§. 22. Fourthly, The fourth is, the ufing of Proofs drawn from any of the 4. Ad JudiFoundations of Knowledg or Probability. This I call Argumentum ad Judicium, cium. This alone of all the four, brings true Inftruction with it, and advances us in our way to Knowledg. For, 1. It argues not another Man's Opinion to be right, because I out of Refpect, or any other Confideration but that of Conviction, will not contradict him. 2. It proves not another Man to be in the right way, nor that I ought to take the fame with him, because I know not a better. 3. Nor does it follow that another Man is in the right way, because he has fhewn me that I am in the wrong. I may be modeft, and therefore not oppose another Man's Perfuafion: I may be ignorant, and not be able to produce a better: I may be in an Error, and another may fhew me that I am fo. This may dispose me, perhaps, for the Reception of Truth, but helps me not to it; that must come from Proofs and Arguments, and Light arifing from the Nature of Things themselves, and not from my Shamefacednefs, Ignorance or Error.

23. By what has been before faid of Reason, we may be able to make fome Above,contraguefs at the Diftin&tion of Things, into thofe that are according to, above, and ry,and a cordcontrary to Reafon. 1. According to Reafon are fuch Propofitions, whofe Truth ing to Reason. we can difcover, by examining and tracing those Ideas we have from Senfation and Reflection; and by natural Deduction find to be true or probable. 2. Above Reafon are fuch Propofitions, whofe Truth or Probability we cannot by Reason derive from those Principles. 3. Contrary to Reafon are fuch Propofitions, as are inconfiftent with, or irreconcilable to our clear and diftinct Ideas. Thus the Existence of one GOD is according to Reason; the Existence of more than one GOD, contrary to Reafon; the Refurre&tion of the Dead, above Reafon. Farther, as Above Reafon may be taken in a double Senfe, viz. either as fignitying above Probability, or above Certainty; fo in that large Senfe alfo, Contrary to Reafon, is, I fuppofe, fometimes taken.

. 24. There is another ufe of the word Reafon, wherein it is oppos'd to Faith; Reafon and which tho' it be in it felf a very improper way of speaking, yet common Ufe Faith not oppo has fo authoriz'd it, that it would be Folly either to oppofe or hope to remedy fite. it: Only I think it may not be amifs to take notice, that however Faith be oppos'd to Reason, Faith is nothing but a firm Affent of the Mind: which if it' be regulated, as is our Duty, cannot be afforded to any thing but upon good Reason; and fo cannot be oppofite to it. He that believes, without having any Reason for believing, may be in love with his own Fancies; but neither feeks Truth as he ought, nor pays the Obedience due to his Maker, who would have him use those difcerning Faculties he has given him, to keep him out of Miftake and Error. He that does not this to the beft of his Power, however he fometimes lights on Truth, is in the right but by chance; and I know not whether the Luckinefs of the Accident will excufe the Irregularity of his Proceeding. This at least is certain, that he must be accountable for whatever Mistakes he runs into: whereas he that makes ufe of the Light and Faculties GOD has given him, and feeks fincerely to discover Truth by those Helps and Abilities he has, may have this Satisfaction in doing his Duty as a rational Creature, that tho' he should mifs Truth, he will not miss the Reward of it. For he governs his Affent right, and places it as he should, who in any Cafe or Matter whatsoever, believes or disbelieves according as Reason directs him. He that does otherwife, tranfgreffes against his own Light, and mifufes those Faculties which were given him to no other End but to fearch and follow the clearer Evidence, and greater Probability. But fince Reason and Faith are by fome Men oppos'd, we will fo confider them in the following Chapter.

CHA P.

CHAP. XVIII.

Neceffary to §. 1.

know their

Boundaries.

FaithandRea

Of Faith and Reason, and their diftinct Provinces.

T has been above fhewn, 1. That we are of neceffity ignorant, and want Knowledg of all forts, where we want Ideas. 2. That we are ignorant, and want rational Knowledg, where we want Proofs. 3. That we want general Knowledg and Certainty, as far as we want clear and determin'd fpecifick Ideas. 4. That we want Probability to direct our Affent in Matters where we have neither Knowledg of our own, nor Teftimony of other Men, to bottom our Reafon upon.

From these things thus premis'd, I think we may come to lay down the Meafures and Boundaries between Faith and Reafon; the want whereof may poffibly have been the caufe, if not of great Disorders, yet at leaft of great Disputes, and perhaps Miftakes in the World. For till it be refolv'd how far we are to be guided by Reason, and how far by Faith, we fhall in vain difpute, and endeavour to convince one another in Matters of Religion.

§. 2. I find every Sect, as far as Reafon will help them, make use of it gladly : fon what, as and where it fails them, they cry out, Tis matter of Faith, and above Reafon. contradiftin. And I do not fee how they can argue with any one, or ever convince a Gainguifh'd. fayer who makes ufe of the fame Plea, without fetting down ftrict Boundaries between Faith and Reafon; which ought to be the firft Point eftablish'd in all Questions, where Faith has any thing to do.

No new fimple Idea can be

convey'd by

Traditional
Revelation.

Reafon therefore here, as contra-diftinguish'd to Faith, I take to be the Discovery of the Certainty or Probability of fuch Propofitions or Truths, which the Mind arrives at by Deduction made from fuch Ideas, which it has got by the use of its natural Faculties, viz. by Senfation or Reflection.

Faith, on the other fide, is the Affent to any Propofition, not thus made out by the Deductions of Reafon; but upon the Credit of the Propofer, as coming from GOD, in fome extraordinary way of Communication. This way of difcovering Truths to Men we call Revelation.

§. 3. First then I fay, That no Man inspir'd by GOD, can by any Revelation communicate to others any new fimple Ideas, which they had not before from Senfation or Reflection. For whatsoever Impreffions he himself may have from the immediate Hand of GOD, this Revelation, if it be of new fimple Ideas, cannot be convey'd to another, either by Words, or any other Signs. Becaufe Words by their immediate Operation on us, caufe no other Ideas, but of their natural Sounds: and 'tis by the custom of using them for Signs, that they excite and revive in our Minds latent Ideas ; but yet only fuch Ideas as were there before. For Words feen or heard, recal to our Thoughts thofe Ideas only, which to us they have been wont to be Signs of; but cannot introduce any perfectly new, and formerly unknown fimple Ideas. The fame holds in all other Signs, which cannot fignify to us things, of which we have before never had any

Idea at all.

Thus whatever things were difcover'd to St. Paul, when he was wrap'd up into the third Heaven, whatever new Ideas his Mind there receiv'd, all the Defcription he can make to others of that Place, is only this, That there are fuch things, as Eye hath not seen, nor Ear heard, nor hath it enter'd into the Heart of Man to conceive. And fuppofing GOD fhould discover to any one, fuperna turally, a Species of Creatures inhabiting, for example, Jupiter, or Saturn, (for that it is poffible there may be fuch, no body can deny) which had fix Senses; and imprint on his Mind the Ideas convey'd to theirs by that fixth Sense; he could no more, by Words, produce in the Minds of other Men those Ideas, imprinted by that fixth Senfe, than one of us could convey the Idea of any CoTour by the Sounds of Words into a Man, who having the other four Senfes perfect, had always totally wanted the fifth of Seeing. For our fimple Ideas then, which are the Foundation and fole Matter of all our Notions and Knowledg, we must depend wholly on our Reafon, I mean our natural Faculties;

and

and can by no means receive them, or any of them, from Traditional Revelation ; I fay, Traditional Revelation, in diftin&tion to Original Revelation. By the one, I mean that firft Impreffion, which is made immediately by GOD, on the Mind of any Man, to which we cannot fet any bounds; and by the other, thofe Impreffions deliver'd over to others in Words, and the ordinary ways of conveying our Conceptions one to another.

may make us

tainty that

§. 4. Secondly, I fay, that the fame Truths may be difcover'd, and convey'd down Traditional from Revelation, which are difcoverable to us by Reafon, and by thofe Ideas we na- Revelation turally may have. So GOD might, by Revelation, difcover the Truth of any know PropefiPropofition in Euclid; as well as Men, by the natural ufe of their Faculties, tionsknowable come to make the Discovery them felves. In all things of this kind, there is also by Reafon, little need or use of Revelation, GOD having furnith'd us with natural and but not with furer means to arrive at the knowledg of them. For whatfoever Truth we the fame Cercome to the clear difcovery of, from the Knowledg and Contemplation of our Reafon doth. own Ideas, will always be certainer to us, than those which are convey'd to us by Traditional Revelation. For the Knowledg we have, that this Revelation came at firft from GOD, can never be fo fure, as the Knowledg we have from the clear and diftin& Perception of the Agreement or Difagreement of our own. Ideas, v. g. if it were reveal'd fome Ages fince, That the three Angles of a Triangle were equal to two right ones, I might affent to the Truth of that Propolition, upon the Credit of the 'I radition, that it was reveal'd: But that would never amount to fo great a Certainty, as the Knowledg of it, upon the comparing and meafuring my own Ideas of two right Angles, and the three Angles of a Triangle. The like holds in Matter of Fact, knowable by our Senles, v. g. the Hiftory of the Deluge is convey'd to us by Writings, which had their Original from Revelation: And yet no body, I think, will fay he has as certain and clear a Knowledg of the Flood, as Noah that faw it; or that he himself would have had, had he then been alive, and feen it. For he has no greater an Affurance than that of his Senfes, that it is writ in the Book fuppos'd writ by Mofes infpir'd: but he has not fo great an Affurance that Mofes writ that Book, as if he had feen Mofes write it. So that the Affurance of its being a Revelation, is lefs ftill than the Affurance of his Senfes.

§. 5. In Propofitions then, whofe Certainty is built upon the clear Perception Revelation of the Agreement or Difagreement of our Ideas, attain'd either by immediate cannot be adIntuition, as in felf-evident Propofitions, or by evident Deductions of Reafon mitt dagainst in Demonftrations, we need not the Affiftance of Revelation, as neceffary to the clear Evidence of Rea gain our Affent, and introduce them into our Minds. Because the natural ways fon. of Knowledg could fettle them there, or had done it already; which is the greatest Affurance we can poffibly have of any thing, unlefs where GOD immediately reveals it to us: And there too our Affurance can be no greater, than our Knowledg is, that it is a Revelation from GOD. But yet nothing, I think, can under that title, fhake or over-rule plain Knowledg; or rationally prevail with any Man to admit it for true, in a direct contradiction to the clear Evidence of his own Understanding. For fince no Evidence of our Faculties, by which we receive fuch Revelations, can exceed, if equal, the Certainty of our intuitive Knowledg, we can never receive for a Truth any thing, that is directly contrary to our clear and diftin&t Knowledg; v. g. the Ideas of one Body, and one Place, do fo clearly agree, and the Mind has fo evident a Perception of their Agreement, that we can never affent to a Propofition, that affirms the fame Body to be in two diftant places at once, however it fhould pretend to the Authority of a divine Revelation: Since the Evidence, First, That we deceive not our felves, in afcribing it to GOD; Secondly, That we understand it right; can never be fo great, as the Evidence of our own intuitive Knowledg, whereby we difcern it impoffible for the fame Body to be in two places at once. And therefore no Propofition can be receiv'd for Divine Revelation, or obtain the Affent due to all fuch, if it be contradictory to our clear intuitive Knowledg. Because this would be to fubvert the Principles and Foundations of all Knowledg, Evidence, and Affent whatsoever: And there would be left no difference between Truth and Falfhood, no Measures of Credible and Incredible in the World, if doubtful Propofitions fhall take place before felf-evident; and what we certainly know, give way to what we may poffibly be mistaken in. In Propofitions therefore contrary to the

clear

clear Perception of the Agreement or Difagreement of any of our Ideas, 'twill be in vain to urge them as Matters of Faith. They cannot move our Aflent, under that or any other title whatfoever. For Faith can never convince us of any thing, that contradicts our Knowledg. Because tho' Faith be founded on the Teftimony of GOD (who cannot lye) revealing any Propofition to us; yet we cannot have an Affurance of the Truth of its being a Divine Revelation, greater than our own Knowledg: Since the whole ftrength of the Certainty depends upon our Knowledg that GO Dreveal'd it, which in this cafe, where. the Propofition fuppos'd reveal'd contradicts our Knowledg or Reafon, will always have this Objection hanging to it, viz. that we cannot tell how to conceive that to come from GOD, the bountiful Author of our Being, which if receiv'd for true, muft overturn all the Principles and Foundations of Knowledg he has given us, render all our Faculties ufelefs, wholly deftroy the most excellent part of his Workmanship, our Understandings; and put a Man in a condition, wherein he will have lefs Light, lefs Conduct than the Beast that perifheth. For if the Mind of Man can never have a clearer (and perhaps not fo clear) Evidence of any thing to be a divine Revelation, as it has of the Prineiples of its own Reason, it can never have a ground to quit the clear Evidence ofits Reafon, to give place to a Propofition, whofe Revelation has not a greater Evidence than those Principles have.

Traditional §. 6. Thus far a Man has ufe of Reason, and ought to hearken to it, even in Revelation immediate and original Revelation, where it is fuppos'd to be made to himself : much less. But to all those who pretend not to immediate Revelation, but are requir'd to pay Obedience, and to receive the Truths reveal'd to others, which by the Tradition of Writings, or Word of Mouth, are convey'd down to them; Reafon has a great deal more to do, and is that only which can induce us to receive them. For Matter of Faith being only Divine Revelation, and nothing else; Faith, as we use the word, (call'd commonly Divine Faith) has to do with no Propofitions, but those which are fuppos'd to be divinely reveal'd. So that I do not fee how thofe, who make Revelation alone the fole Object of Faith, can fay that it is a Matter of Faith, and not of Reafon, to believe that fuch or fuch a Propofition, to be found in fuch or fuch a Book, is of Divine Inspiration ; unless it be reveal'd, that that Propofition, or all in that Book, was communicated by Divine Inspiration. Without fuch a Revelation, the believing, or not believing that Propofition or Book to be of Divine Authority, can never be Matter of Faith, but Matter of Reafon; and fuch as I must come to an Affent to, only by the use of my Reason, which can never require or enable me to believe that, which is contrary to it felf: it being impoffible for Reason ever to procure any Affent to that, which to it felf appears unreasonable.

Things above
Reason,

matter of

In all things therefore, where we have clear Evidence from our Ideas, and thofe Principles of Knowledg I have above mention'd, Reafon is the proper Judg; and Revelation, tho' it may in confenting with it confirm its Dictates, yet cannot in fuch cafes invalidate its Decrees: Nar can we be oblig'd, where we have the clear and evident Sentence of Reafon, to quit it for the contrary Opinion, under a pretence that it is matter of Faith; which can have no Authority against the plain and clear Dictates of Reafon.

§. 7. But, Thirdly, there being many things, wherein we have very imperfe&t Notions, or none at all; and other things, of whofe paft, prefent, or future Existence, by the natural Ufe of our Faculties we can have no Knowledg at all: Thefe, as being beyond the Discovery of our natural Faculties, and above Reason, are, when reveal'd, the proper matter of Faith. Thus, that part of the Angels rebel'd against GOD, and thereby loft their firft happy State; and that the Dead fhall rife, and live again: these, and the like, being beyond the Discovery of Reason, are purely matters of Faith; with which Reafon has directly nothing to do.

Or not contra- §. 8. But fince GOD in giving us the Light of Reafon has not thereby tied up ry toReason, if reveal'd, are his own Hands from affording us, when he thinks fit, the Light of Revelation in any of those matters, wherein our natural Faculties are able to give a probable Determination; Revelation, where God has been pleas'd to give it, muß carry it, against the probable Conjectures of Reason. Because the Mind not being certain of the Truth of that it does not evidently know, but only yielding to the Proba

Taith

bility that appears in it, is bound to give up its Affent to fuch a Teftimony; which, it is fatisfy'd, comes from one who cannot err, and will not deceive. But yet it ftill belongs to Reafon to judg of the Truth of its being a Revelation, and of the Signification of the Words wherein it is deliver'd. Indeed, if any thing fhall be thought Revelation, which is contrary to the plain Principles of Reason, and the evident Knowledg the Mind has of its own clear and diftin& Ideas; there Reafon must be hearken'd to, as to a Matter within its Province: fince a Man can never have so certain a Knowledg, that a Propofition which contradicts the clear Principles and Evidence of his own Knowledg, was divinely reveal'd, or that he understands the Words rightly wherein it is deliver'd; as he has, that the contrary is true: and fo is bound to confider and judg of it as a matter of Reason, and not swallow it, without Examination, as a matter of Faith.

§. 9. First, Whatever Propofition is reveal'd, of whose Truth our Mind, by Revelation in its natural Faculties and Notions, cannot judg; that is purely matter of Faith, Matters where Reason and above Reason. cannot judg,

Secondly, All Propofitions, whereof the Mind, by the ufe of its natural Facul- or but proba ties, can come to determine and judg from naturally acquir'd Ideas, are matter bly,ought to be of Reafon; with this difference ftill, that in thofe concerning which it has but hearken'd to. an uncertain Evidence, and fo is perfuaded of their Truth only upon probable grounds, which still admit a Poffibility of the contrary to be true, without doing violence to the certain Evidence of its own Knowledg, and overturning the Principles of all Reafon; in fuch probable Propolitions, I fay, an evident Revelation ought to determine our Affent even againft Probability. For where the Principles of Reafon have not evidenc'd a Propofition to be certainly true or falfe, there clear Revelation, as another Principle of Truth, and Ground of Affent, may determine; and so it may be matter of Faith, and be alfo above Reafon. Because Reafon, in that particular matter, being able to reach no higher than Probability, Faith gave the Determination, where Reafon came fhort; and Revelation discover'd on which fide the Truth lay.

§ 10. Thus far the Dominion of Faith reaches, and that without any Violence In Matters or Hindrance to Reafon; which is not injur'd or difturb'd, but affifted and im- where Reason can afford cer prov'd, by new Difcoveries of Truth coming from the eternal Fountain of tainknowledg all Knowledg. Whatever GOD hath reveal'd, is certainly true; no doubt that is to be can be made of it. This is the proper Obje& of Faith: But whether it be a bearken'd to. divine Revelation or no, Reafon muft judg; which can never permit the Mind to reject a greater Evidence, to embrace what is lefs evident, nor allow it to entertain Probability in oppofition to Knowledg and Certainty. There can be no Evidence, that any traditional Revelation is of divine Original, in the Words we receive it, and in the Sense we understand it, fo clear and fo certain, as that of the Principles of Reafon; and therefore, Nothing that is contrary to and inconfiftent with the clear and Self-evident Dictates of Reafon, has a right to be urged or affented to as a matter of Faith, wherein Reafon hath nothing to do. Whatsoever is divine Revelation, ought to over-rule all our Opinions, Prejudices, and Interefts, and hath a right to be receiv'd with full Affent, Such a Submiffion as this, of our Reason to Faith, takes not away the Land-marks of Knowledg: This shakes not the Foundations of Reason, but leaves us that Use of our Faculties, for which they were given us.

dicted.

0. 11. If the Provinces of Faith and Reason are not kept diftinct by these Bounda- If the Boundaries, there will, in matter of Religion, be no room for Reafon at all; and thofe ries be not fet extravagant Opinions and Ceremonies that are to be found in the feveral Reli- between Faith and Reason,no gions of the World, will not deferve to be blamed. For, to this crying-up of Enthusiasm or Faith, in oppofition to Reason, we may, I think, in good measure afcribe thofe ExtravaganAbfurdities that fill almost all the Religions which poffefs and divide Mankind. cy in Religion For Men having been principled with an Opinion, that they must not confult can be contraBeafon in the things of Religion, however apparently contradictory to common Senfe, and the very Principles of all their Knowledg, have let loose their Fancies and natural Superftition; and have been by them led into so strange Opinions and extravagant Practices in Religion, that a confiderate Man cannot but ftand amaz'd at their Follies, and judg them fo far from being acceptable to the great and wife GOD, that he cannot avoid thinking them ridiculous, and offenfive Vol. I.

U u