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thou knoweft not what is the way of the Spirit, nor how the Bones do grow in the Womb Eccl. 11.5. of her that is with Child; even fo thou knoweft not the Works of God who maketh all things: I gratefully receive and rejoice in the Light of Revelation, which fets me at reft in many things; the manner whereof my poor Reason can by no means make out to me: Omnipotency, I know, can do any thing that contains in it no Contradiction; so that I readily believe whatever God has declar'd, tho' my Reafon find Difficulties in it which it cannot mafter. As in the present Cafe, God having reveal'd that there fhall be a Day of Judgment, I think that Foundation enough, to conclude Men are free enough to be made answerable for their Actions, and to receive according to what they have done; tho' how Man is a free Agent, furpass my Explication or Comprehenfion.

In answer to the place I brought out of St. Luke, your Lordship asks, Whe- Chap. 24. ther from these words of our Saviour, it follows that a Spirit is only an Appearance? ver. 39. Ianfwer, No; nor do I know who drew fuch an Inference from them: But it Anfw.1.p.66. follows, that in Apparitions there is fomething that appears, and that that which appears is not wholly immaterial; and yet this was properly call'd vεuμα, and was often look'd upon by thofe who call'd it Пveux in Greek, and now call it Spirit in English, to be the Ghoft or Soul of one departed: which, I humbly conceive, juftifies my ufe of the word Spirit, for a thinking voluntary Agent, whether material or immaterial.

Your Lordship fays, That I grant, that it cannot, upon these Principles, be Anfw.1.p.67. demonftrated, that the fpiritual Subftance in us is immaterial: From whence you conclude, That then my Grounds of Certainty from Ideas are plainly given up. This being a way of arguing that you often make ufe of, I have often had occafion to confider it, and cannot after all fee the force of this Argument. I acknowledg, that this or that Propofition cannot upon my Principles be demonftrated; ergo, I grant this Propofition to be falfe, That Certainty confifts in the Perception of the Agreement or Difagreement of Ideas: For that is my Ground of Certainty, and till that be given up, my Grounds of Certainty are not given up.

You farther tell me, That I fay, the Soul's Immateriality may be prov'd pro- Ibid. bable to the highest degree; to which your Lordship replies, That is not the Point: For it is not Probability, but Certainty, that you are promis'd in this way of Ideas, and that the Foundation of our Knowledg and real Certainty lies in them; and is it dwindled into a Probability at laft? This is alfo what your Lordship has been pleas'd to object to me more than once, that I promis'd Certainty. I would be glad to know in what words this Promife is made, and where it ftands, for I love to be a Man of my Word. I have indeed told wherein I think Certainty, real Certainty does confift, as far as any one attains it; and I do not yet, from any thing your Lordship has faid against it, find any reason to change my Opinion therein: But I do not remember that I promis'd Certainty in this Question, concerning the Soul's Immateriality, or in any ofi thofe Propofitions, wherein you, thinking I come fhort of Certainty, infer from thence, that my way of Certainty by Ideas is given up. And I am fo far from promifing Certainty in all things, that I am accus'd by your Lordship of Scepticism, for fetting too narrow Bounds to our Knowledg and Certainty. Why therefore your Lordship asks me, And is the Certainty [of the Soul's being immaterial] dwindled into a Probability at laft? will be hard to fee a Reafon for, till you can fhew that I promis'd to demonftrate that it is immaterial; or that others, upon their Principles without Ideas, being able to demonftrate it immaterial, it comes to dwindle into bare Probability, upon my Principles by Ideas.

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One thing more I am oblig'd to take notice of. I had faid, "That the Be- Lett.1.p.113. "lief of God being the Foundation of all Religion and genuine Morality, I thought no Arguments, that are made ufe of to work the Persuasion of a "God into Mens Minds, fhould be invalidated, which, I grant, is of ill Confequence. To which words of mine I find, according to your particular

Favour to me, this Reply; That here I must give your Lordship leave to ask me, Anfw.1.p.89. what I think of the univerfal Confent of Mankind, as to the Being of God? Hath not this been made ufe of as an Argument, not only by Chriftians, but by the wifeft and greatest Men among the Heathens? And what then would I think of one who should go about to invalidate this Argument? And that by proving, that it hath been dif

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cover'd in thefe latter Ages by Navigation, that there are whole Nations at the Bay of Soldania, in Brafil, in the Caribbee-Iflands and Paraquaria, among whom there was found no Notion of a God: And even the Author of the Effay of Human Understanding hath done this.

To this your Question, my Lord, I anfwer, That I think that the univerfal Confent of Mankind, as to the Being of a God, amounts to thus much, that the vaftly greater Majority of Mankind, have, in all Ages of the World, actually believ'd a God; that the Majority of the remaining part have not actually disbeliev'd it, and confequently thofe who have actually oppos'd the Belief of a God, have truly been very few. So that comparing those that have actually disbeliev'd with those who have a&ually believ'd a God, their Number is so inconfiderable, that in refpect of this incomparably greater Majority of those who have own'd the Belief of a God, it may be faid to be the univerfal Confent of Mankind.

This is all the univerfal Confent which Truth of Matter of Fact will allow, and therefore all that can be made ufe of to prove a God. But if any one would extend it farther, and speak deceitfully for God; if this Univerfality should be urg'd in a strict Senfe, not for much the Majority, but for a general Confent of every one, even to a Man in all Ages and Countries: this would make it either no Argument, or a perfectly ufelefs and unneceffary one. For if any one deny a God, fuch a perfect Univerfality of Confent is deftroy'd; and if no body does deny a God, what need of Arguments to convince Atheifts?

I would crave leave to ask your Lordfhip, Were there ever in the World any Atheist or no? If there were not, what need is there of raifing a Question about the Being of a God, when no body queftions it? What need of provifional Arguments against a Fault, from which Mankind are fo wholly free; and which, by an univerfal Confent, they may be prefum'd to be fecure from? If you fay (as I doubt not but you will) that there have been Atheists in the World, then your Lordship's univerfal Confent reduces it felf to only a great Majority; and then make that Majority as great as you will, what I have faid in the place quoted by your Lordfhip, leaves it in its full force, and I have not faid one word that does in the leaft invalidate this Argument for a God. The Argument I was upon there, was to fhew, That the Idea of God was not innate; and to my purpose it was fufficient, if there were but a lefs Number found in the World, who had no Idea of God, than your Lordship will allow there have been of profefs'd Atheists: for whatsoever is innate, must be univerfal in the ftricteft Senfe; one Exception is a fufficient Proof against it. So that all that I faid, and which was quite to another purpose, did not at all tend, nor can be made ufe of to invalidate the Argument for a Deity, grounded on fuch an univerfal Confent as your Lordship, and all that build on it must own, which is only a very difproportion'd Majority: Such an univerfal Confent my Argument there neither affirms nor requires to be lefs, than you will be pleas'd to allow it. Your Lordship therefore might, without any prejudice to those Declarations of Good-will and Favour you have for the Author of the Efay of Human Understanding, have fpar'd the mentioning his quoting Authors that are in Print, for Matters of Fact, to quite another purpofe,. as going about to invalidate the Argument for a Deity from the univerfal Confent of Mankind; fince he leaves that univerfal Confent as entire, and as large as you your felf do, or can own, or fuppofe it. But here I have no reason to be forry that your Lordship has given me this occafion for the Vindication of this Paffage of my Book, if there fhould be any one befides your Lordship who fhould fo far miftake it, as to think it in the leaft invalidates the Argument for a God, from the universal Confent of Mankind.

But because you queftion the Credibility of thofe Authors I have quoted, Anfw.1.p.89. which, you fay in the next Paragraph, were very ill chofen; I will crave leave to fay, That he whom I rely'd on for his Teftimony concerning the Hotentots of Soldania, was no lefs a Man than an Ambassador from the King of England to the Great Mogul: Of whofe Relation, Monfieur Thevenot, no ill Judg in the Cafe, had fo great an Efteem, that he was at the pains to tranflate it into French, and publifh it in his (which is counted no unjudicious) Collection of Travels. But to intercede with your Lordship for a little more favourable al

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lowance of Credit to Sir Thomas Roe's Relation, Coore, an Inhabitant of the Country who could speak English, atlur'd Mr. Terry, That they of Soldania had Terry's no God. But if he too have the ill luck to find no Credit with you, I hope you Voyage, will be a little more favourable to a Divine of the Church of England now li- P. 17,& 23. ving, and admit of his Teftimony in confirmation of Sir Tho. Roe's. This worthy Gentleman, in the Relation of his Voyage to Surat, printed but two years fince, fpeaking of the fame People, has thefe words; They are funk even below Idolatry, are deftitute of both Priest and Temple, and Saving a little Shew of Rejoicing, which is made at the full and new Moon, have lost all kind of religious Devotion. Nature has fo richly provided for their Convenience in this Life, that they have drown'd all Senfe of the God of it, and are grown quite careless of the next.

Mr. Oving

ton, p. 489.

But to provide against the cleareft Evidence of Atheism in thefe People, you fay, That the Account given of them makes them not fit to be a Standard for the Senfe Antw. 1. of Mankind. This, I think, may pafs for nothing, till fome body be found, p. 90. that makes them to be a Standard for the Senfe of Mankind: All the ufe I made of them was to fhew, That there were Men in the World that had no innate Idea of a God. But to keep fomething like an Argument going (for what will not that do?) you go near denying thole Cafers to be Men: what elfe do these words fignify? A People fo ftrangely bereft of common Senfe, that they can hardly Ibid. be reckon'd among Mankind; as appears by the beft Accounts of the Cafers of Soldania, &c. I hope if any of them were call'd Peter, James or John, it would be paft fcruple that they were Men; however Courvee, Wewena, and Coufheda, and thofe others who had Names, that had no place in your Nomenclator, would hardly pass mufter with your Lordship.

My Lord, I fhould not mention this, but that what you your felf say here may be a Motive to you to confider, That what you have laid fuch stress on, concerning the general Nature of Man, as a real Being, and the Subject of Properties, amounts to nothing for the diftinguishing of Species; fince you your self own that there may be Individuals, wherein there is a common Nature with a particular Subfiftence proper to each of them: whereby you are fo little able to know of which of the Ranks or Sorts they are, into which you fay, God has order'd Beings, P. 165. and which he hath diftinguifh'd by effential Properties, that you are in doubt whe ther they ought to be reckon'd among Mankind or no.

Give me leave now to think, My Lord, that I have given an Answer to all that is any way material in either of the Letters you have honour'd me with. If there be any Argument which you think of weight, that you find omitted, upon the leaft Intimation from your Lordship where it is, I promise to confider it, and to endeavour to give you Satisfaction concerning it, either by owning my Conviction, or fhewing what hinders it. This Refpect I fhall think due from me to your Lordship: Tho' I know better to imploy the little time my Business and Health afford me, than to trouble my felf with the little Cavillers, who may either be set on, or be forward (in hope to recommend themselves) to meddle in this Controversy.

Before I conclude, 'tis fit I take notice of the Obligation I have to you, for the Pains you have been at about my Essay, which I conclude could not have been any way fo effectually recommended to the World, as by your manner of writing against it. And fince your Lordship's harp Sight, fo carefully employ'd for its Correction, has, as I humbly conceive, found no Faults in it, which your Lordship's great Endeavours this way have made out to be really there; I hope I may prefume it will pafs the better in the World, and the Judgment of all confidering Men, and make it for the future ftand better even in your Lordfhip's Opinion. I beg your Lordship's Pardon for this long Trouble, and am,

Oates, May 4. 1698.

My LORD,

Your Lordship's most Humble, and

Moft Obedient Servant,'

JOHN LOCKE.

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ciples, 14. §. 7.

But two forts of Actions, 98. §.4.
Unpleasant may be made pleasant, and
how, 118. .69. 125. §. 11.
Cannot be the fame in different places,
143. §. 2.

Confider'd as Modes, or as Moral, 158.
S. 15.

Adequate Ideas, 166. §. 1, 2.

Ideas, we have not of any Species of Sub-
ftances, 259. §. 26.
Affirmations are only in concrete, 217. §.1.
Agreement and Disagreement of our Ideas
fourfold, 243. 9. 3. 262. §. 4, 5, 6,7.
Algebra, 305. §. 15.
Alteration, 141. §. 2.
Analogy, useful in natural Philofophy,
313. §. 12.
Anger, 96. §. 12, 14.

Antipathy and Sympathy, whence, 178.§.7.
Arguments of four forts, 1. Ad verecun-
diam, 324. §. 19.

2. Ad ignorantiam, ibid. §. 20.

3. Ad hominem, ibid. 21.

4. Ad judicium, 325. §. 22. This alone

right, ibid. §. 22.

Vol. I.

Arithmetick: The Use of Cyphers in Arith-
metick, 256. §. 19.

Artificial things are most of them collective
Ideas, 137. §.3.

Why we are less liable to Confufion about
artificial things, than about natural,
212. §. 40.

Have diftinct Species, ibid. §. 41.
Affent to Maxims, 6. §. 10.

Upon hearing and understanding the
Terms, 8. §. 17, 18.

A Mark of Self-Evidence, ib. §. 18.
Not of Innate, ib. §. 18. 9. §. 19, 20.
28. §. 19.

Is to Propofitions, 307. §. 3.

Ought to be proportioned to the Proofs,
330. §. I.

Affociation of Ideas, 176.

This Affociation how made, 177. §. 6.
Il Effects of it, as to Antipathies, 178.
§. 7, 8. p. 179. §. 15.

And this in Sects of Philofophy and Reli-
gion, 180. §. 18.

Its ill Influences as to intellectual Habits,
179. §. 17.
Affurance, 312. §. 6.

How it differs from Certainty, 470,

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