I have of them by seeing; but that something without which is the cause of all the variety of the ideas within, in one sense, is the cause also of the variety in the other; and, as they have a necessary connexion with it, we may very justly demonstrate from our ideas of feeling of the same object what will be our ideas in seeing. And, though to talk of seeing by tangible angles and tangible lines be, I agree with you, direct nonsense, yet to demonstrate from angles and lines in feelings, to the ideas in seeing that arise from the same common object, is very good sense, and so vice versâ. From these observations, thus hastily laid together, and a thorough digestion thereof, a great many useful corollaries in all philosophical disputes might be collected. I am, your humble servant, &c. This anonymous Letter was the occasion of the following Vindication of the Theory of Visual Language, by Berkeley, which appeared in March, 1733. The Vindication contributes to his previous reasonings(a) Important explanations of his original theory of the development of the power of Seeing through suggestion. In so doing he points to lines of thought which may be run deeper, especially the distinction between the suggested objects of sense and their ultimate or rational cause (sect 9–18). (b) Answers to the eight objections of the preceding Letter to the Theory of a Divine Visual Language (sect. 19-34). (e) A deductive or synthetical exposition and application of the theory of how we learn to See,-the analytical order of exposition adopted in the original Essay on Vision being reversed. At the close there is an allusion to Cheselden's since celebrated case. The psychological inquiry into the philosophy of Perception leads in this Vindication to a consideration of our judgment of Causality. It is argued that causation involves. more than the natural succession and metamorphosis of phenomena, seeing that reason cannot be satisfied with a caused cause; that we find ourselves obliged to interpret the events of sense as ultimately the expression of Rational Will; and that we are led, by sustained reflection, to transform the visible, and indeed the whole sensible world, into a perpetual Divine Government-physical and at last moral. A. C. F. 9. By a sensible object I understand that which is properly perceived by sense. Things properly perceived by sense are immediately perceived 1.-Besides things properly and immediately perceived by any sense, there may be also other things suggested to the mind by means of those proper and immediate objects;-which things so suggested are not objects of that sense, being in truth only objects of the imagination 2, and originally belonging to some other sense or faculty. Thus, sounds are the proper object of hearing, being properly and immediately perceived by that, and by no other sense. But, by the mediation of sounds or words, all other things may be suggested to the mind; and yet things so suggested are not thought the object of hearing. 10. The peculiar objects of each sense, although they are truly or strictly perceived by that sense alone, may yet be suggested to the imagination by some other sense. The objects therefore of all the senses may become objects of imagination --which faculty represents all sensible things. A colour, there 1 Do we become at all percipient-meaning by that cognisant of something that is independent of transient phenomena-in any one of our five senses, taken singly? Does externality so belong to any one of them that, in that one, we have not only sensations, but also apprehend a real object--and an object that is distinguished (not necessarily as something extended) from the percipient? If so, on what rational principle is the distinction made? These questions are scarcely touched by Berkeley. 2 Imagination,' i. e. expectant imagination, or rather expectant conception, discursive thought and rational common sense being latent in the 'suggestion.' |