poffible to know all thofe Properties that flow from it, and are fo annex'd to it, that any one of them being away, we may certainly conclude, that that Effence is not there, and fo the Thing is not of that Species. We can never know what are the precife number of Properties depending on the real Effence of Gold, any one of which failing, the real Effence of Gold, and confequently Gold, would not be there, unless we knew the real Effence of Gold it felf, and by that determin'd that Species. By the word Gold here, I must be understood to defign a particular piece of Matter; v. g. the laft Guinea that was coin'd. For if it fhould ftand here in its ordinary Signification for that complex Idea, which I or any one else calls Gold; i. e. for the nominal Effence of Gold, it would be Jargon fo hard is it to fhew the various meaning and imperfection of words, when we have nothing elfe but words to do it by. §. 20. By all which it is clear, That our diftinguishing Subftances into Species by Names, is not at all founded on their real Effences; nor can we pretend to range and determine them exactly into Species, according to the internal effential Differences. . 21. But fince, as has been remark'd, we have need of general words, tho But fuch we know not the real Effences of Things; all we can do is to collect fuch a Collection as number of fimple Ideas, as by Examination we find to be united together in our Name Things exifting, and thereof to make one complex Idea. Which tho it be not Stands for the real Effence of any Substance that exifts, is yet the Specifick Effence, to which our Name belongs, and is convertible with it; by which we may at least try the Truth of thefe nominal Effences. For example, there be that fay, that the Effence of Body is Extenfion: If it be fo, we can never mistake in putting the Effence of any thing for Thing it felf. Let us then in Difcourfe put Extenfon for Body; and when we would fay that Body moves, let us fay that Extenfion moves, and fee how it will look. He that fhould fay that one Extenfion by Impulse moves another Extenfion, would by the bare Expreffion, fufficiently fhew the Abfurdity of fuch a Notion. The Effence of any thing, in refpect of us, is the whole complex Idea, comprehended and mark'd by that Name; and in Subftances, befides the feveral diftin& fimple Ideas that make them up, the confus'd one of Subftance, or of an unknown Support and Cause of their Union, is always a part: And therefore the Effence of Body is not bare Extension, but an extended folid thing: and so to say an extended folid thing moves, or impels another, is all one, and as intelligible as to fay, Body moves or impels. Likewise to say, that a rational Animal is capable of Conversation, is all one as to fay a Man. But no one will fay, that Rationality is capable of Conversation, because it makes not the whole Effence to which we give the name Man. S. 22. There are Creatures in the World that have Shapes like ours, but are Our abstract hairy, and want Language and Reafon. There are Naturals amongst us that Ideas are to have perfectly our Shape, but want Reason, and fome of them Language too. us the MeaThere are Creatures, as 'tis faid (fit fides penes Authorem, but there appears no fures of Species; inftance Contradiction that there fhould be fuch) that with Language, and Reason, and in that of a Shape in other things agreeing with ours, have hairy Tails; others where Man. the Males have no Beards, and others where the Females have. If it be ask'd, whether thefe be all Men or no, all of human Species; 'tis plain, the Question refers only to the nominal Effence: For those of them to whom the definition of the word Man, or the complex Idea fignify'd by that Name, agrees, are Men, and the other not, But if the Inquiry be made concerning the fuppos'd real Effence, and whether the internal Conftitution and Frame of these several Creatures be fpecifically different, it is wholy impoffible for us to answer, no part of that going into our fpecifick Idea; only we have reafon to think, that where the Faculties or outward Frame fo much differs, the internal Conftitution is not exactly the fame. But what difference in the internal real Conftitution makes a specifick difference, it is in vain to enquire; whilft our Measures of Species be, as they are, only our abstract Ideas, which we know; and not that internal Conftitution, which makes no part of them. Shall the difference of Hair only on the Skin, be a Mark of a different internal fpecifick Constitution between a Changeling and a Drill, when they agree in Shape, and want of Reason and Speech? And thall not the want of Reafon and Speech be a fign to us of different real real Conftitutions and Species between a Changeling and a reafonable Man? And fo of the reft, if we pretend that the diftinction of Species or Sorts is fixedly eftablifh'd by the real Frame and fecret Conftitutions of things. : Species not 9. 23. Nor let any one fay, that the Power of Propagation in Animals by diftinguifh'd the mixture of Male and Female, and in Plants by Seeds, keeps the fuppos'd real by Generati Species diftin& and entire. For granting this to be truc, it would help us in the diftinction of the Species of things no farther than the Tribes of Animais and Vegetables. What muft we do for the reft? But in thofe too it is not fufficient for if Hiftory lye not, Woman have conceiv'd by Drills; and what real Species, by that Measure, fuch a Production will be in Nature, will be a new Queftion and we have reafon to think this is not impoffible, fince Mules and Jumarts, the one from the mixture of an Afs and a Mare, the other from the mixture of a Bull and a Mare, are fo frequent in the World. I once faw a Creature that was the iffue of a Cat and a Rat, and had the plain Marks of both about it? wherein Nature appear'd to have follow'd the Pattern of neither fort alone, but to have jumbled them both together. To which, he that shall add the monftrous Productions that are fo frequently to be met with in Nature, will find it hard, even in the Race of Animals, to determine by the Pedegree of what Species every Animal's Iflue is; and be at a lofs about the real Effence, which he thinks certainly convey'd by Generation, and has alone a right to the fpecifick Name. But farther, if the Species of Animals and Plants are to be diftinguifl'd only by Propagation, muft I go to the Indies to fee the Sire and Dam of the one, and the Plant from which the Seed was gather'd that produc'd the other, to know whether this be a Tyger or that Tea? Y. Not by Sub ftantial Forms. The fpecifick Effences are made by the Mind. §. 24. Upon the whole matter, 'tis evident, that 'tis their own Collections of fenfible Qualities, that Men make the Effences of their feveral forts of Subftances; and that their real internal Structures are not confider'd by the greatest part of Men, in the forting them. Much lefs were any fubftantial Forms ever thought on by any, but thofe who have in this one part of the World learn'd the Language of the Schools: and yet thofe ignorant Men, who pretend not any infight into the real Effencss, nor trouble themselves about fubstantial Forms, but are content with knowing things one from another by their fenfible Qualities, are often better acquainted with their Differences, can more nicely distinguish them from their Ufes, and better know what they may expect from each, than thofe learned quick-fighted Men, who look fo deep into them, and talk so confidently of fomething more hidden and effential. §. 25. But fuppofing that the real Effences of Subftances were discoverable by thofe that would feverely apply themselves to that Enquiry, yet we could not reafonably think, that the ranking of things under general Names, was regulated by thofe internal real Conftitutions, or any thing else but their obvious Appearances: fince Languages, in all Countries, have been establish'd long before Sciences. So that they have not been Philofophers, or Logicians, or fuch who have troubled themselves about Forms and Effences, that have made the general Names that are in ufe amongst the feveral Nations of Men: but those more or lefs comprehenfive Terms have for the most part, in all Languages, receiv'd their birth and fignification from ignorant and illiterate People, who forted and denominated things by thofe fenfible Qualities they found in them; thereby to fignify them, when abfent, to others, whether they had an occasion to mention a fort or a particular thing. Therefore very . 26. Since then it is evident, that we fort and name Substances by their novaricus and minal, and not by their real Effences; the next thing to be confider'd is, how and by whom thefe Effences come to be made. As to the latter, 'tis evident they are made by the Mind, and not by Nature: For were they Nature's Workmanfhip, they could not be fo various and different in feveral Men, as experience tells us they are. For if we will examin it, we shall not find the nominal Effence of any one Species of Subftances in all Men the fame; no not of that which of all others we are the most intimately acquainted with. It could not poffibly be, that the abstract Idea to which the name Man is given, fhould be different in feveral Men, if it were of Nature's making; and that to one it fhould be Animal rationale, and to another Animal implume bipes latis unguibus. He that annexes the Name Man, to a complex Idea made up of Senfe and fpontaneous Motion, join'd to a Body of fuch a Shape, has thereby one Effence of uncertain. the the Species Man; and he that, upon farther examination, adds Rationality, has another Effence of the Species he calls Man: by which means, the fame Individual will be a true Man to the one, which is not fo to the other. I think, there is fcarce any one will allow this upright Figure, fo well known, to be the eflential difference of the Species Man; and yet how far Men determine of the forts of Animals rather by their Shape than Defcent, is very vifible: fince it has been more than once debated, whether feveral human Fetus's fhould be preferv'd or receiv'd to Baptifm or no, only because of the difference of their outward Configuration from the ordinary Make of Children, without knowing whether they were not as capable of Reason, as Infants caft in another Moid: Some whereof tho' of an approv'd Shape, are never capable of as much appearance of Reason, all their lives, as is to be found in an Ape, or an Elephants and never give any figns of being acted by a rational Soul. Whereby it is evident, that the outward Figure, which only was found wanting, and not the Faculty of Reason, which no body could know would be wanting in its due Seafon, was made effential to the human Species: The learned Divine and Lawyer, muft, on fuch occafions, renounce his facred Definition of Animal Rationale, and fubftitute fome other Effence of the human Species. Monfieur Menage furnishes us with an Example worth the taking notice of on this occafion. When the Abbot of St. Martin, fays he, was born, he had fo little of the Figure of a Man, that it befpoke him rather a Monster. 'Twas for fome time under Deliberation, whether he should be baptiz'd or no. However, he was baptiz'd and declar'd a Man provifionally [till time fhould thew what he would prove.] Nature had molded him Jo untowardly, that he was call'd all his life the Abbot Malotru, i. e. Ill-fhaped. He was of Caen. Menagiana 43. This Child, we fee, was very near being excluded out of the Species of Man barely by his Shape. He efcap'd very narrowly as he was, and 'tis certain a Figure a little more oddly turn'd had caft him, and he had been executed as a thing not to be allow'd to pafs for a Man. And yet there can be no reason given, why if the Lineaments of his Face had been a little alter'd, a rational Soul could not have been lodg'd in him; why a Vifage fomewhat longer, or a Nofe flatter, or a wider Mouth, could not have confifted, as well as the reft of his ill Figure, with fuch a Soul, fuch Parts, as made him, disfigur,d as he was, capa‐, ble to be a Dignitary in the Church. §. 27. Wherein then, would I gladly know, confifts the precife and unmovable Boundaries of that Species ? 'Tis plain, if we examine, there is no fuch thing made by Nature, eftablifh'd by her amongst Men. The real Effence of that, or any other fort of Subftances, 'tis evident we know not; and therefore are fo undetermin'd in our nominal Effences, which we make our felves, that if feveral Men were to be ask'd concerning fome oddly-fhaped Fatus, as foon as born, whether it were a Man or no, 'tis paft doubt, one fhould meet with different Anfwers. Which could not happen, if the nominal Effences. whereby we limit and diftinguish the Species of fubftances, were not made by Man, with fome liberty; but were exactly copy'd from precife Boundaries fet by Nature, whereby it diftinguifh'd all Subftances into certain Species. Who would undertake to refolve, what Species that Monster was of, which is mention'd by Licetus, lib. 1. c. 3. with a Man's Head and Hogs Body? Or thofe other, which to the Bodies of Men had the Heads of Beafts, as Dogs, Horfes, &c. if any of thefe Creatures had liv'd, and could have fpoke, it would have increas'd the difficulty. Had the upper part, to the middle, been of human Shape, and all below Swine; had it been Murder to deftroy it? Or muft the Bishop have been confulted, whether it were Man enough to be admitted to the Font or no? as, I have been told, it happen'd in France fome Years fince, in fomewhat a like cafe. So uncertain are the Boundaries of Species of Animals to us, who have no other Measures than the complex Ideas of our own collecting: And fo far are we from certainly knowing what a Man is; tho', perhaps, it will be judg'd great Ignorance to make any doubt about it. And yet I think, I may fay, that the certain Boundaries of that Species are so far from being determin'd, and the precife number of fimple Ideas, which make the nominal Effence, fo far from being fettled and perfectly known, that very material Doubts may still arife about it. And I imagine, none of the Definitions of the word Man, which we yet have, nor Defcriptions of that fort of Animal, are fo perfect and exact, as to to fatisfy a confiderate inquifitive Perfon, much less to obtain a general Confent, and to be that which Men would every where ftick by, in the Decifion of Cafes, and determining of Life and Death, Baptifm or no Baptifm, in Productions that might happen. But not fo ar§. 28. But tho' these nominal Effences of Subftances are made by the Mind, they bitary as are not yet made fo arbitrarily as those of mix'd modes. To the making of any mix'd Modes. nominal Effence, it is neceffary, Firft, That the Ideas whereof it confists, have fuch an Union as to make but one Idea, how compounded foever. Secondly, That the particular Ideas fo united be exactly the fame, neither more nor lefs. For if two abftract complex Ideas differ either in Number or Sorts of their component parts, they make two different, and not one and the fame Effence. In the firft of thefe, the Mind, in making its complex Ideas of Subftances, only follows Nature; and puts none together, which are not fuppos'd to have an Union in Nature. No body joins the Voice of a Sheep, with the Shape of a Horse; nor the Colour of Lead, with the Weight and Fixednefs of Gold, to be the complex Ideas of any real Subftances: unless he has a Mind to fill his Head with Chimera's, and his Difcourfe with unintelligible Words. Men obferving certain Qualities always join'd and exifting together, therein copy'd Nature; and of Ideas fo united, made their complex ones of Substances. For tho' Men may make what complex Ideas they please, and give what Names to them they will; yet if they will be understood, when they fpeak of things really exifting, they muft in fome degree conform their Ideas to the things they would speak of: or elfe Mens Language will be like that of Bible; and every Man's Words being intelligible only to himfelf, would no longer ferve to Converfation, and the ordinary Affairs of Life, if the Ideas they fland for be not fome way answering the common Appearances and Agreement of Subftances, as they really exist. Tho' very im perfect. Which yet 29. Secondly, Tho' the Mind of Man, in making its complex Ideas of Subftances, never puts any together that do not really or are not fuppos'd to co-exift; and fo it truly borrows that Union from Nature: yet the number it combines, depends upon the various Care, Industry, or Fancy of him that makes it. Men generally content themselves with fome few fenfible obvious Qualities; and often, if not always, leave out others as material, and as firmly united, as those that they take. Of fenfible Substances there are two forts; one of organiz❜d Bodies which are propagated by Seed; and in thefe, the Shape is that, which to us is the leading Quality and moft chara&eristical Part that determines the Species. And therefore in Vegetables and Animals, an extended folid Subftance of such a certain Figure ufually ferves the turn. For however fome Men feem to prize their Definition of Animal Rational, yet fhould there a Creature be found, that had Language and Reafon, but partook not of the ufual fhape of a Man, I believe it would hardly pafs for a Man, how much foever it were Animal Rational. And if Baalam's Afs had, all his life, difcours'd as rational as he did once with his Master, I doubt yet whether any one would have thought him worthy the Name Man, or allow'd him to be of the fame Species with himself. As in Vegetables and Animals 'tis the Shape, fo in moft other Bodies, not propagated by Seed, 'tis the Colour we muft fix on, and are moft led by. Thus where we find the Colour of Gold, we are apt to imagine all the other Qualities, comprehended in our complex Idea, to be there alfo: and we commonly take these two obvious Qualities, viz. Shape and Colour, for fo prefumptive Ideas of feveral Species, that in a good Picture we readily fay this is a Lion, and that a Rofe; this is a Gold, and that a Silver Goblet, only by the different Figures and Colours represented to the Eye by the Pencil. S. 30. But tho' this ferves well enough for grofs and confus'd Conceptions, and ferve for com- unaccurate ways of Talking and Thinking; yet Men are far enough from having mon Converse. agreed on the precife number of fimple Ideas, or Qualities, belonging to any fort of things, fignify'd by its name. Nor is it a wonder, fince it requires much time, pains, and skill, ftrict enquiry, and long examination, to find out what and how many thofe fimple Ideas are, which are conftantly and infeparably united in Nature, and are alway to be found together in the fame Subje&t. Moft Men wanting either Time, Inclination, or Induftry enough for this, even to fome tolerable degree, content themselves with fome few obvious and outward Appearances of things, thereby readily to diftinguish and fort them for the common Affairs of up of Life: And fo, without farther examination, give them Names, or take name very . 31. But however thefe Species of Subftances pafs well enough in ordinary Effences of Conversation, it is plain that this complex Idea, wherein they obferve feveral Species under Individuals to agree, is by different Men made very differently; by fome more the fame and others lefs accurately. in fome, this complex Idea contains a greater, and different. in others a smaller number of Qualities; and fo is apparently fuch as the Mind makes it. The yellow fhining Colour makes Gold to Children; others add Weight, Malleablenefs, and Fufibility; and others yet other Qualities, which they find join'd with that yellow Colour, as conftantly as its Weight and Fufibility: For in all thefe and the like Qualities, one has as good a right to be put into the complex Idea of that Subftance wherein they are all join'd, as another. And therefore different Men leaving out or putting in feveral fimple Ideas, which others do not, according to their various Examination, Skill, or Obfervation of that Subject, have different Effences of Gold; which must therefore be of their own, and not of Nature's making. §. 32. If the number of fimple Ideas, that make the nominal Effence of the The more ge lowest Species, or firft forting of Individuals, depends on the Mind of Man neral our Ideas are, the variously collecting them, it is much more evident that they do fo, in the more more incom comprehenfive Claffis, which by the Mafters of Logick are call'd Genera. Thefe pleat and parare complex Ideas defignedly imperfect: And 'tis vifible at firit fight, that feve- tial they are ral of those Qualities that are to be found in the things themselves, are purpofely left out of generical Ideas. For as the Mind, to make general Ideas comprehending feveral particulars, leaves out thofe of Time, and Place, and fuch other, that make them incommunicable to more than one Individual; fo to make other yet more general Ideas, that may comprehend different forts, it leaves out thofe Qualities that diftinguish them, and puts into its new Collection only fuch Ideas as are common to feveral forts. The fame Convenience that Vol. I. made E e |