k

application and reception? Again, it hath been obferved', that the State punishes deviations from the rule of right as crimes only; and not as fuck deviations, or as fins; and, on the idea of crimes, proportions its punishments: by which means fome very enormous deviations from the rule of right, which do not immediately affect fociety, and fo are not confidered as crimes, are overlooked by the civil tribunal: yet thefe, being, tho' mediately, very pernicious to the ftate, it is for its interefts they fhould be brought before fome capable tribunal. But, befides the civil, there is no other than the ecclefiafti

cal, endowed with coactive power. Hence may be deduced the true, and only, end and ufe of SPIRITUAL COURTS. A church tribunal then, with coactive power, being neceffary in all these cafes; and a religious Society having, in itself, no fuch power, it must be borrowed from the State: but a State cannot lend it, without great danger to itself, but on the terms of an Alliance; a State therefore will be induced to seek this Alliance, in order to improve the natural efficacy of religion.

3. By conferring on the State the application of the efficacy of religion, and by putting it under the Magiftrate's direction. There are certain junctures when the influence of religion is more than ordinarily serviceable to the State: and thefe, the civil Magiftrate only knows. Now while a Church is in its

A jurifdiction fomewhat refembling this we find in the famous court of AREOPAGUS at Athens: which city was once the model of civil prudence as well as of religion, to the improved part of mankind. Ifocrates fpeaking of this branch of jurif diction in the Areopagus, fays, "It was not exerted to PU66 NISH crimes, but to PREVENT them. · 8 τ8το πρῶτον ἐσκόπων, δι ̓ ὧν κολάσεσι τὲς ἀκισμένας, ἀλλ ̓ ἐξ ὧν ἂν κατασκευάσεσι μηδὲν αὐτὲς ἄξιον ζημίας βελήσεσθαι αμαξάνειν. ἡγελο γὰρ τῦτο μὲν αὐτῶν ἔργον εἶναι. ΑΡΕΙΟΠ. ΛΟΓ.

1 See the Alliance, Book i. § 4.

natural

natural ftate of independency, it is not in his power to improve thofe conjunctures to the advantage of the State, by a proper application of religion: but when the Alliance is made, and confequently the Church under his direction, he hath then authority to prefcribe fuch public exercises of religion, and at fuch times, and in fuch manner, as he finds the exigencies of State require.

4. By engaging the Church to apply its utmost en deavours in the fervice of the State. For an Alliance laying an obligation on the State to protect and defend the Church, and to provide a fettled maintenance for its minifters, fuch benefits must needs produce the higheft love and efteem for the benefactor: which will be returned, out of motives both of gratitude and intereft, in the moft zealous labours for the fervice of civil government.

III. Laftly, the State was induced to feek this Alliance, as the only means of preventing the mischiefs, which the Church, in its natural independent condition, might occafion to civil Society. For, in this ftate the Church having, of itfelf, a power of affembling for religious worship, factious men may commodiously, under that cover, hatch and carry on defigns against the peace of civil government: and the influence which popular and leading men gain over the confciences of fuch affemblies, by the frequency of occafional harangues, may easily ripen thefe contrivances into act, when ftrengthened with the fpecious pretext of religion: all which evils are effectually remedied by this Alliance. For then, the civil Magiftrate being become protector of the Church, and, confequently, fupreme HEAD and director of it, the miniftry is moftly in his power; that mutual dependency, between the clergy and people, being, by means of a fettled revenue, quite broken and destroyed. He admits and excludes to

5

the

the exercise of their function, as he fees fit; and grants it to none, but fuch as give a previous fecurity for their allegiance to him: by which means, all that influence, which the minifters and leaders in a Church had over it before the Alliance, as the protectors of religion, is now drawn off from them, and placed folely in the civil Magiftrate.

Another mischief there is in this unallied condition of the Church, ftill as certain and fatal, whenever more than one religion is found in a State. For in thefe latter ages, every fect thinking itself the only true church, or, at least, the most perfect, is naturally pufhed on to advance its own fcheme upon the ruins of the reft: and where argument fails, civil power is brought in, as foon as ever a party can be formed in the public adminiftration and we find, they have been but too fuccessful in perfuading the Magiftrate that his interefts are concerned in their religious differences. Now the most effectual remedy to the dangerous and ftrong convulfions, into which States are fo frequently thrown by these struggles, is an Alliance, which eftablishes one church, and gives a full toleration to the reft; only keeping fectaries out of the public adminiftration: From a heedlefs admiffion into which, these disorders have arifen.

Having now fhewn the principal motives which engaged the State to feek an alliance with the Church,

I come, in the next place, to confider the motives which the Church had to accept of it. For this being, as is obferved, a FREE CONVENTION, unlefs the Church, as well as State, had its proper views, no Alliance could have been formed. To discover thefe motives, we must recollect what hath been faid of the nature and end of a religious Society: for the benefits adapted to that nature and end,

must

muft be her legitimate motive: but if fo, this benefit can be no other than SECURITY FROM ALL EXTERNAL VIOLENCE. The State indeed could not justly offer it, had no Alliance been made: but this is no reason why the Church should not think it for its intereft to fecure its natural right by compact; any more than that one State fhould not ftipulate with another not to do it violence, though that other was under prior obligations, by the law of nature and nations, to forbear.

But by this Alliance between the two Societies, the State does more: it not only promifes not to injure the Church confederated, but to ferve it; that is, to protect it from the injuries of other religious Societies, which then exift, or may afterwards arife in the State. How one religious Society may be injuriously affected by another, hath been fhewn just before; how great thofe injuries may prove, will be fhewn hereafter. It muft needs then be the first care of a Church, and a reasonable care, to preferve itself, by all lawful ways, from outward violence. A State then, as hath been faid, in order to induce the Church's acceptance of this offer, muft propose some benefit by it: and because this is the only legitimate benefit the Church can receive, it must propofe this: which, therefore, being confiderable, will be the Church's motive for Alliance.

There are only two other confiderations that can be esteemed motives: the one, to engage the State to propagate the established religion by force: and the other, to bestow honours, riches, and powers upon it. Now, on recurring to the nature and end of the two Societies, the first motive will be found unjust ; and the fecond, impertinent. It is unjust in the Church to require the engagement; because the performing it would be violating the natural right every man VOL. II. C

hath

hath of worshipping God according to his own confcience. It is unjust in the State to engage in it; because, as we have fhewn, its jurisdiction extendeth not to opinions.

It is impertinent in a Church to aim at riches, honours, and powers, because these are things which, as a Church, the can neither ufe nor profit by; for they have no natural tendency to promote the ultimate end of this Society, falvation of fouls; nor the immediate end, purity of wcrShip. "Nihil ecclefia fibi nifi fidem poffidet "," fays St. Ambrofe. We conclude, therefore, that the only legitimate motive fhe could have, was fecurity and protection from outward violence.

On these mutual motives was formed this FREE ALLIANCE; which gave birth to a CHURCH BY LAW

ESTABLISHED.

Now as from the nature of the two Societies is discovered what kind of union only they could enter into; fo from that confideration, together with the motives they had in uniting, may be deduced, by neceffary inference, the reciprocal TERMS and conditions of that union.

From the mutual motives inducing thereunto, it appears, that the great preliminary and fundamental article of Alliance is this, THAT THE CHURCH

SHALL APPLY ITS UTMOST INFLUENCE IN THE SERVICE OF THE STATE; AND THAT THE STATE SHALL SUPPORT AND PROTECT THE CHURCH.

But in order to the performance of this agreement, there must be a mutual communication of their respective powers: for the province of each Society being naturally diftinct and different, each can have to do in the other's, but by mutual conceffion.

m

Epift. contra Symmachum.

But