Divifion of
Simple Ideas.

are made to his hand; but can do nothing towards the making the least Particle of new Matter, or deftroying one Atom of what is already in being. The fame Inability will every one find in himself, who fhall go about to fashion in his Understanding any fimple Idea, not receiv'd in by his Senfes from external Objects, or by Reflection from the Operations of his own Mind about them. I would have any one try to fanfy any Tafte which had never affected his Palate; or frame the Idea of a Scent he had never fmelt: and when he can do this, I will also conclude that a blind Mind hath Ideas of Colours, and a deaf Man true diftin& Notions of Sounds.

§. 3. This is the reafon why, tho' we cannot believe it impoffible to God to make a Creature with other Organs, and more ways to convey into the Underftanding the notice of corporeal things than thofe five, as they are ufually counted, which he has given to Man: yet, I think, it is not poffible for any one to imagine any other Qualities in Bodies, howfoever conftituted, whereby they can be taken notice of, befides Sounds, Taftes, Smells, vifible and tangible Qualities. And had Mankind been made with but four Senfes, the Qualities then, which are the Object of the fifth Senfe, had been as far from our Notice, Imagination and Conception, as now any belonging to a fixth, Jeventh, or eighth Senfe, can poffibly be: which, whether yet fome other Creatures, in fome other parts of this vaft and ftupendous Univerfe, may not have, will be a great Prefumption to deny. He that will not fet himself proudly at the top of all things; but will confider the Immenfity of this Fabrick, and the great Variety that is to be found in this little and inconfiderable part of it which he has to do with, may be apt to think, that in other Manfions of it there may be other and different intelligent Beings, of whofe Faculties he has as little Knowledg or Apprehenfion, as a Worm fhut up in one Drawer of a Cabinet hath of the Senfes or Understanding of a Man: fuch Variety and Excellency being fuitable to the Wisdom and Power of the Maker. I have here follow'd the common Opinion of Man's having but five Senfes; tho', perhaps, there may be juftly counted more: but either Suppofition ferves equally to my prefent purpose.

S. 1.

S. 1. THI

CHA P. III.

Of Ideas of one Senfe.

HE better to conceive the Ideas we receive from Senfation, it may not be amifs for us to confider them, in reference to the different ways whereby they make their approaches to our Minds, and make themselves perceivable by us.

First, then, There are fome which come into our Minds by one Senfe only. Secondly, There are others that convey themselves into the Mind by more Senfes than one.

Thirdly, Others that are had from Reflection only.

Fourthly, There are fome that make themfelves way, and are fuggefted to the Mind by all the Ways of Senfation and Reflection.

We shall confider them apart under these feveral Heads.

First, There are fome Ideas which have admittance only through one Senfe, which is peculiarly adapted to receive them. Thus Light and Colours, as White, Red, Yellow, Blue, with their feveral Degrees or Shades, and Mixtures, as Green, Scarlet, Purple, Sea-green, and the reft; come-in only by the Eyes: All kind of Noifes, Sounds and Tones, only by the Ears: The feveral Taftes and Smells, by the Nofe and Palate. And if thefe Organs, or the Nerves which are the Conduits to convey them from without to their Audience in the Brain, the Mind's Prefence-room (as I may fo call it) are any of them fo diforder'd, as not to perform their Functions, they have no Poftern to be admitted by; no other way to bring themselves into view, and be perceiv'd by the Understanding.

The most confiderable of thofe belonging to the 'Touch, are Heat and Cold, and Solidity all the reft confifting, almost wholly in the fenfible Configuration,

as

.

as fmooth and rough; or elfe more or lefs firm adhesion of the Parts, as hard and foft, tough and brittle, are obvious enough.

§. 2. I think, it will be needlefs to enumerate all the particular fimple Ideas, belonging to each Senfe. Nor indeed is it poffible, if we would; there being a great many more of them belonging to most of the Senfes, than we have Names for. The variety of Smells, which are as many almoft, if not more, than Species of Bodies in the World, do moft of them want Names. Sweet and Stinking commonly ferve our turn for thefe Ideas, which in Effect is little more than to call them pleafing or difpleafing; tho' the Smell of a Rofe and Violet, both fweet, are certainly very diftinct Ideas. Nor are the different Taftes that by our Palates we receive Ideas of, much better provided with Names. Sweet, Bitter, Sour, Harfh, and Salt, are almoft all the Epithets we have to denominate that numberlefs variety of Relifhes, which are to be found diftinct, not only in almost every fort of Creatures, but in the different parts of the fame Plant, Fruit, or Animal. The fame may be faid of Colours and Sounds. I fhall therefore, in the account of fimple Ideas I am here giving, content my felf to fet down only fuch, as are moft material to our prefent purpofe, or are in themfelves lefs apt to be taken notice of, tho' they are very frequently the Ingredients of our complex Ideas, amongst which, I think, I may well account Solidity, which therefore I fhall treat of in the next Chapter.

5.1. TH

CHA P. IV.

Of Solidity.

any

Body this dea from

HE Idea of Solidity we receive by our Touch; and it arifes from the We receive resistance which we find in Body, to the Entrance of other Touch. into the Place it poffeffes, till it has left it. There is no Idea, which we receive more conftantly from Senfation, than Solidity. Whether we move or rest, in what pofture foever we are, we always feel fomething under us that supports us, and hinders our farther finking downwards; and the Bodies which we daily handle, make us perceive, that whilft they remain between them, they do by an infurmountable Force hinder the approach of the parts of our Hands that press them. That which thus hinders the approach of two Bodies, when they are moving one towards another, Icall Solidity. I will not difpute, whether this Acceptation of the Word folid be nearer to its original Signification, than that which Mathematicians ufe it in; it fuffices, that I think the common Notion of Solidity will allow, if not juftify, this Ufe of it; but if any one think it better to call it Impenetrability, he has my Confent. Only I have thought the term Solidity the more proper to exprefs this Idea, not only because of its vulgar ufe in that Senfe; but also because it carries fomething more of pofitive in it than Impenetrability, which is negative, and is perhaps more a Confequence of Solidity, than Solidity it felf. This of all other, feems the Idea moft intimately connected with and effential to Body, fo as no where elfe to be found or imagin'd, but only in Matter. And tho' our Senfes take no notice of it, but in Maffes of Matter, of a bulk fufficient to caufe a Senfation in us; yet the Mind, having once got this Idea from fuch groffer fenfible Bodies, traces it farther: and confiders it, as well as Figure, in the minuteft Particle of Matter that can exift: and finds it infeparably inherent in Body, whatever or however modify'd.

§. 2. This is the Idea belongs to Body, whereby we conceive it to fill Space. Solidity fills The Idea of which filling of fpace, is, That where we imagine any space taken Space. up by a folid Subftance, we conceive it fo to poffefs it, that it excludes all other folid Subftances; and will for ever hinder any two other Bodies, that move towards one another in a strait Line, from coming to touch one another, unless it removes from between them, in a Line not parallel to that which they move in. This Idea of it, the Bodies which we ordinarily handle, fufficiently furnish

us with.

§. 3. This Refiftance, whereby it keeps other Bodies out of the space which Diftinct from it pofleffes, is fo great, that no Force, how great foever, can furmount it. All Space. Vol. I.

G

the

From Hardnefs.

the Bodies in the World preffing a drop of Water on all Sides, will never be able to overcome the Refiftance which it will make, as foft as it is, to their approaching one another, till it be remov'd out of their Way: Whereby our Idea of Solidity is diftinguijh'd both from pure Space, which is capable neither of Resistance nor Mo.ion; and from the ordinary Idea of Hardness. For a Man may conceive two Bodies at a Distance, so as they may approach one another, without touching or difplacing any folid Thing, till their Superficies come to meet: Whereby, I think, we have the clear Idea of Space without Solidity. For (not to go fo far as Annihilation of any particular Body) I ask, whether a Man cannot have the Idea of the Motion of one fingle Body alone, without any other fucceeding immediately into its place? I think, 'tis evident he can: The Idea of Motion in one Body no more including the Idea of Motion in another, than the Idea of a fquare Figure in one Body includes the Idea of a fquare Figure in another. I do not ask, whether Bodies do fo exift, that the Motion of one Body cannot really be without the Motion of another. To determine this either Way, is to beg the Queftion for or against a Vacuum. But my Queftion is, Whether one cannot have the Idea of one Body mov'd, whilft others are at reft? And I think, this no one will deny. If fo, then the Place it deferted gives us the Idea of pure Space without Solidity, whereinto another Body may enter, without either Refiftance or Protrufion of any Thing. When the Sucker in a Pump is drawn, the space it fill'd in the Tube is certainly the fame, whether any other Body follows the Motion of the Sucker or no : Nor does it imply a Contradiction, that upon the Motion of one Body, another, that is only contiguous to it, fhould not follow it. The Neceffity of fuch a Motion is built only on the Suppofition that the World is full, but not on the diftin&t Ideas of Space and Solidity; which are as different as Resistance and not Resistance, Protrufion and not Protrufion. And that Men have Ideas of Space without Body, their very Difputes about a Vacuum plainly demonftrate; as is fhew'd in another place.

§. 4. Solidity is hereby alfo differenced from Hardnefs, in that Solidity consists in Repletion, and fo an utter Exclufion of other Bodies out of the Space it poffeffes; but Hardness, in a firm Cohesion of the Parts of Matter, making up Maifes of a fenfible bulk, fo that the whole does not eafily change its Figure. And indeed Hard and Soft are Names that we give to Things, only in relation to the Conftitutions of our own Bodies; that being generally call'd hard by us, which will put us to Pain, fooner than change Figure by the preffure of any part of our Bodies; and that, on the contrary, foft, which changes the Situation of its parts upon an eafy and unpainful touch.

But this difficulty of changing the Situation of the fenfible parts amongst themfelves, or of the Figure of the whole, gives no more Solidity to the hardest Body in the World, than to the fofteft; nor is an Adamant one Jot more folid than Water. For tho' the two flat Sides of two Pieces of Marble will more eafily approach each other, between which there is nothing but Water or Air, than if there be a Diamond between them: Yet it is not that the parts of the Diamond are more folid than thofe of Water, or refift more; but because the parts of Water being more eafily feparable from each other, they will by a Side-Motion be more eafily remov'd, and give way to the approach of the two pieces of Marble. But if they could be kept from making place, by that Side-motion, they would eternally hinder the approach of thefe two Pieces of Marble, as much as the Diamond; and 'twould be as impoffible by any force to furmount their Refiftance, as to furmount the Resistance of the Parts of a Diamond. The fofteft Body in the World will as invincibly refift the coming together of any two other Bodies, if it be not put out of the Way, but remain between them, as the hardest that can be found or imagin'd. He that fhall fill a yielding foft Body well with Air or Water, will quickly find its Resistance : And he that thinks that nothing but Bodies that are hard can keep his Hands from approaching one another, may be pleas'd to make a trial, with the Air inclos'd in a Foot ball. The Experiment, I have been told, was made at Florence, with a hollow Globe of Gold fill'd with Water, and exactly clos'd; which farther fhews the Solidity of fo, foft a Body as Water. For the golden Globe thus fill'd being put into a Prefs, which was driven by the extreme force of Skrews, the

Water

Water made it felf way thro' the Pores of that very clofe Metal; and finding no Room for a nearer approach of its Particles within, got to the outfide, where it rofe like a Dew, and fo fell in Drops, before the Sides of the Globe could be made to yield to the violent Compreffion of the Engine that fqueez'd it.

trufion.

§. 5. By this Idea of Solidity, is the Extenfion of Body diftinguifh'd from the On Solidity Extenfion of Space: The Extenfion of Body being nothing but the Cohesion or depends_ImContinuity of folid, feparable, movable Parts; and the Extenfion of Space, the pulfe, RefiftContinuity of unfolid, infeparable, and immovable Parts. Upon the Solidity of ance, and ProBodies alfo depends their mutual Impulse, Refistance and Protrufion. Of pure Space then, and Solidity, there are feveral (amongst which, I confefs my self one) who perfuade themselves they have clear and diftinct Ideas: and that they can think on Space, without any thing in it that refifts or is protruded by Body. This is the Idea of pure Space, which they think they have as clear, as any Idea they can have of the Extenfion of Body; the Idea of the distance between the oppofite Parts of a concave Superficies, being equally as clear without as with the Idea of any folid Parts between: And on the other Side they perfuade themfelves, That they have, diftin&t from that of pure Space, the Idea of fomething that fills Space, that can be protruded by the Impulfe of other Bodies, or refift their Motion. If there be others that have not thefe two Ideas diftin&t, but confound them, and make but one of them; I know not how Men, who have the fame Idea under different Names, or different Ideas under the fame Name, can in that Cafe talk with one another; any more than a Man, who not being blind or deaf, has diftinct Ideas of the Colour of Scarlet, and the Sound of a Trumpet, could difcourfe concerning Scarlet-Colour with the blind Man I mention in another Place, who fanfy'd that the Idea of Scarlet was like the Sound of a Trumpet.

§. 6. If any one asks me, What this Solidity is? I fend him to his Senfes to in- What it is form him: Let him put a Flint or a Foot-ball between his Hands, and then endeavour to join them, and he will know. If he thinks this not a fufficient Explication of Solidity, what it is, and wherein it confifts; I promise to tell him what it is, and wherein it confifts, when he tells me what Thinking is, or wherein it confifts; or explains to me what Extenfion or Motion is, which perhaps feems much eafier. The fimple Ideas we have, are fuch as Experience teaches them us; but if beyond that, we endeavour by Words to make them clearer in the Mind, we fhall fucceed no better, than if he went about to clear up the Darkness of a blind Man's Mind by talking; and to difcourfe into him the ideas of Light and Colours. The reafon of this I fhall fhew in another Place.

TH

CHAP. V.

Of Simple Ideas of divers Senfes.

HE Ideas we get by more than one Senfe, are of Space, or Extenfion, Figure, Reft, and Motion; for thefe make perceivable Impreffions, both on the Eyes and Touch: And we can receive and convey into our Minds the Ideas of the Extenfion, Figure, Motion, and Rest of Bodies, both by feeing and feeling. But having Occasion to speak more at large of these in another place, I here only enumerate them.

§. 1.TH

CHAP. VI.

Of Simple Ideas of Reflection.

HE Mind receiving the Ideas, mention'd in the foregoing Chapters, Simple Ideas from without, when it turns its view inward upon it felf, and obferves are the Operaits own Actions about thofe Ideas it has, takes from thence other Ideas, which tions of the are as capable to be the Objects of its Contemplation, as any of those it receiv'd its other Ifrom foreign Things.

Vol. I.

G 2

Mind about

deas.

§. 2.

The Idea of
Preception,

S. 2. The two great and principal Actions of the Mind, which are most freand Idea of quently confidered, and which are fo frequent, that every one that pleases may take notice of 'em in himself, are these two:

and

Willing, we flection

bave from Re

Preception or Thinking, and
Volition, or Willing.

The Power of Thinking is call'd the Understanding, and the Power of Volition is call'd the Will; and these two Powers or Abilities in the Mind are denominated Faculties. Of fome of the Modes of thefe fimple Ideas of Reflection, such as are Remembrance, Difcerning, Reasoning, Judging, Knowledg, Faith, &c. I fhall have Occafion to speak hereafter.

§.

CHAP. VII.

Of Simple Ideas of both Senfation and Reflection.

Pleasure and S. 1.THERE be other fimple Ideas which convey themselves into the Mind by all the Ways of Senfation and Reflection, viz.

Pain.

TH

Pleasure or Delight, and its oppofite.
Pain or Uneafinefs.

Power.

Exiftence.
Unity.

. 2. Delight or Uneafinefs, one or other of them join themselves to almoft all our Ideas, both of Senfation and Reflection: And there is fcarce any Affection of our Senses from without, any retir'd Thought of our Mind within, which is not able to produce in us Pleasure or Pain. By Pleafure and Pain I would be understood to fignify whatfoever delights or molefts us; whether it arifes from the Thoughts of our Minds, or any Thing operating on our Bodies. For whether we call it Satisfaction, Delight, Pleafure, Happiness, &c. on the one Side; or Uneafiness, Trouble, Pain, Torment, Anguifh, Mifery, c. on the other; they are still but different Degrees of the fame Thing, and belong to the Ideas of Pleasure and Pain, Delight or Uneafinefs: Which are the Names I fhall moft commonly use for those two Sorts of Ideas.

1. 3. The infinite wife Author of our Being having given us the Power over feveral Parts of our Bodies, to move or keep them at reft as we think fit; and allo by the Motion of them, to move our felves and other contiguous Bodies, in which confift all the Actions of our Body: Having alfo given a Power to our Minds in feveral Inftances, to chufe, among its Ideas, which it will think on, and to pursue the Enquiry of this or that Subje&t with Confideration and Attention, to excite us to thefe Actions of Thinking and Motion that we are capable of; has been pleas'd to join to feveral Thoughts and feveral Senfations, a Perception of Delight. If this were wholly feparated from all our outward Senfations and inward Thoughts, we fhould have no Reason to prefer_one Thought or Action to another; Negligence to Attention; or Motion to Rest. And fo we should neither ftir our Bodies nor employ our Minds, but let our Thoughts (if I may fo call it) run a-drift, without any Direction or Design; and fuffer the Ideas of our Minds, like unregarded Shadows, to make their appearances there, as it happen'd, without attending to them. In which state Man, however furnish'd with the Faculties of Understanding and Will, would be a very idle unactive Creature, and pass his time only in a lazy lethargick Dream. It has therefore pleas'd our Wife Creator to annex to feveral Obje&s, and to the Ideas which we receive from them, as alfo to feveral of our Thoughts, a concomitant Pleasure, and that in feveral Objects, to feveral Degrees; that those Faculties which he had endow'd us with, might not remain wholly idle and unemploy❜d by us.

. 4. Pain has the fame Efficacy and Ufe to fet us on work that Pleasure has, we being as ready to employ our Faculties to avoid that, as to purfue this: Only this is worth our Confideration, that Pain is often produc'd by the fame Objects and Ideas that produce Pleasure in us. This their near Conjunction,