This all ac

made Men exprefs feveral parcels of yellow Matter coming from Guinea and Peru under one name, fets them alfo upon making of one Name that may comprehend both Gold and Silver, and fome other Bodies of different forts. This is done by leaving out thofe Qualities, which are peculiar to each fort; and retaining a complex Idea made up of thofe that are common to them all. To which the name Metal being annex'd, there is a Genus conflituted; the Effence whereof being that abftract Idea, containing only Malleablenefs and Fufibility, with certain degrees of Weight and Fixednefs, wherein fome Bodies of feveral kinds agree, leaves out the Colour, and other Qualities peculiar to Gold and Silver, and the other forts comprehended under the name Metal. Whereby it is plain, that Men follow not exactly the Patterns fet them by Nature, when they make their general Ideas of Substances; fince there is no Body to be found, which has barely Malleableness and Fufibility in it, without other Qualities as infeparable as thofe. But Men, in making their general Ideas, feeing more the Convenience of Language and quick Difpatch, by fhort and comprehenfive Signs, than the true and precife Nature of things as they exift, have, in the framing their abstract Ideas, chiefly purfu'd that End which was to be furnish'd with store of general and variously comprehenfive Names. So that in this whole bufinefs of Genera and Species the Genus, or more comprehenfive, is but a partial Conception of what is in the Species, and the Species but a partial Idea of what is to be found in each Individual. If therefore any one will think, that a Min, and a Horse, and an Animal, and a Plant, &c. are diftinguifh'd by real Effences, made by Nature, he must think Nature to be very liberal of thefe real Effences, making one for Body, another for an Animal, and another for a Horfe,; and all thele Effences liberally beftow'd upon Bucephalus. But if we would rightly confider what is done, in all these Genera and Species, or Sorts, we fhould find, that there is no new thing made, but only more or lefs comprehensive Signs whereby we may be enabled to exprefs, in a few Syllables, great Numbers of particular things, as they agree in more or lefs general Conceptions, which we have fram'd to that purpofe. In all which we may obferve, that the more general term is always the Name of a lefs complex Idea; and that each Genus is but a partial Conception of the Species comprehended under it. So that if these abftract general Ideas be thought to be compleat, it can only be in respect of a certain establish'd Relation between them and certain Names, which are made ufe of to fignify them; and not in refpect of any thing exifting, as made by Nature.

. 33. This is adjusted to the true end of Speech, which is to be the easiest and commodated horteft way of communicating our Notions. For thus he, that would difcourfe to the end of of things as they agreed in the complex Idea of Extenfion and Solidity, needed Speech. but ufe the word Body to denote all fuch. He that to thefe would join others, fignify'd by the words Life, Senfe, and fpontaneous Motion, needed but ufe the word Animal, to fignify all which partook of those Ideas: and he that had made a comp ex Idea of a Body, with Life, Senfe, and Motion, with the Faculty of Reasoning, and a certain Shape join'd to it, needed but use the fhort monofyllable Man to exprefs all Particulars that correfpond to that complex Idea. This is the proper bufinefs of Genus and Species: and this Men do, without any confideration of real Effences, or fubftantial Forms, which come not within the reach of our Knowledg, when we think of thofe things; nor within the Signification of our words, when we difcourfe with others.

Inftance in
Contraries.

. 34. Were I to talk with any one of a fort of Birds I lately faw in St. James's Park, about three or four Foot high, with a Covering of fomething between Feathers and Hair, of a dark brown Colour without Wings, but in the place thereof two or three little Branches coming down like Sprigs of Spanith Broom, long great Legs, with Feet only of three Claws, and without a Tail; I must make this Defcription of it, and fo may make others understand me: But when I am told that the Name of it is Caffuaris, I may then use that Word to ftand in difcourfe for all my complex Idea mention'd in that Difcrip. tion; tho' by that word, which is now become a fpecifick Name, I know no more of the real Effence or Conftitution of that fort of Animals than I did before; and knew probably as much of the Nature of that Species of Birds, before I learn'd the Name, as many English-men do of Swans, or Herons,

which are fpecifick Names, very well known, or Sorts of Birds common in England.

Sorts

35. From what has been faid, 'tis evident, that Men make Sorts of things. Men For it being different Effences alone that make different Species, 'tis plain that mine the they who make thofe abftract Ideas, which are the nominal Effences, do thereby make the Species, or Sort. Should there be a Body found, having all the other Qualities of Gold, except malleablenefs, 'twould no doubt be made a question whether it were Gold or no, i. e. whether it were of that Species. This could be determin'd only by that abftract Idea to which every one annex'd the name Gold: fo that it would be true Gold to him, and belong to that Species, who included not Malleablenefs in his nominal Effence, fignify'd by the Sound Gold; and on the other fide it would not be true Gold, or of that Species to him who included Malleablenefs in his fpecifick Idea, And who, I pray, is it that makes thefe diverte Species even under one and the fame Name, but Men that make two different abstract Ideas confifting not exactly of the fame Collection of Qualities? Nor is it a mere Suppofition to imagine that a Body may exift, wherein the other obvious Qualities of Gold may be without Malleablenefs; fince it is certain, that Gold it felf will be fometimes fo eager, (as Artifts call it) that it will as little endure the Hammer as Glafs it fef. What we have faid, of the putting in or leaving Malleablenefs out of the complex Idea, the name Gold is by any one annex'd to, may be faid of its peculiar Weight, Fixednefs, and feveral other the like Qualities: For wnatíoever is left out, or put in, 'tis ftill the complex Idea, to which that Name is annex'd, that makes the Species: and as any particular Parcel of Matter antwers that Idea, fo the Name of the Sort belongs truly to it; and 'tis of that Species. And thus any thing is true Gold, perfect Metal. All which determination of the Species, 'tis plain, depends on the Understanding of Man, making this or that complex Idea.

deter

. 36. This then, in fhort, is the cafe: Natue makes many particular things Nature makes which do agree one with another, in many fenuiole Qualities, and probably too the Similiin their internal Frame and Conftitution: but is not this real Eilence that tude. diftinguishes them into Species; 'tis Men, who, taking occafion from the Qualities they find united in them, and wherein they obferve often feveral Individuals to agree, range them into Sorts, in order to their naming, for the convenience of comprehenfive Signs under which Individuals, according to their conformity to this or that abftract Idea, come to be rank'd as under Enfigns; fo that this is of the Blue, that the Red Regiment; this is a Man, that a Drill: And in this, I think, confifts the whole bufinefs of Genus and Species.

§. 37. I do not deny but Nature, in the conftant Production of particular Beings, makes them not always new and various, but very much alike and of kin one to another: But I think it nevertheless true, that the Boundaries of the Species, whereby Men fort them, are made by Men; fince the Effences of the Species, diftinguith'd by different Names, are, as has been prov'd, of Man's making, and feldom adequate to the internal Nature of the things they are taken from. So that we may truly fay, fuch a manner of forting of things is the Workmanship of Men.

§. 38. One thing I doubt not but will feem very ftrange in this Doctrine; Each abstract which is, that from what has been faid it will follow, that each abftract Idea, Idea is an Ellence. with a name to it, makes a diftinct Species. But who can help it if Truth will have it fo? For fo it must remain till fome body can fhew us the Species of things limited and diftinguifh'd by fomething elfe; and let us fee, that general Terms fignify not our abftract Ideas, but fomething different from them. I would fain know why a Shock and a Hound are not as diftinct Species as a Spaniel and an Elephant. We have no other Idea of the different Effence of an Elephant and a Spaniel, than we have of the different Effence of a Shock and a Hound; all the effential difference, whereby we know and diftinguish them one from another, confifting only in the different Collection of fimple Ideas, to which we have given those different Names.

. 39. How much the making of Species and Genera is in order to general Names, Genera and and how much general Names are neceffary, if not to the Being, yet at leaft Species are in order to to the compleating of a Species, and making it pafs for fuch, will appear, benaming. fides what has been faid above concerning Ice and Water, in a very familiar Vol. I: Ee2

Example

than natural.

Example. A filent and a striking Watch are but one Species to thofe who have but one Name for them: but he that has the name Watch for one, and Clock for the other, and diftin&t complex Ideas, to which thofe Names belong, to him they are different Species. It will be faid perhaps that the inward Contrivance and Conftitution is different between thefe two, which the Watch-maker has a clear Idea of. And yet, 'tis plain, they are but one Species to him, when he has but one Name for them. For what is fufficient in the inward Contrivance to make a new Species? There are fome Watches that are made with four Wheels, others with five: Is this a fpecifick difference to the Workman? Some have Strings and Phyfies, and others none; fome have the Ballance loofe, and others regulated by a Spiral Spring, and others by Hogs-Briftles: Are any or all of thefe enough to make a fpecifick difference to the Workman, that knows each of thefe, and feveral other different Contrivances, in the internal Conftitutions of Watches? "Tis certain each of thefe hath a real difference from the reft: But whether it be an effential, a fpecifick difference or no, relates only to the complex Idea to which the name Watch is given: as long as they all a gree in the Idea which that Name ftands for, and that Name does not as a generical Name comprehend different Species under it, they are not effentially nor fpecifically different. But it any one will make minuter Divifions from Differences that he knows in the internal Frame of Watches, and to fuch precife complex Ideas, give Names that fhall prevail; they will then be new Species to them, who have thofe Ideas with Names to them; and can, by thofe differences, diftinguifh Watches into thefe feveral forts, and then Watch will be a generical Name. But yet they would be no diftin&t Species to Men ignorant of Clock-work and the inward Contrivances of Watches, who had no other Idea but the outward Shape and Bulk. with the marking of the Hours by the Hand. For to them all thofe other Names would be but fynonymous Terms for the fame Idea, and fignify no more, nor no other thing but a Watch. Juft thus, I think, it is in natural things. No body will doubt that the Wheels or Springs (if I may fo fay) within, are different in a rational Man and a Change ling, no more than that there is a difference in the Frame between a Drill and a Changeling. But whether one, or both thefe Differences be effential or specifical, is only to be known to us, by their agreement or disagreement with the complex Idea that the name Man ftands for: For by that alone can it be determin'd, whether one, or both, or neither of those be a Man or no.

Species ofarti- §. 40. From what has been before faid, we may fee the reason why, in the fical things Species of artifical things, there is generally lefs Confufion and Uncertainty, than in lefs confus'd, natural. Becaufe an artifical thing being a production of Man, which the Artificer defign'd, and therefore well knows the Idea of, the Name of it is fuppos'd to ftand for no other Idea, nor to import any other Effence than what is certainly to be known, and eafy enough to be apprehended. For the Idea or Effence of the feveral forts of artifical things confifting, for the moft part, in nothing but the determinate Figure of fenfible Parts; and fometimes Motion depending thereon, which the Artificer fafhions in Matter, fuch as he finds for his turn; it is not beyond the reach of our Faculties to attain a certain Idea thereof, and fo fettle the Signification of the Names, whereby the Species of artificial things are diftinguifh'd with lefs Doubt, Obfcurity and Equivocation, than we can in things natural, whofe Differences and Operations depend upon Contrivances beyond the reach of our Discoveries.

Artificial §. 41. I must be excus'd here if I think artificial things are of diftinct Species, things of dif- as well as natural: fince I find they are as plainly and orderly rank'd into tinct Species. Sorts, by different abftra& Ideas, with general Names annex'd to them, as diftinct one from another as thofe of natural Subftances. For why fhould we not think a Watch and Pistol, as diftin& Species one from another, as a Horfe and a Dog, they being exprefs'd in our Minds by diftin&t Ideas, and to others by diftinct Appellations?

Sabftances alone have pre per Names

. 42. This is farther to be obferv'd concerning Subftances, that they alone of all our feveral forts of Ideas have particular or proper Names, whereby one only particular thing is fignify'd. Becaufe in fimple Ideas, Modes, and Relations, it feldom happens that Men have occafion to mention often this or that Patticular when it is abfent. Befides, the greatest part of mix'd Modes, being

Actions which perish in their Birth, are not capable of a lafting Duration as Subftances, which are the Actors; and wherein the fimple Ideas that make up the complex Ideas defign'd by the Name, have a lafting Union.

Words.

§. 43. I muft beg pardon of my Reader, for having dwelt fo long upon this Difficulty to Subject, and perhaps with fome Obfcurity. But I defire it may be confider'd treat of how difficult it is to lead another by Words into the Thoughts of things, ftrip'd of those Specifick Differences we give them which things, if I name not, I fay nothing; and if I do name them, I thereby rank them into fome fort or other, and fuggeft to the Mind the ufual abftra& Idea of that Species, and fo cross my purpose. For to talk of a Man, and to lay by, at the fame time, the ordinary Signification of the name Man, which is our complex Idea ufually annex'd to it; and bid the Reader confider Man as he is in himself, and as he is really diftinguish'd from others in his internal Conftitution, or real Effence, that is, by fomething he knows, not what, looks like trifling: and yet thus one must do who would fpeak of the fuppos'd real Effences and Species of things, as thought to be made by Nature, if it be but only to make it understood, that there is no fuch thing fignify'd by the general Names, which Subftances are call'd by. But becaufe it is difficult by known familiar Names to do this, give me leave to endeavour by an Example to make the different Confideration the Mind has of specifick Names and Ideas a little more clear; and to fhew how the complex Ideas of Modes are refer'd fometimes to Archetypes in the Minds of other intelligent Beings; or, which is the fame, to the Signification annex'd by others to their receiv'd Names; and fometimes to no Archetypes at all. Give me leave alfo to fhew how the Mind always refers its Ideas of Subftances, either to the Subftances themselves, or to the Signification of their Names as to the Archetypes; and alfo to make plain the Nature of Species, or forting of things, as apprehended, and made ufe of by us; and of the Effences belonging to thofe Species, which is perhaps of more moment, to discover the Extent and Certainty of our Knowledg, than we at firft imagine.

in Kinneah and Niouphe

§. 44. Let us fuppofe Adam in the State of a grown Man, with a good Un- Inftance of derstanding, but in a ftrange Country, with all things new and unknown about mix'd Modes him; and no other Faculties, to attain the Knowledg of them, but what one of this Age has now. He obferves Lamech more malancholy than usual, and imagines it to be from a fufpicion he has of his Wife Adah (whom he most ardently lov'd) that he had too much kindness for another Man. Adam discourses thefe his Thoughts to Eve and defires her to take care that Adah commit not folly And in thefe Difcourfes with Eve he makes use of these two new words, Kinneah and Niouph. In time Adam's Miftake appears, for he finds Lamech's Trouble proceeded from having kill'd a Man: But yet the two Names, Kinneah and Niouph; the one ftanding for Sufpicion, in a Husband, of his Wife's Disloyalty to him, and the other for the Act of committing Disloyalty, loft not their diftinct Significations. It is plain then that here were two diftinct complex Ideas of mix'd Modes, with Names to them, two diftinct Species of Actions effentially different; I ask wherein confifted the Effences of these two diftinct Species of Action? And 'tis plain it confifted in a precife Combination of fimple Ideas, different in one from the other. I ask, whether the complex Idea in Adam's Mind, which he call'd Kinneah, were adequate or no? And it is plain it was, for it being a Combination of fimple Ideas, which he, without any regard to any Archetype, without refpect to any thing as a Pattern, voluntarily put together, abftract and gave the name Kinneah to, to express in short to others, by that one Sound, all the fimple Ideas contain'd and united in that complex one; it must neceffarily follow, that it was an adequate Idea. His own Choice having made that Combination, it had all in it he intended it fhould, and fo could not but be perfect, could not but be adequate, it being refer'd to no other Archetype which it was fuppos'd to reprefent.

§. 45. Thefe words, Kinneah and Niouph, by degrees grew into common ufe; and then the cafe was fomewhat alter'd. Adam's Children had the fame Faculties, and thereby the fame Power that he had to make what complex Ideas of mix'd Modes they pleas'd in their own Minds; to abstract them, and make what Sounds they pleas'd the Signs of them: But the ufe of Names being to make our Ideas within us known to others, that cannot be done, but when the

fame

Inftance of

Zahab.

fame Signs ftands for the fame Idea in two who would communicate their Thoughts, and difcourfe together. Thofe therefore of Adam's Children, that found thefe two words, Kinneah and Niouph, in familiar ufe, could not take them for infignificant Sounds; but muft needs conclude, they food for fomething, for certain Ideas, abftract Ideas, they being general Names, which abftract Ideas were the Effences of the Species diftinguith'd by thofe Names. If therefore they would ufe thefe words, as Names of Species already eftablifh'd and agreed on, they were oblig'd to conform the Ideas, in their Minds, fignify'd by thefe Names, to the Ideas, that they flood for in other mens Minds, as to their Patterns and Archetypes; and then indeed their Ideas of thefe com plex Modes were liable to be inadequate, as being very apt (efpccially thofe that confifted of Combinations of many fimple Ideas) not to be exactly conformable to the Ideas in other mens minds, uling the fame Names; tho' for this there be ufually a Remedy at hand, which is to ask the meaning of any word we understand not, of him that ufes it: it being as impoffible to know certainly what the words Jealoufy and Adultery (which I think anfwer NP and ) ftand for in another man's Mind, with whom I would difcourfe about them; as it was impoffible, in the beginning of Language, to know what Kinneah and Nonph ftood for in another man's Mind, without Explication, they being voluntary Signs in every one.

§. 46. Let us now alfo confider, after the fame manner, the Names of SubSubftances in ftances in their firft Application. One of Adam's Children, roving in the Mountains, lights on a glittering Subftance which pleafes his Eye; home he carries it to Adam, who, upon confideration of it, finds it to be hard, to have a bright yellow Colour, and an exceeding great Weight. Thefe, perhaps at firft, are all the Qualities he takes notice of in it and abftra&ting this complex Idea, confifting of a Subftance having that peculiar bright Yellowness, and a Weight very great in proportion to its Bulk, he gives it the name Zahab, to denominate and mark all Subftances that have thefe fenfible Qualities in them. 'Tis evident now that, in this cafe, Adam acts quite differently from what he did before in forming thofe Ideas of mix'd Modes, to which he gave the name Kinneah and Niouph. For there he puts Ideas together, only by his own imagination, not taken from the Exiftence of any thing; and to them he gave Names to denominate all things that fhould happen to agree to thofe his abstract Ideas, without confidering whether any fuch thing did exift or no: the Standard there was of his own making. But in the forming his Idea of this new Subftance, he takes the quit contrary Courfe; here he has a Standard made by Nature; and therefore being to reprefent that to himself, by the Idea he has of it, even when it is abfent, he puts in no fimple Idea into his complex one, but what he has the Preception of from the thing it felf. He takes care that his Idea be conformable to this Archetype, and intends the Name fhould stand for an Idea fo conformable.

§. 47. This piece of Matter, thus denominated Zahab by Adam, being quite different from any he had feen before, no body, I think, will deny to be a diftin& Species, and to have its peculiar Effence; and that the name Zahab is the mark of the Species, and a Name belonging to all things partaking in that Effence. But here it is plain, the Effence, Adam made the name Zahab stand for, was nothing but a Body hard, fhining, yellow, and very heavy. But the inquifitive Mind of Man, not content with the Knowledg of thefe, as I may fay fuperficial Qualities, puts Adam on farther examination of this Matter. He therefore knocks and beats it with Flints, to fee what was discoverable in the Infide: He finds it yield to Blows, but not eafily feperate into pieces: He finds it will bend with breaking. Is not now Ductility to be added to his former Idea, and made part of the Effence of the Species that name Zahab ftands for? Farther Trials difcover Fufibility and Fixednefs. Are not they alfo, by the fame reason that any of the others were, to be put into the complex Idea fignify'd by the name Zahab? If not, what reafon will there be fhewn more for the one than the other? If thefe muft, then all the other Properties, which any farther Trials fhall difcover in this matter, ought by the fame reason to make a part of the Ingredients of the complex Llea, which the name Zahab ftands for, and fo be the Effences of the Species mark'd by that Name. Which Properties,