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of the proposition. Man is the name of one cluster of ideas; animal is the name of a cluster, including both this and other clusters. The latter cluster is partly the same with, and partly different from, the former. But having two clusters, and knowing them to be two, is not two things, but one and the same thing; knowing them in the case in which I call them same, and knowing them in the case in which I call them different, is still having them, having them such as they are, and nothing besides. In this second case also, of the belief of a proposition, there is, therefore, nothing but ideas, and association.
We have already shewn, under the head NAMING, when explaining the purpose to which Predication is subservient, that all Predication may be strictly considered as of one kind, the application to the same thing of another name of greater extent; in other words, that Predication by what Logicians call the Difference, Property, or Accident of a thing, may be reduced to Predication by the Genus or Species; but as there is a seeming difference in these latter cases, a short illustration of them will probably be useful.
Thus, suppose I say, "Man is rational," and that I choose to expound it, without the aid of the word animal, understood; what is there in the case? The word "man," marks a certain cluster of ideas. "Rational" marks a portion of that cluster.
In the cluster marked 66 man," the
cluster marked "rational," is included. To recognise this, is also called believing the proposition. But to have one cluster of ideas, and know what it is; then another, and know what it is, is merely to have the two clusters. To have a second cluster, part of a first, and to know that it is a part of the first, is the same thing.
The peculiar property of that class of words to which "Rational" belongs, must here be recollected. They are the connotative class. Beside marking something peculiarly, they mark something else in conjunction; and this last, they are said to connote. Thus the word “rational," beside the part of the cluster, man, which it peculiarly marks, connotes, or marks in conjunction with it, the part included under the word animal.
It will be easy to apply the same explanation to all other cases. I say, the rose is red. Red is a connotative term, distinctively marking the idea of red. The idea of red is part of the cluster I mark by the word rose.
Take a more obscure expression; Fire burns. It is very obvious, that in the cluster of ideas I mark by the word fire, the idea of burning is included. To have the idea, "fire," therefore, and the idea, "burning," called up by the names standing in predication,—is to believe the proposition.
The Predications, "Virtue is lovely,' "Vice is hateful," and the like, all admit of a similar exposition. In the cluster "virtue," the idea of
loveliness is included; in the cluster "vice," that
of hatefulness is included. Such propositions, therefore, merely say, that what is a part of a thing, is a part of it. The two words call up the two ideas; and to have two ideas, one a part of another, and know that one is part of another, is not two things, but one and the same thing. To have the idea of rose, and the idea of red, and to know that red makes part of rose, is not two things, but one and the same thing.
Little more is necessary to explain this case of Belief in the truth of Propositions. Propositions are formed, either of general names, or particular names, that is, names of individuals. Propositions consisting of general names are by far the most numerous class, and by far the most important. The preceding exposition embraces them all. They are all merely verbal; and the Belief is nothing more than recognition of the coincidence, entire, or partial, of two general
The case of Propositions formed of particular names, is different, and yet remains to be explained. "Mr. Brougham made a speech in the House of Commons on such a day." The Predicate, " making a speech in the House of Commons," is neither general, so as to include the subject, "Mr. Brougham," as in a species; nor is the cluster of ideas, marked by the predicate, included in the cluster marked by the subject, as a part in its
whole. The proposition marks a case, either of experience, or of testimony. If I heard the speech, the proposition is an expression of the Memory of an event; Mr. Brougham, antecedent, and making a speech, consequent; and the Belief of the Proposition, is another name for the Memory of the Event. If I did not hear it, Belief of the proposition, is belief in the testimony of those who say they heard it.
As all propositions relating to individual objects are, after this manner, marks either of other men's testimony, or of our own experience, what belief, in these cases, is, has already been explained.
Propositions relating to individuals may be expressions either of past, or of future events. Belief in past events, upon our own experience, is memory; upon other men's experience, is Belief in testimony; both of them resolved into association. Belief in future events, is the inseparable association of like consequents with like antecedents.
It is not deemed necessary to unfold these associations. It has been already done. It seems enough, if they are indicated here.
"It would afford great light and clearness to the art of Logic, to determine the precise nature and composition of the ideas affixed to those words which have complex ideas; i. e., which excite any combinations of simple ideas, united intimately by association."— Hartley. Prop. 12, Corol. 3.
RATIOCINATION is one of the most complicated of all the mental phenomena. And it is worthy of notice, that more was accomplished towards the analysis of it, at an early period in the history of intellectual improvement, than of any other of the complex cases of human consciousness.
It was fully explained by Aristotle, that the simplest case of Ratiocination consists of three propositions, which he called a syllogism. piece of ratiocination may consist of one, or more syllogisms, to any extent; but every single step is a syllogism.