1. Words are used for recording and communicating our Thoughts. 2. Any Words will ferve for recording. 4. The Imperfection of Words, is the 7. Secondly, Because they have no 8. Propriety not a fufficient Remedy. 9. The way of learning thefe Names contributes alfo to their Doubtfulness. 10. Hence unavoidable Obfcurity in antient Authors. 12. Names of Substances refer'd, First, to real Effences that cannot be known. 13,14. Secondly, To co-exifting Qualities, which are known but imperfectly. 15. With this Imperfection they may Jerve for Civil, but not well for Philofophical Ufe. 16. Inftance, Liquor of Nerves. 18. The Names of fimple Ideas the leaft 19. And next to them fimple Modes. 6. Thirdly, Affected Obfcurity by wrong Application. 7. Logick and Dispute has much contributed to this. 8. Calling it Subtilty. 9. This Learning very little benefits Society. 10. But deftroys the Inftruments of Knowledg and Communication. 11. As useful as to confound the Sound of the Letters. 12. This Art has perplex'd Religion and Fuftice. 13. And ought not to pafs for Learning. 14. Fourthly, Taking them for things. 15. Inftance in Matter. 16. This makes Errors lafting. 17. Fifthly, Setting them for what they cannot fignify. 18. V. g. putting them for the real Ef fences of Subftances. 19. Hence we think every Change of our Idea in Subftances, not to change the Species. 20. The Caufe of this Abuse, a Suppofition of Nature's working always regularly. 21. This Abufe contains two falfe Suppofitions. 22. Sixthly, A Suppofition, that Words have a certain and evident Signifi cation. 23. The Ends of Language: Firft, To convey our Ideas. 24. Secondly, To do it with Quickness. 25. Thirdly, Therewith to convey the Knowledg of things. 26-31. How Mens words fail in all these. 33. How in Modes and Relations. CHAP. 16. Morality capable of Demonftration. 17. Definitions can make moral Difcourfes clear. 18. And is the only way. 19. Thirdly, In Subftances, by fhewing and defining. 20,21. Ideas of the leading Qualities of Subftances, are beft got by fhewing. 22. The Ideas of their Powers beft by Definition. 23. A Reflection on the Knowledg of 24. Ideas alfo of Substances must be 26. Fifthly, By Conftancy in their Sig- 27. When the Variation is to be explain'd. BOOK IV. Of Knowledg and Opinion. CHAP. I. Of Knowledg in general. SECT. 9. Demonftration not limited to Quantity. 10-13. Why it has been fo thought. 14. Senfitive Knowledg of particular Existence. 15. Knowledg not always clear, where the Ideas are fo. CHA P. III. Of the Extent of Human Knowledg. SECT. 1. First, No farther than we have Ideas. 2. Secondly, No farther than we can per ceive the Agreement or Disagreement. 3. Thirdly, Intuitive Knowledg extends it felf not to all the Relations of all our Ideas. 4. Fourthly, Nor demonftrative Knowledg 5. Fifthly, Senfitive Knowledg narrower than either. 6. Sixthly, our Knowledg therefore narrower than our Ideas. 7. How far our Knowledg reaches. 8. First, Our Knowledg of Identity and Diverfity, as far as our Ideas. 9. Secondly, of Co existence a very little way. 10. Because the Connection between moft fimple Ideas is unknown. 11. Efpe 11. Especially of fecondary Qualities. 15. Of Repugnancy to co-exift larger. 18. Thirdly, Of other Relations, it is 20. Remedies of thofe Difficulties. 2. A right joining, or Separating of 4. Mental Propofitions are very hard 5. Being nothing but the joining, or se- 9. Falfhood is the joining of Names 11. Moral and metaphyfical Truth. 1. Treating of Words, necessary to 2. General Truths hardly to be under- food, but in verbal Propofitions. 3. Certainty two-fold, of Truth, and 4. No Propofition can be known to be true, where the Effence of each Spe- 5. This more particularly concerns Sub- 6. The Truth of few universal Propo- fitions concerning Subftances, is to be 7. Because Co-existence of Ideas in few 10. As far as any fuch Co-existence can be known, fo far univerfal Propo- fitions may be certain. 11,12. The Qualities which make our com- plex Ideas of Substances, depend 8. Thefe Axioms do not much influence our other Knowledg. 9, 10. Because they are not the Truths the first known. 11. What Use these general Maxims have. 12. Maxims, if care be not taken in the Ufe of Words, may prove Contradictions. 13. Inftance in Vacuum. 14. They prove not the Existence of things without us. 15. Their Application dangerous about. complex Ideas. 16-18. Inftance in Man. 19. Little Ufe of thefe Maxims in Proofs where we have clear and diftinct Ideas. 20. Their Ufe dangerous, where our Ideas are confufed. Two forts of Beings, Cogitative and Incogitative. 10. Incogitative Being cannot produce a Cogitative. 11,12. Therefore there has been an eternal Wisdom. 13. Whether material or no. 16. Thirdly, A Syftem of incogitative 17. Whether in Motion, or at Reft. 18,19. Matter not co-eternal with an eternal Mind. CHA P. XI. of the Knowledg of the Existence of 1. Is to be had only by Senfation. 4. Firft, Becafe we cannot have them but by the Inlet of the Senfes. 5. Because an Idea from actual Senfation, and another from Memory, are very diftinct Perceptions. 6. Thirdly, Pleasure or Pain, which accompanies actual Senfation, accompanies not the returning of those Ideas without the external Objects. 7. Fourthly, Our Senfes affift one another's Teftimony of the Existence of outward things. 8. This Certainty is as great as our Condition needs. 9. But reaches no farther than actual Senfation. 10. Folly to expect Demonftration in every thing. 11. Paft Existence is known by Memory. 12. The Existence of Spirits not knowable. 13. Particular Propofitions concerning Existence, are knowable. 14. And general Propofitions concerning abftract Ideas. CHAP. XII. Of the Improvement of our Knowledg. SECT. 1. Knowledg is not from Maxims. 2. The Occafion of that Opinion. 3. But from the comparing clear and diftinct Ideas. 4. Dangerous to build upon precarious Principles. 5. This no certain way to Truth. 6. But to compare clear compleat Ideas under fteddy Names. 7. The true Method of advancing Knowledg, is by confidering our abftract Ideas.. 8. By which, Morality alfo may be made clearer. 9. But Knowledg of Bodies is to be improved only by Experience. 10. This may procure us Convenience, not Science. 11. We are fitted for moral Knowledg, and natural Improvements. 12. But must beware of Hypothefes and wrong Principles. 13. The true Ufe of Hypothefes. 14. Clear and diftinet Ideas with fettled Names, and the finding of the fe which shew their Agreement or Dif agreement, are the ways to enlarge our Knowledg. 15. Mathematicks an Inftance of it. SECT. CHA P. XV. Of Probability. 1. Probability is the Appearance of Agreement upon falible l'roofs. 2. It is to fupply the want of Knowledg 3. Being that which makes us prefume Things to be true, before we know them to be fo. 4. The Grounds of Probability are two; Conformity with our own Experience, or the Teft:mony of others Experience. 5. In this all the Agreements, pro and con, ought to be examined, before we come to a Judgment. 6. They being capable of great Variety. "CHA P. XVI. Of the Degrees of Allent. SECT. 1. Our Affent ought to be regulated by the Grounds of Probability. 2. These cannot always be all actually in view, and then we must content our felves with the Remembrance that we once faw ground for fuch a Degree of Affent. 3. The ill Confequence of this, if our former Judgment were not rightly made. 4. The right Ufe of it, is mutual Charity and Forbearance. 5. Probability is either of Matter of Fact or Speculation. 6. The concurrent Experience of all other Men with our's, produces Affurance approaching to Knowledg. 7. Unquestionable Teftimony and Experience for the most part produce Confidence. 8. Fair |