Such then is the nature of that Union which produceth a RELIGION BY LAW ESTABLISHED: and which is, indeed, no other than a public league and alliance for mutual fupport and defence. For the State, not having the care of fouls, cannot inforce the influence of religion; and therefore feeks the concurring aid of the Church: and the Church having no coercive power (the confequence of its care's not extending to bodies) as naturally flies for protection to the State: this being of that kind of Alliance which Grotius calls FOEDUS INÆQUALE" Inæquale "fœdus (fays he) hic intelligo quod ex ipfa vi pac"tionis manentem prælationem quandam alteri donat: hoc eft, ubi quis tenetur alterius impe"rium ac majeftatem confervare UT POTENTIORI +66 PLUS HONORIS, INFIRMIORI PLUS AUXILII DEFERATUR'

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An Alliance, then, by free convention, being in its nature fuch that each party must have its motives for contracting; our next enquiry will be,

I. What those motives were, which the State had for feeking, and the Church for accepting the offers of an union: And,

II. The mutual benefits and advantages thereby arifing.

The motives the Magiftrate had to feek this alli`ance, were these :

I. To preferve the effence and purity of religion. H. To improve its usefulness, and apply its influence in the best manner.

III. To prevent the mischief which, in its natural independent ftate, it might occafion to civil fociety. I. The Magiftrate was induced to feek it, 1. As the neceffary means of preferving the being of religion. For though (as hath been fhewn in the treatife of

De Jure Belli et Paç. 1. i. c. 3. § 21.

the

the Alliance) religion conftitutes a Society; and tho' this Society will indeed, for fome time, fupport the existence of religion, which, without it, would foon vanish from amongst men; yet, if we confider that religious Society is made up of the fame individuals which compofe the civil; and deftitute likewife of all coercive power; we must needs fee, that a Society, abandoned to its own fortune, without fupport or protection, would, in no long time, be fwallowed up and loft. Of this opinion was a very able writer, whofe knowledge of human nature will not be difputed: "Were it not, fays he, for that "fense of virtue, which is principally preferved, fo "far as it is preserved, BY NATIONAL FORMS AND HABITS OF RELIGION, men would foon lose it "all, run wild, prey upon one another, and do "what else the worst of favages do "."

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2. But of whatever ufe an Alliance may be thought, for preferving the being of religion, the neceffity of it, for preferving its purity, is most evident: for if truth, and public utility coincide, the nearer any religion approacheth to the truth of things, the fitter that religion is for the fervice of the State. That they do coincide, that is, that truth is productive of utility, and uti ity indicative of truth, may be proved on any principles, but the atheistic; and therefore we think it needlefs, in this place, to draw out the argument in form: Let us then confider the danger religion runs of deviating from truth, when left, in its natural ftate, to itself. In thofe circumftances, the men of higheft credit, are fuch as are famed for greatest fanctity. This fanctity hath been generally understood to be then moft per

• Book i. § 5. f Wollafton's Religion of Nature delineated, p. 124. Quarto Edit. 1725. See Book iii. § 6.

fect

ཕ

fect, when most estranged from the world, and all its habits and relations. But this being only to be acquired by feceffion and retirement from affairs; and that feceffion rendering man ignorant of civil Society, and of its rights and interefts; in place of which will fucceed, according to his natural temper, the deftructive follies either of fuperftition or fanaticism, we must needs conclude, that religion, under such directors and reformers, (and God knows these are generally its lot) will deviate from truth; and confequently from a capacity, in proportion, of ferving civil Society. I wish I could not fay, we have too many examples to fupport this obfervation. The truth is, we have feen, and yet do fee religious Societies, fome grown up, and continuing unfupported by, and ununited with the State; others, that, when fupported and united, have by strange arts brought the ftate into subjection, and become its tyrants and ufurpers; and thereby defeated all the good which can arise from this alliance; fuch Societies, I fay, we have feen, whose religious doctrines are fo little ferviceable to civil Government, that they can profper only on the ruin and deftruction of it. Such are thofe which teach the holiness of celibacy and afceticism, the finfulness of defenfive war, of capital punishments, and even of civil magistracy itself.

On the other hand, when religion is in Alliance with the State, as it then comes under the Magiftrate's direction, thofe holy leaders having now neither credit nor power to do mifchief, its purity must needs be reasonably well fupported and preserved for truth and public utility coinciding, the civil Magiftrate, as fuch, will fee it for his interest to feek after, and promote truth in religion: and, by means of public utility, which his office enables him fo well to understand, he will never be at a

lofs,

lofs, where fuch truth is to be found: fo that it is impoffible, under this civil influence, for religion ever to deviate far from truth; always fuppofing (for on fuch fuppofition this whole theory proceeds). a LEGITIMATE government, or civil policy, eftablifhed on the principles of the natural rights and liberties of man: for an unequal and unjust Government, which feeks its own, not public utility, will. always have occafion for error; and fo, muft corrupt religion both in principle and practice, to pro mote its own wrong interefts.

II. Secondly, the Magiftrate was induced to feek this Alliance, as the neceffary means to improve the ufefulness, and to apply in the best manner the influence of religion for his fervice. And this an Alliance does by feveral ways.

1. By beftowing additional reverence and veneration on the perfon of the civil MAGISTRATE, and on the LAWS of the state. For, in this alliance, where the religious Society is taken into the protection of the State, the fupreme Magiftrate, as will be fhewn hereafter, is acknowledged HEAD of the religion. Now nothing can be imagined of more efficacy for fecuring the obedience of the people. Thofe two great mafters in politics, Ariftotle and Machiavel, as we have feen, thought it of force enough to gain reverence and fecurity to a tyrant. What then muft we fuppofe its efficacy in a legitimate Magiftrature? The fame veneration will extend itfelf over the Laws likewife: For while fome of them are employed by the State for the fupport of the Church, and others lent to the Church to be employed in the fervice of the State, and all of them. enacted by a legislature, in which churchmen have a confiderable bare (all these things being amongst the conditions of Alliance") laws, under fuch die

See the Alliance between Ch. and St. B. ii. c: 3.

rection,

rection, muft needs be regarded with the greatest

reverence.

2. By lending to the CHURCH a coactive powerIt may be remembered, that, in fpeaking of the innate defects of civil Society, we obferved, that there were feveral forts of duties which civil laws could not inforce; fuch as the duties of IMPERFECT OBLIGATION; which a religious Society, when endowed with coercive power, to invigorate the influence of religion, is capable of exacting: and SUCH likewife of the duties of PERFECT OBLI GATION; whofe breach is owing to the intemperance of the fenfual appetites; the fevere prohibition of which threatens greater and more enormous evils for while these unruly paffions overflow, the stopping them in one place is caufing them to break out with greater violence in another: as the rigorous punishment of fornication hath been generally feen to give birth to unnatural lufts. The effectual correction therefore of fuch evils must be begun by moderating and fubduing the paffions themselves. But this, civil laws are not underftood to prescribe; as punishing thofe paffions only when they proceed to act; and not rewarding the attempts to fubdue them: it must be a tribunal regarding irregular intentions as criminal, and good defires as meritorious, which can work this effect; and this can be no other than the tribunal of religion. When that is once done, a coactive power of the civil kind may be applied to good purpose; but not till then: And who fo fit to apply it as that Society, which prepared the fubject for its due

1 Thefe were the confiderations, doubtless, which induced the excellent author De l'efprit des loix to fay, " Il eft aisé de regler par des loix, ce qu'on doit aux autres; il eft difficile d'y comprendre tout ce qu'on fe doit à foi-meme." Vol. i. p. 167.

4to.

2

applic