Action, we may receive it as of Divine Authority: But 'tis not the Strength of our own Perfuafions which can by it felf give it that Stamp. The bent of our own Minds may favour it as much as we please; that may fhew it to be a Fondling of our own, but will by no means prove it to be an Offspring of Heaven, and of Divine Original. . I. •K' CHAP. XX. Of Wrong Affent, or Error. NOWLEDG being to be had only of vifible certain Truth, Error Causes of is not a Fault of our Knowledg, but a Miftake of our Judgment, Error giving Allent to that which is not true. But it Affent be grounded on Likelyhood, if the proper Obje& and Motive of our Affent be Probability, and that Probability confifts in what is laid down in the foregoing Chapters, it will be demanded how Men come to give their Affents contrary to Probability. For there is nothing more common than Contrariety of Opinions; nothing more obvious than that one Man wholly disbelieves what another only doubts of, and a third stedfaftly believes, and firmly adheres to. The Reafons whereof, tho' they may be very various, yet, I fuppofe, may all be reduc'd to thefe four. 1. Want of Proofs. 2. Want of Ability to use them. 4. Wrong Meafures of Probability. §. 2. First, By Want of Proofs, I do not mean only the Want of those Proofs 1. Want of which are no where extant, and fo are no where to be had; but the Want even Proofs. of thofe Proofs which are in being, or might be procur'd. And thus Men want Proofs who have not the Convenience or Opportunity to make Experiment and Obfervations themselves tending to the Proof of any Propofition; nor likewife the Convenience to enquire into, and colle& the Teftimonies of others: And in this ftate are the greateft part of Mankind, who are given up to Labour, and enflav'd to the Neceffity of their mean Condition; whofe Lives are worn out only in the Provifions for living. Thefe Mens Opportunity of Knowledg and Enquiry are commonly as narrow as their Fortunes; and their Understandings are but little inftructed, when all their whole Time and Pains is laid out to ftill the Croaking of their own Bellies, or the Cries of their Children. "Tis not to be expected that a Man, who drudges on all his Life in a laborious Trade, fhould be more knowing in the variety of Things done in the World, than a Pack-horse, who is driven conftantly forwards and backwards in a narrow Lane, and dirty Road, only to Market, fhould be skill'd in the Geography of the Country. Nor is it at all more poffible, that he who wants Leifure, Books, and Languages, and the Opportunity of converfing with Variety of Men, fhould be in a Condition to collect thofe Teftimonies and Obfervations which are in being, and are neceffary to make out many, nay moft of the Propofitions that, in the Societies of Men, are judg'd of the greatest moment; or to find out grounds of Affurance fo great as the Belief of the Points he would build on them, is thought neceffary; fo that a great part of Mankind are, by the natural and unalterable State of things in this World, and the Conftitution of human Affairs, unavoidably given over to invincible Ignorance of thofe Proofs on which others build, and which are neceflary to eftablish thofe Opinions: The greatest part of Men, having much to do to get the Means of Living, are not in a Condition to look after thofe of learned and laborious Enquiries. who want . 3. What fhall we fay then? Are the greatest part of Mankind, by the Ob.what fall Neceffity of their Condition, fubjected to unavoidable Ignorance in those things become of the which are of greateft Importance to them? (for of thefe 'tis obvious to en- them,anfre quire.) Have the Bulk of Mankind no other Guide but Accident, and blind ed. Chance, to conduct them to their Happiness or Misery? Are the current Opi People binder nions, and licens'd Guides of every Country, fufficient Evidence and Security to every Man to venture his greatest Concernments on; nay, his everlafting Happiness or Mifery? Or can those be the certain and infallible Oracles and Standards of Truth, which teach one thing in Chriftendom, and another in Turkey? Or fhall a poor Country-man be eternally happy for having the Chance to be born in Italy; or a Day-labourer be unavoidably loft, because he had the ill luck to be born in England? How ready fome Men may be to fay fome of these things, I will not here examine: but this I am fure, that Men muft allow one or other of thefe to be true, (let them chufe which they pleafe) or else grant, That GOD has furnish'd Men with Faculties fufficient to direct them in the way they fould take, if they will but feriously employ them that way, when their ordinary Vocations allow them the leifure. No Man is fo wholly taken up with the Attendance on the Means of Living, as to have no fpare time at all to think of his Soul, and inform himself in Matters of Religion. Were Men as intent upon this, as they are on things of lower Concernment, there are none fo enflav'd to the Neceffities of Life, who might not find many Vacancies that might be husbanded to this Advantage of their Knowledg. §. 4. Befides thofe, whofe Improvements and Informations are ftraiten'd by ed from En- the narrowness of their Fortunes, there are others whofe Largenefs of Forquiry. tune would plentifully enough fupply Books and other Requifites for clearing of Doubts, and difcovering of Truth: But they are cooped in clofe, by the Laws of their Countries, and the ftri& Guards of those whole Intereft it is to keep them ignorant, left, knowing more, they should believe the lefs in them. Thefe are as far, nay farther from the Liberty and Opportunities of a fair Enquiry, than those poor and wretched Labourers we before fpoke of. And, however they may feem high and great, are confin'd to Narrownefs of Thought, and enflav'd in that which fhould be the freeft Part of Man, their Understandings. This is generally the Cafe of all those who live in Places where care is taken to propagate Truth without Knowledg; where Men are forc'd, at a venture, to be of the Religion of the Country; and muft therefore fwallow down Opinions, as filly People do Empirick Pills, without knowing what they are made of, or how they will work, and have nothing to do but believe that they will do the Cure: but in this are much more miferable than they, in that they are not at liberty to refufe fwallowing what perhaps they had rather let alone; or to chufe the Physician, to whofe Conduct they would truft themselves. 3.Want ofWill to use them. §. 5. Secondly, Those who want Skill to use thofe Evidences they have of Probabilities; who cannot carry a Train of Confequences in their Heads, nor weigh exactly the Preponderancy of contrary Proofs and Teftimonies, making every Circumstance its due Allowance, may be eafily milled to affent to Positions that are not probable. There are fome Men of one, fome but of two Syllogifms, and no more; and others that can but advance one step farther. These cannot always difcern that fide on which the ftrongest Proofs lie; cannot constantly follow that which in it felf is the more probable Opinion. Now that there is fuch a difference between Men, in refpe&t of their Understandings, I think no body, who has had any Converfation with his Neighbours, will queftion: tho' he never was at Westminster-Hall, or the Exchange on the one hand; nor at Alms-Houfes, or Bedlam on the other. Which great difference in Mens Intellectuals, whether it rifes from any Defect in the Organs of the Body, particularly adapted to Thinking; or in the Dulnefs or Untractableness of thofe Faculties for want of Ufe; or, as fome think, in the natural Differences of Mens Souls themselves; or fome, or all of these together; it matters not here to examine: Only this is evident, that there is a difference of Degrees in mens Understandings, Apprehenfions, and Reafonings, to fo great a Latitude, that one may, without doing injury to Mankind, affirm, that there is a greater distance between fome Men and others, in this refpe&t, than between fome Men and fome Beasts. But how this comes about is a Speculation, tho' of great Confequence, yet not neceffary to our prefent Purpose. §. 6. Thirdly, There are another fort of People that want Proofs, not because they are out of their reach, but because they will not use them: who tho' they have Riches and Leisure enough, and want neither Parts nor other Helps, are yet never the better for them. Their hot pursuit of Pleasure, or conftant Drudgery Drudgery in Bufinefs, engages fome Mens Thoughts elsewhere: Laziness and Ofcitancy in general, or a particular Averfion for Books, Study and Meditation, keep others from any ferious Thoughts at all: and fome out of Fear, that an impartial Enquiry would not favour thofe Opinions which beft fuit their Prejudices, Lives, and Defigns, content themselves without Examination to take upon truft what they find convenient and in fashion. Thus moft Men, even of thofe that might do otherwife, pafs their Lives without an acquintance with, much lefs a rational Affent to Probabilities they are concern'd to know, tho' they lie fo much within their View, that to be convinc'd of them, they need but turn their Eyes that way. But we know fome Men will not read a Letter which is fuppos'd to bring ill News; and many Men forbear to cast up their Accounts, or fo much as think upon their Eftates, who have reafon to fear their Affairs are in no very good Pofture. How Men, whofe plentiful Fortunes allow them leifure to improve their Understandings, can fatisfy themselves with a lazy Ignorance, I cannot tell: But methinks they have a low Opinion of their Souls, who lay out all their Incomes in Provifions for the Body, and employ none of it to procure the Means and Helps of Knowledg; who take great care to appear always in a neat and fplendid Outfide, and would think themfelves miferable in coarfe Clothes, or a patch'd Coat, and yet contentedly fuffer their Minds to appear abroad in a pie-bald Livery of coarfe Patches, and borrow'd Shreds, fuch as it has pleas'd Chance, or their Country-Taylor (I mean the common Opinion of thofe they have convers'd with) to clothe them in. I will not here mention how unreafonable this is for Men that ever think of a future State, and their Concernment in it, which no rational Man can avoid to do sometimes: nor fhall I take notice what a Shame and Confufion it is, to the greatest Contemners of Knowledg, to be found ignorant in things they are concern'd to know. But this at leaft is worth the Confideration of thofe who call themselves Gentlemen, That however they may think Credit, Refpect, Power and Authority, the Concomitants of their Birth and Fortune; yet they will find all thefe ftill carry'd away from them, by Men of lower Condition, who furpafs them in Knowledg. They who are blind will always be led by thofe that fee, or elfe fall into the Ditch: and he is certainly the most fubjected, the most enflav'd, who is fo in his Understanding. In the foregoing Inftances, fome of the, Caufes have been fhewn of wrong Affent, and how it comes to pafs, that probable Doctrines are not always receiv'd with an Affent proportionable to the Reasons which are to be had for their Probability; but hitherto we have confider'd only fuch Probabilities, whofe Proofs do exift, but do not appear to him who embraces the Error. §. 7. Fourthly, There remains yet the laft fort, who, even where the real Pro- 4.wrong mea babilities appear, and are plainly laid before them, do not admit of the Con-fures of Probability; viction, nor yield unto manifeft Reafons, but do either new, fufpend their Whereof, Affent, or give it to the lefs probable Opinion: And to this Danger are thofe expos'd, who have taken up wrong Meafures of Probability; which are, 1. Propofitions that are not in themfelves certain and evident, but doubtful and falfe, taken up for Principles. 2. Receiv'd Hypotheses. 3. Predominant Paffions or Inclinations. 4. Authority. §. 8. First, The first and firmest Ground of Probability, is the Conformity 1. Doubtful any thing has to our own Knowledg; efpecially that Part of our Knowledg Propofitions which we have embrac'd, and continue to look on as Principles. Thefe have fo taken for great an Influence upon our Opinions, that 'tis ufually by them we judg of Principles. Truth, and meafure Probability to that degree, that what is inconfiftent with Our Principles, is so far from paffing for probable with us, that it will not be allow'd poffible. The Reverence borne to these Principles is so great, and their Authority fo paramount to all other, that the Teftimony not only of other Men, but the Evidence of our own Senfes are often rejected, when they offer to vouch any thing contrary to these establish'd Rules. How much the Doctrine of innate Principles, and that Principles are not to be prov'd or queftion'd, has contributed to this, I will not here examine. This I readily grant, that one Truth cannot contradict another: but withal I take leave alfo to fay, that every one ought very carefully to beware what he admits for a Principle, to exVol. I. X x amine 2. Receiv'd amine it ftrictly, and fee whether he certainly knows it to be true of it self by 9. 9. There is nothing more ordinary, than Childrens receiving into their Minds Propofitions (especially about Matters of Religion) from their Parents, Nurses, or those about them: which being infinuated into their unwary, as well as unbiafs'd Understandings, and faften'd by degrees, are at last (equally, whether true or false ) riveted there by long Custom and Education, beyond all Poffibility of being pull'd out again. For Men, when they are grown up, reflecting upon their Opinions, and finding thofe of this fort to be as antient in their Minds as their very Memories, not having observed their early Infinuation, nor by what Means they got them, they are apt to reverence them as facred things, and not to fuffer them to be profan'd, touch'd, or queftion'd: They look on them as the Urim and Thummim fet up in their Minds immediately by GOD Himself, to be the great and unerring Deciders of Truth and Falfhood, and the Judges to which they are to appeal in all manner of Controverfies. . 10. This Opinion of his Principles (let them be what they will) being once establish'd in any one's Mind, it is eafy to be imagin'd what Reception any Propolition fhall find, how clearly foever prov'd, that fhall invalidate their Authority, or at all thwart with thefe internal Oracles; whereas the groffeft Abfurdities and Improbabilities, being but agreeable to fuch Principles, go down glibbly, and are easily digefted. The great Obftinacy that is to be found in Men firmly believing quite contrary Opinions, tho' many times equally abfurd, in the various Religions of Mankind, are as evident a Proof as they are an unavoidable Confequence of this way of Reasoning from receiv'd traditional Principles. So that Men will disbelieve their own Eyes, renounce the Evidence of their Senfes, and give their own Experience the lye, rather than admit of any thing difagreeing with the facred Tenets. Take an intelligent Romanift, that from the very firft dawning of any Notions in his Understanding, hath had this Principle conftantly inculcated, viz. That he must believe as the Church (i. e. thofe of his Communion) believes, or that the Pope is infallible; and this he never fo much as heard queftion'd, till at forty or fifty Years old he met with one of other Principles: how is he prepar'd eafily to fwallow, not only against all Probability, but even the clear Evidence of his Senfes, the Doârine of Tranfubftantiation? This Principle has fuch an Influence on his Mind, that he will believe that to be Flefh which he fees to be Bread. And what way will you take to convince a Man of any improbable Opinion he holds, who, with fome Philofophers, hath laid down this as a Foundation of Reasoning, That he muft believe his Reason (for fo Men improperly call Arguments drawn from their Principles) against his Senfes? Let an Enthufiaft be principled, that he or his Teacher is infpir'd, and acted by an immediate Communication of the Divine Spirit, and you in vain bring the Evidence of clear Reasons against his Doctrine. Whoever therefore have imbibed wrong Principles, are not, in things inconfiftent with thefe Principles, to be mov'd by the most apparent and convincing Probabilities, till they are so candid and ingenuous to themfelves, as to be perfuaded to examine even those very Principles, which many never fuffer themselves to do. 1. 11. Secondly, Next to thefe are Men whofe Understandings are caft into a Hypotbefes. Mold, and fashion'd juft to the fize of a receiv'd Hypothefis. The difference between these and the former, is, that they will admit of Matter of Fact, and agree with Diffenters in that; but differ only in affigning of Reasons, and explaining the Manner of Operation. Thefe are not at that open defiance with their Senfes, as the former: they can endure to hearken to their Information a little more patiently, but will by no means admit of their Reports in the Explanation of Things; nor be prevail'd on by Probabilities, which would convince them that things are not brought about juft after the fame manner that they have decreed within themselves that they are. Would it not be an infufferable thing for a learned Profeffor, and that which his Scarlet would blush blush at, to have his Authority of forty Years standing wrought out of hard Rock-Greek and Latin, with no (mall Expence of Time and Candle, and confirm'd by general Tradition and a Reverend Beard, in an inftant over-turn'd by an upftart Novelift? Can any one expect that he fhould be made to confefs, That what he taught his Scholars thirty Years ago, was all Error and Mistake; and that he fold them hard Words and Ignorance at a very dear rate? What Probabilities, I fay, are fufficient to prevail in fuch a cafe? And who ever by the most cogent Arguments will be prevail'd with, to difrobe himself at once of all his old Opinions, and Pretences to Knowledg and Learning, which with hard Study he hath all his time been labouring for; and turn himself out stark naked, in queft a fresh of new Notions? All the Arguments can be used, will be as little able to prevail, as the Wind did with the Traveller to part with his Cloke, which he held only the fafter. To this of wrong Hypothefis, may be reduc'd the Errors that may be occafion'd by a true Hypothefis, or right Principles, but not rightly understood. There is nothing more familiar than this. The Inftances of Men contending for different Opinions, which they all derive from the infallible Truth of the Scripture, are an undeniable Proof of it. All that call themselves Chriftians, allow the Text, that lays, Melavoêle, to carry in it the Obligation to a very weighty Duty. But yet however erroneous will one of their Practices be, who understanding nothing but the French, take this Rule with one Translation to be repentez vous, repent; or with the other, faitiez Penitence, do Penance. 3. Predomi 9. 12. Thirdly, Probabilities, which cross Mens Appetites and prevailing Paffions, run the fame fate. Let ever fo much Probability hang on one fide of a nant Paffions. covetous Man's Reasoning, and Money on the other; it is ealy to foresee which will outweigh. Earthly Minds, like Mud-Walls, refift the ftrongest Batteries: and tho' perhaps fometimes the Force of a clear Argument may make fome Impreffion; yet they nevertheless ftand firm, keep out the Enemy Truth, that would captivate or disturb them. Tell a Man, paffionately in love, that he is jilted; bring a fcore of Witneffes of the Falfhood of his Mistress, 'tis ten to one but three kind Words of her's fhall invalidate all their Teftimonies. Quod volumus, facile credimus; What fuits our Wishes, is forwardly believ'd; is, I fuppofe, what every one hath more than once experimented: and tho' Men cannot always openly gain-fay or refift the Force of manifeft Probabilities that make against them, yet yield they not to the Argument. Not but that it is the Nature of the Understanding conftantly to clofe with the more probable fide; but yet a Man hath a power to fufpend and reftrain its Enquiries, and not permit a full and fatisfactory Examination, as far as the matter in question is capable, and will bear it to be made. Until that be done, there will be always these two ways left of evading the most apparent Probabilities. §. 13. First, That the Arguments being (as for the most part they are) The means of brought in words, there may be a Fallacy latent in them: and the Confequences evading Probeing, perhaps, many in train, they may be fome of them incoherent. There babilities: 1. Suppos'd are very few Difcourfes fo fhort, clear, and confiftent, to which moft Men may Fallacy. not, with Satisfaction enough to themselves, raise this doubt; and from whofe Conviction they may not, without reproach of Difingenuity or Unreasonableness, fet themselves free with the old Reply, Non perfuadebis, etiamfi perfuaferis; Tho' I cannot answer, I will not yield. §. 14. Secondly, Manifest Probabilities may be evaded, and the Affent with- 2. Suppos'd held upon this Suggestion, That I know not yet all that may be faid on the contrary Arguments for the contrafide: And therefore tho' I be beaten, 'tis not neceffary I fhould yield, not ry. knowing what Forces there are in referve behind. This is a Refuge against Conviction fo open and fo wide, that it is hard to determine, when a Man is quite out of the Verge of it. Sent. . 15. But yet there is fome end of it; and a Man having carefully enquir'd What Probabiinto all the Grounds of Probability and Unlikelinefs, done his utmost to inform lities deter himself in all particulars fairly, and caft up the Sum total on both fides, may mine the Afin most cafes come to acknowledg, upon the whole matter, on which fide the Probability refts: wherein fome Proofs in matter of Reason, being Suppofitions upon univerfal Experience, are fo cogent and clear; and fome Teftimonies in matter of Fact fo univerfal, that he cannot refufe his Affent. So that, I think, Vol. I. Xx 2 we |