again upon Occafion, even when the Objects that first produced them are removed. Now our Ideas are nothing else but these renewed Representations of what we have at any time perceived and felt, by means of which, things are again brought under the View of the Mind, and feem to have a kind of Exiftence in it. It is true, we can upon many Occafions combine our Ideas variously together, and thereby form to ourselves Representations of things that never had an Existence in Nature, as when we fancy a Centaur, or a Golden Mountain; but it is still certain, that the original Ideas out of which these are made, are fuch as have been conveyed into the Mind by fome former Impreffions. It remains therefore to enquire, how we came by our first Notions and Perceptions of things. Whence does the Understanding derive those original Impressions and Characters, which it can combine in so many different Ways, and represent to itself under such infinite Varieties? To this I anfwer, that if we attend carefully to what passes in our own Minds, we shall observe two Inlets of Knowledge, from whence, as from two Fountains, the Understanding is supplied with all the Materials of thinking.

All cur original Idras derived either

from Senfation:

II. FIRST, outward Objects, acting upon our Senfes, rouse in us a Variety of Perceptions, according to the different manner in which they affect us. It is thus that we come by the Ideas

of Light and Darkness, Heat and Cold, Sweet and Bitter, and all those other Impressions which we term sensible Qualities. This great Source and Inlet of Knowledge, is commonly diftinguished by the Name of Senfation, as comprehending all the Notices conveyed into the Mind, by Impulfes made upon the Organs of Senfe.

III. BUT these Ideas, numerous as they are, Or Reflection. are wholly derived to us from without; there is therefore yet another Source of Impreffions, arifing from the Mind's Attention to its own Acts, when turning inwards upon itself, it takes a View of the Perceptions that are lodged there, and the various Ways in which it employs itself about them. For the Ideas furnished by the Sentes, give the Mind an Opportunity of exerting its feveral Powers; and as all our Thoughts, under whatever Form they appear, are attended with Consciousness, hence the Impreffions they leave, when we come to turn the Eye of the Soul upon them, enrich the Understanding with a new Set of Perceptions, no less diftinct than those conveyed in by the Senfes. Thus it is that we get Ideas of Thinking, Doubting

Doubting, Believing, Willing, &c. which are the different Acts and Workings of our Minds, represented to us by our own Consciousness. This second. Source of Ideas is called Reflection, and evidently presupposes Sensation, as the Impressions it furnishes, are only of the various Powers of the Understanding, employed about Perceptions already in the Mind.

Rife and Progress of buman Knowledge.

IV. THESE Confiderations, if we duly attend to them, will give us a clear and distinct View of the natural Procedure of the human Intellect, in its Advances to Knowledge. We can have no Perception of the Operations of our own Minds until they are exerted; nor can they be exerted before the Understanding is furnished with Ideas about which to employ them; and as these Ideas, that give the first Employment to our Faculties, are evidently the Perceptions of Senfe, it is plain, that all our Knowledge must begin here. This then is the first Capacity of the human Mind, that it is fitted to receive the Impreffions made upon it by outward Objects affecting the Senfes, which Impressions thus derived into the Understanding, and there lodged for the View of the Soul, employ it in various Acts of Perceiving, Remembering, Confidering, &c. all which are attended with an internal Feeling and Confciousness. And this leads us to the second Step the Mind takes in its Progress towards Knowledge, viz. that it can by its own Consciousness represent to itself these its feveral Workings and Operations, and thereby furnish the Understanding with a new Stock of Ideas. From these fimple Beginnings, all our Discoveries take their Rife; for the Mind thus provided with its original Characters and Notices of things, has a Power of combining, modifying, and examining them in an infinite Variety of Lights, by which means it is enabled to enlarge the Objects of its Perception, and finds itself poffefsed of an inexhaustible Stock of Materials. It is in the various Comparison of these Ideas, according to fuch Combinations of them as seem best to fuit its Ends, that the Understanding exerts itself in the Acts of Judging and Reasoning, by which the capacious Mind of Man pushes on its Views of Things, adds Discovery to Difcovery, and often extends its Thoughts beyond the utmost Bounds of the Universe. Thus we see as it were at one Glance, the whole Progress of the Soul, from the very first Dawnings of Perception, till it reaches the Perfection of human Knowledge; nor shall we, among all its vaft Stock of Difcoveries, or that infinite Variety of Conceptions where

of

1

of they confift, be able to find one original Idea which is not derived from Sensation or Reflection, or one complex Idea, which is not made up of those original ones.

Division of our Ideas into fimple and complex.

V. HAVING thus shewn how the Mind comes to be first furnished with Ideas, we shall next proceed to the Confideration of the Ideas themselves, and endeavour to give fuch an Account

of them, as will best serve to explain their several Appearances, and the Manner in which they are formed. It is evident from what has been faid above, that they all fall naturally under these two Heads. First, those original Impressions that are conveyed into the Mind by Sensation and Reflection, and which exift there simple, uniform, and without any Shadow of Variety. Secondly, those more complex Notions of Things that result from the various Combinations of our fimple Ideas, whether they are conceived to coexift of themselves in any particular Subject, or are united and joined together by the Mind, enlarging its Conceptions of Things, and pursuing the Ends and Purposes of Knowledge. These two Classes comprehend our whole Stock of Ideas; and when considered separately in that Order, wherein they most naturally seem to offer themselves to our Thoughts, will, I hope, give such a View of the Conduct and Manner of the Mind, as may contribute not a little to introduce us to an Acquaintance with ourselves, and make us fenfible of the Capacity and Extent of the human Intellect. We proceed therefore to a more particular Account of this Division of our Ideas.

Simple Ideas
wbat.

I.

T

CHAP. II.

Of fimple Ideas.

HE first Class of our Ideas are thofe which I diftinguish by the Name of

simple Perceptions; because they exift in the Mind under one uniform Appearance, without Varicty or Compofition. For though external Objects, convey at once into the Understanding, many different Ideas all united together, and making as it were one Whole; yet the Impressions themselves are evidently distinct, and are conceived by the Mind, each under a Form peculiar to itself. Thus Thus the Ideas of Colour, Extenfion, and Motion, may be taken in at one and the fame Time, from the fame Body; yet these three Perceptions are as diftinct in themselves, as if they all proceeded from different Objects, or were exhibited to our Notice at different Times. We are therefore carefully to diftinguish between our simple and primitive Conceptions, and those different Combinations of them, which are often fuggefted to the Mind, by single Objects acting upon it. The first conftitute our original Notices of Things, and are not diftinguishable into different Ideas, but enter by the Senses simple and unmixed. They are also the Materials out of which all the others, how complex and complicated foever, are formed; and therefore ought deservedly to be looked on as the Foundation and Ground-work of our Knowledge.

Simple Ideas of Senfation.

II. Now if we take a Survey of these Ideas, and their feveral Divifions and Classes, we shall find them all fuggested to us, either by our Senfes, or the Attention of the Mind to what paffes within itself. Thus our Notices of the different Qualities of Bodies, are all of the Kind we call simple Ideas, and may be reduced to five general Heads, according to the feveral Organs which are affected by them. Colours, &८. and Sounds are conveyed in by the Eyes and Ears; Tastes, and Smells by the Nose and Palate; and Heat, Cold, and Solidity, &c. by the Touch. Besides thefe, there are others which make Impressions on feveral of our Senfes, as Extenfion, Figure, Rest and Motion, &c. the Ideas of which we receive into our Minds both by feeing and feeling.

III. IF we next turn our View upon what passes within ourselves, we shall find another Set Simple Ideas of fimple Ideas, arifing from our Confciousness of of Reflections the Acts and Operations of our own Minds. Perception or Thinking, and Volition or Willing, are what every Man experiments in himself, and cannot avoid being fenfible of. I fhall only observe farther, that befides all the above-mentioned Perceptions, there are others that come into our Minds by all the Ways of Sensation and Reflection; fuch are the Ideas of Pleasure and Pain, Power, Exiftence, Unity, Succeffion, &c. which are derived into our Under standings, both by the Action of Objects without us, and the Confciousness of what we feel within. It is true some of these Ideas, as of Extenfion and Duration, cannot be conceived altogether without Parts; nevertheless they are juftly rank'd among our fimple Ideas; because their Parts being

all

all of the fame Kind, and without the Mixture of any other Idea, neither of them can be resolved into two distinct and separate Conceptions: Thus they still answer the Definition given above, of being one uniform Appearance in the Mind, without Variety or Plurality. But to prevent confounding our simple Ideas of Space and Duration, with those complex Modes of them, marked out by the feveral Measures commonly in Use, as Yards, Miles, Days, Years, &c. it may perhaps be more proper, to confider the least Portions of either, whereof we can form a clear and distinct Perception, as the simple Ideas of that kind, out of which all their other Modes and Combinations are formed. Such an Instant, or Point, may be conceived to be the same in respect of Duration or Space, as Unity is in refpect of Number; and will ferve best to shew, how by a continued Addition or Repetition, our more enlarged and complex Ideas are made up.

Simple Ideas bave no Admiffion but by the proper Inlets of Nature.

IV. HAVING thus given a general View of our simple Ideas, I have still two Observations to make concerning them. The first is, that they are such as can only be conveyed into the Mind by the proper Channels and Avenues pro

vided by Nature; infomuch that if we are destitute of any of those Inlets, by which the Impressions that produce them are wont to be admitted, all the Ideas thence arifing are absolutely loft to us; nor can we, by any Quickness of Understanding, find a Remedy for this Want. A Man born blind, is incapable of the Ideas of Light and Colours; in like manner as one who is deaf, can form no Notion or Conception of Sound. Hence it appears, that these our fimple Ideas are just such as Nature has furnished them, and have no Dependence on our Will; we can neither destroy them when in the Understanding, nor fashion or invent any new one, not taken in by the ordinary means of Perception. So that we here see the utmost Bounds of human Knowledge, which however mighty and enlarged, cannot exceed the Limits of these our fimple original Ideas, and their various Combinations.

They furnish ample Mate-rials of

V. AND this leads me to the second Obfervation I proposed to make, which is, that though the Mind cannot, in multiplying its ConKnowledge. ceptions of Things, advance one Pace beyond the Materials furnished it by Sense and Consciousness; yet as it has a Power of combining, modifying and enlarging them, in all the different Ways in which they can be put together, it thereby finds itself in Poffeffion of an inexhaustible Treasure of Ideas, fufficient to em

ploy