proper Name; we may eafily find a reafon, why Men have never attempted to give Names to each Sheep in their Flock, or Crow that flies over their Heads; much lefs to call every Leaf of Plants, or Grain of Sand that came in their way, by a peculiar Name.

§. 3. Secondly, If it were poffible, it would yet be useless; because it would Andufeless: not ferve to the chief end of Language. Men would in vain heap up Names of particular Things, that would not ferve them to communicate their Thoughts. Men learn Names, and ufe them in Talk with others, only that they may be understood which is then only done, when by Use or Confent the Sound I make by the Organs of Speech, excites in another Man's Mind, who hears it, the Idea I apply it to in mine, when I fpeak it. This cannot be done by Names apply'd to particular Things, whereof I alone having the Ideas in my Mind, the Names of them could not be fignificant or intelligible to another, who was not acquainted with all thofe very particular Things which had fallen under my Notice.

§. 4. Thirdly, But yet granting this also feasible (which I think is not) yet a diftinct Name for every particular Thing would not be of any great use for the Improvement of Knowledg: which tho' founded in particular things, enlarges it felf by general Views; to which, things reduc'd into Sorts under general Names, are properly fubfervient. Thefe, with the Names belonging to them, come within fome compafs, and do not multiply every moment, beyond what either the Mind can contain, or Ufe requires: And therefore, in thefe Men, have for the most part stop'd; but yet not fo as to hinder themselves from diftinguishing particular things, by appropriated Names, where Convenience demands it. And therefore in their own Species, which they have moft to do with, and wherein they have often occafion to mention particular Perfons, they make use of proper Names; and there diftinét Individuals have diftin&t Denominations.

Names.

§. 5. Befides Perfons, Countries allo, Cities, Rivers, Mountains, and other What things the like Diftinctions of Place, have ufually found peculiar Names, and that for have proper the fame reason; they being fuch as Men have often an occafion to mark particularly, and as it were fet before others in their Difcourfes with them. And I doubt not, but if we had reason to mention particular Horles, as often as we have to mention particular Men, we should have proper Names for the one, as familiar as for the other, and Bucephalus would be a word as much in use, as Alexander. And therefore we fee that amongst Jockeys, Horfes have their proper Names to be known and diftinguifh'd by, as commonly as their Servants; because, amongst them, there is often occafion to mention this or that particular Horse, when he is out of fight.

made.

§. 6. The next thing to be confider'd, is, How general Words come to be made. How general For fince all things that exift are only particulars, how come we by general Words are Terms, or where find we thofe general Natures they are fuppos'd to stand for? Words become general, by being made the figns of general Ideas; and Ideas become general, by feparating from them the Circumftances of Time, and Place, and any other Ideas, that may determine them to this or that particular Exiftence. By this way of abftraction they are made capable of reprefenting more Individuals than one; each of which having in it a conformity to that abftract Idea, is (as we call it) of that fort.

9. 7. But to deduce.this a little more diftinctly, it will not perhaps be amifs to trace our Notions and Names from their beginning, and obferve by what degrees we proceed, and by what fteps we enlarge our Ideas from our firft Infancy. There is nothing more evident, than that the Ideas of the Perfons Children converfe with (to inftance in them alone) are like the Persons themselves only particular. The Ideas of the Nurfe, and the Mother, are well framed in their Minds; and, like Pictures of them there, reprefent only those Individuals. The Names they firft gave to them, are confin'd to thefe Individuals; and the names of Nurse and Mamma the Child ufes, determine themselves to thofe Perfons. Afterwards, when Time and a larger Acquaintance has made them obferve, that there are a great many other things in the World that in fome common Agreements of Shape, and feveral other Qualities, refemble their Father and Mother, and thofe Perfons they have been used to, they frame an Idea, which they find those many Particulars do partake in and to that they give, Vol. I. Bb

with

General Na

tures are nothing but abftra& Ideas.

with others, the name Man for example. And thus they come to have a general Name, and a general Idea. Wherein they make nothing new, but only leave out of the complex Idea they had of Peter and James, Mary and Jane, that which is peculiar to each, and retain only what is common to them all,

§. 8. By the fame way that they come by the general Name and Idea of Man, they easily advance to more general Names and Notions. For obferving that feveral things that differ from their Idea of Man, and cannot therefore be comprehended under that Name, have yet certain Qualities wherein they agree with Man, by retaining only thofe Qualities, and uniting them into one Idea, they have again another and a more general Idea; to which having given a Name, they make a Term of a more comprehenfive extenfion: Which new Idea is made, not by any new addition, but only, as before, by leaving out the fhape, and fome other Properties fignify'd by the name Man, and retaining only a Body, with Life, Senfe, and fpontaneous Motion, comprehended under the name Animal.

§. 9. That this is the way whereby Men first form'd general Ideas, and general Names to them, I think, is fo evident, that there needs no other proof of it, but the confidering of a Man's felf or others, and the ordinary Proceedings of their Minds in Knowledg: And he that thinks general Natures or Notions are any thing else but fuch abstract and partial Ideas of more complex ones, taken at firit from particular Exiftences, will, I fear, be at a lofs where to find them. For let any one reflect, and then tell me, wherein does his Idea of Man differ from that of Peter and Paul, or his Idea of Horfe from that of Bucephalus, but in the leaving out fomething that is peculiar to each Individual, and retaining fo much of those particular complex Ideas of feveral particular Exiftences, as they are found to agree in? Of the complex Ideas fignify'd by the names Man and Horfe, leaving out but thofe particulars wherein they differ, and retaining only those wherein they agree, and of thofe making a new diftinct complex Idea, and giving the name Animal to it; one has a more general Term, that comprehends with Man feveral other Creatures. Leave out of the Idea of Animal, Senfe and fpontaneous Motion; and the remaining complex Idea, made up of the remaining fimple ones of Body, Life, and Nourishment, becomes a more general one, under the more comprehenfive Term Vivens. And not to dwell longer upon this particular, fo evident in it felf, by the fame way the Mind proceeds to Body, Subftance, and at laft to Being, Thing, and fuch univerfal Terms, which stand for any of our Ideas whatfoever. To conclude, this whole Mystery of Genera and Species, which make such a noife in the Schools, and are with juftice fo little regarded out of them, is nothing elfe but abftra& Ideas, more or less comprehenfive, with names annex'd to them. In all which, this is conftant and unvariable, That every more general Term stands for fuch an Idea, as is but a part of any of thole contain'd under it. Why the Ge. §. 1o. This may fhew us the reason, why, in the defining of Words, which is nonus is ordina- thing but declaring their fignification, we make use of the Genus, or next general rily made ufe Word that comprehends it. Which is not out of neceffity, but only to fave the labour of enumerating the feveral fimple Ideas, which the next general Word or Genus ftands for; or, perhaps, fometimes the shame of not being able to do it. But tho' defining by Genus and Differentia (I crave leave to use these Terms of Art, tho' originally Latin, fince they moft properly fuit thofe Notions they are apply'd to) I fay, tho' defining by the Genus be the fhorteft way, yet I think it may be doubted whether it be the best. This I am fure, it is not the only, and fo not abfolutely neceffary. For Definition being nothing but making another understand by Words, what Idea the Term defin'd ftands for, a Definition is beft made by enumerating thofe fimple Ideas that are combin'd in the fignification of the Term defin'd: and if instead of fuch an Enumeration, Men have accuftom'd themselves to use the next general Term; it has not been out of neceffity, or for greater clearnefs, but for quickness and dispatch fake. For, I think, that to one who defir'd to know what Ideas the word Man stood for, if it fhould be faid, that Man was a folid extended Substance, having Life, Senfe, fpontaneous Motion, and the Faculty of Reasoning; I doubt not but the meaning of the Term Man would be as well understood, and the Idea it stands for be at least as clearly made known, as when it is defin'd to be a rational Ani

of in Defini

tions.

mal:

1

mal: which by the feveral Definitions of Animal, Vivens, and Corpus, refolves it felf into thofe enumerated Ideas. I have, in explaining the Term Man, follow'd here the ordinary Definition of the Schools: which tho', perhaps, not the moft exact, yet ferves well enough to my prefent purpofe. And one may, in this inftance, fee what gave occafion to the Rule, that a Definition must confift of Genus and Differentia: and it fuffices to fhew us the little neceffity there is of fuch a Rule, or advantage in the ftrict obferving of it. For Definitions, as has been faid, being only the explaining of one Word by feveral others, fo that the Meaning or Idea it ftands for may be certainly known; Languages are not always fo made according to the Rules of Logick, that every Term can have its Signification exactly and clearly exprefs'd by two others. Experience fufficiently fatisfies us to the contrary; or elfe those who have made this Rule, have done ill, that they have given us fo few Definitions conformable to it. But of Definitions, more in the next Chapter.

9. 11. To return to general Words, it is plain by what has been faid, That General and General and Univerfal belong not to the real Exiftence of things; but are the Univerfal are Creatures of Inventions and Creatures of the Understanding, made by it for its own ufe, and the Underconcern only Signs, whether Words or Ideas. Words are general, as has been standing. faid, when used for Signs of general Ideas, and fo are applicable indiffently to many particlar things; and Ideas are general, when they are fet up as the Reprefentatives of many particular things: but Univerfality belongs not to things themselves, which are all of them particular in their Existence; even those Words and Ideas, which in their fignification are general. When therefore we quit Particulars, the Generals that reft are only Creatures of our own making; their general nature being nothing but the Capacity they are put into by the Understanding, of fignifying or reprefenting many particulars, For the Signification they have, is nothing but a Relation, that by the Mind of Man is added to them.

§. 12. The next thing therefore to be confider'd, is, What kind of Signification Abftra&Ideas it is, that General Words have. For as it is evident, that they do not fignify are the Elences of the Gebarely one particular thing; for then they would not be general Terms, but nera and Spe proper Names: fo on the other fide 'tis as evident, they do not fignify a plu- cies. rality; for Man and Men would then fignify the fame, and the Distinction of Numbers(as the Grammarians call them) Would be fuperfluous and useless. That then which general Words fignify, is a fort of things; and each of them does that, by being a fign of an abstract Idea in the Mind, to which idea, as things exifting are found to agree, fo they come to be rank'd under that name; or, which is all one, be of that fort. Whereby it is evident, that the Effences of the forts, or (if the Latin Word pleafes better) Species of things, are nothing else but these abftra&t Ideas. For the having the Effence of any Species, being that which makes any thing to be of that Species, and the Conformity to the Idea to which the Name is annex'd, being that which gives a right to that Name; the having the Effence, and the having that Conformity, muft needs be the fame thing: fince to be of any Species, and to have a right to the name of that Species, is all one. As for example, to be a Man, or of the Species Man, and to have right to the name Man, is the fame thing, Again, to be a Man, or of the Species Man, and have the Effence of a Man, is the fame thing. Now fince nothing can be a Man, or have a right to the name Man, but what has a conformity to the abftra&t Idea the name Man ftands for; nor any thing be a Man, or have a right to the Species Man, but what has the Effence of that Species, It follows, that the abftra&t Idea for which the name ftands, and the Effence of the Species is one and the fame. From whence it is ealy to observe, that the Effences of the forts of things, and confequently the forting of this, is the Workmanship of the Understanding, that abftracts and makes thofe general Ideas.

have their

9. 13. I would not here be thought to forget, much lefs to deny; that Na They are the ture in the production of things makes feveral of them alike: there is nothing Workmanship more obvious, especially in the Races of Animals, and all things propagated of the Underby Seed. But yet, I think, we may fay the forting of them under Names is the tanding, but Workmanship of the Understanding, taking occafion from the Similitude it obferves foundation in amongst them to make abitract general Ideas, and fet them up in the Mind, the Similiwith Names annex'd to them as Patterns or Forms, (for in that fenfe the word tude of things? Vol. I. Bb 2 Form

Each diftin& abstract Idea is a distinct Effence.

Form has a very proper Signification) to which as particular things exifting are found to agree, lo they come to be of that Species, have that Denomination, or are put into that Claffis. For when we fay, this is a Man, that a Horse; this Juftice, that Cruelty; this a Watch, that a Jack; what do we elfe but rank things under different fpecifick Names, as agreeing to thofe abftract Ideas, of which we have made those Names the figns? And what are the Effences of thofe Species fet out and mark'd by Names, but thofe abftra&t Ideas in the Mind; which are as it were the Bonds between particular things that exift, and the Names they are to be rank'd under? And when general Names have any con nection with particular Beings, these abstract Ideas are the Medium that unites them: fo that the Effences of Species, as diftinguifh'd and denominated by us, neither are nor can be any thing but thofe precife abftra& Ideas we have in our Minds. And therefore the fuppos'd real Effences of Subftances, if different from our abftra& Ideas, cannot be the Effences of the Species we rank things into. For two Species may be one as rationally, as two different Effences be the Elfence of one Species: And I demand what are the alterations may or may not be in a Horfe or Lead, without making either of them to be of another Species? In determining the Species of things by our abftra&t Ideas, this is easy to refolve but if any one will regulate himfelf herein by fuppos'd real Effences, he will, I fuppofe, be at a lofs; and he will never be able to know when any thing precifely ceafes to be of the Species of a Horfe or Lead.

, 14. Nor will any one wonder, that I lay thefe Effences, or abftra& Ideas, (which are measures of Name, and the Boundaries of Species) are the Workmanship of the Understanding, who confiders, that at least the complex ones are often, in feveral Men, different Collections of fimple Ideas: and therefore that is Covetousness to one Man, which is not fo to another. Nay, even in Subftances, where their abftra&t Ideas feem to be taken from the things themselves, they are not conftantly the fame; no not in that Species which is most familiar to us, and with which we have the most intimate acquaintance: It having been more than once doubted, whether the Fatus born of a Woman were a Man, even fo far, as that it hath been debated, whether it were or were not to be nourish'd and baptiz'd: which could not be, if the abftra&t Idea of Effence, to which the Name Man belong'd, were of Nature's making; and were not the uncertain and various Collection of fimple Ideas, which the Understanding puts together, and then abftracting it, affix'd a Name to it. So that in truth every diftinct abftract Idea is a diftinct Effence: and the Names that ftand for fuch diftinet Ideas are the Names of things eflentially different. Thus a Circle is as effentially different from an Oval, as a Sheep from a Goat: and Rain is as effentially different from Snow, as Water from Earth; that abftra&t Idea which is the Effence of one, being impoffible to be communicated to the other. And thus any two abftra&t Ideas, that in any part vary one from another, with two diftin&t Names annex'd to them, conftitute two diftin&t forts, or, if you please, Species, as effentially different as any two the most remote, or oppofite in the World.

!

Real and No- §. 15. But fince the Effences of things are thought, by fome, (and not withminal Effence. Out reafon) to be wholly unknown; it may not be amifs to confider the several Significations of the word Effence.

Firft, Effence may be taken for the Being of any thing, whereby it is what it is. And thus the real internal, but generally in Subftances unknown, Conftitution of things, where on their difcoverable Qualities depend, may be call'd their Effence. This is the proper original Signification of the Word, as is cvident from the Formation of it; Effentia, in its primary notation, fignifying properly Being. And in this fenfe it is ftill us'd, when we fpeak of the Effence of particular things, without giving them any name.

Secondly, The Learning and Difputes of the Schools having been much bufy'd about Genus and Species, the word Effence has almoft loft its primary Signification and instead of the real Conftitution of things, has been almost wholly apply'd to the artificial Conftitution of Genus and Species. 'Tis true, there is ordinarily fuppos'd a real Conftitution of the forts of things; and 'tis past doubt, there must be fome real Conftitution, on which any Collection of limple Ideas co-exifting, muft depend. But it being evident, that things are rank'd under

under Names into Sorts or Species, only as they agree to certain abftra& Ideas, to which we have annex'd thofe Names; the Effence of each Genus, or Sort, comes to be nothing but that abftra&t Idea, which the General, or Sortal (if I may have leave fo to call it from Sort, as I do General from Genus) Name stands for. And this we fhall find to be that which the word Effence imports in its moft familiar ufe. Thefe two forts of Effences, I fuppofe, may not unfitly be term'd, the one the Real, the other the Nominal Effence.

Conftant ConS. 16. Between the Nominal Effence, and the Name, there is so near a Connection, nection bethat the Name of any fort of things cannot be attributed to any particular tween the Being but what has this Effence, whereby it answers that abstract Idea, whereof Name and nothat Name is the Sign. minal Effence. 9. 17. Concerning the real Effences of corporeal Subftances, (to mention Suppofition thofe only) there are, if I miftake not, two Opinions. The one is of those, that Species who ufing the word Effence for they know not what, suppose a certain number are diftinof thofe Effences, according to which all natural things are made, and wherein gui'd by their real Efthey do exactly every one of them partake, and fo become of this or that Spefences, ufelefs cies. The other, and more rational Opinion, is of those who look on all natural things to have a real, but unknown Conftitution of their infenfible Parts; from which flow thofe fenfible Qualities, which ferve us to distinguish them one from another, according as we have occafion to rank them into forts under common Denominations. The former of thefe Opinions, which supposes these Effences, as a certain Number of Forms or Molds, wherein all natural things, that exist, are caft, and do equally partake, has, I imagine, very much perplex'd the Knowledg of natural things. The frequent Productions of Monsters, in all the Species of Animals, and of Changelings, and other ftrange Iffues of human Birth, carry with them difficulties, not poffible to confift with this Hypothefis : Since it is as impoffible, that two things, partaking exactly of the fame real Effence, fhould have different Properties, as that the two Figures partaking in the fame real Effence of a Circle fhould have different Properties. But were there no other reafon against it, yet the Suppofition of Effences that cannot be known, and the making them nevertheless to be that which diftinguishes the Species of things, is fo wholly useless, and unferviceable to any part of our Knowledg, that that alone were fufficient to make us lay it by, and content our felves with fuch Effences of the Sorts or Species of things as come within the reach of our Knowledg: which, when feriously confider'd, will be found, as I have said, to be nothing else but those abstract complex Ideas, to which we have annex'd distinct general Names.

§. 18. Effences being thus diftinguish'd into Nominal and Real, we may farther Real and noobserve, that in the Species of fimple Ideas and Modes, they are always the fame; minal Essence but in Subftances always quite different. Thus a Figure including a Space between the fame in three Lines, is the real as well as nominal Effence of a Triangle; it being not only and Modes, Simple Ideas the abstract Idea to which the general Name is annex'd, but the very Effentia or different in Being of the thing it felf, that Foundation from which all its Properties flow, Subftances. and to which they are all infeparably annex'd. But it is far otherwife concerning that parcel of Matter, which makes the Ring on my Finger, wherein these two Effences are apparently different. For it is the real Conftitution of its infenfible Parts, on which depend all thofe Properties of Colour, Weight, Fufibility, Fixednefs, &c. which makes it to be Gold, or gives it a right to that Name which is therefore its nominal Effence: Since nothing can be call'd Gold but what has a Conformity of Qualities to that abstract complex Idea, to which that Name is annex'd. But this Diftinction of Effences, belonging particularly to Substances, we fhall, when we come to confider their Names, have an occafion to treat of more fully.

§. 19. That fuch abftract Ideas, with Names to them, as we have been speaking Effences inge of, are Effences, may farther appear by what we are told concerning Effences, nerable and viz. that they are all ingenerable and incorruptible. Which cannot be true of incorruptible. the real Conftitutions of things which begin and perish with them. All things that exift, befides their Author, are all liable to change; efpecially those things we are acquainted with, and have rank'd into Bands under diftinct Names or Enfigns. Thus that which was Grafs to day, is to morrow the Flesh of a Sheep; and within few days after becomes part of a Man: In all which, and the like

Changes,