Propriety net a fuficient Remedy.

Names con

pleafure, muft needs be of doubtful fignification, when fuch Collections are no where to be found conftantly united in Nature, nor any Patterns to be fhewn whereby Men may adjuft them. What the word Murder, or Sacrilege, &c. fignifies, can never be known from things themselves: There be many of the parts of thofe complex Ideas, which are not visible in the Action it felf; the Intention of the Mind, or the Relation of Holy Things, which make a part of Murder or Sacrilege, have no neceflary Connection with the outward and visible Action of him that commits either: and the pulling the Trigger of the Gun with which the Murder is committed, and is all the Action that perhaps is vifibic, has no natural Connection with thofe other Ideas that make up the complex one, nam'd Murder. They have their Union and Combination only from the Understanding, which unites them under one Name: but uniting them without any Rule or Pattern, it cannot be but that the fignification of the Name that ftands for fuch voluntary Collections, fhould be often various in the Minds of different Men, who have fcarce any ftanding Rule to regulate themselves and their Notions by, in fuch arbitrary Ideas.

§. 8. 'Tis true, Common Ufe that is the Rule of Propriety, may be fuppos'd here to afford fome aid, to fettle the Signification of Language; and it cannot be deny'd, but that in fome meafure it does. Common Ufe regulates the meaning of Words pretty well for common Converfation; but no Body having an Authority to eftablish the precife Signification of Words, nor determine to what Ideas any one fhall annex them, common ufe is not fufficient to adjust them to philofophical Difcourfes; there being fearce any Name of any very complex Idea (to fay nothing of others) which in common ufe has not a great latitude, and which, keeping within the bounds of Propriety, may not be made the fign of far different Ideas. Befides, the Rule and Measure of Propriety it felf being no where eftablifh'd, it is often matter of difpute whether this or that way of ufing a word, be Propriety of Speech or no. From all which it is evident, that the Names of fuch kind of very complex Ideas are naturally liable to this Imperfection, to be of doubtful and uncertain fignification; and even in Men that have a mind to understand one another, do not always ftand for the fame Idea in Speaker and Hearer. Tho' the names Glory and Gratitude be the fame in every Man's mouth thro' a whole Country, yet the complex colle&tive Idea, which every one thinks on, or intends by that name, is apparently very different in Men using the fame Language.

Ø. 9. The way alfo wherein the Names of mix'd Modes are ordinarily learn'd, does

The way of not a little contribute to the Doubtfulness of their Signification. For if we will oblearning thefe ferve how Children learn Languages, we fhall find that to make them understand tributes alfo what the Names of fimple Ideas, or Subftances, ftand for, People ordinarily fhew to their them the thing whereof they would have them have the Idea; and then repeat Doubtfulness. to them the Name that ftands for it, as White, Sweet, Milk, Sugar, Cat, Dog. But as for mix'd Modes, especially the moft material of them, moral Words, the Sounds are ufually learn'd firft; and then to know what complex Ideas they ftand for, they are either beholden to the explication of others, or (which happens for the most part) are left to their own Obfervation and Industry; which being little laid out in the fearch of the true and precife meaning of Names, thefe moral Words are in moft Mens mouths little more than bare Sounds; or when they have any, 'tis for the most part but a very loose and undetermin'd, and confequently obfcure and confus'd Signification. And even those themselves, who have with more attention fettled their Notions, do yet hardly avoid the inconvenience, to have them ftand for complex Ideas, different from those which other, even intelligent and ftudious Men, make them the figns of. Where fhall one find any, either controverfial Debate, or familiar Difcourfe, concerning Honour, Faith, Grace, Religion, Church, &c. wherein it is not easy to obferve the different Notions Men have of them? which is nothing but this, that they are not agreed in the Signification of thofe Words, nor have in their Minds the fame complex Ideas which they make them ftand for: and fo all the Contests that follow thereupon, are only about the meaning of a Sound. And hence we fee, that in the Interpretation of Laws, whether Divine or Human, there is no end; Comments beget Comments, and Explications make new Matter for Explications: And of limiting, diftinguifhing, varying

the

the Signification of thefe moral Words, there is no End. Thefe Ideas of Mens making, are, by Men ftill having the fame Power, multiply'd in infinitum. Many a Man, who was pretty well fatisfy'd of the meaning of a Text of Scripture, or Claufe in the Code at firft reading, has by confulting Commentators quite loft the fenfe of it, and by thofe Elucidations given rife or increase to his Doubts, and drawn Obfcurity upon the place. I fay not this, that I think Commentaries needlefs; but to fhew how uncertain the Names of mix'd Modes naturally are, even in the mouths of those who had both the Intention and the Faculty of Speaking as clearly as Language was capable to express their Thoughts.

. 10. What Obfcurity this has unavoidably brought upon the Writings of Hence una Men, who have liv'd in remote Ages and different Countries, it will be needlefs voidable Obto take notice; fince the numerous Volumes of learned Men, employing their tient Authors. Thoughts that way, are proofs more than enough to fhew what Attention, Study, Sagacity, and Reafoning are requir'd, to find out the true meaning of antient Authors. But there being no Writings we have any great concernment to be very folicitous about the meaning of, but thofe that contain either Truths we are requir'd to believe, or Laws we are to obey, and draw Inconveniences on us when we mistake or tranfgrefs, we may be lefs anxious about the Senfe of other Authors; who writing but their own Opinions, we are under no greater neceffity to know them, than they to know our's. Our Good or Evil depending not on their Decrees, we may fafely be ignorant of their Notions: And therefore in the reading of them, if they do not ule their Words with a due Clearness and Perfpicuity, we may lay them afide, and without any injury done them refolve thus with our felves,

Si non vis intelligi, debes negligi.

་

§. 11. If the Signification of the Names of mix'd Modes are uncertain, because there be no real Standards exifting in Nature, to which those Ideas are refer'd, and by which they may be adjusted, the Names of Substances are of a doubtful Signification, for a contrary reafon, viz. Because the Ideas they ftand for are fuppos'd conformable to the Reality of things, and are refer'd to the Standards made by Nature. In our Ideas of Subitances we have not the liberty, as in mix'd Modes, to frame what Combinations we think fit, to be the characteristical Notes to rank and denominate things by. In thefe we must follow Nature, fuit our complex Ideas to real Exiftences, and regulate the Signification of their Names by the things themselves, if we will have our Names to be the figns of them, and stand for them. Here, 'tis true, we have Patterns to follow; but Patterns that will make the Signification of their Names very uncertain: For Names must be of a very unfteddy and various meaning, if the Ideas they stand for be refer'd to Standards without us, that either cannot be known at all, or can be known but imperfectly and uncertainly.

§. 12. The Names of Substances have, as has been fhew'd, a double Reference in Names of their ordinary Use. Subftances re

1. To real Ef

known.

First, Sometimes they are made to ftand for, and fo their Signification is fup- fer'd, pos'd to agree to the real Conftitution of things, from which all their Properties fences that flow, and in which they all centre. But this real Conftitution, or (as it is apt cannot be to be call'd) Effence, being utterly unknown to us, any Sound that is put to ftand for it, must be very uncertain in its Application; and it will be impoffible to know what things are, or ought to be call'd an Horse, or Antimony, when those words are put for real Effences, that we have no Ideas of at all. And therefore in this Suppofition, the Names of Subftances being refer'd to Standards that cannot be known, their Significations can never be adjusted and establish'd by thofe Standards.

known but

9. 13. Secondly, The fimple Ideas that are found to co-exift in Subftances being 2. To co-exist that which their Names immediately fignify, thefe, as united in the feveral ing Qualities, Sorts of things, are the proper Standards to which their Names are refer'd, and which are by which their Significations may be beft rectify'd. But neither will these Ar- imperfe&ly. chetypes fo well ferve to this Purpofe, as to leave these Names without very various and uncertain Significations. Because these fimple Ideas that co-exist, and are united in the fame Subject, being very numerous, and having all an equal tight to go into the complex fpecifick Ideas, which the fpecifick Name is to ftand

for,

known but

for, Men, tho' they propofe to themfelves the very fame Subject to confider, yet frame very different Ideas about it; and fo the Name they ufe for it unavoidably comes to have, in feveral Men, very different Significations. The fimple Qualities which make up the complex Ideas being moft of them Powers, in relation to Changes, which they are apt to make in, or receive from other Bodies, are almoft infinite. He that fhall but obferve what a great variety of alterations any one of the bafer Metals is apt to receive from the different application only of Fire; and how much a greater number of Changes any of them will receive in the hands of a Chymift, by the application of other Bodies, will not think it ftrange that I count the Properties of any fort of Bodies not easy to be collected, and completely known by the ways of Enquiry, which our Faculties are capable of. They being therefore at leaft fo many, that no Man can know the precife and definite number, they are differently discover'd by different Men, according to their various Skill, Attention, and Ways of handling; who therefore cannot chufe but have different Ideas of the fame Subftarice, and therefore make the Signification of its common Name very various and uncertain. For the complex Ideas of Subftances being made up of fuch fimple ones as are fuppos'd to co-exift in Nature, every one has a right to put into his complex Idea thofe Qualities he has found to be united together. For tho' in the Subftance Gold, one fatisfies himself with Colour and Weight, yet another thinks Solubility in Aq. Regia as neceffary to be join'd with that Colour in his Idea of Gold, as any one does its Fufibility; Solubility in Aq. Regia being a Quality as conftantly join'd with its Colour and Weight, as Fufibility, or any other; others put in its Ductility or Fixednefs, &c. as they have been taught by Tradition or Experience. Who of all these has eftablish'd the right Signification of the word Gold? or who fhall be the Judg to determine? Each has his Standard in Nature, which he appeals to, and with reason thinks he has the fame right to put into his complex Idea fignity'd by the word Gold, thofe Qualities which upon trial he has found united; as another, who has not fo well examin'd, has to leave them out; or a third, who has made other trials, has to put in others. For the Union in nature of these Qualities being the true Ground of their Union in one complex Idea, who can fay, one of them has more reason to be put in, or left out, than another? From whence it will always unavoidably follow, that the complex Ideas of Subftances, in Men ufing the fame Name for them, will be very various; and fo the Significations of thofe Names very uncertain.

3. To co-exist. 14. Befides, there is fcarce any particular thing exifting, which, in fome ing Qualities of its fimple Ideas, does not communicate with a greater, and in others a lefs which are Number of particular Beings: Who fhall determine in this cafe which are those imperfectly. that are to make up the precife Collection that is to be fignify'd by the specifick Name; or can with any juft Authority prefcribe, which obvious or common Qualities are to be left out; or which more fecret, or more particular, are to be put into the Signification of the Name of any Subftance? All which together feldom or never fail to produce that various and doubtful Signification in the Names of Substances, which caufes fuch Uncertainty, Difputes, or Mistakes, when we come to a Philofophical Ufe of them.

With this Im

not well for Pbilofophical Ufe.

. 15. 'Tis true, as to civil and common Converfation, the general Names of Subperfection they stances, regulated in their ordinary Signification by fome obvious Qualities may Jerve for (as by the Shape and Figure in things of known feminal Propagation, and in Civil, but other Subftances, for the moft part by Colour, join'd with fome other sensible Qualities) do well enough to defign the things Men would be understood to speak of: And fo they ufually conceive well enough the Subftances meant by the word Gold, or Apple, to diftinguish the one from the other. But in Philofophical Enquiries and Debates, where general Truths are to be eftablish'd, and Confequences drawn from Pofitions laid down; there the precife Signification of the Names of Substances will be found, not only not to be well establish'd, but also very hard to be fo. For example, he that fhall make Malleablenefs, or a certain degree of Fixedness, a part of his complex Idea of Gold, may make Propofitions concerning Gold, and draw Confequences from them, that will truly and clearly follow from Gold taken in fuch a Signification: But yet fuch as another Man can never be forc'd to admit, nor be convinc'd of their Truth, who

makes

makes not Malleablenefs, or the fame degree of Fixednels, part of that complex Idea, that the name Gold, in his use of it, ftands for.

§. 16. This is a natural, and almoft unavoidable Imperfection in almost all Inftance, Lithe Names of Subftances, in all Languages whatsoever, which Men will eafily quor. find, when once paffing from confus'd or loofe Notions, they come to more ftrict and clofe Enquiries. For then they will be convinc'd how doubtful and obfcure those words are in their Signification, which in ordinary use appear'd very clear and determin'd. I was once in a Meeting of very Learned and Ingenious Physicians, where by chance there arofe a Queftion, whether any Liquor pafs'd thro' the Filaments of the Nerves. The Debate having been manag'd a good while by variety of Arguments on both fides, I (who had been used to fufpect, that the greatest part of Difputes were more about the Signification of words, than a real difference in the Conception of things) defir'd, That before they went any farther on in this Difpute, they would firft examine, and eftablish amongst them, what the word Liquor fignify'd. They at firft were a little furpriz'd at the Propofal; and had they been Perfons lefs ingenious, they might perhaps have taken it for a very frivolous or extravagant one: fince there was no one there that thought not himself to underftand very perfectly what the word Liquor ftood for; which I think too none of the moft perplex'd Names of Subftances. However, they were pleas'd to comply with my Motion, and upon Examination found, that the Signification of that word was not fo fettled and certain as they had all imagin'd; but that each of them made it a fign of a different complex Idea. This made them perceive that the main of their Difpate was about the Signification of that Term; and that they differ'd very little in their Opinions, concerning fome fluid and fubtile Matter, paffing thro' the Conduits of the Nerves; tho' it was not fo eafy to agree whether it was to be call'd Liquor or no, a thing which when confider'd, they thought it not worth the contending about.

S. 17. How much this is the cafe, in the greatest part of Difputes that Men Inftance, are engag'd fo hotly in, I fhall perhaps have an occafion in another place to Gold take notice. Let us only here confider a little more exa&ly the fore-mention'd Inftance of the word Gold, and we fhall fee how hard it is precisely to determine its Signification. I think all agree to make it ftand for a Body of a certain yellow fhining Colour; which being the Idea to which Children have annex'd that Name, the fhining yellow part of a Peacock's Tail is properly to them Gold. Others, finding Fufibility join'd with that yellow Colour in certain Parcels of Matter, made of that Combination a complex Idea, to which they give the name Gold to denote a fort of Subftance; and fo exclude from being Gold all fuch yellow fhining Bodies, as by Fire will be reduc'd to Ashes; and admit to be of that Species, or to be comprehended under that name Gold, only fuch Subftances as having that fhining yellow Colour will by Fire be reduc'd to Fufion, and not to Afhes. Another, by the fame Reafon, adds the Weight, which, being a Quality as ftraitly join'd with that Colour as its Fufibility, he thinks has the fame reafon to be join'd in its Idea, and to be fignify'd by its Name: and therefore the other made up of Body, of fuch a Colour and Fufibility, to be imperfect; and fo on of all the reft: wherein no one can fhew a Reafon why fome of the infeparable Qualities, that are always united in Nature, fhould be put into the nominal Effence, and others left out: or why the word Gold, fignifying that fort of Body the Ring on his Finger is made of, fhould determine that fort rather by its Colour, Weight, and Fufibility, than by its Colour, Weight, and Solubility in Aq. Regia: fince the diffolving it by that Liquor is as infeparable from it as the Fufion by Fire; and they are both of them nothing, but the relation which that Substance has to two other Bodies, which have a Power to operate differently upon it. For by what right is it that Fufibility comes to be a part of the Effence fignify'd by the word Gold, and Solubility but a Property of it? or why is its Colour part of the Effence, and its Malleablenefs but a Property? That which I mean is this, That thele being all but Properties depending on its real Conftitution, and nothing but Powers, either active or paffive, in reference to other Bodies; no one has Authority to determine the fignification of the word Gold (as refer'd to fuch a Body exifting in Nature) more to one Collection of Ideas to be found

in

the leaft

doubtful.

in that Body than to another: whereby the Signification of that Name must unavoidably be very uncertain; fince, as has been faid, feveral People obferve feveral Properties in the fame Subftance; and, I think, I may fay no body all. And therefore we have but very imperfe&t Defcriptions of things, and Words have very uncertain Significations.

The Names of §. 18. From what has been faid, it is easy to obferve what has been before fimple Ideas remark'd, viz. That the Names of fimple Ideas are, of all others, the leaft liable to Miftakes, and that for thefe Reasons. First, Because the Ideas they stand for, being each but one fingle Perception, are much easier got, and more clearly retain'd, than the more complex ones, and therefore are not liable to the Uncertainty which ufually attends thofe compounded ones of Subftances and mix'd Modes, in which the precife number of fimple Ideas, that make them up, are not eafily agreed, and fo readily kept in the Mind. And Secondly, Because they are never refer'd to any other Effence, but barely that Perception they immediately fignify which Reference is that which renders the Signification of the Names of Subftances naturally fo perplex'd, and gives occafion to fo many Difputes. Men, that do not perverfly use their Words, or on purpose fet themfelves to cavil, feldom mistake in any Language which they are acquainted with, the Ufe and Signification of the Names of fimple Ideas: White and Sweet, Yellow and Bitter, carry a very obvious meaning with them, which every one precifely comprehends, or eafily perceives he is ignorant of, and feeks to be inform'd. But what precife Collection of fimple Ideas, Modefty or Frugality ftand for in another's Ufe, is not fo certainly known. And however we are apt to think, we well enough know what is meant by Gold or Iron; yet the precife complex Idea, others make them the Signs of, is not fo certain: And I believe it is very feldom that in Speaker and Hearer they ftand for exactly the fame Collection. Which muft needs produce Miftakes and Difputes, when they are made use of in Difcourfes, wherein Men have to do with univerfal Propofitions, and would fettle in their Minds univerfal Truths, and confider the Confequences that follow from them.

And next to

them fimple Modes.

very com

§. 19. By the fame Rule, the Names of fimple Modes are, next to those of fimple Ideas, leaft liable to Doubt and Uncertainty, especially thofe of Figure and Number, of which Men have fo clear and diftin& Ideas. Who ever, that had a mind to understand them, miftook the ordinary meaning of Seven, or a Triangle? And in general the leaft compounded Ideas in every kind have the least dubious Names.

The most §. 20. Mix'd Modes therefore, that are made up but of a few and obvious doubtful are fimple Ideas, have ufually Names of no very uncertain Signification. But the the Names of Names of mix'd Modes, which comprehend a great number of fimple Ideas, pounded mix- are commonly of a very doubtful and undetermin'd Meaning, as has been fhewn. ed Modes and The Names of Subftances, being annex'd to Ideas that are neither the real ESubftances. fences nor exa& Reprefentations of the Patterns they are refer'd to, are liable yet to greater Imperfection and Uncertainty, efpecially when we come to a philofophical Ufe of them.

Why this imperfection

charg'd upon Words.

. 21. The great Disorder that happens in our Names of Subftances, proceeding for the most part from our want of Knowledg, and Inability to penetrate into their real Conftitutions, it may probably be wonder'd, Why I charge this as an imperfection rather upon our Words than Understandings. This Exception has fo much appearance of Justice, that I think my felf oblig'd to give a reason why I have follow'd this Method. I muft confefs then, that when I first began this Difcourfe of the Understanding, and a good while after, I had not the leaft thought that any Confideration of Words was at all neceffary to it. But when, having pafs'd over the Original and Compofition of our Ideas, I began to examine the Extent and Certainty of our Knowledg, I found it had fo near a Connection with Words, that unless their force and manner of Signification were first well obferv'd, there could be very little faid clearly and pertinently concerning Knowledg: which being converfant about Truth, had conftantly to do with Propofitions. And tho' it terminated in things, yet it was for the most part fo much by the intervention of Words, that they feem'd fcarce feparable from our general Knowledg. At leaft they interpofe themselves fo much between our Understandings and the Truth, which it would contem

plate