ly be admitted, as an Imperfection or Abuse of it. I confefs, in Difcourfes where we seek rather Pleasure and Delight than Information and Improvement, fuch Ornaments as are borrow'd from them can fcarce pafs for Faults. But yet if we would speak of things as they are, we must allow that all the Art of Rhetorick, befides Order and Clearnefs, all the artificial and figurative Application of words Eloquence hath invented, are for nothing elfe but to infinuate wrong Ideas, move the Paffions, and thereby mislead the Judgment, and fo indeed are perfect cheat: And therefore however laudable or allowable Oratory may render them in Harangues and popular Addreffes, they are certainly in all Discourses that pretend to inform or inftruct, wholly to be avoided; and where Truth and Knowledg are concern'd, cannot but be thought a great fault, either of the Language or Person that makes ufe of them. What and how various they are, will be fuperfluous here to take notice; the Books of Rhetorick which abound in the World, will inftruct those who want to be inform'd: only I cannot but obferve, how little the Prefervation and Improvement of Truth and Knowledg, is the Care and Concern of Mankind; fince the Arts of Fallacy are endow'd and prefer'd. 'Tis evident how much Men love to deceive and be deceiv'd, fince Rhetorick, that powerful Inftrument of Error and Deceit, has its establish'd Profeffors, is publickly taught, and has always been had in great Reputation: And, I doubt not, but it will be thought great Boldnefs, if not Brutality in me, to have said thus much against it. Eloquence, like the Fair Sex, has too prevailing Beauties in it, to fuffer it felf ever to be spoken againft. And 'tis in vain to find fault with thofe Arts of Deceiving, wherein Men find pleasure to be deceiv'd. CHA P. XI. Of the Remedies of the foregoing Imperfections and Abuses. §. I. HE natural and improv❜d Imperfections of Languages, we have feen They are worth above at large; and Speech being the great Bond that holds Society feeking. together, and the common Conduit whereby the Improvements of Knowledg are convey'd from one Man, and one Generation to another, it would well deferve our moft ferious Thoughts, to confider what Remedies are to be found for these Inconveniences above-mention'd. §. 2. I am not fo vain to think, that any one can pretend to attempt the Are not easy. perfe& Reforming the Languages of the World, no not fo much as of his own Country, without rendering himfelf ridiculous. To require that Men should ufe their Words conftantly in the fame fenfe, and for none but determin'd and uniform Ideas, would be to think that all Men fhould have the fame Notions, and should talk of nothing but what they have clear and diftin& Ideas of: which is not to be expected by any one, who hath not vanity enough to imagine he can prevail with Men to be very knowing or very filent. And he must be very little skill'd in the World, who thinks that a voluble Tongue fhall accompany only a good Underftanding; or that Mens talking much or little, fhall hold proportion only to their Knowledg. 6.3. But tho' the Market and Exchange muft be left to their own ways of But yet necefTalking, and Goffippings not to be robb'd of their antient Privilege; tho' the fary to Philo Schools and Men of Argument would perhaps take it amifs to have any thing fophy. offer'd to abate the length, or leffen the number of their Difputes: yet methinks those who pretend feriously to fearch after or maintain Truth, should think themfelves oblig'd to ftudy how they might deliver themfelves without Obfcurity, Doubtfulness, or Equivocation, to which Mens Words are naturally liable, if care be not taken. §. 4. For he that fhall well confider the Errors and Obfcurity, the Mistakes Mifufe of and Confufion, that are Spread in the World by an ill use of Words, will find fome Words the reason to doubt whether Language, as it has been employ'd, has contributed cause of great more to the improvement or hindrance of Knowledg amongst Mankind. How many are there, that when they would think on things, fix their Thoughts only Vol. I. Hh 2 од Errors. on Words, especially when they would apply their Minds to moral matters ? And who then can wonder, if the Refult of fuch Contemplations, and Realonings about little more than Sounds, whilft the Ideas they annex'd to them are very confus'd or very unfteddy, or perhaps none at all; who can wonder, I say, that fuch Thoughts and Reafonings end in nothing but Obfcurity and Mistake, without any clear Judgment or Knowledge? Obftinacy. . 5. This Inconvenience, in an ill ufe of Words, Men fuffer in their own private Meditations: but much more manifeft are the Disorders which follow from it, in Converfation, Discourse, and Arguings with others. For Language being the great Conduit, whereby Men convey their Difcoveries, Reasonings, and Knowledg, from one to another, he that makes an ill ufe of it, tho' he does not corrupt the Fountains of Knowledg, which are in things themselves; yet he does, as much as in him lies, break or ftop the Pipes, whereby it is diftributed to the publick use and advantage of Mankind. He that ufes Words without any clear and fteddy meaning, what does he but lead himself and others into Errors? And he that defignedly does it, ought to be look'd on as an Enemy to Truth and Knowledg. And yet who can wonder, that all the Sciences and Parts of Knowledg have been fo over-charg'd with obfcure and equivocal Terms, and infignificant and doubtful Expreffions, capable to make the most Attentive or Quick-fighted, very little or not at all the more knowing or orthodox ; fince Subtility, in those who make profeffion to teach or defend Truth, hath pass'd fo much for a Vertue: A Vertue, indeed, which confifting for the most part in nothing but the fallacious and illufory ufe of obfcure or deceitful Terms, is only fit to make Men more conceited in their Ignorance, and obftinate in their Errors. And Wrang ling. Inftance, Bat and Bird. 9. 6. Let us look into the Books of Controverfy of any kind; there we fhall fee, that the Effect of obfcure, unfteddy or equivocal Terms, is nothing but Noife and Wrangling about Sounds, without convincing or bettering a Man's Understanding. For if the Idea be not agreed on betwixt the Speaker and Hearer, for which the words ftand, the Argument is not about Things, but Names. As often as fuch a word, whofe fignification is not afcertain'd betwixt them, comes in use, their Understandings have no other Object wherein they agree, but barely the Sound; the Things that they think on at that time, as exprefs'd by that word, being quite different. §. 7. Whether a Bat be a Bird or no, is not a Question; whether a Bat be another thing than indeed it is, or have other Qualities than indeed it has, for that would be extremely abfurd to doubt of: But the Question is, 1. Either between those that acknowledg'd themselves to have but imperfect Ideas of one or both of those forts of things, for which thefe Names are fuppos'd to stand; and then it is a real Inquiry concerning the nature of a Bird or a Bat, to make their yet imperfect Ideas of it more compleat, by examining, whether all the fimple Ideas, to which, combin'd together, they both give the name Bird, be all to be found in a Bat: But this is a Question only of Enquirers (not Disputers) who neither affirm, nor deny, but examine. Or, 2. It is a Question between Difputants, whereof the one affirms, and the other denies, that a Bat is a Bird. And then the Queftion is barely about the fignification of one or both these words; in that they not having both the fame complex Ideas, to which they give these two Names, one holds, and t'other denies, that these two Names may be affirm'd one of another. Were they agreed in the fignification of these two Names, it were impoffible they fhould difpute about them: For they would prefently and clearly fee (were that adjusted between them) whether all the fimple Ideas, of the more general name Bird, were found in the complex Idea of a Bat, or no; and fo there could be no doubt, whether a Bat were a Bird or no. And here I defire it may be confider'd and carefully examin'd, whether the greatest part of the Disputes in the World are not merely verbal, and about the fignification of Words; and whether, if the Terms they are made in were defin'd, and reduc'd in their fignification (as they must be where they fignify any thing) to determin'd Collections of the fimple Ideas they do or hould ftand for, thofe Difputes would not end of themselves, and immediately vanish. I leave it then to be confider'd, what the Learning of Dilputation is, and how well they are imploy'd for the Advantage of themselves or others, whose Business is only the vain Oftentation of Sounds; i. e. thofe who spend their Lives in Difputes and Controverfies. When I fhall fee any of those Combatants ftrip all his Terms of Ambiguity and Obfcurity (which every one may do in the words he ufes himself) I fhall think him a Champion for Knowledg, Truth and Peace, and not the Slave of Vain-Glory, Ambition, or a Party. without an §. 8. To remedy the Defects of Speech before mention'd to fome degree, and to 1. Remedy, to prevent the Inconveniences that follow from them, I imagine the Obfervation ufe no Word of thefe following Rules may be of use, till some body better able fhall judg it Idea. worth his while, to think more maturely on this Matter, and oblige the World with his Thoughts on it. First, A Man fhould take care to use no Word without a Signification, no Name without an Idea for which he makes it ftand. This Rule will not feem altogether needlefs, to any one who fhall take the pains to recolle&t how often he has met with fuch Words, as Inftinet, Sympathy, and Antipathy, &c. in the Difcourfe of others, fo made ufe of, as he might eafily conclude, that those that us'd them had no Ideas in their Minds to which they apply'd them; but spoke them only as Sounds, which usually ferv'd inftead of Reafons on the like occafions. Not but that these Words, and the like, have very proper Significations in which they may be us'd; but there being no natural Connection between any Words and any Ideas, these, and any other, may be learn'd by rote, and pronounc'd or writ by Men, who have no Ideas in their Minds, to which they have annex'd them, and for which they make them ftand; which is neceffary they fhould, if Men would fpeak intelligibly even to themselves alone. annex'd to §. 9. Secondly, 'Tis not enough a Man ufes his Words as Signs of fome Ideas: 2. To have those Ideas he annexes them to, if they be fimple, must be clear and diftin&t; if difting Ideas complex, must be determinate, i. e. the precife Collection of fimple Ideas fettled them in in the Mind, with that Sound annex'd to it, as the fign of that precife deter- Modes. min'd Collection, and no other. This is very neceffary in Names of Modes, and especially moral words; which having no fettled Objects in Nature, from whence their Ideas are taken, as from their Original, are apt to be very confus'd. Juftice is a word in every Man's Mouth, but moft commonly with a very undetermin'd loofe fignification: Which will always be fo, unless a Man has in his Mind a diftin&t comprehenfion of the component Parts that complex Idea confifts of; and if it be decompounded, must be able to refolve it ftill on, till he at last comes to the fimple Ideas that make it up: And unless this be done, a Man makes an ill ufe of the Word, let it be Juftice, for Example, or any other: I do not fay, a Man needs ftand to recollect and make this Analyfis at large, every time the word Justice comes in his way: But this at least is neceffary, that he have so examin'd the fignification of that Name, and fettled the Idea of all its Parts in his Mind, that he can do it when he pleafes. If one, who makes his complex Idea of Justice, to be fuch a Treatment of the Perfon or Goods of another, as is according to Law, hath not a clear and diftin&t Idea what Law is, which makes a part of his complex Idea of Juftice, 'tis plain his Idea of Juftice it felf will be confus'd and imperfect. This Exactness will perhaps, be judg'd very troublesome; and therefore moft Men will think they may be excus'd from fettling the complex Ideas of mix'd Modes fo precifely in their Minds. But yet I muft fay, till this be done, it must not be wonder❜d that they have a great deal of Obfcurity and Confufion in their own Minds, and a great deal of wrangling in their Difcourfes with others. . 10. In the Names of Subftances, for a right ufe of them, fomething more is And conforrequir'd than barely determin'd Ideas. In thefe the Names must also be conforma- mable in Subftances. ble to Things, as they exift; but of this I fhall have occafion to speak more att large by and by. This Exactnefs is abfolutely neceffary in Inquiries after Philofophical Knowledg, and in Controverfies about Truth. And tho' it would be well too, if it extended it felf to common Conversation, and the ordinary Affairs of Life; yet I think that is fcarce to be expected. Vulgar Notions fuit vulgar Difcourfes; and both, tho' confus'd enough, yet ferve pretty well the Market and the Wake. Merchants and Lovers, Cooks and Taylors, have words wherewithal to dispatch their ordinary Affairs; and fo, I think, might Philofophers and Difputants too, if they had a mind to understand, and to be clearly understood. §. 11. 3. Propriety. 4. To make known their meaning. And that . 11. Thirdly, 'Tis not enough that Men have Ideas, determin'd Ideas, for which they make thefe Signs ftand; but they must also take care to apply their Words, as near as may be, to fuch Ideas as common Ufe has annex'd them to. For Words, especially of Languages already fram'd, being no Man's private possesfion, but the common measure of Commerce and Communication, 'tis not for any one, at pleasure, to change the Stamp they are current in, nor alter the Ideas they are affix'd to; or at leaft, when there is a neceffity to do so, he is bound to give notice of it. Mens Intentions in fpeaking are, or at least should be, to be understood; which cannot be without frequent Explanations, Demands, and other the like incommodious Interruptions, where Men do not follow common ufe. Propriety of Speech is that which gives our Thoughts entrance into other Mens Minds with the greatest Eafe and Advantage; and therefore deferves fome part of our Care and Study, especially in the Names of moral Words. The proper fignification and the ufe of Terms is beft to be learned from thofe, who in their Writings and Difcourfes appear to have had the clearest Notions, and apply'd to them their Terms with the exacteft Choice and Fitness. This way of ufing a Man's Words according to the Propriety of the Language, tho' it have not always the good Fortune to be understood; yet moft commonly leaves the blame of it on him, who is fo unskilful in the Language he speaks, as not to understand it, when made ufe of as it ought to be. §. 12. Fourthly, But because common Ufe has not so visibly annex'd any fignification to Words, as to make Men know always certainly what they precisely ftand for And because Men, in the improvement of their Knowledg, come to have Ideas different from the vulgar and ordinary receiv'd ones, for which they muft either make new Words (which Men feldom venture to do, for fear of being thought guilty of Affectation or Novelty) or elfe muft ufe old ones in a new Signification: Therefore after the Obfervation of the foregoing Rules, it is fometimes neceffary, for the afcertaining the fignification of Words, to declare their Meaning, where either common Ufe has left it uncertain and loose (as it has in moft Names of very complex Ideas) or where the Term, being very material in the Difcourfe, and that upon which it chiefly turns, is liable to any Doubtfulness or Miftake. §. 13. As the Ideas, Mens Words ftand for, are of different forts; fo the three ways. way of making known the Ideas, they ftand for, when there is occafion, is alfo different. For tho' defining be thought the proper way to make known the proper fignification of Words; yet there are fome Words that will not be defin'd, as there are others, whofe preeife Meaning cannot be made known but by Definition; and perhaps a third, which partake fomewhat of both the other, as we fhall fee in the names of fimple Ideas, Modes and Subftances. nonymous Terms or Chewing. 1. In fimple 14. First, When a Man makes ufe of the Name of any fimple Idea, which Ideas, by fy- he perceives is not understood, or is in danger to be mistaken, he is oblig'd by the Laws of Ingenuity, and the end of Speech, to declare his meaning, and make known what Idea he makes it ftand for. This, as has been fhewn, cannot be done by Definition; and therefore, when a fynonymous Word fails to do it, there is but one of these ways left. Firft, Sometimes the naming the Subject, wherein that fimple Idea is to be found, will make its Name be understood by those who are acquainted with that Subje&t, and know it by that Name. So, to make a Countryman understand what Fueillemorte Colour fignifies, it may fuffice to tell him, 'tis the Colour of wither'd Leaves falling in Autumn. Secondly, But the only fure way of making known the fignification of the Name of any fimple Idea, is by prefenting to his Senfes that Subject which may produce it in his Mind, and make him actually have the Idea that word ftands for. 2. In mix'd . 15. Secondly, Mix'd Modes, especially those belonging to Morality, being Modes, by de- most of them fuch Combinations of Ideas, as the mind puts together of its own finition. choice, and whereof there are not always ftanding Patterns to be found exifting; the fignification of their Names cannot be made known, as those of simple Ideas, by any fhewing; but in recompence thereof, may be perfectly and exactly defin'd. For they being Combinations of feveral Ideas, that the Mind of Man has arbitrarily put together, without reference to any Archetypes, Men may, if they please, exactly know the Ideas that go to each Compofition, and fo both use these words in a certain and undoubted Signification, and perfectly de clare, clare, when there is occafion, what they ftand for. This, if well confider'd, would lay great blame on thofe, who make not their Difcourfes about moral things very clear and diftin&t. For fince the precife fignification of the Names of mix'd Modes, or, which is all one, the real Effence of each Species is to be known, they being not of Nature's but Man's making, it is a great Negligence and Perverfeness to Difcourfe of moral Things with Uncertainty and Obfcurity; which is more pardonable in treating of natural Subftances, where doubtful Terms are hardly to be avoided, for a quite contrary Reafon, as we fhall fee by and by. §. 16. Upon this ground it is, that I am bold to think, that Morality is capa- Morality cable of Demonftration, as well as Mathematicks: fince the precife real Effence pable of Deof the Things moral Words ftand for, may be perfectly known; and fo the monstration. Congruity or Incongruity of the Things themselves be certainly discover'd, in which confifts perfect Knowledg. Nor let any one object, that the Names of Substances are often to be made ufe of in Morality, as well as thofe of Modes, from which will arife Obfcurity. For as to Subftances, when concern'd in moral Difcourfes, their divers Natures are not fo much enquir'd into, as fuppos'd; v.g. when we fay, that Man is Subject to Law, we mean nothing by Man, but a corporeal rational Creature: What the real Effence or other Qualities of that Creature are, in this Cafe, is no way confider'd. And therefore, whether a Child or Changling be a Man in a phyfical Senfe, may among the Naturalifts be as difputable as it will, it concerns not at all the moral Man, as I may call him, which is this immoveable unchangeable Idea, a corporeal rational Being. For were there a Monkey, or any other Creature to be found, that had the use of Reason to such a degree as to be able to understand general Signs, and to deduce Confequences about general Ideas, he would no doubt be fubject to Law, and in that Sense be a Man, how much foever he differ'd in Shape from others of that Name. The Names of Subftances, if they be us'd in them as they fhould, can no more difturb Moral than they do Mathematical Difcourfes: where, if the Mathematician fpeaks of a Cube or Globe of Gold, or any other Body, he has his clear fettled Idea which varies not, tho' it may by mistake be apply'd to a particular Body to which it belongs not. §. 17. This I have here mention'd by the bye, to fhew of what Confequence it is for Men, in their Names of mix'd Modes, and confequently in all their moral Discourses, to define their Words when there is occafion : fince thereby moral Knowledg may be brought to fo great Clearnefs and Certainty. And it must be great want of Ingenuity (to fay no worse of it) to refufe to do it: fince a Definition is the only way whereby the precife Meaning of moral Words can be known; and yet a way whereby their Meaning may be known certainly, and without leaving room for any conteft about it. And therefore the Negligence or Perverfenefs of Mankind cannot be excus'd, if their Difcourfes in Morality be not much more clear than thofe in Natural Philofophy: fince they are about Ideas in the Mind, which are none of them falfe or difproportionate; they having no external Beings for the Archetypes which they are refer'd to, and muft correspond with. It is far easier for Men to frame in their Minds an Idea which fhall be the Standard to which they will give the Name Justice, with which Pattern fo made all Actions that agree fhall país under that Denomination, than, having feen Ariftides, to frame an Idea that hall in all Things be exactly like him, who is as he is, let men make what Idea they please of him. For the one, they need but know the Combination of Ideas that are put together in their own Minds; for the other, they must enquire into the whole Nature, and abstruse hidden Constitution, and various Qualities of a thing existing without them. Definition can make moral Difcourfes 9. 18. Another Reason that makes the defining of mix'd Modes fo neceffary, And is the efpecially of moral Words, is what I mention'd a little before, viz. That it is the only way. only way whereby the Signification of the most of them can be known with Certainty. For the Ideas they ftand for, being for the moft part fuch whofe component Parts no where exift together, but fcatter'd and mingled with others, it is the Mind alone that collects them, and gives them the Union of one Idea: and it is only by Words, enumerating the feveral fimple Ideas which the Mind has united, that we can make known to others what their Names ftand for; the Affistance |