1. Words are used for recording and

communicating our Thoughts.

2. Any Words will ferve for recording.
3. Communication by Words, Civil or
Philofophical.

4. The Imperfection of Words, is the
Doubtfulness of their Signification.
5. Caufes of their Imperfection.
6. The Names of mix'd Modes doubt-
ful: Firft, Because the Ideas they
ftand for, are fo complex.

7. Secondly, Because they have no
Standards.

8. Propriety not a fufficient Remedy. 9. The way of learning thefe Names contributes alfo to their Doubtfulness. 10. Hence unavoidable Obfcurity in antient Authors.

12. Names of Substances refer'd, First,

to real Effences that cannot be known. 13,14. Secondly, To co-exifting Qualities, which are known but imperfectly. 15. With this Imperfection they may Jerve for Civil, but not well for Philofophical Ufe.

16. Inftance, Liquor of Nerves.
17. Inftance, Gold.

18. The Names of fimple Ideas the leaft
doubtful.

19. And next to them fimple Modes.
20. The most doubtful, are the Names
of very compounded mixed Modes
and Subftances.

6. Thirdly, Affected Obfcurity by wrong Application.

7. Logick and Dispute has much contributed to this.

8. Calling it Subtilty.

9. This Learning very little benefits Society.

10. But deftroys the Inftruments of Knowledg and Communication. 11. As useful as to confound the Sound of the Letters.

12. This Art has perplex'd Religion and Fuftice.

13. And ought not to pafs for Learning. 14. Fourthly, Taking them for things. 15. Inftance in Matter.

16. This makes Errors lafting. 17. Fifthly, Setting them for what they cannot fignify.

18. V. g. putting them for the real Ef fences of Subftances.

19. Hence we think every Change of our Idea in Subftances, not to change the Species.

20. The Caufe of this Abuse, a Suppofition of Nature's working always regularly.

21. This Abufe contains two falfe Suppofitions.

22. Sixthly, A Suppofition, that Words have a certain and evident Signifi

cation.

23. The Ends of Language: Firft, To convey our Ideas.

24. Secondly, To do it with Quickness. 25. Thirdly, Therewith to convey the Knowledg of things.

26-31. How Mens words fail in all these.
32. How in Subftances.

33. How in Modes and Relations.
34. Seventhly, Figurative Speech alfo an
Abufe of Language.

CHAP.

16. Morality capable of Demonftration. 17. Definitions can make moral Difcourfes clear.

18. And is the only way.

19. Thirdly, In Subftances, by fhewing and defining.

20,21. Ideas of the leading Qualities of Subftances, are beft got by fhewing. 22. The Ideas of their Powers beft by Definition.

23. A Reflection on the Knowledg of
Spirits.

24. Ideas alfo of Substances must be
conformable to things.
25. Not ealy to be made fo.

26. Fifthly, By Conftancy in their Sig-
nification.

27. When the Variation is to be explain'd.

CHAP. I.

Of Knowledg in general.

SECT.

9. Demonftration not limited to Quantity. 10-13. Why it has been fo thought. 14. Senfitive Knowledg of particular Existence.

15. Knowledg not always clear, where the Ideas are fo.

CHA P. III.

Of the Extent of Human Knowledg.

SECT.

1. First, No farther than we have Ideas. 2. Secondly, No farther than we can per

ceive the Agreement or Disagreement. 3. Thirdly, Intuitive Knowledg extends it felf not to all the Relations of all our Ideas.

4. Fourthly, Nor demonftrative Knowledg

5. Fifthly, Senfitive Knowledg narrower than either.

6. Sixthly, our Knowledg therefore narrower than our Ideas.

7. How far our Knowledg reaches. 8. First, Our Knowledg of Identity and Diverfity, as far as our Ideas.

9. Secondly, of Co existence a very little way.

10. Because the Connection between moft fimple Ideas is unknown.

11. Efpe

11. Especially of fecondary Qualities.
12-14. And farther, because all Connection
between any fecondary and primary
Qualities is undiscoverable.

15. Of Repugnancy to co-exift larger.
16. Of the Co-existence of Powers a very
little way.

17. Of Spirits yet narrower.

18. Thirdly, Of other Relations, it is
not easy to say how far. Morality
capable of Demonftration.
19. Two Things have made moral Ideas
thought uncapable of Demonftration.
Their Complexedness and want of
fenfible Reprefentations.

20. Remedies of thofe Difficulties.
21. Fourthly, of real Exiftence, we
have an intuitive Knowledg of our
own, demonftrative of God's, fen-
fible of fome few other things.
22. Our Ignorance great.
23. First, One Caufe of its want of
Ideas, either fuch as we have no
Conception of, or fuch as particularly

2. A right joining, or Separating of
Signs; i. e Ideas or Words.
3. Which make mental or verbal Pro-
pofitions.

4. Mental Propofitions are very hard
to be treated of.

5. Being nothing but the joining, or se-
parating Ideas without Words.
6. When mental Propofitions contain
real Truth, and when verbal.
7. Objection against verbal Truth, that
it may be thus all chimerical.
8. Anfwered, real Truth is about Ideas
agreeing to Things.

9. Falfhood is the joining of Names
other wife than their Ideas agree.
10. General Propofitions to be treated of
more at large.

11. Moral and metaphyfical Truth.

CHAP. VI.

Of universal Propofitions, their Truth

and Certainty.

SECT.

1. Treating of Words, necessary to

Knowledg

2. General Truths hardly to be under-

food, but in verbal Propofitions.

3. Certainty two-fold, of Truth, and

of Knowledg

4. No Propofition can be known to be

true, where the Effence of each Spe-

cies mentioned, is not known.

5. This more particularly concerns Sub-

ftances.

6. The Truth of few universal Propo-

fitions concerning Subftances, is to be

known.

7. Because Co-existence of Ideas in few

Cafes to be known.

8,9. Inftance in Gold.

10. As far as any fuch Co-existence can

be known, fo far univerfal Propo-

fitions may be certain.
be certain. But this will

go but a little way, because,

11,12. The Qualities which make our com-

plex Ideas of Substances, depend

moftly on external, remote, and un-

perceiv'd Caufes.

13. Judg-

8. Thefe Axioms do not much influence our other Knowledg.

9, 10. Because they are not the Truths the first known.

11. What Use these general Maxims have.

12. Maxims, if care be not taken in the

Ufe of Words, may prove Contradictions.

13. Inftance in Vacuum.

14. They prove not the Existence of things without us.

15. Their Application dangerous about. complex Ideas.

16-18. Inftance in Man.

19. Little Ufe of thefe Maxims in Proofs where we have clear and diftinct Ideas. 20. Their Ufe dangerous, where our Ideas are confufed.

Two forts of Beings, Cogitative and Incogitative.

10. Incogitative Being cannot produce a Cogitative.

11,12. Therefore there has been an eternal Wisdom.

13. Whether material or no.
14. Not material, Firft, because every
Particle of Matter is not cogitative.
15. Secondly, One Particle alone of
Matter cannot be cogitative.

16. Thirdly, A Syftem of incogitative
Matter cannot be cogitative.

17. Whether in Motion, or at Reft. 18,19. Matter not co-eternal with an eternal Mind.

CHA P. XI.

of the Knowledg of the Existence of
other Things.
SECT.

1. Is to be had only by Senfation.
2. Inftance, Whiteness of this Paper.
3. This, tho' not fo certain as Demon-
ftration, yet may be call'd Knowledg,
and proves the Existence of things
without us.
4. First,

4. Firft, Becafe we cannot have them but by the Inlet of the Senfes. 5. Because an Idea from actual Senfation, and another from Memory, are very diftinct Perceptions. 6. Thirdly, Pleasure or Pain, which accompanies actual Senfation, accompanies not the returning of those Ideas without the external Objects. 7. Fourthly, Our Senfes affift one another's Teftimony of the Existence of outward things.

8. This Certainty is as great as our Condition needs.

9. But reaches no farther than actual Senfation.

10. Folly to expect Demonftration in every thing.

11. Paft Existence is known by Memory. 12. The Existence of Spirits not knowable.

13. Particular Propofitions concerning Existence, are knowable.

14.

And general Propofitions concerning abftract Ideas.

CHAP. XII.

Of the Improvement of our Knowledg.

SECT.

1. Knowledg is not from Maxims. 2. The Occafion of that Opinion. 3. But from the comparing clear and diftinct Ideas.

4. Dangerous to build upon precarious Principles.

5. This no certain way to Truth. 6. But to compare clear compleat Ideas under fteddy Names.

7. The true Method of advancing Knowledg, is by confidering our abftract Ideas..

8. By which, Morality alfo may be

made clearer.

9. But Knowledg of Bodies is to be improved only by Experience. 10. This may procure us Convenience, not Science.

11. We are fitted for moral Knowledg, and natural Improvements. 12. But must beware of Hypothefes and wrong Principles.

13. The true Ufe of Hypothefes. 14. Clear and diftinet Ideas with fettled Names, and the finding of the fe which shew their Agreement or Dif agreement, are the ways to enlarge our Knowledg.

15. Mathematicks an Inftance of it.

SECT.

CHA P. XV.

Of Probability.

1. Probability is the Appearance of Agreement upon falible l'roofs. 2. It is to fupply the want of Knowledg 3. Being that which makes us prefume Things to be true, before we know them to be fo.

4. The Grounds of Probability are two; Conformity with our own Experience, or the Teft:mony of others Experience. 5. In this all the Agreements, pro and con, ought to be examined, before we come to a Judgment.

6. They being capable of great Variety. "CHA P. XVI. Of the Degrees of Allent.

SECT.

1. Our Affent ought to be regulated by the Grounds of Probability. 2. These cannot always be all actually in view, and then we must content our felves with the Remembrance that we once faw ground for fuch a Degree of Affent.

3. The ill Confequence of this, if our former Judgment were not rightly made.

4. The right Ufe of it, is mutual Charity and Forbearance.

5. Probability is either of Matter of Fact or Speculation.

6. The concurrent Experience of all other Men with our's, produces Affurance approaching to Knowledg. 7. Unquestionable Teftimony and Experience for the most part produce Confidence.

8. Fair