done two ways: Firft, by keeping the Idea, which is brought into it, for fome time actually in view; which is call'd Contemplation.

. 2. The other way of Retention, is the Power to revive again in our Minds Memory. those Ideas, which after imprinting have difappear'd, or have been as it were laid afide out of Sight: And thus we do, when we conceive Heat or Light, Yellow or Sweet, the Object being remov'd. This is Memory, which is as it were the Store-houfe of our Ideas. For the narrow Mind of Man not being capable of having many Ideas under View and Confideration at once, it was neceffary to have a Repository to lay up those Ideas, which at another Time it might have ufe of. But our Ideas being nothing but actual Perceptions in the Mind, which cease to be any thing when there is no Preception of them, this laying up of our Ideas in the Repofitory of the Memory, fignifies no more but this, that the Mind has a Power in many Cafes to revive Perceptions, which it has once had, with this additional Perception annex'd to them, that it has had them before. And in this Sense it is, that our Ideas are faid to be in our Memories, when indeed they are actually no where, but only there is an Ability in the Mind when it will to revive them again, and as it were paint them a-new on it felf, tho' fome with more, fome with lefs difficulty; fome more lively, and others more obfcurely. And thus it is, by the affiftance of this Faculty, that we are faid to have all those Ideas in our Undertandings, which tho' we do not actually contemplate, yet we can bring in fight, and make appear again, and be the Objects of our Thoughts, without the help of those fenfible Qualities which firft imprin

ted them there.

§. 3. Attention and Repetition help much to the fixing any Ideas in the Memory: Atteation,Rebut thofe which naturally at firit make the deepest and most lafting Impreffion, petition, Plea are thofe which are accompany'd with Pleasure or Pain. The great Bulinels of fure and Pain, the Senfes being to make us take notice of what hurts or advantages the Body, fix Ideas. it is wifely order'd by Nature (as has been fhewn) that Pain fhould accompany the Reception of feveral Ideas; which fupplying the Place of Contideration and Reasoning in Children, and acting quicker than Confideration in grown Men, makes both the Old and Young avoid painful Objects, with that hafte which is necessary for their Prefervation; and in both fettles in the Memory a Caution for the future.

§. 4. Concerning the feveral Degrees of lafting, wherewith Ideas are imprinted Ideas fade in on the Memory, we may obferve, That fome of them have been produc'd in the the Memory, Und erftanding, by an Object affecting the Senfes once only, and no more than once; others that have more than once offer'd themlelves to the Senfes, have yet been little taken notice of: The Mind either heedlefs, as in Children, or otherwife employ'd, as in Men, intent only on one thing, not letting the ftamp deep into it felf. And in fome, where they are fet on with care and repeated Impreffions, either thro' the Temper of the Body, or fome other default, the Memory is very weak. In all thefe Cafes, Ideas in the Mind quickly fade, and often vanish quite out of the Understanding, leaving no more Foot-steps or remaining Characters of themselves, than Shadows do flying over Fields of Corn; and the Mind is as void of them, as if they never had been there.

9. 5. Thus many of thofe Ideas, which were produc'd in the Minds of Children, in the beginning of their Senfation, (fome of which perhaps, as of fome Pleafures and Pains, were before they were born, and others in their Infancy) if in the future Courfe of their Lives they are not repeated again, are quite loft, without the leaft glimpfe remaining of them. This may be observ'd in those, who by fome mifchance have loft their fight when they were very young, in whom the Ideas of Colours, having been but flightly taken notice of, and ceafing to be repeated, do quite wear out; fo that fome Years after there is no more Notion nor Memory of Colours left in their Minds, than in thofe of People born blind. The Memory in fome Men, 'tis true, is very tenacious, even to a miracle: But yet there feems to be a conftant decay of all our Ideas, even of those which are ftruck deepeft, and in Minds the most retentive; fo that if they be not fometimes renew'd by repeated Exercife of the Senfes, or Reflection on thofe kinds of Objects which at firft occafion'd them, the Print wears out and at laft there remains nothing to be feen. Thus the Ideas, as well as Children, of our Youth, often die before us and our Minds reprefent to us those

Tombs,

་།

left.

Tombs, to which we are approaching; where tho' the Brafs and Marble remain, yet the Infcriptions are effaced by Time, and the Imagery moulders away. The Pictures drawn in our Minds are laid in fading Colours; and if not fometimes refresh'd, vanish and disappear. How much the Conftitution of our Bodies, and the Make of our animal Spirits are concern'd in this, and whether the Temper of the Brain make this difference, that in some it retains the Characters drawn on it like Marble, in others like Free-ftone, and in others little better than Sand; I fhall not here enquire: tho' it may feem probable, that the Conftitution of the Body does fometimes influence the Memory; fince we oftentimes find a Disease quite ftrip the Mind of all its Ideas, and the Flames of a Fever in a few Days calcine all thofe Images to Duft and Confufion, which feem'd to be as lafting as if grav'd in Marble.

§. 6. But concerning the Ideas themselves it is easy to remark, That thofe that Conftantly re- are ofteneft refresh'd (amongst which are thofe that are convey'd into the Mind by peated Ideas can fearce be more ways than one) by a frequent return of the Objects or Actions that produce them, fix themselves beft in the Memory, and remain cleareft and longest there: And therefore those which are of the original Qualities of Bodies, viz. Solidity, Extenfion, Figure, Motion, and Reft; and those that almoft conftantly affect our Bodies, as Heat and Cold; and thofe which are the Affections of all kinds of Beings, as Existence, Duration, and Number, which almost every Object that affects our Senfes, every Thought which employs our Minds, bring along with them: Thefe, I fay, and the like Ideas, are feldom quite loft, whilft the Mind retains any Ideas at all.

active.

In remem§. 7. In this fecondary Perception, as I may fo call it, or viewing again the bring, the Ideas that are lodg'd in the Memory, the Mind is oftentimes more than barely passive ; Mind is often the Appearance of thofe dormant Pictures depending fometimes on the Will. The Mind very often fets it felf on work in fearch of fome hidden Idea, and turns as it were the Eye of the Soul upon it; tho' fometimes too they start up in our Minds of their own accord, and offer themselves to the Understanding; and very often are rouz'd and tumbled out of their dark Cells into open Daylight, by fome turbulent and tempeftuous Paffions: Our Affections bringing Ideas to our Memory, which had otherwife lain quiet and unregarded. This farther is to be observ'd concerning Ideas lodg'd in the Memory, and upon occafion reviv'd by the Mind, that they are not only (as the word revive imports) none of them new ones; but also that the Mind takes notice of them, as of a former Impreffion, and renews its Acquaintance with them, as with Ideas it had known before. So that tho' Ideas formerly imprinted are not at all conftantly in view, yet in Remembrance they are constantly known to be fuch as have been formerly imprinted; i. e. in view, and taken notice of before by the Understanding. Two Defects in §. 8. Memory, in an intellectual Creature, is neceffary in the next Degree to the Memory, Perception. It is of fo great Moment, that where it is wanting, all the reft of Oblivion and our Faculties are in a great measure ufelefs: And we in our Thoughts, ReafonSlowness. ings, and Knowledg, could not proceed beyond prefent Objects, were it not for the Affiftance of our Memories, wherein there may be two Defects.

Firft, That it lofes the Idea quite,jand fo far it produces perfect Ignorance. For fince we can know nothing farther than we have the Idea of it, when that is gone, we are in perfe& Ignorance.

Secondly, That it moves flowly, and retrieves not the Ideas that it has, and are laid up in Store, quick enough to ferve the Mind upon Occafions. This, if it be to a great Degree, is Stupidity; and he, who thro' this default in his Memory, has not the Ideas that are really preferv'd there ready at hand when need and Occafion calls for them, were almoft as good be without them quite, fince they ferve him to little purpose. The dull Man, who lofes the Opportunity whilft he is feeking in his Mind for those Ideas that fhould ferve his turn, is not much more happy in his Knowledg than one that is perfectly ignorant. 'Tis the business therefore of the Memory to furnish to the Mind thole dormant Ideas which it has prefent Occafion for; in the having them ready at Hand on all Occasions, confists that which we call Invention, Fancy, and Quickness of Parts.

9. 9. These are Defects, we may obferve, in the Memory of one Man compar'd with another. There is another Defect which we may conceive to be in the Memory of Man in general, compar'd with fome fuperior created intellectual

Beings,

Beings, which in this faculty may fo far excel Man, that they may have conftantly in view the whole fcene of all their former Actions, wherein no one of the Thoughts they have ever had may flip out of their Sight. The Omniscience of God, who knows all things paft, prefent, and to come, and to whom the Thoughts of Mens Hearts always lie open, may fatisfy us of the poffibility of this. For who can doubt but God may communicate to thofe glorious Spirits, his immediate Attendants, any of his Perfections, in what Proportion he pleafes, as far as created finite Beings can be capable? 'Tis reported of that Prodigy of Parts, Monfieur Pafcal, that, till the Decay of his Health had impair'd his Memory, he forgot nothing of what he had done, read, or thought, in any part of his rational Age. This is a privilege fo little known to moft Men, that it feems almost incredible to thofe, who, after the ordinary way, measure all o thers by themselves; but yet, when confider'd, may help us to enlarge our Thoughts towards greater Perfections of it in fuperior ranks of Spirits. For this of Mr. Pafcal was ftill with a narrowness that human Minds are confin'd to here, of having great variety of Ideas only by fucceffion, not all at once: Whereas the feveral Degrees of Angels may probably have larger views, and fome of them be endow'd with Capacitics. able to retain together, and constantly fet before them, as in one Picture, all their past Knowledge at once. This, we may conceive, would be no fmall advantage to the Knowledg of a thinking Man, if all his paft Thoughts and Reafonings could be always prefent to him. And therefore we may fuppofe it one of thofe Ways, wherein the Knowledg of feparate Spirits may exceedingly furpass ours.

. 10. This faculty of laying up and retaining the Ideas that are brought into Brutes have the Mind, feveral other Animals feem to have to a great degree, as well as Man. Memory. For to pass by other Inftances, Birds learning of Tunes, and the endeavours one may obferve in them to hit the Notes right, put it paft doubt with me, that they have Perception, and retain Ideas in their Memories, and use them for Patterns. For it feems to me impoffible, that they fhould endeavour to conform their Voices to Notes (as 'tis plain they do) of which they had no Ideas. For tho' I fhould grant Sound may mechanically caufe a certain Motion of the animal Spirits, in the Brains of thofe Birds, whilft the Tune is actually playing; and that Motion may be continu'd on to the Mufcles of the Wings, and fo the Bird mechanically be driven away by certain noifes, because this may tend to the Bird's prefervation: Yet that can never be fuppos'd a reafon, why it should caufe mechanically, either whilft the Tune was playing, much lefs after it has ceas'd, fuch a motion in the Organs of the Bird's Voice, as fhould conform it to the Notes of a foreign Sound, which Imitation can be of no ufe to the Bird's Prefervation. But, which is more, it cannot with any appearance of Reason be fuppos'd (much less prov'd) that Birds, without Senfe and Memory, can approach their Notes nearer and nearer by degrees to a Tune play'd yesterday; which if they have no Idea of in their Memory, is now no where, nor can be a Pattern for them to imitate, or which any repeated Effays can bring them nearer to. Since there is no reason why the Sound of a Pipe fhould leave traces in their Brains, which not at first, but by their after-endeavours, fhould produce the like Sounds; and why the Sounds they make themselves, fhould not make traces which they should follow, as well as thofe of the Pipe, is impoffible to conceive.

§. 1.

СНАР. XІI.

Of Difcerning, and other Operations of the Mind.

"A

Nother Faculty we may take notice of in our Minds, is that of Dif- No Knowledg cerning and diftinguishing between the feveral Ideas it has. It is not without Dif enough to have a confus'd Perception of fomething in general: Unless the Mind cerning. had a diftin& Perception of different Objects and their Qualities, it would be capable of very little Knowledg; tho' the Bodies that affect us were as bufy about us as they are now, and the Mind were continually employ'd in thinking. On this faculty of diftinguishing one thing from another, depends the Evidence and Vol. I. Certainty

I

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The difference of Wit and Judgment.

Clearness alone binders Confufion.

Comparing.

Brutes com

Certainty of feveral, even very general Propofitions, which have pafs'd for innate Truths; becaufe Men overlooking the true Caufe why thofe Propofitions find univerfal Affent, impute it wholly to native uniform Impreffions: whereas it in truch depends upon this clear difcerning Faculty of the Mind, whereby it per ceives two Ideas to be the fame, or different. But of this more hereafter.

. 2. How much the imperfection of accurately difcriminating Ideas one from another, lies either in the dulnefs or faults of the Organs of Senfe; or want of acutenefs, exercife or attention in the Understanding; or haftinefs and precipitancy, natural to fome Tempers, I will not here examine: It fuffices to take notice, that this is one of the Operations, that the Mind may reflect on and obferve in it felf. It is of that confequence to its other Knowledg, that fo far as this Faculty is in it felf dull, or not rightly made ufe of for the diftinguishing one thing from another; fo far our Notions are confus'd, and our Reafon and Judgment difturb'd or mifled. If in having our Ideas in the Memory ready at Hand, confifts quickness of Parts; in this of having them unconfus'd, and being able nicely to diftinguifh one thing from another, where there is but the leaft difference, confifts, in a great measure, the exactness of Judgment, and clearness of Reason, which is to be obferv'd in one Man above another. And hence perhaps may be given fome reafon of that common Obfervation, That Men, who have a great deal of Wit, and prompt Memories, have not always the cleareft Judgment, or deepeft Reason: For Wit lying moft in the affemblage of Ideas, and putting those together with quickness and variety, wherein can be found any resemblance or congruity, thereby to make up pleasant Pictures, and agreeable Vifions in the Fancy; Judgment, on the contrary, lics quite on the other fide, in feparating carefully one from another, Ideas wherein can be found the leaft difference, thereby to avoid being mifled by Similitude, and by affinity to take one thing for another. This is a way of proceeding quite contrary to Metaphor and Allufion, wherein for the most part lies that Entertain ment and Pleasantry of Wit, which ftrikes fo lively on the Fancy, and thetefore is fo acceptable to all People; because its Beauty appears at firft Sight, and there is requir'd no labour of Thought to examine what Truth or Reason there is in it. The Mind, without looking any farther, refts fatisfy'd with the agreeableness of the Picture, and the gaity of the Fancy: And it is a kind of an affront to go about to examine it by the fevere Rules of Truth and good Reason; whereby it appears, that it confifts in fomething that is not perfectly conformable to them.

. 3. To the well diftinguishing our Ideas, it chiefly contributes, they be clear and determinate: And when they are fo, it will not breed any Confufion or Mistake about them, tho' the Senfes fhould (as fometimes they do) convey them from the fame Object differently, on different occafions, and fo feem to err For tho' a Man in a Fever fhould from Sugar have a bitter Tafte, which at ano ther time would produce a fweet one; yet the Idea of bitter in that Man's Mind, would be as clear and distinct from the Idea of fweet, as if he had tafted only Gall. Nor does it make any more confufion between the two Ideas of fweet and bitter, that the fame fort of Body produces at one Time one, and at another Time another Idea by the Tafte, than it makes a confufion in two Ideas of white and fweet, or white and round, that the fame piece of Sugar produces them both in the Mind at the fame Time. And the Ideas of Orange-colour and Azure, that are produced in the Mind by the fame parcel of the infufion of Lig num Nephriticum, are no lefs diftin&t Ideas, than thofe of the fame Colours, taken from two very different Bodies.

§. 4. The COMPARING them one with another, in refpe&t of Extent, Degrees, Time, Place, or any other Circumftances, is another Operation of the Mind about its Ideas, and is that upon which depends all that large Tribe of Ideas, comprehended under Relation; which of how vaft an Extent it is, I fhall have Occafion to confider hereafter.

§. 5. How far Brutes partake in this Faculty, is not eafy to determine, I pare but im- imagine they have it not in any great degree: For tho' they probably have feperfectly. vera Ideas diftinct enough, yet it feems to me to be the Prerogative of human Understanding, when it has fufficiently diftinguifh'd any Ideas, fo as to perceive them to be perfectly different, and fo confequently two, to caft about

and

and confider in what Circumftances they are capable to be compar'd: And therefore, I think, Beafts compare not their Ideas farther than fome fenfible Circumftances annex'd to the Objects themselves. The other power of comparing, which may be observ'd in Men, belonging to general Ideas, and useful only to abstract Reasonings, we may probably conjecture Beasts have not.

§. 6. The next Operation we may obferve in the Mind about its Ideas, is Compounding COMPOSITION; whereby it puts together feveral of thofe fimple ones it has receiv'd from Senfation and Reflection, and combines them into complex ones. Under this of Compofition may be reck on'd alfo that of ENLARGING; wherein tho' the Compofition does not fo much appear as in more complex ones, yet it is nevertheless a putting feveral Ideas together, tho' of the fame kind. Thus by adding feveral Units together, we make the Idea of à Dozen; and putting together the repeated Ideas of feveral Perches, we frame that of Furlong.

§. 7. In this alfo, I fuppofe, Brutes come far fhort of Men: For tho' they Brutes com take in, and retain together feveral Combinations of fimple Ideas, as poffibly pound but lit the Shape, Smell and Voice of his Mafter make up the complex Idea a Dog has the of him, or rather are fo many diftin&t Marks, whereby he knows him; yet I do not think they do of themselves ever compound them, and make complex Ideas. And perhaps even where we think they have complex Ideas, 'tis only one fimple one that directs them in the knowledg of feveral things, which poffibly they diftinguifh lefs by their Sight than we imagine: For I have been credibly. inform'd, that a Bitch will nurfe, play with, and be fond of young Foxes, as much as, and in place of her Puppies, if you can but get them once to fuck her fo long, that her Milk may go thro' them. And thofe Animals, which have a numerous brood of young ones at once, appear not to have any knowledg of their number: for tho' they are mightily concern'd for any of their Young that are taken from them whilft they are in fight or hearing; yet if one or two of them be ftolen from them in their abfence, or without noife, they appear not to miss them, or to have any fenfe that their number is leffen'd.

§. 8. When Children have, by repeated Senfations, got Ideas fix'd in their Naming Memories, they begin by degrees to learn the ufe of Signs. And when they have got the Skill to apply the Organs of Speech to the framing of articulate Sounds, they begin to make use of Words, to fignify their ideas to others. Thefe verbal Signs they fometimes borrow from others, and fometimes make themselves, as one may obferve among the new and unusual Names Children often give to things in their firft ufe of Language:

§. 9. The ufe of Words then being to ftand as outward Marks of our inter- Abstraction nal Ideas, and those Ideas being taken from particular things, if every particular Idea that we take in, fhould have a diftinct Name, Names must be endless: To prevent this, the Mind makes the particular Ideas, receiv'd from particular Objects, to become general; which is done by confidering them as they are in the Mind fuch Appearances, feparate from all other Existences, and the Circumftances of real Exiftence, as Time, Place, or any other concomitant Ideas. This is call'd ABSTRACTION, whereby Ideas, taken from particular Beings, become general Representatives of all of the fame kind, and their Names general Names, applicable to whatever exifts conformable to fuch abstract Ideas. Such precife naked Appearances in the Mind, without confidering how, whence, or with what others they came there, the Understanding lays up (with Names commonly annex'd to them) as the Standards to rank real Existences into forts, as they agree with thefe Patterns, and to denominate them accordingly. Thus the fame Colour being obferv'd to day in Chalk or Snow, which the Mind yesterday receiv'd from Milk, it confiders that Appearance a lone, makes it a Reprefentative of all of that kind; and having given it the hame Whiteness, it by that Sound fignifies the fame Quality, wherefoever to be imagin'd or met with: and thus Univerfals, whether Ideas of Terms, are made.

§. 1. If it may be doubted, whether Beafts compound and inlarge their Brutes ab aḥIdeas that way to any degree; this, I think, I may be pofitive in, that the ftra& not. power of Abstracting is not at all in them; and that the having of general Ideas, is that which pats à perfect distinction betwixt Man and Brutes, and is an ExVol. I, cellency