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We have no


other number of Miles, or Years, whereof he has, or can have a pofitive Idea ; which is all the Idea I think, we have of Infinite. So that what lies beyond our pofitive Idea towards Infinity, lies in Obscurity; aud has the indeterminate confufion of a negative Idea, wherein I know I neither do nor can comprehend all I would, it being too large for a finite and narrow Capacity: And that cannot but be very far from a pofitive compleat Idea, wherein the greatest part of what I would comprehend is left out, under the undeterminate intimation of being ftill greater: For to say, that having in any Quantity meafur'd fo much, or gone fo far, you are not yet at the end, is only to fay, that that Quantity is greater. So that the Negation of an End in any Quantity, is in other words, only to fay, that it is bigger: and a total Negation of an End is but carrying this bigger ftill with you, in all the progreffions your Thoughts fhall make in Quantity; and adding this Idea of ftill greater to all the Ideas you have, or can be fuppos'd to have, of Quantity. Now whether fuch an Idez as that be pofitive, I leave any one to confider.

§. 16. I ask thofe who fay they have a pofitive Idea of Eternity, whether their pofitive Idea Idea of Duration includes in it Succeffion, or not? If it does not, they ought of an infinite to fhew the Difference of their Notion of Duration, when apply'd to an eternal Being, and to a finite: fince perhaps there may be others, as well as I, who will own to them their weakness of understanding in this Point; and acknowledg, that the Notion they have of Duration forces them to conceive, that whate ever has Duration, is of a longer continuance to-Day than it was Yesterday. If to avoid Succeffion in eternal Exiftence, they recur to the Punctum Stans of the Schools, I fuppofe they will thereby very little mend the Matter, or help us to a more clear and pofitive Idea of infinite Duration, there being nothing more inconceivable to me than Duration without Succeffion. Befides that Punctum Stans, if it fignify any thing, being not Quantum, finite or infinite, cannot belong to it. But if our weak apprehenfions cannot feparate Succeffion from any Duration whatsoever, our Idea of Eternity can be nothing but of infinite Succeffion of moments of Duration, wherein any thing does exift; and whether any one has, or can have a pofitive Idea of an actual infinite Number, I leave him to confider, till his infinite Number be so great that he himself can add no more to it; and as long as he can increase it, I doubt he himself will think the Idea he hath of it, a little too fcanty for pofitive Infinity.

No pofitive
Idea of infi

nite Space.

§. 17. I think it unavoidable for every confidering rational Creature, that will but examine his own or any other Existence, to have the Notion of an eternal wife Being, who had no Beginning: And fuch an Idea of infinite Duration I am fure I have. But this Negation of a Beginning being but the Negation of a pofitive thing, Scarce gives me a pofitive Idea of Infinity; which whenever I endeavour to extend my Thoughts to, I confefs my self at a lofs, and find I cannot attain any clear comprehenfion of it.

§. 18. He that thinks he has a positive Idea of infinite Space, will, when he confiders it, find that he can no more have a pofitive Idea of the greatest, than he has of the leaft Space. For in this latter, which feems the easier of the two, and more within our Comprehenfion, we are capable only of a comparative Idea of Smallness, which will always be lefs than any one whereof we have the positive Idea. All our pofitive Ideas of any Quantity, whether great or little, have always bounds; tho' our comparative Idea, whereby we can always add to the one and take from the other, hath no Bounds: For that which remains either great or little, not being comprehended in that pofitive Idea which we have, lies in obfcurity; and we have no other Idea of it, but of the Power of enlarging the one and distinguishing the other, without ceafing. A Peftle and Mortar will as foon bring any Particle of Matter to Indivifibility, as the acuteft Thought of a Mathematician: And a Surveyor may as foon with his Chain measure out infinite Space, as a Philofopher by the quickest flight of Mind reach it, or by thinking comprehend it; which is to have a pofitive Idea of it. He that thinks on a Cube of an Inch Diameter, has a clear and pofitive Idea of it in his Mind, and fo can frame one of, 4, 4, and fo on till he has the Idea in his Thoughts of fomething very little; but yet reaches not the Idea of that incomprehenfible Littleness which Divifion can produce. What remains of Smallness, is as far from his Thoughts as when he first began; and therefore he never comes at


all to have a clear and pofitive Idea of that Smallnefs, which is confequent to infinite Divifibility.

. 19. Every one that looks towards Infinity, does, as I have faid, at first what is pofiglance make fome very large idea of that which he applies it to, let it be Space tive, what ne or Duration; and poffibly he wearies his Thoughts, by multiplying in his Mind gative, in our Idea of Infithat first large Idea; But yet by that he comes no nearer to the having a pofitive nite. clear Idea of what remains to make up a pofitive infinite, than the Countryfellow had of the Water, which was yet to come and pass the Chanel of the River where he ftood:

Rufticus expectat dum tranfeat amnis, at ille

Labitur, & labetur in omne volubilis avum.

A. 20. There are fome I have met with, that put fo much difference between Some think infinite Duration and infinite Space, that they perfuade themselves that they they have a have a pofitive Idea of Eternity; but that they have not, nor can have any Idea Pofitive Idea of infinite Space. The reafon of which mistake I fuppofe to be this, That finding and not of inof Eternity, by a due Contemplation of Caufes and Effects, that it is neceffary to admit fome finite Space eternal Being, and fo to confider the real Exiftence of that Being, as taking up and commenfurate to their Idea of Eternity; but on the other fide, not finding it neceffary, but on the contrary, apparently abfurd that Body thould be infinite; they forwardly conclude, they can have no Idea of infinite Space, because they can have no Idea of infinite Matter. Which confequence, I conceive, is very ill colle&ed; because the Existence of Matter is no ways necessary to the Existence of Space, no more than the Exiftence of Motion, or the Sun, is neceflary to Duration, tho' Duration uses to be measur'd by it: And I doubt not but a Man may have the Idea of 10,000 Miles fquare, without any Body fo big, as well as the Idea of 10,000 Years, without any Body fo old. It seems as easy to me to have the Idea of Space empty of Body, as to think of the capacity of a Bufhel without Corn, or the hollow of a Nutshel without a Kernel in it: It being more neceflary that there fhould be exifting a folid Body infinitely extended, because we have an Idea of the Infinity of Space, than it is neceffary that the World should be Eternal, because we have an Idea of infinite Duration. And why fhould we think our Idea of infinite Space requires the real Exiftence of Matter to fupport it, when we find that we have as clear an Idea of infinite Duration to come, as we have of infinite Duration paft? Tho', I fuppofe, no body thinks it conceivable, that any thing does, or has existed in that future Duration. Nor is it poffible to join our Idea of future Duration with prefent or past Existence, any more than it is poffible to make the Ideas of Yefterday, to-Day, and to-Morrow, to be the fame; or bring Ages paft and future together, and make them contemporary. But if thefe Men are of the Mind, that they have clearer Ideas of infinite Duration than of infinite Space; because it is past doubt, that GOD has exifted from all Eternity, but there is no real Matter co-extended with infinite Space: yet thofe Philofophers who are of Opinion, that Infinite Space is poffefs'd by GOD's infinite Omniprefence, as well as infinite Duration by his eternal Existence, must be allow'd to have as clear an Idea of infinite Space as of infinite Duration; tho' neither of them, I think, has any pofitive Idea of Infinity in either Cafe. For whatsoever pofitive Ideas a Man has in his Mind of any Quantity, he can repeat it, and add it to the former as eafy as he can add together the Ideas of two Days, or two Paces; which are pofitive Ideas of Lengths he has in his Mind, and fo on as long as he pleases: Whereby if a Man had a pofitive Idea of infinite, either Duration or Space, he could add two Infinites together; nay, make one Infinite infinitely bigger than another: Abfurdities too grofs to be confuted.

§. 21. But yet after all this, there being Men who perfuade themselves that they Suppofed pofthave clear pofitive comprehenfive Ideas of Infinity, 'tis fit they enjoy their Pri- tive Ideas of vilege: And I should be very glad (with fome others that I know, who ac- Infinity, caufe knowledg they have none fuch) to be better inform'd by their Communication. of Miftakes For I have been hitherto apt to think, that the great and inextricable Difficul ties which perpetually involve all Difcourfes concerning Infinity, whether of Space, Duration, or Divifibility, have been the certain marks of a Defect in our Ideas of Infinity, and the difproportion the Nature thereof has to the CompreVol. I. Ń 2 henfion

henfion of our narrow Capacities. For whilft Men talk and dispute of infinite Space or Duration, as if they had as compleat and pofitive Ideas of them, as they have of the Names they ufe for them, or as they have of a Yard, or an Hour, or any other determinate Quantity; it is no wonder if the incomprehenfible Nature of the thing they difcourfe of or reafon about, leads them into Perplexities and Contradictions; and their Minds be overlaid by an Object too large and mighty to be furvey'd and manag'd by them.

8. 22. If I have dwelt pretty long on the Confiderations of Duration, Space, AllthefeIdeas from Senfation and Number, and what arifes from the Contemplation of them, Infinity; 'tis andReflection. poffibly no more than the Matter requires, there being few fimple Ideas, whofe Modes give more exercife to the Thoughts of Men than thefe do. I pretend not to treat of them in their full Latitude; it fuffices to my Defign, to fhew how the Mind receives them, fuch as they are, from Senfation and Reflection; and how even the Idea we have of Infinity, how remote foever it may feem to be from any Object of Senfe, or Operation of our Mind, has nevertheless, as all our other Ideas, its Original there. Some Mathematicians perhaps of advanc'd Speculations, may have other ways to introduce into their Minds Ideas of Infinity; but this hinders not, but that they themselves, as well as all other Men, got the firft Ideas which they had of Infinity, from Senfation and Reflection, in the Method we have here fet down,


Of other fimple Modes.

Medes of Mc-. I. taken-in by Senfation, the Mind comes to extend it felf even to InT

HO'I have in the foregoing Chapters fhewn, how from fimple Ideas


Modes of

finity; which however it may, of all others, feem moft remote from any senfible Perception; yet at laft hath nothing in it but what is made out of fimple Ideas, receiv'd into the Mind by the Senfes, and afterwards there put together by the Faculty the Mind has to repeat its own Ideas: Tho' I fay, thefe might be Inftances enough of fimple Modes of the fimple Ideas of Senfation and fuffice to fhew how the Mind comes by them; yet I fhall for Method's fake, tho' briefly, give an account of some few more, and then proceed to more complex Ideas.

1. 2. To fide, roll, tumble, walk, creep, run, dance, leap, skip, and abundance others that might be named, are words which are no fooner heard, but every one who understands English, has prefently in his Mind distinct Ideas, which are all but the different Modifications of Motion. Modes of Motion anfwer thofe of Extension: Swift and Slow are two different Ideas of Motion, the Measures whereof are made of the distances of Time and Space put together; fo they are complex Ideas comprehending Time and Space with Motion.

§. 3. The like variety have we in Sounds. Every articulate word is a different Modification of Sound: By which we fee, that from the Senfe of Hearing by fuch Modifications, the Mind may be furnifh'd with diftin& Ideas to almoft an infinite number. Sounds alfo, befides the diftin& Cries of Birds and Beasts, are modify'd by diverfity of Notes of different length put together, which make that complex Idea call'd a Tune, which a Mufician may have in his Mind when he hears or makes no Sound at all, by reflecting on the Ideas of thofe Sounds fo put together filently in his own Fancy.

§. 4. Thofe of Colours are also very various: Some we take notice of as Modes of Co- the different Degrees, or, as they are term'd, Shades of the fame Colour.


Modes of Tafte.


fince we very feldom make affemblages of Colours either for Ufe or Delight, but Figure is taken in alfo and has its part in it; as in Painting, Weaving, Needle-Works, &c. thofe which are taken notice of, do most commonly belong to mix'd Modes, as being made-up of Ideas of divers kinds, viz. Figure and Colour, fuch as Beauty, Rainbow, &c.

9. 5. All compounded Taftes and Smells are alfo Modes made up of the fimple Ideas of thofe Senfes. But they being fuch as generally we have no names for,


are lefs taken notice of, and cannot be fet down in writing; and therefore muft be left without Enumeration to the Thoughts and Experience of my Reader.

§. 6. In general it may be obferv'd, that thofe fimple Modes which are confider'd but as different Degrees of the fame fimple Idea, tho' they are in themselves many of them very diftin&t Ideas, yet have ordinarily no diftinct names, nor are much taken notice of as diftin&t Ideas, where the difference is but very small between them. Whether Men have neglected thefe Modes, and given no Names to them, as wanting Measures nicely to diftinguish them; or because when they were fo diftinguifh'd, that Knowledg would not be of general or necessary. Ufe, I leave it to the Thoughts of others: it is fufficient to my purpose to fhew, that all our fimple Ideas come to our Minds only by Senfation and Reflection; and that when the Mind has them, it can variously repeat and compound them, and fo make new complex Ideas. But tho' White, Red, or Sweet, &c. have not been modify'd or made into complex Ideas, by feveral Combinations fo as to be named, and thereby rank'd into Species; yet fome others of the fimple Ideas, viz. thofe of Unity, Duration, Motion, &c. above inftanc'd in, as alfo Power and Thinking, have been thus modify'd to a great variety of complex Ideas, with Names belonging to them.

have not

§. 7. The reafon whereof, I fuppofe, has been this, That the great Concern- Why fome ment of Men being with Men one amongst another, the knowledg of Men and Modes have, their Actions, and the fignifying of them to one another, was moft neceffary; and and others therefore they made Ideas of Actions very nicely modify'd,and gave thofe complex Names. Ideas Names, that they might the more easily record, and difcourfe of those things they were daily converfant in, without long Ambages and Circumlocutions; and that the things they were continually to give and receive Information about, might be the easier and quicker understood. That this is fo, and that Men in framing different complex Ideas, and giving them Names, have been much govern'd by the end of Speech in general, (which is a very fhort and expedite way of conveying their Thoughts one to another) is evident in the Names, which in feveral Arts have been found out, and apply'd to several complex Ideas of modify'd Actions belonging to their feveral Trades, for dispatch-fake, in their Direction or Difcourfes about them. Which Ideas are not generally fram'd in the Minds of Men, not converfant about these Operations. And thence the words that ftand for them, by the greatest part of Men of the fame Language, are not understood: v.g. Colbire, Drilling, Filtration, Cohobation, are words ftanding for certain complex Ideas, which being feldom in the Minds of any but thofe few whofe particular Imployments do at every turn fuggeft them to their Thoughts, thofe Names of them are not generally understood but by Smiths and Chymifts; who having fram'd the complex Ideas which these words ftand for, and having given Names to them, or received them from others upon hearing of thefe Names in communication, readily conceived those Ideas in their Minds; as by Cohobation all the fimple Ideas of Diftilling, and the pouring the Liquor diftill'd from any thing, back upon the remaining Matter, and diftilling it again. Thus we fee that there are great varieties of fimple Ideas, as of Taftes and Smells, which have no Names; and of Modes many more. Which either not having been generally enough obferv'd, or elfe not being of any great ufe to be taken notice of in the Affairs and Converfe of Men, they have not had Names given to them, and fo pass not for Species. This we fhall have occafion hereatter to confider more at large, when we come to speak of Words.

Ø. I.



Of the Modes of Thinking.

HEN the Mind turns its View inwards upon it felf, and con- Senfation, Retemplates its own Actions, Thinking is the first that occurs. In membrance, it the Mind obferves a great variety of Modifications, and from thence receives Contempladiftin&t Ideas. Thus the Perception which actually accompanies, and is annexed


tion &c.

to any Impreffion on the Body, made by an external Object, being diftin& from all other Modifications of Thinking, furnishes the Mind with a diftin&t Idea, which we call Senfation; which is, as it were, the actual Entrance of any Idea into the Understanding by the Senfes. The fame Idea, when it again recurs without the Operation of the like Obje& on the external Senfory, is Remembrance: If it be fought after by the Mind, and with Pain and Endeavour found, and brought again in view, 'tis Recollection; if it be held there long under attentive Confideration, 'tis Contemplation. When Ideas float in our Mind, without any Reflection or Regard of the Understanding, it is that which the French call Reverie, our Language has fcarce a Name for it. When the Ideas that offer themselves (for, as I have obferv'd in another place, whilft we are awake, there will always be a Train of Ideas fucceeding one another in our Minds) are taken notice of, and, as it were, regifter'd in the Memory, it is Attention. When the Mind with great Earneftnefs, and of Choice, fixes its View on any Idea, confiders it on all fides, and will not be call'd off by the ordinary Sollicitation of other Ideas, it is that we call Intention, or Study: Sleep, without dreaming, is Reft from all thefe And Dreaming it felf, is the having of Ideas (whilft the outward Senfes are ftop'd, fo that they receive not outward Objects with their ufual Quicknefs) in the Mind, not fuggefted by any external Objects, or known Occafion, nor under any Choice or Conduct of the Understanding at all. And whether that, which we call Extafy, be not le neethin sen dreaming with the Eyes open, I leave to be examin'd. non reflexion how do we come

If Dreanung the Understanding

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The various

the Mind in

2. These are some few Inftances of thofe various Modes of Thinking, which the Mind may obferve in it felf, and fo have as diftin&t Ideas of, as it hath of White, and Red, a Square or a Circle. I do not pretend to enumerate them all, nor to treat at large of this Set of Ideas, which are got from Reflection: That would be to make a Volume. It fuffices to my prefent purpose to have fhewn here, by fome few Examples, of what fort thefe Ideas are, and how the Mind comes by them; especially fince I fhall have occafion hereafter to treat more at large of Reasoning, Judging, Volition and Knowledg, which are fome of the most confiderable Operations of the Mind, and Modes of Thinking.

§. 3. But perhaps it may not be an unpardonable Digreffion, nor wholly im Attention of pertinent to our prefent Defign, if we refle&t here upon the different State of the Mind in Thinking, which thofe Inftances of Attention, Reverie and Dreaming, &c. before mention'd, naturally enough fuggeft. That there are Ideas, fome or other, always prefent in the Mind of a waking Man, every one's Experience convinces him, tho' the Mind imploys it felf about them with feveral Degrees of Attention. Sometimes the Mind fixes it felf with fo much Earneftness on the Contemplation of fome Objects, that it turns their Ideas on all fides, remarks their Relations and Circumftances, and views every part fo nicely, and with fuch Intention, that it fhuts out all other Thoughts, and takes no notice of the ordinary Impreffions made then on the Senfes, which at another feafon would produce very fenfible Perceptions: At other times it barely obferves the Train of Ideas that fucceed in the Understanding, without directing and pursuing any of them; and at other times it lets them pafs almoft quite unregarded, as faint Shadows that make no Impreffion.


Hence'tis pro-
§. 4. This Difference of Intention, and Remiffion of the Mind in thinking,
bable that
with a great variety of Degrees between earneft Study, and very near minding
Thinking is
the Action, not
nothing at all; every one, I think, has experimented in himself. Trace it a
Elence of the little farther, and you find the Mind in Sleep retir'd as it were from the Senfes,
and out of the reach of thofe Motions made on the Organs of Senfe, which at
other times produce very vivid and fenfible Ideas. I need not for this inftance
in those who fleep out whole ftormy Nights, without hearing the Thunder, or
feeing the Lightning, or feeling the fhaking of the Houfe, which are fenfible
enough to those who are waking: But in this Retirement of the Mind from the
Senfes, it often retains a yet more loofe and incoherent manner of Thinking,
which we call Dreaming; and laft of all, found Sleep clofes the Scene quite,
and puts an end to all Appearances. This, I think, almost every one has ex-
perience of in himself, and his own Obfervation without difficulty leads him
thus far. That which I would farther conclude from hence, is, That fince the
Mind can fenfibly put on, at feveral times, feveral degrees of Thinking, and


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