:

it carry with it the Notion of Excellency, Greatnefs, or fomething extraordinary; if Apprehenfion and Concernment accompany it if the Fear of abfolute and irrefiftible Power fet it on upon the Mind, the Idea is likely to fink the deeper, and fpread the farther; efpecially, if it be fuch an Ideas as is agreeable to the common Light of Reason, and naturally deducible from every part of our Knowledg, as that of a God is. For the vifible marks of extraordinary Wisdom and Power appear fo plainly in all the Works of the Creation, that a rational Creature, who will but feriously reflect on them, cannot miss the difcovery of a Deity. And the influence that the difcovery of fuch a Being muft neceffarily have on the Minds of all, that have but once heard of it, is fo great, and carries fuch a weight of Thought and Communication with it, that it fecms ftranger to me, that a whole Nation of Men fhould be any where found fo brutish, as to want the Notion of a God; than that they should be without any Notion of Numbers, or Fire.

§. 10. The Name of God being once mention'd in any part of the World, to exprefs a fuperiour, powerful, wife, invifible Being, the fuitablenefs of fuch a Notion to the Principles of common Reason, and the intereft Men will always have to mention it often, muft neceffarily fpread it far and wide, and continue it down to all Generations; tho' yet the general Reception of this Name, and fome imperfect and unfteddy Notions convey'd thereby to the unthinking part of Mankind, prove not the Idea to be innate; but only that they, who made the difcovery, had made a right ufe of their Reason, thought maturely of the Caufes of things, and trac'd them to their Original; from whom other lefs confidering People having once receiv'd fo important a Notion, it could not eafily be loft again. §. 11. This is all could be infer'd from the Notion of a God, were it to be found univerfally in all the Tribes of Mankind, and generally acknowledg'd by Men grown to maturity in all Countries. For the generality of the acknowledging of a God, as I imagine, is extended no farther than that; which, if it be fufficient to prove the Idea of God innate, will as well prove the Idea of Fire innate: fince, I think, it may truly be faid, That there is not a Perfon in the world, who has a Notion of a God, who has not alfo the Idea of Fire. I doubt not, but if a Colony of young Children fhould be placed in an Inland where no Fire was, they would certainly neither have any Notion of fuch a thing, nor Name for it, how generally foever it were receiv'd, and known in all the World befides: and perhaps too their Apprehenfions would be as far remov'd from any Name, or Notion of a God, till fome one amongst them had employ'd his Thoughts to enquire into the Conftitution and Caufes of things, which would eafily lead him to the Notion of a God: which having once taught to others, Reason, and the natural Propenfity of their own Thoughts, would afterwards propagate, and continue amongst them.

§. 12. Indeed it is urg'd, That it is fuitable to the Goodness of God, to imprint Suitable to upon the Minds of Men, Characters and Notions of Himself, and not to leave them GOD's in the dark and doubt in fo grand a Concernment; and alfo by that means to all Men should Goodness, that Menfhould fecure to himfelt the Homage and Veneration due from fo intelligent a Creature have an Idea as Man; and therefore he has done it.

of him, there

him; an

This Argument, if it be of any force, will prove much more than those who fore naturally ufe it in this cafe expect from it. For if we may conclude, that God hath imprinted by done for Men all that Men fhall judg is beft for them, because it is fuitable to fwer'd. his Goodness fo to do; it will prove not only that God has imprinted on the Minds of Men an Idea of Himfelf, but that he hath plainly ftamp'd there, in fair Characters, all that Men ought to know or believe of him, all that they ought to do in obedience to his Will; and that he hath given them a Will and Affections conformable to it. This, no doubt, every one will think better for Men, than that they fhould in the dark grope after Knowledg, as St. Paul tel's us all Nations did after God, Acts XVII. 27. than that their Wills fhould clash with their Understandings, and their Appetites crofs their Duty. The Romanifts say, 'Tis beft for Men, and fo fuitable to the Goodness of God, that there fhould be an infallible Judg of Controverfies on Earth; and therefore there is one. And I, by the fame reason, say, 'Tis better for Men that every Man himself fhould be infallible. I leave them to confider, whether by the force of this Argument they fhall think, that every Man is fo. Vol. I.

E

I

Ideas of

rent Men.

I think it a very good Argument, to fay, the infinitely wife God hath made it fo: and therefore it is belt. But it feems to me a little too much Confidence of our own Wijdom, to fay, I think it beft, and therefore God hath made it fo; aud in the matter in hand, it will be in vain to argue from fuch a Topick that God hath done fo, when certain Experience fhews us that he hath not. But the Goodness of God hath not been wanting to Men without fuch original Impreffions of Knowledg, or Ideas ftamp'd on the Mind: fince he hath furnifh'd Man with thofe Faculties, which will ferve for the fufficient difcovery of all things requifite to the End of fuch a Being. And I doubt not but to fhew that a Man, by the right Ufe of his natural Abilities, may, without any innate Principles, attain the Knowledg of a God, and other things that concern him. God having endu'd Man with thofe Faculties of Knowing which he hath, was no more oblig'd by his Goodnefs to implant thofe innate Notions in his Mind, than that having given him Reafon, Hands, and Materials, he should build him Bridges, or Houses; which fome People in the World, however of good Parts, do either totally want, or are but ill provided of, as well as others are wholly without Ideas of God, and Principles of Morality; or at leaft have but very ill ones. The reafon in both cafes being, that they never employ'd their Parts, Faculties, and Powers, induftriously that way, but contented themfelves with the Opinions, Fashions, and Things of their Country, as they found them, without looking any farther. Had you or I been born at the Bay of Soldania, poffibly our Thoughts and Notions had not exceeded thofe brutifh ones of the Hottentots that inhabit there: And had the Virginia King Apochancana been educated in England, he had perhaps been as knowing a Divine, and as good a Mathematician, as any in it. The difference between him and a more improv'd Englishman lying barely in this, that Exercise of his Faculties was bounded within the Ways, Modes, and Notions of his own Country, and never directed to any other, or farther Enquiries: And if he had not any Idea of a God, it was only because he purfu'd not thofe Thoughts that would have led him to it.

S. 13. I grant, That if there were any Ideas to be found imprinted on the GOD va- Minds of Men, we have reafon to expect, it should be the Notion of his Maker, as rious in diffe- a mark GOD fet on his own Workmanship, to mind Man of his Dependance and Duty; and that herein fhould appear the firft Inftances of human Knowledg But how late is it before any fuch Notion is discoverable in Children? And when we find it there, how much more does it refemble the Opinion and Notion of the Teacher, than reprefent the true God? He that fhall obferve in Children the progrefs whereby their Minds attain the Knowledg they have, will think that the Objects they do firft and most familiarly converfe with, are those that make the firft impreffions on their Understandings: nor will he find the leaft footsteps of any other. It is eafy to take notice, how their Thoughts enlarge themselves, only as they come to be acquainted with a greater variety of fenfible Objects, to retain the Ideas of them in their Memories; and to get the skill to compound and enlarge them, and feveral ways put them together. How by these means they come to frame in their Minds an Idea Men have of a Deity, I fhall hereafter thew.

§. 14. Can it be thought, that the Ideas Men have of God, are the Characters and Marks of Himfelf, engraven in their Minds by his own Finger; when we fee that in the fame Country, under one and the fame name, Men have far different, nay, often contrary and inconfiftent Ideas and Conceptions of him? Their agreeing in a Name, or Sound, will fearce prove an innate Notion of Him.

S. 15. What true or tolerable Notion of a Deity could they have, who acknowledg'd and worship'd hundreds? Every Deity that they own'd above one, was an infallible evidence of their ignorance of Him, and a proof that they had no true Notion of God, where Unity, Infinity, and Eternity were excluded. To which if we add their grofs Conceptions of Corporeity, exprefs'd in their Images and Reprefentations of their Deities; the Amours, Marriages, Copulations, Lufts, Quarrels, and other mean Qualities attributed by them to their Gods; we fhall have little reafon to think, that the Heathen World, e. the greatest part of Mankind, had fuch Ideas of God in their Minds, as he himself, out of care that they should not be mistaken about Him, was Author of. And this Univerfality of Confent, fo much argu'd, if it prove any native

Impreffions, 'twill be only this, That God imprinted on the Minds of all Men, fpeaking the fame Language, a Name for himself, but not any Idea; fince thofe People, who agreed in the Name, had at the fame time far different Apprehenfions about the thing fignify'd. If they fay, That the variety of Deities, worship'd by the Heathen World, were but figurative ways of expreffing the feveral Attributes of that incomprehenfible Being, or feveral Parts of his Providence: I answer, What they might be in their Original, I will not here inquire; but that they were fo in the Thoughts of the Vulgar, I think no body will affirm. And he that will confult the Voyage of the Bishop of Beryte, c. 13. (not to mention other Teftimonies) will find, that the Theology of the Siamites profeffedly owns a Plurality of Gods: Or, as the Abbé de Choify more judiciously remarks, in his Journal du Voiage de Siam, 177, it confifts properly in acknowledging no God at all.

102

§. 15. If it be faid, That wife Men of all Nations came to have true Conceptions of the Unity and Infinity of the Deity, I grant it. But then this,

First, Excludes Univerfality of Confent in any thing but the Name; for those wife Men being very few, perhaps one of a thoufand, this Univerfality

is

very narrow.

Secondly, It feems to me plainly to prove, that the trueft and best Notions Men had of God were not imprinted, but acquir'd by Thought and Meditation, and a right ufe of their Faculties; fince the wife and confiderate Men of the World, by a right and careful Imployment of their Thoughts and Reason, attain'd true Notions in this as well as other things; whilft the lazy and inconfiderate part of Men, making the far greater number, took up their Notions by chance, from common Tradition and vulgar Conceptions, without much beating their Heads about them. And if it be a reason to think the Notion of God innate, because all wife Men had it, Vertue too must be thought innate, for That alfo wife Men have always had.

§. 16. This was evidently the Cafe of all Gentilifm: Nor hath even amongst Jews, Chriftians and Mahometans, who acknowledg but one God, this Doctrine, and the Care taken in those Nations to teach Men to have true Notions of a GOD, prevail'd fo far as to make Men to have the fame, and true Ideas of him. How many, even amongst us, will be found, upon inquiry, to fancy him in the fhape of a Man fitting in Heaven, and to have many other abfurd and unfit Conceptions of him? Chriftians, as well as Turks, have had whole Sects owning and contending earnestly for it, that the Deity was corporeal, and of human Shape: And tho' we find few amongst us who profefs themselves Anthropomorphites (tho' fome I have met with that own it) yet, I believe, he that will make it his business, may find amongst the ignorant and uninftructed Christians many of that Opinion. Talk but with Country-People, almoft of any Age, or young People, almoft of any Condition; and you shall find, that tho' the Name of GOD be frequently in their Mouths; yet the Notions they apply this Name to are so odd, low and pitiful, that no body can imagine they were taught by a rational Man, much less that they were Characters writ by the Finger of God himself. Nor do I fee how it derogates more from the Goodnefs of God, that he has given us Minds unfurnish'd with these Ideas of himself, than that he hath fent us into the World with Bodies uncloth'd, and that there is no Art or Skill born with us: For being fitted with Faculties to attain these, it is want of Industry and Confideration in us, and not of Bounty in him, if we have them not. 'Tis as certain that there is a God, as that the oppofite Angles, made by the interfection of two ftrait Lines, are equal. There was never any rational Creature, that fet himself fincerely to examine the Truth of thefe Propofitions, that could fail to affent to them; tho' yet it be paft doubt, that there are many Men, who having not apply'd their Thoughts that way, are ignorant both of the one and the other. If any one think fit to call this (which is the utmost of its Extent) universal Confent, fuch an one I cafily allow; but fuch an univerfal Confent as this proves not the Idea of God, no more than it does the Idea of fuch Angles, innate.

If the Idea of §. 17. Since then tho' the knowledg of a GOD be the most natural Discovery GOD be not of human Reason, yet the Idea of him is not innate, as, I think, is evident from innate, no what has been said; I imagine there will scarce be any other Idea found, that fuppos'din Vol. I. E z

ther can be

can nates

nate.

can pretend to it: Since if God had fet any Impreffion, any Character on the Understanding of Men, it is moft reasonable to expect it fhould have been fome clear and uniform Idea of himfelf, as far as our weak Capacities were capable to receive fo incomprehenfible and infinite an Object. But our Minds being at first void of that Idea, which we are most concern'd to have, it is a Strong Prefumption against all other innate Characters. I muft own, as far as I can obferve, I can find none, and would be glad to be inform'd by any other.

Idea of Sub- §. 18. 1 confefs there is another Idea, which would be of general ufe for ftance not in- Mankind to have, as it is of general Talk, as if they had it; and that is the Idea of Subftance which we neither have, nor can have, by Senfation or Reflection. If Nature took care to provide us any Ideas, we might well expect they should be fuch, as by our own Faculties we cannot procure to our felves: but we fee, on the contrary, that fince by thofe ways whereby other Ideas are brought into our Minds, this is not; we have no fuch clear Idea at all, and therefore fignify nothing by the word Substance, but only an uncertain fuppofition of we know not what (i. e. of fome thing whereof we have no particular diftinct positive) Idea, which we take to be the Subftratum, or Support, of those Ideas we do

nate, fince no

nate.

know.

No Propofiti- §. 19. Whatever then we talk of Innate, either fpeculative or practical Prinons can be in- ciples, it may, with as much probability, be faid, that a Man hath 100 7. fterIdeas are in ling in his Pocket, and yet deny'd that he hath either Penny, Shilling, Crown, or any other Coin, out of which the Sum is to be made up; as to think that certain Propofitions are innate, when the Ideas about which they are, can by no means be fuppos'd to be fo. The general Reception and Affent that is given, doth not at all prove that the Ideas exprefs'd in them are innate: For in many Cafes, however the Ideas came there, the Affent to Words, expreffing the Agreement or Difagreement of fuch Ideas, will neceffarily follow. Every one, that hath a true Idea of God and Worship, will affent to this Propofition, That God is to be worship'd, when exprefs'd in a Language he understands: And every rational Man, that hath not thought on it to day, may be ready to affent to this Propofition to morrow; and yet Millions of Men may be well fuppos'd to want one or both of those Ideas to Day. For if we will allow Savages and moft Country-People to have Ideas of God and Worship (which Converfation with them will not make one forward to believe) yet I think few Children can be fuppos'd to have those Ideas, which therefore they must begin to have some time or other: and then they will also begin to affent to that Propofition, and make very little queftion of it ever after. But fuch an Affent upon Hearing no more proves the Ideas to be innate, than it does that one born blind (with Cataracts, which will be couch'd to morrow) had the innate Ideas of the Sun, or Light, or Saffron, or Yellow; because when his Sight is clear'd, he will certainly affent to this Propofition, That the Sun is lucid, or that Saffron is yellow and therefore if fuch an Affent upon hearing cannot prove the Ideas innate, it can much less the Propofitions made up of thofe Ideas. If they have any innate Ideas, I would be glad to be told what, and how many they are. J. 20. To which let me add: If there be any innate Ideas, any Ideas in the Mind, which the Mind does not actually think on, they must be lodg'd in the Memory, and from thence must be brought into view by Remembrance; i. e. must be known, when they are remember'd, to have been Perceptions in the Mind before, unless Remembrance can be without Remembrance. For to remember is to perceive any thing with Memory, or with a Consciousness, that it was known or perceiv'd before: without this, whatever Idea comes into the Mind is new, and not remember'd; this Confcioufnefs of its having been in the Mind before, being that which diftinguishes Remembering from all other ways of thinking. Whatever Idea was never perceiv'd by the Mind, was never in the Mind. Whatever Idea is in the Mind, is either an actual Perception; or elfe having been an actual Perception, is fo in the Mind, that by the Memory it can be made an actual Perception again. Whenever there is the actual Perception of an Idea without Memory, the Idea appears perfectly new and unknown before to the Understanding. Whenever the Memory brings any Idea into actual view, it is with a Confcioufnefs, that it had been there before, and was not wholly a stranger to the Mind. Whether this be not fo, I appeal to

No innate I. deas in the Memory.

A

every one's Obervation and then I defire an Inftance of an Idea pretended to be innate, which (before any impreffion of it by ways hereafter to be mention'd) any one could revive and remember as an idea he had formerly known, without which Consciousness of a former Perception there is no remembrance; and whatever Idea comes into the Mind without that Confcioufnefs, is not remember'd, or comes not out of the Memory, nor can be faid to be in the Mind before that appearance: For what is not either actually in View, or in the Memory, is in the Mind no way at all, and is all one as if it never had been there. Suppose a Child had the use of his Eyes, till he knows and diftinguishes Colours; but then Cataracts fhut the Windows, and he is forty or fifty Years perfectly in the dark, and in that time perfectly lofes all Memory of the Ideas of Colours he once had. This was the Cafe of a blind Man I once talk'd with, who loft his Sight by the Small-Pox when he was a Child, and had no more notion of Colours than one born blind. I ask, whether any one can say this Man had then any Ideas of Colours in his Mind, any more than one born blind? And I think no body will fay, that either of them had in his Mind any Idea of Colours at all. His Cataracts are couch'd, and then he has the Ideas (which he remembers not) of Colours, de novo, by his reftor'd Sight convey'd to his Mind, and that without any Confcioufnefs of a former acquaintance; and thefe now he can revive, and call to mind in the dark. In this cafe all these Ideas of Colours, which when out of view can be reviv'd with a Conscioufnefs of a former acquaintance, being thus in the Memory, are faid to be in the Mind. The ufe I make of this, is, that whatever Idea being not actually in View, is in the Mind, is there only by being in the Memory; and if it be not in the Memory, it is not in the Mind; and if it be in the Memory, it cannot by the Memory be brought into actual View, without a Perception that it comes out of the Memory; which is this, that it had been known before, and is now remember'd. If therefore there be any innate Ideas, they must be in the Memory, or else no where in the Mind; and if they be in the Memory, they can be reviv'd without any Impreffion from without; and whenever they are brought into the Mind, they are remember'd, i. e. they bring with them a Perception of their not being wholly new to it. This being a conftant and diftinguishing difference between what is, and what is not in the Memory, or in the Mind; that what is not in the Memory, whenever it appears there, appears perfectly new and unknown before; and what is in the Memory, or in the Mind, whenever it is fuggefted by the Memory, appears not to be new, but the Mind finds it in it felf, and knows it was there before. By this it may be try'd, whe ther there be any innate Ideas in the Mind, before impreffion from Senfation or Reflection. I would fain meet with the Man, who when he came to the use of Reafon, or at any other time, remember'd any of them: And to whom, after he was born, they were never new. If any one will fay, there are Ideas in the Mind, that are not in the Memory; I defire him to explain himfelt, and make what he fays intelligible.

§. 21. Befides what I have already said, there is another Reason why I doubt Principles not that neither thefe nor any other Principles are innare. I that am fully per- innate, befuaded, that the infinitely wife GOD made all things in perfe&t Wifdom, can- Uje, or little caufe of little not fatisfy my felf why he fhould be fuppos'd to print upon the Minds of Men Certainty. fome univerfal Principles, whereof thofe that are pretended innate, and concern Speculation, are of no great use; and those that concern Practice, not self-evident; and neither of them diftinguishable from fome other Truths not allow'd to be innate. For to what purpofe fhould Characters be graven on the Mind by the Finger of God, which are not clearer there than those which are afterwards introduc'd, or cannot be diftinguish'd from them? If any one thinks there are fuch innate Ideas and Propofitions, which by their Clearness and Usefulness are diftinguishable from all that is adventitious in the Mind and acquir'd, it will not be a hard matter for him to tell us which they are, and then every one will be a fit Judg whether they be fo or no; fince if there be fuch innate Ideas and Impreffions, plainly different from all other Perceptions and Knowledg, every one will find it true in himfelf. Of the Evidence of these fuppos'd innate Maxims I have fpoken already; of their Usefulness I fhall have occafion to fpeak more hereafter.