Idiots and
Madmen.

cellency which the Faculties of Brutes do by no means attain tc. For it is evident we obferve no Footsteps in them, of making use of general Signs for univerfal Ideas; from which we have reason to imagine, that they have not the faculty of abftra&ting, or making general Ideas, fince they have no ufe of Words, or any other general Signs.

§. II. Nor can it be imputed to their want of fit Organs to frame articulate Sounds, that they have no ufe or knowledg of general Words; fince many of them we find, can fashion fuch Sounds, and pronounce Words diftinctly enough, but never with any fuch Application. And on the other fide, Men who thro' fome defect in the Organs want Words, yet fail not to exprefs their univerfal Ideas by figns, which ferve them inftead of general Words; a faculty which we fee Beafts come fhort in. And therefore I think we may fuppofe, that 'tis in this that the Species of Brutes are difcriminated from Man; and 'tis that proper difference wherein they are wholly feparated, and which at last widens to fo vaft a diftance: For if they have any Ideas at all, and are not bare Machines (as fome would have them) we cannot deny them to have fome Reason. It seems as evident to me, that they do fome of them in certain Inftances reafon, as that they have Sense; but it is only in particular Ideas, juft as they received them from their Senfes. They are the best of them ty'd up within those narrow bounds, and have not (as I think) the faculty to inlarge them by any kind of Abftraction.

§. 12. How far Idiots are concern'd in the want or weakness of any, or all of the foregoing Faculties, an exact Obfervation of their several ways of faltering would no doubt difcover: For those who either perceive but dully, or retain the Ideas that come into their Minds but ill, who cannot readily excite or compound them, will have little matter to think on. Those who cannot diftinguifh, compare and abftra&t, would hardly be able to understand and make ufe of Language, or judg or reafon to any tolerable degree; but only a little and imperfectly about things prefent, and very familiar to their Senfes. And indeed any of the foremention'd Faculties, if wanting, or out of order, produce fuitable defects of Mens Understandings and Knowledg

§. 13. In fine, the defect in Naturals feem to proceed from want of Quickness, Activity and Motion in the intelle&tual Faculties, whereby they are depriv'd of Reafon; whereas Madmen, on the other fide, feem to fuffer by the other Extreme: For they do not appear to me to have loft the Faculty of Reasoning; but having join'd together fome Ideas very wrongly, they mistake them for Truths, and they err as Men do that argue right from wrong Principles. For by the violence of their Imaginations, having taken their Fancies for Realities, they make right Deductions from them. Thus you fhall find a distracted Man, fanfying himself a King, with a right Inference require fuitable Attendance, Ref pect and Obedience: Others, who have thought themfelves made of Glass, have us'd the Caution neceflary to preferve fuch brittle Bodies. Hence it comes to pass that a Man, who is very fober, and of a right understanding in all other things, may in one particular be as frantick as any in Bedlam; if either by any fudden very strong Impreffion, or long fixing his Fancy upon one fort of Thoughts, incoherent Ideas have been cemented together fo powerfully, as to remain united. But there are degrees of Madnefs, as of Folly; the disorderly jumbling Ideas together, is in fome more, and fome lefs. In fhort, herein seems to lie the difference between Idiots and Madmen, That Madmen put wrong Ideas together, and fo make wrong Propofitions, but argue and reafon right from them; but Idiots make very few or no Propofitions, and reason scarce at all.

Method. §. 14. Thefe, I think, are the firft Faculties and Operations of the Mind, which it makes ufe of in Understanding; and tho' they are exercis'd about all its Ideas in general, yet the Inftances I have hitherto given have been chiefly in fimple Ideas: And I have subjoin'd the Explication of thefe Faculties of the Mind to that of fimple Ideas, before I come to what I have to fay concerning complex ones, for thefe following Reafons.

Firft, Because several of thefe Faculties being exercis'd at firft principally about fimple Ideas, we might, by following Nature in its ordinary Method, trace and difcover them in their Rife, Progrefs, and gradual Improvements. Secondly,

Secondly, Becaufe obferving the Faculties of the Mind, how they operate about fimple Ideas, which are ufually, in moft Mens Minds, much more clear, precife and diftin&t than complex ones, we may the better examine and learn how the Mind abstracts, denominates, compares and exercises its other Operations about thofe which are complex, wherein we are much more liable to mistake.

Thirdly, Because these very Operations of the Mind about Ideas, receiv'd from Senfation, are themselves, when reflected on, another Set of Ideas, deriv'd from that other Source of our Knowledg which I call Reflection, and therefore fit to be confider'd in this place after the fimple Ideas of Senfation. Of Compounding, Comparing, Abstracting, &c. I have but juft fpoken, having Occafion to treat of them more at large in other places.

buman Know

§. 15. And thus I have given a fhort, and, I think, true Hiftory of the first Be- These are the ginnings of Human Knowledg, whence the Mind has its firft Objects, and by what beginnings of fteps it makes its Progrefs to the laying in and ftoring up those Ideas, out of ledg. which is to be fram'd all the knowledg it is capable of; wherein I must appeal to Experience and Obfervation, whether I am in the right: The belt way to come to Truth, being to examine things as really they are, and not to conclude they are as we fanfy of our felves, or have been taught by others to imagine.

9. 16. To deal truly, this is the only way that I can discover, whereby the Ideas Appeal to Exof things are brought into the Understanding: If other Men have either innate Ideas, perience. or infus'd Principles, they have reafon to enjoy them; and if they are fure of it, it is impoffible for others to deny them the Privilege that they have above their Neighbours. I can speak but of what I find in my self, and is agreeable to those Notions; which, if we will examine the whole courfe of Men in their feveral Ages, Countries and Educations, feem to depend on those Foundations which I have laid, and to correfpond with this Method in all the Parts and Degrees thereof.

§. 17. I pretend not to teach, but to enquire, and therefore cannot but con- Dark Room! fefs here again, That external and internal Senfation are the only Paffages that I can find of Knowledg to the Understanding. These alone, as far as I can difcover, are the Windows by which Light is let into this dark Room: For methinks the Understanding is not much unlike a Closet wholly fhut from Light, with only fome little opening left, to let in external vifible Refemblances, or Ideas of things without: Would the Pictures coming into fuch a dark Room but stay there, and lie fo orderly as to be found upon occafion, it would very much resemble the Understanding of a Man, in reference to all Objects of Sight, and the Ideas of them.

These are my Gueffes concerning the means whereby the Understanding comes to have and retain fimple Ideas, and the Modes of them, with fome other Operations about them. I proceed now to examine fome of these fimple Ideas, and their Modes, a little more particularly.

WE

CHAP. XII.

Of Complex Ideas:

§. 1. E have hitherto confider'd those Ideas, in the Reception whereof Made by the the Mind is only paffive, which are thofe fimple ones receiv'd from Mind out of Simple onesi Senfation and Reflection before-mention'd, whereof the Mind cannot make one to it felf, nor have any Idea which does not wholly confift of them. But as the Mind is wholly paffive in the reception of all its fimple Ideas, fo it exerts several Aas of its own, whereby out of its fimple Ideas, as the Materials and Foundations of the reft, the other are fram'd. The Acts of the Mind, wherein it exerts its Power over tis fimple Ideas, are chiefly these three: 1. Combining feveral fimple Ideas into one compound one, and thus all complex Ideas are made. 2. The fecond is bringing two Ideas, whether fimple or complex, together, and fetting them by one another, fo as to take a view of them at once, without uniting them into one; by which way it gets all its Ideas of Re

lations.

Made voluntarily.

'Are either

Modes, Subftances or Relations.

Modes.

lations. 3. The third is feparating them from all other Ideas that accompany them in their real Exiftence; this is call'd Abstraction: And thus all its general Ideas are made. This fhews Man's Power, and its way of Operation, to be much-what the fame in the material and intellectual World. For the Materials in both being fuch as he has no power over, either to make or destroy, all that Man can do is either to unite them together, or to fet them by one another, or wholly feparate them. I fhall here begin with the first of these in the Confi deration of complex Ideas, and come to the other two in their due places. A's fimple Ideas are obferv'd to exift in feveral Combinations united together, fo the Mind has a power to confider several of them united together as one Idea; and that not only as they are united in external Objects, but as it felf has join'd them. Ideas thus made up of feveral timple ones put together, I call complex ; fuch as are Beauty, Gratitude, a Man, an Army, the Univerfe; which tho' complicated of various fimple Ideas, or complex ideas made up of fimple ones, yer are, when the Mind pleafes, confider'd each by it felf as one entire Thing, and fignify'd by one Name.

. 2. In this faculty of repeating and joining together its Ideas, the Mind has great power in varying and multiplying the Objects of its Thoughts, infinitely beyond what Senfation or Reflection furnish'd it with; but all this ftill confin'd to thofe fimple Ideas which it receiv'd from thofe two Sources, and which are the ultimate Materials of all its Compofitions: For fimple Ideas are all from things themselves, and of these the Mind can have no more, nor other than what are suggested to it. It can have no other ideas of fenfible Qualities than what come from without by the Senfes, nor any Ideas of other kind of Opera tions of a thinking Subftance, than what it finds in it felf; but when it has once got thefe fimple Ideas, it is not confin'd barely to Obfervation, and what offers it felf from without: It can, by its own power, put together those Ideas it has, and make new complex ones, which it never receiv'd fo united.

S. 3. Complex Ideas, however compounded and decompounded, tho' their number be infinite, and the variety endless, wherewith they fill and entertain the Thoughts of Men; yet, I think, they may be all reduc'd under these three

Heads:

1. Modes.

2. Subftances.

3. Relations.

3. 4. Firft, Modes I call fuch complex Ideas, which however compounded, contain not in them the fuppofition of fubfifting by themselves, but are confider'd: as Dependances on, or Affections of Subftances; fuch are the Ideas fignify'd by; the Words Triangle, Gratitude, Murder, &c. And if in this I ufe the word Mode in fomewhat a different fenfe from its ordinary fignification, I beg pardon; it Being unavoidable in Difcourfes, differing from the ordinary receiv'd Notions, either to make new Words, or to ufe old Words in fomewhat a new Signification: The latter whereof, in our present Cafe, is perhaps the more tolerable of the two.

. 5. Of these Modes, there are two Sorts which deferve diftin& Confideration: Simple and mix'd Modes. First, There are fome which are only Variations, or different Combinations of the fame fimple Idea, without the mixture of any other, as a dozen or score ; which are nothing but the Ideas of fo many diftinct Units added together: And thefe I call fimple Modes, as being contain'd within the bounds of one fimple Idea. Secondly, There are others compounded of fimple Ideas of feveral kinds, pue together to make one complex one; v. g. Beauty, confifting of a certain Compofition of Colour and Figure, caufing Delight in the Beholder; Theft, which be ing the conceal'd Change of the poffeffion of any thing, without the Confent of the Proprietor, contains, as is vifible, a Combination of feveral Ideas of leveral kinds: And thefe I call mix'd Modes.

Subftances

fingle or colle Aive.

1. 6. Secondly, The Ideas of Subftances are fuch Combinations or fimple Ideas, as are taken to reprefent diftin&t particular things fubfifting by themfelves; in which the fuppos'd or confus'd Idea of Subftance, fuch as it is, is always the firft and chief. Thus if to Subftance be join'd the fimple Idea of a certain. dull whitish Colour, with certain degrees of Weight, Hardness, Ductility and Fufibility, we have the Idea of Lead, and a Combination of the Laeas of a cer

tain

tain fort of Figure, with the Powers of Motion, Thought and Reasoning, join'd to Substance, make the ordinary Idea of a Man. Now of Substances also there are two forts of Ideas, one of fingle Substances, as they exist separately, as of a Man or a Sheep; the other of feveral of those put together, as an Army of Men, or Flock of Sheep: Which collective Ideas of feveral Subftances thus put together, are as much each of them one fingle Idea, as that of a Man, or an Unit.

§. 7. Thirdly, The laft fort of complex Ideas, is that we call Relation, which Relationè confifts in the Confideration and comparing one Idea with another. Of these several kinds we fhall treat in their order.

the two Sour

9. 8. If we trace the progress of our Minds, and with attention obferve how The abftrufeft it repeats, adds together, and unites its fimple Ideas receiv'd from Senfation or Ideas from Reflection, it will lead us farther than at first perhaps we should have imagin'd. ceso And I believe we fhall find, if we warily obferve the Originals of our Notions, that even the most abftrufe Ideas, how remote foever they may feem from Sense, or from any Operation of our own Minds, are yet only fuch as the Understanding frames to it felf, by repeating and joining together Ideas, that it had either from Objects of Senfe, or from its own Operations about them: So that those even large and abstract Ideas, are derived from Senfation or Reflection, being no other than what the Mind, by the ordinary ufe of its own Faculties, imploy'd about Ideas receiv'd from Objects of Senfe, or from the Operations it obferves in it felfabout them, may and does attain unto. This I fhall endeavour to shew in the Ideas we have of Space, Time and Infinity, and fome few others, that feem the most remote from thofe Originals.

CHAP. XIII.

Of Simple Modes, and first of the Simple Modes of Space.

TH

HO' in the foregoing Part I have often mention'd fimple Ideas, which Simple Mode! are truly the Materials of all our Knowledg; yet having treated of them there, rather in the way that they come into the Mind, than as diftinguish'd from others more compounded, it will not be perhaps amils to take a view of fome of them again under this Confideration, and examine those different Modifications of the fame Idea; which the Mind either finds in things exifting, or is able to make within it felf, without the help of any extrinfecal Object, or any foreign Suggestion.

Thofe Modifications of any one fimple Idea (which, as has been faid, I call fimple Modes) are as perfectly different and diftin&t Ideas in the Mind, as thofe of the greatest Distance or Contrariety. For the Idea of Two is as diftinct from that of One, as Bluenefs from Heat, or either of them from any Number: And yet it is made up only of that fimple Idea of an Unit repeated; and Repetitions of this kind join'd together, make thofe diftin& fimple Modes, of a Dozen, a Grofs, a Million.

§. 2. I fhall begin with the fimple Idea of Space. I have fhew'd above, Chap. 4. Idea of Space, that we get the Idea of Space, both by our Sight and Touch; which I think, is so evident, that it would be as needlefs to go to prove that Men perceive, by their Sight, a Distance between Bodies of different Colours, or between the Parts of the fame Body, as that they fee Colours themselves; nor is it less obvious, that they can do fo in the dark by Feeling and Touch.

§. 3. This Space confider'd barely in Length between any two Beings, with- Space andEx out confidering any thing elfe between them, is call'd Diftance; if confider'd tenfion in Length, Breadth and Thickness, I think it may be call'd Capacity. The Term Extenfion is ufually apply'd to it in what manner foever confider'd.

. 4. Each different Distance is a different Modification of Space; and each Immensity, Idea of any different Distance, or Space, is a fimple Mode of this Idea. Men for the Ufe, and by the Custom of Measuring, fettle in their Minds the Ideas of certain ftated Lengths, fuch as are an Inch, Foot, Tard, Fathom, Mile, Diameter of the Earth, &c. which are fo many diftinct Ideas made up only of Space. When any fuch stated Lengths or Measures of Space are made familiar to Mens

Thoughts,

Thoughts, they can in their Minds repeat them as often as they will without mixing or joining to them the Idea of Body, or any thing clfe; and frame to themselves the Ideas of Long, Square, or Cubick, Feet, Yards, or Fathoms, here amongst the Bodies of the Univerfe, or elfe beyond the utmoft Bounds of all Bodies; and by adding thefe ftill one to another, enlarge their Idea of Space as much as they please. This Power of repeating, or doubling any Idea we have of any distance, and adding it to the former as often as we will, without being e never able to come to any ftop or flint, let us enlarge it as much as we will, is such idret that which gives us the Idea of Immenfity.

Have

Figure.

Figure.

Place.

9. 5. There is another Modification of this Idea, which is nothing but the relation which the Parts of the Termination of Extenfion, or circumfcrib'd Space, have amongst themselves. This the Touch difcovers in fenfible Bodies, whofe Extremities come within our reach ; and the Eye takes both from Bodies and Colours, whose Boundaries are within its view: Where obferving how the Extremities terminate either in ftreight Lines, which meet at difcernible Angles, or in crooked Lines, wherein no Angles can be perceiv'd, by confidering these as they relate to one another, in all Parts of the Extremities of any Body or Space, it has that Idea we call Figure, which affords to the Mind infinite Variery. For befides the vaft number of different Figures, that do really exift in the coherent Maffes of Matter, the Stock that the Mind has in its power, by varying the Idea of Space, and thereby making ftill new Compofitions, by repeating its own Ideas, and joining them as it pleafes, is perfectly inexhauftible: And fo it can multiply Figures in infinitum.

§. 6. For the Mind having a power to repeat the Idea of any Length directly ftretch'd out, and join it to another in the fame Direction, which is to double the Length of that ftreight Line, or elfe join it to another with what Inclination it thinks fit, and fo make what fort of Angle it pleases; and being able alfo to fhorten any Line it imagines, by taking from it one half, or one fourth, or what part it pleases, without being able to come to an end of any fuch Divifions, it can make an Angle of any Bignefs: So alfo the Lines that are its Sides, of what Length it pleases; which joining again to other Lines of different Lengths and at different Angles, till it has wholly inclos'd any Space, it is evident, that it can multiply Figures both in their Shape and Capacity in infinitum; all which are but fo many different fimple Modes of Space.

The fame that it can do with ftreight Lines, it can do alfo with crooked, or crooked and streight together; and the fame it can do in Lines, it can alfo in Superficies: By which we may be led into farther Thoughts of the endless Variety of Figures, that the Mind has a Power to make, and thereby to multiply the fimple Modes of Space.

. 7. Another Idea coming under this Head, and belonging to this Tribe, is that we call Place.. As in fimple Space, we confider the relation of Distance between any two Bodies, or Points; fo in our Idea of Place, we confider the rela tion of Distance betwixt any Thing, and any two or more Points, which are confider'd as keeping the fame distance one with another, and fo confider'd as at reft: for when we find any thing at the fame diftance now, which it was yesterday from any two or more Points, which have not fince chang'd their dif tance one with another, and with which we then compar'd it, we fay it hath kept the fame Place; but if it hath fenfibly alter'd its diftance with either of thofe Points, we fay it hath chang'd its place: Tho' vulgarly fpeaking, in the common Notion of Place, we do not always exactly obferve the diftance from precise Points; but from larger Portions of fenfible Objects, to which we confider the thing plac'd to bear relation, and its distance from which we have some reason to obferve.

8. Thus a Company of Chefs-men ftanding on the fame Squares of the Chefs-board, where we left them, we fay they are all in the fame Place, or unmov'd; tho' perhaps the Chef-board hath been in the mean time carry'd out of one Room into another, because we compar'd them only to the Parts of the Chefs-board, which keep: the fame distance one with another. The Chefsboard, we alfo, fay, is in the fame Place it was, if it remain in the fame part of the Cabin, tho' perhaps the Ship, which it is in, fails all the while: And the Ship is faid to be in the fame Place, fuppofing it kept the fame distance with

the