be fometimes even in a waking Man fo remifs, as to have Thoughts dim and obfcure to that degree, that they are very little remov'd from none at all; and at laft, in the dark Retirements of found Sleep, lofes the Sight perfectly of all Ideas whatfoever: Since, I fay, this is evidently fo in Matter of Fact, and conitant Experience, I ask whether it be not probable that Thinking is the Action, and not the Effence of the Soul? Since the Operations of Agents will eafily admit of Intention and Remiffion, but the Effences of things are not conceiv'd capable of any fuch Variation. But this by the By.

CHAP. XX.

Of Modes of Pleasure and Pain.

Ø. I. MONGST the fimple Ideas, which we receive both from Senfation Pleasure and ・A and Reflection, Pain and Pleasure are two very confiderable ones. Pain fimple For, as in the Body there is Senfation barely in it felf, or accompany'd with Ideas. Pain or Pleasure; fo the Thought or Preception of the mind is fimply fo, or elfe accompany'd alfo with Pleasure or Pain, Delight or Trouble, call it how you please. These, like other fimple Ideas, cannot be defcrib'd, nor their Names defin'd; the way of knowing them, is, as of the fimple Ideas of the Senfes, only by Experience. For to define them by the Prefence of Good or Evil, is no otherwife to make them known to us, than by making us reflect on what we feel in our felves, upon the feveral and various Operations of Good and Evil upon our Minds, as they are differently apply'd to or confider'd by

us.

§. 2. Things then are Good or Evil, only in reference to Pleasure or Pain. Good and That we call Good, which is apt to caufe or increase Pleasure, or diminish Pain in Evil, whatı us; or elfe to procure or preferve us the Poffeffion of any other Good, or Abfence of any Evil. And on the contrary, we name that Evil, which is apt to produce or increafe any Pain, or diminish any Pleasure in us; or elfe to procure us any Evil, or deprive us of any Good. By Pleasure and Pain, I must be understood to mean of Body or Mind, as they are commonly diftinguifh'd; tho' in truth they be only different Conftitutions of the Mind, fometimes occafion'd by Disorder in the Body, fometimes by Thoughts of the Mind.

S. 3. Pleafure and Pain, and that which caufes them, Good and Evil, are the Our Paffions Hinges on which our Paffions turn: And if we reflect on our felves, and obferve mov'd by Good how these, under various Confiderations, operate in us; what Modifications or and Evil. Tempers of Mind, what internal Senfations (if I may so call them) they produce in us, we may thence form to our felves the Ideas of our Paffions.

9.4. Thus any one reflecting upon the Thought he has of the Delight, which Love. any prefent or abfent thing is apt to produce in him, has the Idea we call Love. For when a Man declares in Autumn, when he is eating them, or in Spring, when there are none, that he loves Grapes, it is no more but that the Taste of Grapes delights him; let an Alteration of Health or Conftitution destroy the Delight of their Tafte, and he then can be faid to love Grapes no longer. 1.5. On the contrary, the Thought of the Pain, which any thing prefent Hatred, or absent is apt to produce in us, is what we call Hatred. Were it my bufinefs here to enquire any farther than into the bare Ideas of our Paffions, as they depend on different Modifications of Pleasure and Pain, I fhould remark, that our Love and Hatred of inanimate infenfible Beings, is commonly founded on that Pleasure and Pain which we receive from their Ufe and Application any way to our Senfes, tho' with their Destruction: But Hatred or Love, to Beings capable of Happiness or Mifery, is often the Uneafinefs or Delight, which we find in ourselves arifing from a Confideration of their very Being or Happiness. Thus the Being and Welfare of a Man's Children or Friends, producing conftant Delight in him, he is faid conftantly to love them. But it fuffices to note, that our Ideas of Love and Hatred are but the Difpofitions of the Mind, in respect of Pleasure and Pain in general, however caus'd in us.

$

Defire §. 6. The Uneafiness a Man finds in himself upon the Abfence of any thing,
whose present Enjoyment carries the Idea of Delight with it, is that we call
Defire which is greater or lefs, as that Uneafinefs is more or less vehement.
Where by the By, it may perhaps be of fome ufe to remark, that the chief, if
not only Spur to humane Industry and Action, is Uneafinefs. For whatever
Good is propos'd, if its Absence carries no Displeasure nor Pain with it, if a
Man be eafy and content without it, there is no Defire of it, nor Endeavour after
it; there is no more but a bare Velleity, the term us'd to fignify the lowest
degree of Defire, and that which is next to none at all, when there is fo little
Uneafinefs in the Abfence of any thing, that it carries a Man no farther than
fome faint Wishes for it, without any more effectual or vigorous Ufe of the Means
to attain it. Defire alfo is stopp'd or abated by the Opinion of the Impoffibility
or Unattainableness of the Good propos'd, as far as the Uneafiness is cur'd or
allay'd by that Confideration. This might carry our Thoughts farther, were it
feasonable in this place.
Joy. 9. 7. Joy is a delight of the Mind, from the Confideration of the present or
affur'd approaching poffeffion of a Good; and we are then poffefs'd of any
Good, when we have it fo in our power, that we can use it when we please.
Thus a Man almost starv'd has Joy at the arrival of Relief, even before he has
the Pleasure of ufing it: And a Father, in whom the very Well-being of his
Children caufes Delight, is always, as long as his Children are in fuch a State,
in the poffeffion of that Good; for he needs but to refle& on it, to have that
Pleasure.

Sorrow.

. 8. Sorrow is Uneafinefs in the Mind, upon the thought of a Good loft, which might have been enjoy'd longer; or the Senfe of a prefent Evil. Hope. §. 9. Hope is that Pleasure in the Mind, which every one finds in himself, upon the thought of a profitable future Enjoyment of a thing, which is apt to delight

Fear.

him.

9. 10. Fear is an Uneafinefs of the Mind, upon the thought of future Evil likely to befal us.

Despair. §. 11. Defpair is the Thought of the Unattainableness of any Good, which works differently in Mens Minds, fometimes producing Uneafinefs or Pain, fometimes Reft and Indolency.

'Anger'

Envy.

9. 12. Anger is Uneafinefs or Difcompofure of the Mind, upon the receipt of any Injury, with a prefent purpose of Revenge.

. 13. Envy is an Uneafinefs of Mind, caus'd by the Confideration of a Good we defire, obtain'd by one we think should not have had it before us.

What Passion's §. 14. These two laft, Envy and Anger, not being caus'd by Pain and Pleaall Men bave fure fimply in themfelves, but having in them fome mix'd Confiderations of our felves and others, are not therefore to be found in all Men, because those other Parts of valuing their Merits, or intending Revenge, is wanting in them but all the reft terminated purely in Pain and Pleasure, are I think, to be found in all Men. For we love, defire, rejoice, and hope, only in refpect of Pleafure; we hate, fear, and grieve, only in refpea of Pain ultimately In fine, all thefe Paffions are mov'd by things, only as they appear to be the Causes of Pleasure and Pain, or to have Pleasure or Pain fome way or other annex'd to them. Thus we extend our Hatred ufually to the Subject (at least if a fenfible or voluntary Agent) which has produc'd Pain in us, because the Fear it leaves is a conftant Pain: But we do not fo conftantly love what has done us good; because Pleasure operates not fo ftrongly on us as Pain, and because we are not fo ready to have hope it will do fo again. But this by the By.

Pleafure and, §. 15. By Pleafure and Pain, Delight and Uneafinefs, I must all along be unPain what derftood (as I have above intimated) to mean not only bodily Pain and Pleafure, but whatsoever Delight or Uneafinefs is felt by us, whether rifing from any grateful or unacceptable Senfation or Reflection.

Shame.

§. 16. 'Tis farther to be confider'd, that in reference to the Paffions, the re moval or leffening of a Pain is confider'd, and operates as a Pleasure; and the lofs or diminishing of a Pleasure, as a Pain.

§. 17. The Paffions too have most of them in most Perfons Operations on the Body, and caufe various Changes in it, which, not being always fenfible, do not make a neceffary part of the Idea of each Paffion. For Shame, which is an

Uneafiness

Uneafinefs of the Mind upon the Thought of having done fomething which is indecent, or will leffen the valu'd Efteem which others have for us, has not always blushing accompanying it.

9. 18. I would not be miltaken here, as if I meant this as a Difcourfe of the These InftanPaffions; they are many more than those I have here nam'd: And thofe I have ces to few taken notice of, would each of them require a much larger, and more accu- how our Ideas curate Difcourfe. I have only mention'd thefe here as fo many Inftances of Modes of the Paffions of Pleafure and Pain refulting in our Minds from various Confiderations of Senfation and are got from Good and Evil. Imight perhaps have inftanc'd in other Modes of Pleasure and Reflection. Pain more fimple than these, as the Pain of Hunger and Thirst, and the Pleasure of Eating and Drinking to remove them; the Pain of tender Eyes, and the Pleasure of Mufick; Pain from captious uninftru&tive Wrangling, and the Pleafure of rational Converfation with a Friend, or of well-directed Study in the Search and Discovery of Truth. But the Paffions being of much more Concernment to us, I rather made choice to inftance in them, and fhew how the Ideas we have of them are deriv'd from Senfation and Reflection.

S. I.

"TH

CHAP. XXI.
Of Power.

HE Mind being every day inform'd, by the Senfes, of the Alteration This Idea hot of thofe fimple Ideas it obferves in things without, and taking no- got. tice how one comes to an end, and ceafes to be, and another begins to exift which was not before; reflecting alfo on what paffes within it felf, and obferving a conftant Change of its Ideas, fometimes by the Impreffion of outward Objects on the Senfes, and fometimes by the Determination of its own Choice; and concluding from what it has fo conftantly obferv'd to have been, that the like Changes will for the future be made in the fame things by like Agents, and by the like Ways; confiders in one thing the Poffibility of having any of its fimple Ideas chang'd, and in another the Poffibility of making that Change; and fo comes by that Idea which we call Power. Thus we fay, Fire has a Power to melt Gold, i. e. to deftroy the Confiftency of its infenfible Parts, and confequently its Hardness, and make it fluid; and Gold has a Power to be melted: That the Sun has a Power to blanch Wax, and Wax a Power to be blanch'd by the Sun, whereby the Yellownefs is deftroy'd, and Whiteness made to exift in its room. In which, and the like Cafes, the Power we confider is in reference to the Change of perceivable Ideas: For we cannot obferve any alteration to be made in, or operation upon any thing, but by the obfervable Change of its fenfible Ideas: nor conceive any alteration to be made, but by conceiving a Change of fome of its Ideas.

§. 2. Power, thus confider'd, is two-fold, viz. as able to make, or able to Power active receive any Change: The one may be call'd Active, and the other Paffive Power. and palive. Whether Matter be not wholly deftitute of Active Power, as its Author GOD is truly above all paffive Power; and whether the intermediate State of created Spirits be not that alone which is capable of both active and paffive Power, may be worth confideration. I fhall not now enter into that Enquiry; my present Bufinefs being not to fearch into the Original of Power, but how we come by the Idea of it. But fince active Powers make fo great a part of our complex Ideas of natural Subftances, (as we fhall fee hereafter) and I mention them as fuch according to common Apprehenfion; yet they being not perhaps fó truly active Power, as our hafty Thoughts are apt to reprefent them, I judg it not amifs, by this Intimation, to direct our Minds to the confideration of GOD and Spirits, for the cleareft Idea of active Powers.

§. 3. I confefs Power includes in it fome kind of Relation, (a Relation to Action Power inor Change) as indeed which of our Ideas, of what kind foever, when atten- cludes Relá tively confider'd, does not? For our Ideas of Extenfion, Duration, and Num- tion. ber, do they not all contain in them a fecret Relation of the Parts ? Figure and Motion have fomething relative in them much more vifibly: And fenfible QuaVol. I.

lities

The clearest Idea of active

Power had from Spirit.

Will and Un

lities, as Colours and Smells, &c. what are they but the Powers of different Bodies, in relation to our Perception? c. And if confider'd in the things themselves, do they not depend on the Bulk, Figure, Texture, and Motion of the Parts? All which include fome kind of Relation in them. Our Idea therefore of Power, I think, may well have a place amongst other fimple Ideas, and be confider'd as one of them, being one of those that make a principal Ingredient in our complex Ideas of Subftances, as we fhall hereafter have occafion to observe.

§. 4. We are abundantly furnish'd with the Idea of paffive Power by almost all forts of fenfible things. In most of them we cannot avoid obferving their senfible Qualities; nay, their very Subftances to be in a continual Flux: And therefore with reafon we look on them as liable still to the fame Change. Nor have we of active Power (which is the more proper Signification of the word Power) fewer Inftances: Since whatever Change is obferv'd, the Mind muft collect a Power fomewhere able to make that Change, as well as a Poffibility in the thing it felf to receive it. But yet, if we will confider it attentively, Bodies, by our Senfes, do not afford us fo clear and diftinct an Idea of active Power, as we have from Reflection on the Operations of our Minds. For all Power relating to Action, and there being but two forts of Action, whereof we have any Idea, viz. Thinking and Motion; let us confider whence we have the cleareft Ideas of the Powers, which produce thefe Actions. 1. Of Thinking, Body affords us no Idea at all, it is only from Reflection that we have that. 2. Neither have we from Body any Idea of the beginning of Motion. A Body at reft affords us no Idea of any active Power to move; and when it is fet in Motion it felf, that Motion is rather a Paffion, than an Action in it. For when the Ball obeys the Stroke of a Billiard-ftick, it is not any Action of the Ball, but bare Paffion: Alfo when by Impulse it fets another Ball in motion that lay in its way, it only communicates the Motion it had receiv'd from another, and lofes in it felf fo much as the other receiv'd; which gives us but a very obfcure Idea, of an active Power of moving in Body, whilft we obferve it only to transfer but not produce any Motion. For it is but a very obfcure Idea of Power, which reaches not the Production of the Action, but the Continuation of the Paffion. For fo is Motion in a Body impell'd by another: The Continuation of the Alteration made in it from Reft to Motion, being little more an Action than the Continuation of the Alteration of its Figure by the fame Blow, is an Action. The Idea of the beginning of Motion we have only from Reflection on what paffes in our felves, where we find by Experience, that barely by willing it, barely by a Thought of the Mind, we can move the Parts of our Bodies, which were before at reft. So that it feems to me, we have from the Obfervation of the Operation of Bodies by our Senfes but a very imperfect obfcure Idea of active Power, fince they afford us not any Idea in themselves of the Power to begin any Action, either Motion or Thought. But if, from the Impulfe Bodies are obferv'd to make one upon another, any one thinks he has a clear Idea of Power, it ferves as well to my purpose, Senfation being one of thofe Ways whereby the Mind comes by its Ideas: Only I thought it worth while to confider here by the way, whether the Mind doth not receive its Idea of active Power clearer from Reflection on its own Operations, than it doth from any external Sensation.

§. 5. This at least I think evident, That we find in our felves a Power to begin derstanding, or forbear, continue or end feveral Actions of our Minds, and Motions of our two Powers. Bodies, barely by a Thought or Preference of the Mind crdering, or, as it were, commanding the doing or not doing fuch or fuch a particular Action. This Power which the Mind has thus to order the confideration of any Idea, or the forbearing to confider it ; or to prefer the Motion of any part of the Body to its Reft, and vice verfa in any particular Inftance, is that which we call the Will. The actual Exercife of that Power, by directing any particular Action, or its Forbearance, is that which we call Volition or Willing. The Forbearance of that Action, confequent to fuch Order or Command of the Mind, is call'd Voluntary. And whatsoever Action is perform'd without fuch a Thought of the Mind, is call'd Involuntary. The Power of Perception is that which we call the Understanding. Perception, which we make the A&t of the Understanding, is of three forts: 1. The Perception of Ideas in our Mind. 2. The Perception

of

of the Signification of Signs. 3. The Perception of the Connexion or Repugnancy, Agreement or Dilagreement, that there is between any of our Ideas. All thefe are attributed to the Understanding, or perceptive Power, tho' it be the two latter only that Ufe allows us to fay we understand.

9. 6. Thefe Powers of the Mind, viz. of Perceiving, and of Preferring, are Faculties. ufually call'd by another Name: And the ordinary way of fpeaking is, That the Understanding and Will are two Faculties of the Mind; a Word proper enough if it be us'd as all Words fhould be, fo as not to breed any Confufion in Mens Thoughts, by being fuppos'd (as I fufpe&t it has been) to ftand for fome real Beings in the Soul that perform'd thofe Actions of Understanding and Volition. For when we fay the Will is the commanding and fuperior Faculty of the Soul; that it is, or is not free; that it determines the inferior Faculties; that it follows the Dictates of the Understanding, &c. tho' thefe, and the like Expreffions, by those that carefully attend to their own Ideas, and conduct their Thoughts more by the Evidence of Things, than the Sound of Words, may be understood in a clear and diftin&t Senfe: Yet I fufpect, I fay, that this way of speaking of Faculties, has milled many into a confus'd Notion of fo many diftinct Agents in us, which had their feveral Provinces and Authorities, and did command, obey, and perform feveral Actions, as fo many distinct Beings; which has been no fmall occafion of Wrangling, Obfcurity, and Uncertainty in Questions relating to them.

§. 7. Every one, I think, finds in himself a Power to begin or forbear, con- Whence the Itinue or put an end to feveral Actions in himself. From the Confideration of deas of Liber ty and Necef the Extent of this Power of the Mind over the Actions of the Man, which eve-ty. ry one finds in himself, arise the Ideas of Liberty and Neceffity.

9. 8. All the Actions that we have any Idea of, reducing them felves, as has Liberty what. been laid, to these two, viz. Thinking and Motion; fo far as a Man has a Power to think, or not to think; to move, or not to move, according to the Preference or Direction of his own Mind, fo far is a Man free. Wherever any Performance or Forbearance are not equally in a Man's Power; wherever doing or not doing, will not equally follow upon the Preference of his Mind directing it, there he is not free, tho' perhaps the Action may be voluntary. So that the Idea of Liberty is the Idea of a Power in any Agent to do or forbear any particular Action, according to the Determination or Thought of the Mind, whereby either of them is prefer'd to the other; where either of them is not in the Power of the Agent to be produc'd by him according to his Volition, there he is not at Liberty, that Agent is under Neceffity. So that Liberty cannot be where there is no Thought, no Volition, no Will; but there may be Thought, there may be. Will, there may be Volition, where there is no Liberty. A little Confideration of an obvious Inftance or two, may make this clear.

§. 9 A Tennis-ball, whether in Motion by the Stroke of a Racket, or lying supposes the ftill acreft, is not by any one taken to be a free Agent. If we enquire into the Underftanreaton, we shall find it is because we conceive not a Tennis-ball to think, and ding andWillı confequently not to have any Volition, or Preference of Motion to Reft, or vice verfa; and therefore has not Liberty, is not a free Agent; but all its both Motion and Reft, come under our Idea of Neceffary, and are so call'd. Likewife a Man falling into the Water (a Bridge breaking under him) has not here in Liberty, is not a free Agent. For tho' he has Volition, tho' he prefers his not falling to falling; yet the Forbearance of that Motion not being in his Power, the Stop or Ceffation of that Motion follows not upon his Volition; and therefore therein he is not free. So a Man ftriking himself, or his Friend, by a convulfive: Motion of his Arm, which it is not in his power, by Volition or the Direction of his Mind, to ftop, or forbear, no body thinks he has in this Liberty; every one pities him, as acting by Neceffity and Constraint..

Volitions

S. 10. Again, fuppofe a Man be carry'd, whilft faft afleep, into a Room, Belongs not to where is a Perfon ne longs to fee and fpeak with; and be there lock'd faft in, beyond his Power to get out; he awakes, and is glad to find himself in fo defirable Company, which he ftays willingly in, i. e. prefers his ftay to going away. I ask, is not this ftay voluntary? I think no body will doubt it; and yet being lock'd faft in, 'tis evident he is not at Liberty not to ftay, he has not Freedom to be gone. So that Liberty is not an Idea belonging to Volition, or · Vol. I. preferring;

O 2