men are fo forward to fuppofe, that the abftract Ideas they have in their Minds, are fuch as agree to the things exifting without them, to which they are refer'd; and are the fame alfo, to which the Names they give them do by the Ufe and Propriety of that Language belong. For without this double Conformity of their Ideas, they find they should


both think amifs of things in themselves, and talk of them unintelligibly to others.

9. 9. First then, I fay, That when the Truth of our Ideas is judg'd of, by the Simple Ideas Conformity they have to the Ideas which other Men have, and commonly fignify by the may be falfe, in reference to Jame Name, they may be any of them falfe. But yet fimple Ideas are leaft of all liable others of the to be fo mistaken; because a Man by his Senfes, and every Day's Obfervation, fame Name, may cafily fatisfy himself what the fimple Ideas are, which their feverai Names but are leaft that are in common ufe ftand for; they being but few in number, and fuch as liable to be fo. if he doubts or mistakes in, he may eafily rectify by the Objects they are to be found in. Therefore it is feldom, that any one miftakes in his Names of fimple Ideas; or applies the Name Red, to the Idea Green; or the Name Sweet, to the Idea Bitter: much lefs are Men apt to confound the Names of Ideas, belonging to different Senfes; and call a Colour by the name of a Tafte, &c. whereby it is evident, that the fimple Ideas they call by any Name, are commonly the fame that others have and mean when they use the fame Names.

§. 10. Complex Ideas are much more liable to be falfe in this refpect; and the com- Ideas of plex Ideas of mix'd Modes, much more than thofe of Subftances: Becaufe in Sub- mix'd Modes ftances (especially thofe which the common and unborrow'd Names of any Lan- moft liable to be falfe in guage are apply'd to) fome remarkable fenfible Qualities, ferving ordinarily to this Senfe. diftinguish one fort from another, easily preserve thofe, who take any care in the Ufe of their words, from applying them to forts of Subftances, to which they do not at all belong. But in mix'd Modes we are much more uncertain; it being not fo eafy to determine of feveral Actions, whether they are to be call'd Juftice or Cruelty, Liberality or Prodigality. And fo in referring our Ideas to thofe of other Men, call'd by the fame Names, ours may be false; and the Idea in our Minds, which we exprefs by the word Juftice, may perhaps be that which ought to have another Name.

. 11. But whether or no, our Ideas of mix'd Modes are more liable than any or at least to fort to be different from those of other Men, which are mark'd by the fame be thought Names; this at leaft is certain, That this fort of Falfhood is much more familiarly false. attributed to our Ideas of mix'd Modes, than to any other. When a Man is thought to have a falfe Idea of Juftice, or Gratitude, or Glory, it is for no other reafon, but that his agrees not with the Ideas which each of thofe Names are the Signs of in other Men.

§. 12. The Reason whereof feems to me to be this, That the abftract Ideas of And why. mix'd Modes, being Mens voluntary Combinations of fuch a precife Collection of fimple Ideas; and fo the Eilence of each Species being made by Men alone, whereof we have no other fenfible Standard exifting any where, but the Name it felf, or the Definition of that Name: we have nothing elfe to refer these our Ideas of mix'd Modes to, as a Standard to which we would conform them, but the Ideas of thofe who are thought to use those Names in their most proper Significations; and fo as our Ideas conform or differ from them, they pass for true or falfe. And thus much concerning the Truth and Falfhood of our Ideas, in reference to their Names.

§. 13. Secondly, As to the Truth and Falfhood of our Ideas, in reference to As refer'd to the real Exiftence of things, when that is made the Standard of their Truth, real Exiftences none of our none of them can be term'd falfe, but only our complex Ideas of Subftances. Ideas can be

. 14. First, Our fimple Ideas being barely fuch Perceptions as God has fitted falfe,but thofe us to receive, and given Power to external Objects to produce in us by esta- of Substances. blifh'd Laws and Ways, fuitable to his Wifdom and Goodnefs, tho' incompre- First, Simple henfible to us, their Truth confifts in nothing else but in fuch Appearances as are Ideas in this produc'd in us, and must be fuitable to thofe Powers he has plac'd in external fenfe not falje, Objects, or else they could not be produc'd in us: And thus anfwering those and why. Powers, they are what they should be, true Ideas. Nor do they become liable to any Imputation of Falfhood, if the Mind (as in most Men I believe it does) judges these Ideas to be in the things themselves. For God, in his Wisdom, having fet them as Marks of Diftin&ion in things, whereby we may be able to difcern one thing from another, and fo chufe any of them for our Ufes, as we have occasion; it alters not the nature of our fimple Idea, whether we think that the Idea of Blue be in the Violet it felf, or in our Mind only; and only the Power of producing it by the Texture of its Parts, reflecting the Particles of

Tho' one

Man's Idea of Blue fhould be different from another's.

Firft, Simple Ideas in this Senfe not falfe, and why.


Modes not falfe.

Light, after a certain manner, to be in the Violet it felf. For that Texture in the Object, by a regular and conftant Operation, producing the fame Idea of Blue in us, it ferves us to diftinguifh, by our Eyes, that from any other thing, whether that distinguishing Mark, as it is really in the Violet, be only a peculiar Texture of Parts, or elfe that very Colour, the Idea whereof (which is in us) is the exact Resemblance. And it is equally from that Appearance to be denominated Blue, whether it be that real Colour, or only a peculiar Texture in it, that causes in us that Idea: fince the name Blue notes properly nothing, but that Mark of Diftinction that is in a Violet, difcernible only by our Eyes, whatever it confists in, that being beyond our Capacities diftin&tly to know, and perhaps would be of less use to us, it we had Faculties to difcern.

§. 15. Neither would it carry any Imputation of Falfhood to our fimple Ideas, if by the different Structure of our Organs it were fo order'd, that the fame Object should produce in feveral Mens Minds different Ideas at the fame time; v. g. if the Idea that a Violet produc'd in one Mans Mind by his Eyes were the fame that a Marigold produc'd in another Man's, and vice verfa. For fince this could never be known, because one Man's Mind could not pafs into another's Man's Body, to perceive what Appearances were produc'd by thofe Organs; neither the Ideas hereby, nor the Names would be at all confounded, or any Falfhood be in either. For all things that had the Texture of a Violet, producing conftantly the Idea which he call'd Blue; and those which had the Texture of a Marigold, producing conftantly the Idea which he has conftantly call'd Yellow; whatever those Appearances were in his Mind, he would be able as regularly to diftinguish things for his Use by thofe Appearances, and understand and fignify thofe Diftin&tions mark'd by the Names Blue and Yellow, as if the Appearances, or Ideas in his Mind, receiv'd from those two Flowers, were exactly the fame with the Ideas in other Mens Minds. I am nevertheless very apt to think, that the sensible Ideas produc'd by any Obje& in different mens Minds, are moft commonly very near and undiscernibly alike. For which Opinion, I think, there might be many Reasons offer'd: But that being befides my prefent Business, I fhall not trouble my Reader with them; but only mind him, that the contrary Suppofition, if it could be prov'd, is of little ufe, either for the Improvement of our Knowledg, or Conveniency of Life; and fo we need not trouble our felves to examine it.

9. 16. From what has been faid concerning our fimple Ideas, I think it evident, That our fimple Ideas can none of them be falfe in refpect of things existing without us. For the Truth of thefe Appearances, or Perceptions in our Minds, confifting, as has been faid, only in their being answerable to the Powers in external Objects, to produce by our Senfes fuch Appearances in us; and each of them being in the Mind, fuch as it is, fuitable to the Power that produc'd it, and which alone it reprefents; it cannot upon that account, or as refer'd to fuch a Pattern, be falfe. Blue or Yellow, Bitter or Sweet, can never be false Ideas; thefe Perceptions in the Mind are juft fuch as they are there, answering the Powers appointed by God to produce them; and fo are truely what they are and are intended to be. Indeed the Names may be mifapply'd; but that in this refpect makes no Falfhood in the Ideas: as if a Man ignorant in the Englife Tongue fhould call Purple Scarlet,

§. 17. Secondly, Neither can our complex Ideas of Modes, in reference to the Effence of any thing really existing, be falfe. Because whatever complex Idea I have of any Mode, it hath no reference to any Pattern exifting, and made by Nature: It is not fuppos'd to contain in it any other Ideas than what it hath; nor to represent any thing but fuch a Complication of Ideas as it does. Thus when I have the Idea of fuch an Action of a Man, who forbears to afford himfelf fuch Meat; Drink, and Clothing, and other Conveniences of Life as his Riches and Eftate will be fufficient to fupply, and his Station requires, I have no falfe idea; but fuch an one as represents an Action, either as I find or imagine it; and fo is capable of neither Truth or Falfhood. But when I give the Name Frugality, or Vertue to this Action, then it may be call'd a false Idea, if thereby it be fuppos'd to agree with that Idea, to which, in Propriety of Speech, the Name of Frugality doth belong; or to be conformable to that Law, which is the Standard of Vertue and Vice.

§. 18.

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