Where it is in

our power to fufpend it.

we may conclude, that in Propofitions where tho' the Proofs in view are of moft moment, yet there are fufficient grounds to fufpect that there is either Fallacy in Words, or certain Proofs as confiderable to be produc'd on the contrary fide, there Affent, Sufpence, or Diffent are often voluntary Actions: But where the Proofs are fuch as male it highly probable, and there is not sufficient ground to fufpect, that there is either Fallacy of Words (which fober and ferious Confideration may discover) nor equally valid Proofs, yet undiscover'd, latent on the other fide (which alfo the nature of the thing may, in fome cafes, make plain to a confiderate Man) there, I think, a Man, who has weigh'd them, can scarce refufe his Allent to the fide, on which the greater Probability appears. Whether it be probable, that a promifcuous Jumble of Printing Letters fhould often fall into a method and order, which fhould ftamp on Paper a coherent Difcourfe; or that a blind fortuitous Concourfe of Atoms, not guided by an understanding Agent, fhould frequently conftitute the Bodies of any Species of Animals: in thefe and the like cafes, I think, no body that confiders them can be one jot at a ftand which fide to take, nor at all waver in his Af fent. Laftly, when there can be no Suppofition (the thing in its own nature indifferent, and wholly depending upon the Teftimony of Witneffes) that there is as fair Teftimony againft, as for the Matter of Fact attefted; which by Enquiry is to be learned, v. g. whether there was 1700 Years ago fuch a Man at Rome as Julius Cafar: in all fuch cafes, I fay, I think it is not in any rational Man's power to refufe his Affent; but that it neceffarily follows, and clofes with fuch Probabilities. In other lefs clear cafes, I think, it is in a Man's power to fufpend his Affent; and perhaps content himself with the Proofs he has, if they favour the Opinion that fuits with his Inclination or Intereft, and fo ftop from farther fearch. But that a Man fhould afford his Affent to that. fide, on which the lefs Probability appears to him, feems to me utterly impracticable, and as impoffible, as it is to believe the same thing probable and improbable at the fame time.

9. 16. As Knowledg is no more arbitrary than Perception; fo, I think, Affent is no more in our power than Knowledg. When the Agreement of any two Ideas appears to our Minds, whether immediately, or by the affiftance of Reafon, I can no more refufe to perceive, no more avoid knowing it, than I can avoid feeing thofe Objects which I turn my Eyes to, and look on in Day-light: And what upon full examination I find the most probable, I cannot deny my Affent to. But tho' we cannot hinder our Knowledg, where the Agreement is once perceiv'd; nor our Affent, where the Probability manifeftly appears upon due Confideration of all the Measures of it: yet we can hinder both Knowledg and Affent, by ftopping our Enquiry, and not employing our Faculties in the Search of any Truth. If it were not fo, Ignorance, Error, or Infidelity could not in any cafe be a Fault. Thus in fome cafes we can prevent or fufpend our Affent: But can a Man, vers'd in modern of antient Hiftory, doubt whether there be fuch a Place as Rome, or whether there was fuch a Man as Julius Cafar? Indeed there are millions of Truths, that a Man is not, or may not think himfelf concern'd to know; as whether our King Richard the Third was crookback'd, or no; or whether Roger Bacon was a Mathematician, or a Magician. In thefe and fuch-like cafes, where the Affent one way or other is of no impor tance to the Intereft of any one; no Action, no Concernment of his following or depending thereon; there 'tis not strange, that the Mind fhould give it felf up to the common Opinion, or render it felf to the firft Comer. These and the like Opinions are of fo little weight and moment, that, like Motes in the Sun, their Tendencies are very rarely taken notice of. They are there, as it were, by Chance, and the Mind lets them float at liberty. But where the Mind judges that the Propofition has concernment in it; where the Affent or not Affenting is thought to draw Confequences of moment after it, and Good and Evil to depend on chufing or refufing the right fide, and the Mind fets it felf ferioufly to enquire and examine the Probability: there, I think, it is not in our choice to take which fide we pleafe, if manifeft odds appear on either. The greater Probability, I think, in that cafe will determine the Affent: and a Man can no more avoid affenting, or taking it to be true, where he perceives the

greater

greater Probability, than he can avoid knowing it to be true, where he perceives the Agreement or Difagreement of any two Ideas.

If this be fo, the Foundation of Error will lie in wrong Measures of Probability; as the Foundation of Vice in wrong Measures of Good.

S. 17. Fourthly, The fourth and laft wrong Measure of Probability I fhall take no- 4. Authority. tice of, and which keeps in Ignorance or Error more People than all the other together, is that which I have mention'd in the fore-going Chapter; I mean, the giving up our Affent to the common receiv'd Opinions, either of our Friends or Party, Neighbourhood or Country. How many Men have no other ground for their Tenets, than the fuppos'd Honefty, or Learning, or Number of those of the fame Profeffion? As if honeft or bookish Men could not err, or Truth were to be eftablifh'd by the Vote of the Multitude: yet this with moft Men ferves the turn. The Tenet has had the Atteftation of reverend Antiquity, it comes to me with the Paffport of former Ages, and therefore I am fecure in the Reception I give it other Men have been, and are of the fame Opinion (for that is all is faid) and therefore it is reasonable for me to embrace it. A Man may more juftifiably throw up Crofs and Pile for his Opinions, than take them up by fuch Measures. All Men are liable to Error, and moft Men are in many points, by Paffion or Intereft, under Temptation to it. If we could but fee the fecret Motives that influenc'd the Men of Name and Learning in the World, and the Leaders of Parties, we fhould not always find that it was the embracing of Truth for its own fake, that made them efpoufe the Doctrines they own'd and maintain❜d. This at least is certain, there is not an Opinion fo abfurd, which a Man may not receive upon this ground: There is no Error to be nam'd, which has not had its Profeffors: And a Man fhall never want crooked Paths to walk in, if he thinks that he is in the right way, wherever he has the Footsteps of others to follow.

§. 18. But notwithstanding the great noife is made in the World about Errors Men not in fo and Opinions, I must do Mankind that right, as to fay, There are not fo many Men many Errors as isimagin'd. in Errors and wrong Opinions, as is commonly Suppos'd. Not that I think they embrace the Truth; but indeed, because concerning thofe Doctrines they keep fuch a itir about, they have no Thought, no Opinion at all. For if any one fhould a little catechize the greatest part of the Partizans of most of the Seats in the World, he would not find, concerning those matters they are fo zealous for, that they have any Opinions of their own: much less would he have reafon to think, that they took them upon the Examination of Arguments, and Appearance of Probability. They are refolv'd to ftick to a Party, that Education or Interest has engag'd them in; and there, like the common Soldiers of an Army, fhew their Courage and Warmth as their Leaders direa, without ever examining or fo much as knowing the Cause they contend for. If a Man's Life thews, that he has no ferious Regard for Religion; for what reafon fhould we think, that he beats his Head about the Opinions of his Church, and troubles himself to examine the Grounds of this or that Doctrine? 'Tis enough for him to obey his Leaders, to have his Hand and his Tongue ready for the Support of the common Caufe, and thereby approve himself to thofe, who can give him Credit, Preferment or Protection in that Society. Thus Men become Profeffors of, and Combatants for those Opinions, they were never convinc'd of, nor Profelytes to; no, nor ever had fo much as floating in their Heads: And tho' one cannot fay, there are fewer improbable or erroneous Opinions in the World than there are; yet this is certain, there are fewer that actually affent to them, and mistake them for Truths, than is imagin'd.

+ СНАР.

CHAP. XXI.

Of the Divifion of the Sciences.

Three forts. §. 1. A Lether, Garft, The Nature of things as they are in themselves, their

LL that can fall within the compafs of Human Understanding, being

1. Phyfica.

2. Practica.

3. σημειωτχή.

Relations, and their Manner of Operation: Or, Secondly, That which Man himself ought to do, as a rational and voluntary Agent, for the Attainment of any End, especially Happiness: Or, Thirdly, The ways and means, whereby the Knowledg of both the one and the other of thefe are attain'd and communicated: I think, Science may be divided properly into these three forts.

§. 2. First, The Knowledg of things, as they are in their own proper Beings, their Conftitutions, Properties, and Operations; whereby I mean not only Matter and Body, but Spirits alfo, which have their proper Natures, Conftitutions, and Operations, as well as Bodies. This in a little more enlarged Sense of the Word, I call υon, or Natural Philofophy. The End of this, is bare fpeculative Truth; and whatsoever can afford the Mind of Man any fuch, falls under this branch, whether it be God himself, Angels, Spirits, Bodies, or any of their Affections, as Number, and Figure, &c.

§. 3. Secondly, panlinn, The Skill of right applying our own Powers and Actions, for the attainment of things good and ufeful. The molt confiderable under this head, is Ethicks, which is the feeking out thofe Ru es and Measures of human Actions, which lead to Happiness, and the means to practise them. The End of this is not bare Speculation, and the Knowledg of Truth; but Right, and a Conduct fuitable to it.

§. 4. Thirdly, The third Branch may be call'd nualin, or the Doctrine of Signs, the moft ufual whereof being Words, it is aptly enough term'd also moyıké, Logick; the Bufinefs whereof, is to confider the Nature of Signs the Mind makes ufe of for the understanding of things, or conveying its Knowledg to others. For fince the things the Mind contemplates, are none of them, befides it felf, prefent to the Understanding, 'tis neceffary that fomething else, as a Sign or Representation of the thing it confiders, thould be prefent to it and thefe are Ideas. And because the Scene of Ideas that makes one Man's Thoughts, cannot be laid open to the immediate View of another, nor laid up any where but in the Memory, a no very fure Repofitory: Therefore to communicate our Thoughts to one another, as well as record them for our own ufe, Signs of our Ideas are alfo neceffary. Those which Men have found moft convenient, and therefore generally make use of, are articulate Sounds. The Confideration then of Ideas and Words, as the great Inftruments of Knowledg, makes no defpicable part of their Contemplation, who would take a view of human Knowledg in the whole extent of it. And perhaps if they were diftinctly weigh'd, and duly confider'd, they would afford us another fort of Logick and Critick, than what we have been hitherto acquainted with.

This is the first. 5. This feems to me the first and most general, as well as natural Divifion of Divifion of the Objects of our Understanding. For a Man can employ his Thoughts about the Objects of nothing, but either the Contemplation of Things themfelves for the Difcovery of Knowledg Truth; or about the things in his own power, which are his own Actions, for the attainment of his own Ends; or the Signs the Mind makes ufe of, both in the one and the other, and the right ordering of them for its clearer Information. All which three, viz, Things as they are in themselves knowable; Actions as they depend on us, in order to Happinefs; and the right Ufe of Signs in order to Knowledg, being toto cœlo different, they feem'd to me to be the three great Provinces of the intellectual World, wholly feparate and diftin& one from another.

The End of the Effay of Human Understanding.

A

LETTER

To the Right Reverend

Edward Lord Bishop of Worcester,

Concerning fome Paffages relating to

Mr. LOCKE's Effay of Human Understanding:

IN A

Late DISCOURSE of his Lordship's, in
Vindication of the TRINITY.

My Lord,

Cannot but look upon it as a great Honour that your Lordfhip, who are fo thorowly acquainted with the incomparable Writings of Antiquity, and know fo well how to entertain your Self with the Great Men in the Commonwealth of Letters, fhould at any time take into your Hand my mean Papers; and fo far bestow any of your valuable Minutes on my Effay of Human Understanding, as to let the World fee you have thought my Notions worth your Lordship's Confideration. My Aim in that, as well as every thing else written by me, being purely to follow Truth as far as I could discover it; I think my felf beholden to whoever fhews me my Miftakes, as to one who, concurring in my Defign, helps me forward in my

way.

Your Lordship has been pleas'd to favour me with fome Thoughts of your's in this kind, in your late Learned Difcourfe in Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity; and I hope I may fay, have gone a little out of your way to do me that Kindnefs; for the Obligation is thereby the greater. And if your Lordship has brought in the mention of my Book in a Chapter, entitled, Objections against the Trinity in Point of Reason, anfwer'd; when in my whole Effay, I think there is not to be found any thing like an Objection against the Trinity: I

343

P. 234.

have the more to acknowledg to your Lordship, who would not let the Foreignefs of the Subject hinder your Lordship from endeavouring to fet me right, as to fome Errors your Lordship apprehends in my Book; when other Writers ufing fome Notions like mine, gave you that which was occafion enough for you to do me the Favour to take notice of what you diflike in my Efay.

Your Lordship's Name is of fo great Authority in the Learned World, that I who profefs my felf more ready, upon Conviction, to recant, than I was at first to publish my Mistakes, cannot pay that Refpect is due to it, without telling the Reasons why I ftill retain any of my Notions, after your Lordship's having appear'd diffatisfy'd with them. This must be my Apology, and I hope fuch a one as your Lordship will allow, for my examining what you have printed against several Paffages in my Book, and my fhewing the Reasons why it has not prevail'd with me to quit them.

That your Lordship's Reafonings may lofe none of their Force by my mifapprehending or mifrepresenting them, (a way too familiarly us'd in Writings that have any appearance of Controverfy) I fhall crave leave to give the Reader your Lordship's Arguments in the full ftrength of your own Expreffions; that fo in them he may have the Advantage to fee the Deficiency of my Answers, in Point where I fhall be fo unfortunate as not to perceive, or not to follow the Light your Lordship affords me.

any

Your Lordship having in the two or three preceding Pages, juftly, as I think, found fault with the account of Reafon, given by the Unitarians and a late Writer, in those Paffages you quote out of them; and then coming to the Nature of Subftance, p. 233. and relating what that Author has faid concerning the Mind's getting of fimple Ideas, and thofe fimple Ideas being the fole Matter and Foundation of all our Reasonings, your Lordship thus concludes, P. 234.

Then it follows, That we can have no Foundation of Reasoning, where there can be no fuch Ideas from Senfation or Reflection.

Now this is the Cafe of Subftance; it is not intromitted by the Senfes, nor depends upon the Operation of the Mind; and fo it cannot be within the compafs of our Reason. And therefore I do not wonder, that the Gentlemen of this new way of Reasoning, have almoft difcarded Subftance out of the reasonable part of the World. For they not only tell us, &c.

This, as I remember, is the firft place where your Lordship is pleas'd to quote any thing out of my Effay of Human Understanding, which your Lordship does in these Words following.

"That we can have no Idea of it by Senfation or Reflection; but that nothing is fignify'd by it, only an uncertain Suppofition of we know not what." and therefore it is parallel'd more than once, with the Indian Philofopher's "He-knew-not-what, which fupported the Tortoife, that fupported the Ele66 phant, that fupported the Earth: fo Subftance was found out only to fupport Accidents. And, that when we talk of Substances, we talk like Children; "who being ask'd a Queftion about fomewhat which they knew not, readily give this fatisfactory Anfwer, That it is fomething."

Thefe Words of mine, your Lordfhip brings to prove, That I am one of the Gentlemen of this new way of Reasoning, that have almoft difcarded Substance out of the reasonable part of the World. An Accufation which your Lordship will pardon me, if I do not readily know what to plead to, because I do not understand what is almost to difcard Subftance out of the reasonable part of the World. If your Lordship means by it, That I deny or doubt that there is in the World any fuch Thing as Subftance, that your Lordship will acquit Human Un- me of, when your Lordship looks again into that Chapter, which you have cited derstanding, B. 2. C. 23. more than once, where your Lordship will find thefe Words.

S. 4.

сс

"When we talk or think of any particular fort of Corporeal Substances, as Horse, Stone, &c. tho' the Idea we have of either of them, be but the "Complication or Collection of those feveral fimple Ideas of fenfible Qualities, "which we use to find united in the thing called Horfe or Stone; yet because we cannot conceive how they should fubfift alone, nor one in another, we fup"pose them exifting in, and fupported by fome common Subje&, which Sup❝ port