doubt that they had been sufficiently apprised of the act of bankruptcy." 1833. ROBINSON v. CARRINGTON and others. It is the same with respect to a deed as with respect and another to any other act of bankruptcy. A denial to a stranger would not excite any suspicion in his mind, or, if he did not inquire into the cause of the denial, would it be any evidence of notice of an act of bankruptcy; but denial to a creditor who called again and again for payment of a debt would be such notice of the act as to be evidence of his notice of the intent. With respect to the case of Read and Ward, 7 Vin. 122, the words of the Chancellor are, "Notice of the deeds is not notice of the fraudulent intent, other than to M. K. who was a party." To apply this doctrine to the present case. The parties knew the situation of the bankrupt, that he was insolvent, violating engagements to meet his creditors, with eight or ten executions in his house, and one for such a small sum as 271. Were not these facts sufficient to apprise them of the necessity of inquiring with what intent the deed was executed? 2dly, If they had notice of the deed and of the intent, it is not protected because the commission did not issue within two months. Mr. Beames says, "that the deed, although it might be an act of bankruptcy, and invalidated under a commission which issued within two months of its execution, cannot be invalidated under this commission, which did not issue until more than two months after the execution; and in proof of this position he has referred to Tucker and Barrow, 3 Carr. & P. 87, by which it is determined that a preference cannot be invalidated under a commission that does not issue until after the lapse of two months from the time of the preference; but this nisi prius decision, which was clearly a mistake, is overruled by Beven v. Nunn, 9 Bing. 110, and 2 M. & S. 132. 1833. ROBINSON บ. CARRINGTON and others. 4thly, He committed an act of bankruptcy by absenting himself, as he broke an appointment to meet his creand another ditors, and broke it with the intent to delay them, of which the parties had notice. The cases upon this subject are, in order of time, as follow: Schooly v. Lee, 1822, 3 Stark. 149. The bankrupt was liberated on a promise that he would return and execute a bail-bond; he did not return according to his promise. Abbot, C. J.:-He absented himself, not in order to avoid a creditor with whom he had made an appointment, but merely to avoid the execution of a bail-bond. Tucker v. Jones, 1824, 2 Bing. 3-9, B. M. 24. The bankrupt promised to meet an agent of the creditors, as to giving security for a debt; he broke his appointment; the Court held that it was not an act of bankruptcy, as there was no evidence of an intent to delay creditors. Key v. Shaw, 1832, 1 M. & S. 464. In this case Mr. Justice Park said, "There was one point urged in argument to which I do not accede, viz. that a failure to keep an appointment made with a creditor constitutes an act of bankruptcy. In Toleman v. Jones it was expressly held, that merely appointing to meet a creditor at a given place, and failing to do so, is not an act of bankruptcy." Lord Chief Justice Best there said, "The intent to delay a creditor (which is a proof of fraud or insolvency) is the essence of the act of bankruptcy which this person is supposed to have committed. There was not even prima facie evidence of such an intent. It was only proved that he made an appointment with a creditor to meet him, and he did not keep that appointment. If a jury could, without more evidence, presume that he broke that engagement to delay his creditor, there are very few in the commercial world that could be assured they were not bankrupts. Robson v. Rolls, 1833, 9 Bing. 648. A trader, apprehensive that a ca. sa. had been issued against him in Middlesex, stopped at the end of Chancery Lane till he learnt that Tindall, C. J., thought this a ca. sa. had not issued. On a motion did not amount to an act of bankruptcy. THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS : I am quite satisfied on this point. I consider it clear that the bankrupt, in thus absenting himself from the meeting of North Aston, committed an act of bankruptcy, and that Benjamin Churchill, one of the trustees, had notice of that act of bankruptcy at the time he delivered the conveyance; I consider these points to be clear upon the evidence produced and the cases cited. But the bankrupt has conveyed, and the commission did not issue within two months of the transaction. Mrs. Greenwood, the plaintiff in this case, having a demand upon Samuel Churchill for the sum of 2,2007., in respect to trust monies possessed by him, an application on her behalf was made to Churchill, with strong pressure for a security, early in the year 1826. Upon that occasion Churchill gave his bond for the amount, with interest, I think at two months; that bond became due, and it was not paid; and not being paid, Mrs. Greenwood, the plaintiff, brings an action upon the bond, and obtains judgment. In the month of October 1826, Mr. James, the brother-in-law of Churchill, and the trustee under the deed, which is in this case impeached as an act of bankruptcy, applies to Mrs. Greenwood, and proposes, that if she will not execute her avowed intention to sue out execution on the judgment obtained on this bond on the following Michaelmas, that Churchill was ready, together with the trustees of that deed, to (a) See Lees v. Marton, 1 M. & Robinson, 210. 1833. ROBINSON and another v. CARRINGTON and others. Breaking an appointment to delay creditors is an act of bankruptcy. 1833. ROBINSON v. CARRINGTON and others. execute a security to her for the amount on his Oxfordshire estate. Mrs. Greenwood was advised to accept and another this proposal; and deeds are accordingly prepared, stating the consideration to be the undertaking not to sue out execution; and those deeds James the trustee undertakes to get executed. It appears, in point of fact, that although dated when the agreement was made, namely, on the 27th of October, they were not actually executed till the month of January following; and the acknowledgment of the satisfaction of the judgment was not entered till a subsequent period. It is stated, on the part of the assignees of Churchill, against whom a commission of bankrupt subsequently issued, that Mrs. Greenwood is not entitled to the benefit of this security, because this security is in fact derived from certain trust conveyances executed by Churchill, by deeds of lease and release, on the 17th and 18th days of July 1826, and that those deeds were in fact an act of bankruptcy, and consequently her title derived from the trustees under those deeds was not available. The first consideration, therefore, in the case, is, whether these deeds of the 17th and 18th of July 1826 were or were not an act of bankruptcy. Any deed executed by a trader, with an intent to defeat or delay his creditors, is an act of bankruptcy; and that intention may appear upon the face of the deed, or that intention may be proved by extrinsic circumstances. In this case it is argued both ways; it is said that the intention appears on the face of the deed; it is said also that it is proved by extrinsic circumstances. Upon the face of the deed the recital is an intention to convey his freehold and leasehold estates to trustees, and an actual conveyance of his freehold and leasehold estates in Oxfordshire to trustees, with a power to them to sell or mortgage and apply the money as he shall direct, and to repay to him all monies that shall not be applied according to his direction; and the question is, whether, upon the face of the deed, there is an act of bankruptcy? whether this deed discloses, by its recital or its provision, an intention to defeat or delay the creditors? It has not been stated in what manner the creditors could be defeated or delayed by this deed, if executed according to its avowed purpose; and I am perfectly at a loss to understand how any creditor can be said to be defeated or delayed by the provisions of the deed. It is a power given to trustees, that they may become substitutes for the bankrupt, in order to convert into money his real estates, to be applied as the bankrupt himself should direct. The bankrupt remains to all intents and purposes in the same beneficial ownership of the property as he was actually in before he executed the deed, and the creditor is in manner defeated either of his legal or equitable right. If the effect of this deed were to prevent the legal execution of the creditor, it might then be said, that, upon the face of the deed, it would operate to defeat or delay the creditor; but, by the statute of frauds, inasmuch as the beneficial interest remains in the bankrupt, the creditor has the same legal right of execution as if no such deed had ever been executed. There is no intention expressed upon the deed to give a preference to any particular creditor; the sole purpose is, that the trustees are to take upon themselves the conversion of the property which, before the deed was executed, was solely in the power of the bankrupt. The extrinsic circumstances relied upon are, the circumstances of great embarrassment on the part of the bankrupt, and that he was overwhelmed with debt. It appears upon the evidence that these circumstances certainly induced the deed, for the state of the bankrupt's affairs had so affected his mind, that his friends |