4. Fourthly, not demonstra-

tive knowledge.

5. Fifthly, sensitive know.

ledge, narrower than ei-

ther.

6. Sixthly, our knowledge,

therefore, narrower than

our ideas.

7. How far our knowledge

reaches.

8. First, our knowledge of

identity and diversity, as

as far as our ideas.

9. Secondly, of co-exist-

ence, a very little way.

10. Because the connexion

between most simple

ideas is unknown.

11. Especially of secondary

qualities.

12-14. And farther, because all
connexion between any
secondary and primary
qualities is undiscovera-

ble.

15. Of repugnancy to co-

exist, larger.

16. Of the co-existence of

powers, a very little way.

17. Of spirits yet narrower.

18. Thirdly, of other rela-

tions, it is not easy to

say how far. Morality

capable of demonstration.

19. Two things have made

moral ideas thought in-

capable of demonstration.

Their complexedness and

want of sensible
represen.

tations.

20. Remedies of thofe diffi

culties.

21. Fourthly, of real exist.

ence; we have an intui-

tive knowledge of our

own, demonstrative of

God's, sensitive of some

few other things.

22. Our ignorance great.

23. First, one cause of it, want

of ideas, either such as we

have no conception of, or

CHA P. IV.

Of the reality of our knowledge.
SECT.

1. Objection, knowledge

placed in ideas, may be

all bare vision.

2, 3. Answer, not so, where

ideas agree with things.

4. As, first, all simple ideas

do..

5. Secondly, all complex ide-

as, except of substances.

6. Hence the reality of ma.

thematical knowledge,

7. And of moral.

8. Existence not required to

make it real.

9. Nor will it be lefs true,

or certain, because moral

ideas are of our own mak.

ing and naming.

10. Mif-naming disturbs not

the certainty of the know-

ledge.

11. Ideas of substances have

their archetypes without

us.

12. So far as they agree with

these, so far our know.

ledge concerning them is

real.

1. What truth is.
2. A right joining, or sepa
rating of signs, i. e. ideas
or words.

3. Which make mental, or

verbal propositions.: 4. Mental propositions are very hard to be treated of. 5. Being nothing but joining, or separating ideas, without words. 6. When mental propositions contain real truth, and when verbal. 7. Objection against verbal truth, that thus it may be all chimerical. 8. Answered, real truth is about ideas agreeing to things.

9. Falshood is the joining of

names, otherwise than their ideas agree. 10. General propositions to be treated of more at large. 11. Moral and metaphysical truth.

2. General truths hardly to be understood, but in verbal propositions. 3. Certainly two-fold, of truth, and of knowledge. 4. No proposition can be known to be true, where the essence of each species mentioned, is not known. 5. This more particularly concerns substances. 6. The truth of few universal propositions concerning substances, is to be known. 7. Because, co-existence of ideas in few cases is to be known.

8, 9. Instance in gold. 10. As far as any such co-existence can be known, so far universal propositions may be certain. But this will go but a little way, because, 11, 12. The qualities, which make our complex ideas of substances, depend mostly on external, remote, and unperceived causes. 13. Judgment may reach far. ther, but that is not knowledge.

14. What is requisite for our knowledge of substances. 15. Whilst our ideas of substances contain not their real constitutions, we can make but few general, certain propositions concerning them.

16. Wherein lies the general certainty of propositions.

SECT.

CHAP. VII.

Of maxims.

1. They are self-evident. 2. Wherein that self-evi. dence consists.

3. Self-evidence not peculiar to received axioms. 4. First

4. First, as to identity and

diversity, all propositions

are equally self-evident.

5. Secondly, in co-existence,

we have few self-evident

propositions.

6. Thirdly, in ether relations

we may have.

7. Fourthly, concerning real

existence, we have none.

8. These axioms do not much

influence our other know.

ledge.

9. Because they are not the

truths the first known.

10. Because on them the other

parts of our knowledge
do not depend.

11. What use these general

maxims have.

12. Maxims, if care be not

taken in the use of words,

may prove contradictions.

13. Instance in vacuum.

14. They prove not the exist.

ence of things without us.

15. Their application danger.

ous about complex ideas.

16-18. Instance in man.

19. Little use of these maxims,

in proofs, where we have

clear and distinct ideas.

20. Their use dangerous, where

our ideas are confused.

CHAP. VIII.
Of trifling propositions.

SECT.

1. Some propositions bring

no increase to our know.

ledge.

2, 3. As, first, identical propo-
sitions.

part of

4. Secondly, when a
any complex idea is pre-
dicated of the whole.
5. As part of the definition

of the term defined.
6. Instance, man and palfry.
7. For this teaches but the
signification of words.

8. But no real knowledge.

9. General propositions,con-

cerning substances, are

often trifling.

10. And why.

11. Thirdly, using words va-

riously, is trifling with

them.

12. Marks of verbal proposi-

tions. First, predication

in abstract.

13. Secondly, a part of the

definition, predicated of

any term.

CHAP. IX.

Of our knowledge of existence.

SECT.

1. General, certain proposi-

tions concern not exist.

ence.

2. A threefold knowledge of

existence.

3. Our knowledge of our own

existence, is intuitive.

СНАР. Х.

Of the existence of a God.

SECT.

1. We are capable of know-

ing certainly that there is

a God.

2. Man knows that he him.
self is.

3. He knows also, that no-

thing cannot produce a

being, therefore some.

thing eternal.

4. That eternal being must
be most powerful.

5. And most knowing.
6. And therefore God.
7. Our idea of a most perfect
being, not the sole proof
of a God.

8. Something from eternity.
9. Two sorts of beings, co-
gitative and incogitative.

1. Is to be had only by sen-

sation.

e. Instance, whiteness of this
paper.

3. This, though not so cer.

tain as demonstration, yet

may be called knowledge,

and proves the existence

of things without us.

4. First, because we cannot

have them but by the in-

lets of the senses.

5. Secondly, because an idea

from actual sensation, and

another from memory, are

very distinct perceptions.

6. Thirdly, pleasure or pain,

which accompanies actual

sensation, accompanies not

the returning of those

ideas, without the external

objects.

7. Fourthly, our senses assist

one another's testimony of

the existence of outward

things,

8. This certainty is as great

as our condition needs.
9. But reaches no farther

than actual sensation.
10. Folly to expect demon-
stration in every thing.

11. Past existence is known by
memory.

12. The existence of spirits
not knowable.

13. Particular propositions con-
cerning existence are know-
able.

14. And general propositions
concerning abstract ideas.

CHAP. XII.

Of the improvement of our know.
ledge.

SECT.

1. Knowledge is not from
maxims.

2. (The occasion of that opi-
nion.)

3. But from the comparing

clear and distinct ideas.

4. Dangerous to build upon
precarious principles.

5. This no certain way to

truth.

6. But to compare clear,

complete ideas under stea-

dy names.

7. The true method of ad.

vancing knowledge, is by

considering our abstract

ideas.

8. By which, morality, also,

may be made clearer.

9. But knowledge of bodies

is to be improved only by

experience.

10. This may procure us con-

venience, not science.

11. We are fitted for moral

knowledge, and natural

improvements.

12. But must beware of hypo-

theses and wrong princi-

ples.

13. The

1. Our assent ought to be

regulated by the grounds
of probability.

2. These cannot be always
actually in view, and then
we must content ourselves
with the remembrance,
that we once saw ground

for such a degree of assent.

3. The ill consequence of this,

if our former judgment

were not rightly made.
4. The right use of it, is
mutual charity and for-
bearance.

5. Probability is either of

matter of fact, or specula.

tion.

6. The concurrent experience

of all other men with ours

produces assurance ap-
proaching to knowledge.
7. Unquestionable testimony
and experience for the
most part produce confi.
dence.

8. Fair testimony, and the
nature of the thing indif
ferent, produces also con
fident belief.