Locke and public schools. Escape from "idols."

agrees with Comenius in his enlarged view of the educator's task, and that he thought much less than Comenius of the importance of the knowledge to be given.

§ 15. We already see a gradual escape from the "idols" of the Renascence. Locke, instead of accepting the learned ideal, declares that learning is the last and least thing to be thought of. He cares little about the ordinary literary instruction given to children, though he thinks they must be taught something and does not know what to put in its place. He provides for the education of those who are

scholars under his eye any longer than they are in the school together, nor can it be expected that he should instruct them successfully in any. thing but their books; the forming of their minds and manners requiring a constant attention and particular application to every single boy which is impossible in a numerous flock, and would be wholly in vain (could he have time to study and correct everyone's particular defects and wrong inclinations) when the lad was to be left to himself or the prevailing infection of his fellows the greatest part of the four-and-twenty hours." But the educator who considers himself a director of influences must remember that he is not the only force. The boy's companions are a force at least as great; and if he were brought up in private on Locke's system, he would be entirely without a kind of influence much more valuable than Locke seems to think-the influence of boy companions, and of the traditions of a great school. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that our public schools used to be, and perhaps are still to some extent, under-mastered, and that the masters should not be the mere teachers which, from overwork and other causes, they often tend to become. The consequence has been that the real education of the boys has in a great measure passed out of their hands. What has been the result? A long succession of able teachers have aimed at giving literary instruction and making their pupils classical scholars. Both manners and bodily training have been left to take care of then.selves. Yet such is the irony of Fate that the majority of youths who leave our great schools are not literary and are not much of classical scholars, but they are decidedly gentlemanly and still more decidedly athletic.

Rousseau's clean sweep.

to remain ignorant of Greek, but only when they are "gentlemen." In this respect the van is led by Comenius, who thought of education for all, boys and girls, rich and poor, alike. Comenius also gave the first hint of the true nature of our task—to bring to perfection the seeds implanted by Nature. He also cared for the little ones whom the school. master had despised. Locke does not escape from a certain intellectual disdain of "my young masters," as he calls them; but in one respect he advanced as far as the best thinkers among his successors have advanced. Knowledge, he says, must come by the action of the learner's own mind. The true teacher is within.

§ 16. We now come to the least practical and at the same time the most influential of all the writers on education -I mean Rousseau. He, like Rabelais, Montaigne, and Locke, was (to use Matthew Arnold's expression) a "child of the idea.” He attacked scholastic use and wont not in the name of expedience, but in the name of reason; and such an attack-so eloquent, so vehement, so uncompromising-had never been made before.

Still there remained even in theory, and far more in practice, effects produced by the false ideal of the Renascence. This ideal Rousseau entirely rejected. He proposed making a clean sweep and returning to what he called the state of Nature.

§ 17. Rousseau was by no means the first of the Reformers who advocated a return to Nature. There has been a constant conviction in men's minds from the time of the Stoics onwards that most of the evils which afflict humanity have come from our not following "Nature." The cry of "Everything according to Nature " was soon raised by educationists. Ratke announced it as one of his

Benevolence of Nature. Man disturbs.

principles. Comenius would base all action on the analogy of Nature. Indeed, there has hardly ever been a system of education which did not lay claim to be the “natural” system. And by "natural" has been always understood something different from what is usual. What is the notion

that produces this antithesis?

§ 18. When we come to trace back things to their cause we are wont to attribute them to God, to Nature, or to Man. According to the general belief, God works in and through Nature, and therefore the tendency of things apart from human agency must be to good. This faith which underlies all our thoughts and modes of speech, has been beautifully expressed by Wordsworth

"A gracious spirit o'er this earth presides,
And in the heart of man; invisibly

It comes to works of unreproved delight

And tendency benign; directing those

Who care not, know not, think not, what they do."

Prelude, v, ad f.

But if the tendency of things is to good, why should the usual be in such strong contrast with "the natural"? Here again we may turn to Wordsworth. After pointing to the harmony of the visible world, and declaring his faith that "every flower enjoys the air it breathes," he goes on

"If this belief from heaven be sent,

If this be Nature's holy plan,

Have I not reason to lament,

What Man has made of Man?"

This passage might be taken as the motto of Rousseauisin. According to that philosophy man is the great disturber and perverter of the natural order. Other animals simply follow

We arrange sequences, capitalise ideas.

nature, but man has no instinct, and is thus left to find his own way. What is the consequence? A very different authority from Rousseau, the poet Cowper, tells us in language which Rousseau might have adopted

"Reasoning at every step he treads,

Man yet mistakes his way:

While meaner things whom instinct leads,
Are seldom known to stray."

Man has to investigate the sequences of Nature, and to arrange them for himself. In this way he brings about a great number of foreseen results, but in doing this he also brings about perhaps even a greater number of unforeseen results; and alas! it turns out that many, if not most, of these unforeseen results are the reverse of beneficial.

19. Another thing is observable. Other animals are guided by instinct; we, for the most part, are guided by tradition. Man, it has been said, is the only animal that capitalises his discoveries. If we capitalised nothing but our discoveries, this accumulation would be an immense advantage to us; but we capitalise also our conjectures, our ideals, our habits, and unhappily, in many cases, our blunders.* So a great deal of action which is purely mischievous

* I append a note written from a different point of view-" With how little wisdom!" certainly seems to cover most departments of life. Seems? Yes; but are we not apt to overlook the wisdom that lies in the great mass of people? In some small department we may have investigated further than our class-mates, and may see, or think we see, a good deal of stupidity in what goes on. But in most matters we do not investigate for ourselves, but just do the usual thing; and this seems to work all right. There must be a good deal of wisdom underlying the complex machinery of civilised life. Carlyle's "Mostly fools!" will by Do means account for it. At times one has a dim perception that people

Loss and gain from tradition.

in its effects, comes not from our own mistakes, but from those of our ancestors. The consequence is, that what with our own mistakes and the mistakes we inherit, we sometimes go far indeed out of the course which "Nature" has prescribed for us.

§ 20. The generation which found a mouthpiece in Rousseau had become firmly convinced, not indeed of its

in general are not so stupid as they seem. Perhaps a long life would in the end lead us to say like Tithonus,

"Why should a man desire in any way

"To vary from the kindly race of men?"

There is a higher wisdom than the disintegrating individualism of Carlyle. Far better to believe with Mazzini in "the collective existence of humanity," and remembering that we work in a medium fashioned for us by the labours of all who have preceded us, regard our collective powers as "grafted upon those of all foregoing humanity." (Mazzini's Essays: Carlyle.) This is the point of view to which Wordsworth would raise us :

"One spirit over ignorance and vice

"Predominant, in good and evil hearts;

"One sense for moral judgements, as one eye
"For the sun's light. The soul when smitten thus

"By a sublime idea, whence soe'er

"Vouchsafed for union or communion, feeds

"On the pure bliss and takes her rest with God."

Prelude viij, ad f.

Though unable to share in "the pure bliss" of Wordsworth we may take refuge with Goethe in the thought that "humanity is the true man,' and enjoy much to which we have no claim as individuals. Tradition, blind tradition, must rule our actions through by far the greatest part of our lives; and seeing we owe it so much, we should be tolerant, even grateful.