Men differ little in clear

fimple Ideas

Duration is fleeting Extenfion.

Thickness; or elfe confidering it as lying between any two Bodies, or pofitive Beings, without any confideration whether there be any Matter or no between, we call it Diftance: However named or confidered, it is always the fame uniform fimple Idea of Space, taken from Objects about which our Senfes have been converfant; whereof having fettled Ideas in our Minds, we can revive, repeat, and add them one to another as often as we will, and confider the Space or Distance fo imagin'd, either as fill'd with folid Parts, fo that another Body cannot come there, without difplacing and thrufting out the Body that was there before; or elfe as void of Solidity, fo that a Body of equal dimenfions to that empty or pure Space may be placed in it. without the removing or expulfion of any thing that was there. But to avoid Confufion in Difcourfes concerning this matter, it were poffibly to be wished that the name Extenfion were apply'd only to Matter, or the Distance of the Extremities of particu.ar Bodies; and the term Expanfion to Space in general, with or without folid Matter poffeffing it, so as to lay Space is expanded, and Body extended. But in this, every one has his liberty ; I propofe it only for the more clear and diftin&t way of fpeaking.

. 28. The knowing prec fely what our Words ftand for, would, I imagine, in this as well as a great many other cafes, quickly end the difpute. For I am apt to think that Men, when they come to examine them, find their fimple Ideas all generally to agree, tho' in difcourfe with one another, they perhaps confound one another with different names. I imagine that Men who abftra& their Thoughts, and do well examine the Ideas of their own Minds, cannot much differ in thinking; however, they may perplex themfelves with words, according to the way of speaking of the feveral Schools or Sects they have been bred up in: tho' amongft unthinking Men, who examine not fcrupulously and carefully their own Ideas, and strip them not from the marks Men ufe for them, but confound them with Words, there must be endless Difpute, Wrangling, and Jargon; efpecially if they be learned bookish Men, devoted to fome Sect, and accuftom'd to the Language of it, and have learn'd to talk after others. But if it should happen, that any two thinking Men, fhould really have different Ideas, I do not fee how they could difcourfe or argue one with another. Here I muft not be mistaken, to think that every floating Imagination in Mens brains, is prefently of that fort of Ideas I fpeak of. 'Tis not eafy for the Mind to put off those confus'd Notions and Prejudices it has imbib'd from Custom, Inadvertency, and common Converfation: It requires Pains and Affiduity to examine its Ideas, till it refolves them into thofe clear and diftinct fimple ones out of which they are compounded; and to fee which, amongst its fimple ones, have or have not a neceffary Connexion and dependance one upon another. Till a Man doth this in the primary and original Notions of things, he builds upon floating and uncertain Principles, and will often find himself at a loss.

CHAP. XIV.

Of Duration, and its Simple Modes.

5. 1. THE

HERE is another fort of Distance or Length, the Idea whereof we get not from the permanent Parts of Space, but from the fleeting and perpetually perifhing Parts of Succeffion. This we call Duration, the fimple Modes whereof are any different Lengths of it, whereof we have diftin&t Ideas, as Hours, Days, Years, &c. Time and Eternity.

its Idea from §. 2. The Anfwer of a Great Man, to one who ask'd what Time was, Si non Reflection on rogas intelligo, (which amounts to this; the more I fet my felf to think of it, the Train of the lefs I understand it) might perhaps perfuade one, That Time, which reveals our Ideas. all other things, is it felf not to be difcovered. Duration, Time, and Eternity, are not without Reason thought to have fomething very abftrufe in their nature. But however remote these may feem from our Comprehenfion, yet if we trace them right to their Originals, I doubt not but one of thofe Sources of all our Knowledg, viz. Senfation and Reflection, will be able to furnish us with these Ideas, as clear and diftin&t as many other which are thought much less obfcure;

and

and we shall find, that the Idea of Eternity it felf is deriv'd from the fame common Original with the reft of our Ideas.

§. 3. To understand Time and Eternity aright, we ought with Attention to confider what Idea it is we have of Duration, and how we came by it. "Tis evident to any one, who will but obferve what paffes in his own Mind, that there is a Train of Ideas, which conftantly fucceed one another in his Understanding, as long as he is awake. Reflection on these Appearances of feveral Ideas, one after another, in our Minds, is that which furnishes us with the Idea of Succeffion: and the Distance between any Parts of that Succeffion, or between the Appearance of any two Ideas in our Minds, is that we call Duration. For whilft we are thinking, or whilft we receive fucceffively feveral Ideas in our Minds, we know that we do exift; and fo we call the Exiftence, or the Continuation of the Existence of our felves, or any thing else commenfurate to the Succeffion of any Ideas in our Minds, the Duration of our felves, or any fuch other Thing co-exifting with our Thinking.

5. 4. That we have our Notion of Succeffion and Duration from this Original, viz. from Reflection on the Train of Ideas which we find to appear one after another in our own Minds, feems plain to me, in that we have no Perception of Duration, but by confidering the Train of Ideas that take their Turns in our Understandings. When that Succeffion of Ideas ceafes, our Perception of Duration ceases with it; which every one clearly experiments in himself, whilft he fleeps foundly, whether an Hour or a Day, a Month or a Year; of which Duration of things, whilft he fleeps or thinks not, he has no Perception at all, but it is quite loft to him; and the Moment wherein he leaves off to think, till the Moment he begins to think again, seems to him to have no Distance. And fo I doubt not it would be to a waking Man, if it were poffible for him to keep only one Idea in his Mind, without Variation and the Succeffion of others: And we fee, that one who fixes his Thoughts very intently on one thing, fo as to take but little notice of the Succeffion of Ideas that pafs in his Mind, whilft he is. taken up with that earnest Contemplation, lets flip out of his account a good Part of that Duration, and thinks that Time shorter than it is. But if Sleep commonly unites the diftant Parts of Duration, it is becaufe during that Time we have no Succeffion of Ideas in our Minds. For if a Man, during his Sleep, dreams, and Variety of Ideas make themselves perceptible in his Mind one after another; he hath then, during fuch a dreaming, a Senfe of Duration, and of the Length of it; by which it is to me very clear, that Men derive their Ideas of Duration from their Reflection on the Train of the Ideas they obferve to fucceed one another in their own Understandings; without which Obfervation they can have no Notion of Duration, whatever may happen in the World.

§. 5. Indeed a Man having, from reflecting on the Succeffion and Number of The Idea of his own Thoughts, got the Notion or Idea of Duration, he can apply that No- Duration ap plicable to tion to Things which exift while he does not think; as he that has got the Idea Things whift of Extenfion from Bodies by his Sight or Touch, can apply it to Distances, we sleep. where no Body is feen or felt. And therefore tho' a Man has no Perception of the Length of Duration, which pafs'd whilft he flept or thought not; yet having obferv'd the Revolution of Days and Nights, and found the Length of their Duration to be in Appearance regular and conftant, he can, upon the Suppofition that that Revolution has proceeded after the fame Manner, whilst he was afleep or thought not, as it used to do at other Times; he can, I fay, imagine and make Allowance for the Length of Duration, whilft he slept. But if Adam and Eve (when they were alone in the World) instead of their ordinary Night's Sleep, had pais'd the whole twenty four Hours in one continu'd Sleep, the Duration of that twenty four Hours had been irrecoverably loft to them, and been for ever left out of their Account of Time.

§. 6. Thus by reflecting on the appearing of various Ideas one after another in our The Idea of Understandings, we get the Notion of Succeffion; which if any one fhould think we Succeffion not did rather get from our Obfervation of Motion by our Senfes, he will perhaps from Motion. be of my Mind, when he confiders that even Motion produces in his Mind an Idea of Succeffion, no otherwife than as it produces there a continu'd Train of diftinguishible Ideas. For a Man, looking upon a Body really moving, perceives yet no Motion at all, unless that Motion produces a conftant Train of fucceffive

Ideas: v. g. a Man becalm'd at Sea, out of fight of Land, in a fair day, may look on the Sun, or Sea, or Ship, a whole Hour together, and perceive no Motion at all in either; tho' it be certain, that two, and perhaps all of them, have mov'd during that time a great way. But as foon as he perceives either of them to have chang'd Distance with fome other Body, as foon as this Motion produces any new Idea in him, then he perceives that there has been Motion. But wherever a Man is with all things at reft about him, without perceiving any Motion at all; if during this Hour of Quiet he has been thinking, he will perceive the various Ideas of his own Thoughts in his own Mind, appearing one after another, and thereby obferve and find Succeffion where he could obferve no Motion.

.7. And this, I think, is the Reason, why Motions very flow, tho' they are conftant, are not perceiv'd by us; because in their remove from one fenfible part towards another, their change of Distance is fo flow, that it caufes no new Ideas in us, but a good while one after another: and fo not caufing a conftant Train of new Ideas to follow one another immediately in our Minds, we have no Perception of Motion; which confifting in a conftant Succeffion, we cannot perceive that Succeffion without a conftant Succeffion of varying Ideas arising from it.

§. 8. On the contrary, things that move fo fwift as not to affect the Senfes diftinctly with feveral diftinguifhible Distances of their Motion, and fo caufe not any Train of Ideas in the Mind, are not allo perceiv'd to move: For any thing that moves round about in a Circle, in lefs time than our Ideas are wont to fucceed one another in our Minds, is not perceiv'd to move; but seems to be a perfect entire Circle of that Matter or Colour, and not a part of a Circle in Motion.

The Train of 6. 9. Hence I leave it to others to judg, whether it be not probable that our Ideas has a Ideas do, whilft we are awake, fucceed one another in our Minds at certain certain degree Distances, not much unlike the Images in the infide of a Lanthorn, turn'd round of Quickness. by the Heat of a Candle. This Appearance of theirs in Train, tho' perhaps it may be fometimes fafter, and fometimes flower, yet, I guess, varies not very much in a waking Man. There feem to be certain Bounds to the Quickness and Slowness of the Succeffion of those Ideas one to another in our Minds, beyond which they can neither delay nor haften.

This Train the
Measure of o

. 10. The reafon I have for this odd Conjecture, is, from obferving that in the Impreffions made upon any of our Senfes, we can but to a certain degree perceive any Succeffion; which if exceeding quick, the Senfe of Succeffion is loft, even in Cafes where it is evident that there is a real Succeffion. Let a Cannon-Bullet país thro' a Room, and in its way take with it any Limb, or fleshy Parts of a Man; 'tis as clear as any Demonftration can be, that it muft ftrike fucceffively the two fides of the Room: 'Tis alfo evident, that it muft touch one part of the Flesh firft; and another after, and fo in Succeffion : And yet I believe no body, who ever felt the Pain of fuch a Shot, or heard the Blow against the two diftant Walls, could perceive any Succeffion either in the Pain or Sound of fo fwift a Stroke. Such a part of Duration as this, wherein we perceive no fucceffion, is that which we may call an inftant, and is that which takes up the time of only one Idea in our Minds, without the Succeffion of another, wherein therefore we perceive no Succeffion at all.

. II. This alfo happens, where the Motion is fo flow, as not to fupply a conftant Train of fresh Ideas to the Senfes, as faft as the Mind is capable of rece:ving new ones into it ; and fo other Ideas of our own Thoughts, having room to come into our Minds, between thofe offer'd to our fenfes by the moving Body, there the Senfe of Motion is loft; and the Body, tho' it really moves, yet not changing perceivable Distance with fome other Bodies, as fast as the Ideas of our own Minds do naturally follow one another in Train, the thing feems to ftand ftill, as is evident in the Hands of Clocks and Shadows of Sun-dials, and other conftant but flow Motions; where, tho' after certain Intervals, we perceive by the Change of Distance that it hath mov'd, yet the Motion it felf we perceive

not.

. 12. So that to me it feems, that the conftant and regular Succeffion of Ideas ther Succef in a waking Man, is, as it were, the Measure and Standard of all other Succeffions,

fions.

whereof

whereof if any one either exceeds the pace of our Ideas, as where two Sounds or Pains, &c. take up in their Succeffion the Duration of but one Idea, or elfe where any Motion or Succeffion is fo flow, as that it keeps not pace with the Ideas in our Minds, or the Quicknefs in which they take their turns; as when any one or more Ideas, in their ordinary Courfe, come into our Mind, between thofe which are offer'd to the Sight by the different perceptible Distances of á Body in Motion, or between Sounds or Smells following one another, there alfo the Senfe of a conftant continu'd Succeffion is loft, and we perceive it not but with certain Gaps of Reft between.

one invaria

§. 13. If it be fo that the Ideas of our Minds, whilft we have any there, do The Mind canconftantly change and fhift in a continual Succeffion, it would be impoffible, net fix long on may any one fay, for a Man to think long of any one thing. By which, if it ble Idea. be meant, that a Man may have one felf-fame fingle Idea a long time alone in his Mind, without any Variation at all, I think, in matter of Fact, it is not possible; for which (not knowing how the Ideas of our Minds are fram'd, of what Materials they are made, whence they have their Light, and how they come to make their Appearances) I can give no other reafon but Experience: And I would have any one try whether he can keep one unvary'd fingle Idea in his Mind, without any other, for any confiderable time together.

9. 14. For trial, let him take any Figure, any degree of Light or Whitenefs, or what other he pleases; and he will, I fuppofe, find it difficult to keep all other Ideas out of his Mind: But that fome, either of another kind, or various Confideration of that Idea (each of which Confiderations is a new Idea) will conftantly fucceed one another in his Thoughts, let him be as wary as he

can.

. 15. All that is in a Man's Power in this Cafe, I think is only to mind and obferve what the Ideas are, that take their turns in his Understanding; or elfe to direct the fort, and call in fuch as he hath a defire or ufe of: But hinder the conftant Succeffion of fresh ones, I think he cannot, tho' he may commonly chufe whether he will heedfully obferve and confider them.

include no

§. 16. Whether thefe feveral Ideas in a man's Mind be made by certain Mo- Ideas, howtions, I will not here difpute; but this I am fure, that they include no Idea of ever made Motion, in their Appearance; and if a Man had not the Idea of Motion other Senfe of Mowife, I think he would have none at all which is enough to my prefent pur- tion. pofe, and fufficiently fhews, that the notice we take of the Ideas of our own Minds, appearing there one after another, is that which gives us the Idea of Succeffion and Duration, without which we fhould have no fuch Ideas at all. 'Tis not then Motion, but the conftant Train of Ideas in our Minds, whilft we are waking, that furnishes us with the Idea of Duration, whereof Motion no otherwife gives us any Perception, than as it caufes in our Minds a conftant Succeffion of Ideas, as I have before fhew'd: And we have as clear an Idea of Succeffion and Duration, by the train of other Ideas fucceeding one another in our Minds, without the Idea of any Motion, as by the train of Ideas caus'd by the uninterrupted fenfible Change of Distance between two Bodies, which we have from Motion; and therefore we should as well have the Idea of Duration, were there no Senfe of Motion at all.

. 17. Having thus got the Idea of Duration, the next thing natural for the Time is DuMind to do, is to get fome Measure of this common Duration, whereby it ration fet out might judg of its different Lengths, and confider the diftinct Order wherein by Meafures. feveral things exift, without which a great part of our Knowledg would be confus'd, and a great part of History be render'd very useless. This Confideration of Duration, as fet out by certain Periods, and mark'd by certain Meafures or Epochs, is that, I think, which moft properly we call Time.

muft divide

9. 18. In the measuring of Extenfion, there is nothing more requir'd but A good Meathe Application of the Standard or Measure we make ufe of to the thing, of fure of Time whofe Extenfion we would be inform'd. But in the meafuring of Duration, Duthis cannot be done, because no two different parts of Succeffion can be put to- ration into egether to measure one another: And nothing being a Measure of Duration but qual Periods. Duration, as nothing is of Extenfion but Extenfion, we cannot keep by us any ftanding unvarying Measure of Duration, which confifts in a conftant fleeting Succeffion, as we can of certain Lengths of Extenfion, as Inches, Feet, Yards, L

Vol. I.

&c.

The Revolu tions of the

Sun and Moon the propereft Measures of

Time.

&c. mark'd out in permanent parcels of Matter. Nothing then could ferv well for a convenient measure of Time, but what has divided the whole Length of its Duration into apparently equal Portions, by conftantly repeated Periods. What Portions of Duration are not diftinguifh'd, or confider'd as diftinguifh'd and meafur'd by fuch Periods, come not fo properly under the Notion of Time, as appears by fuch Phrafes as these, viz. Before all Time, and when Time shall be

no more.

§. 19. The diurnal and annual Revolutions of the Sun, as having been, from the beginning of Nature, conftant, regular, and univerfally obfervable by all Mankind, and fuppos'd equal to one another, have been with reafon made ufe of for the Measure of Duration. But the diftinction of Days and Years having depended on the Motion of the Sun, it has brought this Miftake with it, that it has been thought that Motion and Duration were the Measure one of another: For Men, in the measuring of the Length of Time, having been accuftom'd to the Ideas of Minutes, Hours, Days, Months, Years, &c. which they found themfelves upon any mention of Time or Duration prefently to think on, all which Portions of Time were meafur'd out by the Motion of thofe heavenly B dies; they were apt to confound Time and Motion, or at least to think that they had a neceffary Connexion one with another: whereas any conftant periodical Appearance, or Alteration of Ideas in feemingly equidiftant Spaces of Duration, if conftant and univerfally obfervabie, would have as well diftinguifh'd the Intervals of Time, as those that have been made ufe of. For fuppofing the Sun, which fome have taken to be a Fire, had been lighted up at the fame distance of Time that it now every day comes about to the fame Meridian, and then gone out again about twelve Hours after, and that in the space of an annual Revolution, it had fenfibly increas'd in Brightness and Heat, and fo decreas'd again; would not fuch regular Appearances ferve to measure out the Distances of Duration to all that could obferve it, as well without as with Motion? For if the Appearances were conftant, univerfally obfervable, and in equie diftant Periods, they would ferve Mankind for Measure of Time as well, were the Motion away.

But not by . 20. For the freezing of Water, or the blowing of a Plant, returning at their Motion equidiftant Periods in all Parts of the Earth, would as well ferve Men to reckon but periodical their Years by, as the Motions of the Sun: And in effect we fee, that fome Appearances. People in America counted their Years by the coming of certain Birds amongst

No two parts of Duration can be certainly known to be equal.

them at their certain Seafons, and leaving them at others. For a Fit of an Ague, the Senfe of Hunger or Thirft, a Smell or a Tafte, or any other Idea returning conftantly at equidiftant Periods, and making it felf univerfally be taken notice of, would not fail to measure out the Courfe of Succeffion, and diftinguish the Distances of Time. Thus we fee that Men born blind count Time well enough by Years, whofe Revolutions yet they cannot diftinguish by Motions, that they perceive not: And I ask whether a blind Man, who diftinguifh'd his Years either by the Heat of Summer, or Cold of Winter; by the Smell of any Flower of the Spring, or Tafte of any Fruit of the Autumn; would not have a better Measure of Time than the Romans had before the Reformation of their Calendar by Julius Cafar, or many other People, whose Years, notwithstanding the Motion of the Sun, which they pretend to make ufe of, are very irregular? And it adds no fmall Difficulty to Chronology, that the exact Lengths of the Years that feveral Nations counted by, are hard to be known, they differing very much one from another, and I think I may fay all of them from the precife Motion of the Sun. And if the Sun mov'd from the Creation to the Flood conftantly in the Equator, and fo equally dif pers'd its Light and Heat to all the habitable Parts of the Earth, in days all of the fame Length, without its annual Variations to the Tropicks, as a late ingenious Author fuppofes; I do not think it very easy to imagine, that (notwithstanding the Motion of the Sun) Men fhould in the Antediluvian World, from the beginning count by Years, or measure their Time by Periods, that had no fenfible Marks very obvious to diftinguish them by.

S. 21. But perhaps it will be faid, without a regular Motion, fuch as of the Sun, or fome other, how could it ever be known that fuch Periods were equal? To which I anfwer, the Equality of any other returning Appearances might be known